Commander of Second Corps of NGU Ihor Obolienskyi: Ukrainian army can halt Russian offensive but only with proper planning and drone deployment

Author: Yurii Butusov

Commander of the Second Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine, Ihor Obolienskyi, outlined the key principles of managing such units and the decision-making system.

- Greetings, friends! Ukraine’s Defense Forces are undergoing restructuring into 20 army corps, which will take up positions along the frontline. Today we’re speaking with the commander of one of these corps, Commander of the Second Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine, Ihor Obolienskyi. Welcome!

Greetings!

- Could you please tell us what changes the personnel of your corps, the Khartiia Corps, which includes five brigades, should expect?

One of the first key changes will be the introduction of centralized command. Each corps commander will have direct situational awareness of every brigade under their responsibility, brigades they will train, support, and treat as their own. To make this possible, once we’re deployed along a unified frontline, each brigade will take up its stable line and hold it.

A critical issue that will change is the unified tactics. We will be able to establish a training center within the corps to provide officers and sergeants with additional knowledge. It is crucial to study the documents and standards that will guide our preparation. The Khartiia Brigade has adopted certain standards from the United States and NATO. We’re quoting them — it’s ATP-3.2.2 under NATO standards for the Field Manual, and FM 6-0 from the United States when it comes to planning. This is essential because these documents outline operations and planning methods that already take into account the realities of our war. These are manuals issued in 2024. There are some very interesting principles outlined there that we’re working to implement. And the success of Khartiia in planning and conducting combat operations depends on that as well. That’s why we are confident that scaling this approach to other brigades and more importantly, to the corps level, will help us in many areas. Most importantly, it will help save the lives of our servicemembers.

- What will the creation of the corps and the unified frontline you mentioned achieve? How will it strengthen the brigades within the corps that are holding this line?

First and foremost, it will provide clarity and stability in defense. When we have unified planning and shared understanding along the entire frontline, which will stretch roughly 100 kilometers, everything will hinge on the corps commander, the soldiers’ level of training, and staff planning. What’s most important, in my view, is that the corps commander will become the architect of the defense, the architect of all operations within their area of responsibility. That’s why one of our key priorities, once the brigades are integrated into our corps, will be both individual development of officers and NCOs and collective development in terms of operational planning. We fully understand that today’s battlefield is no longer just becoming more technological, it already is. Back in early 2023, engagement distances were around 500–600 meters: drones, munition drops from Mavic-type UAVs were just starting to appear. Now, with advancements in fiber-optic control systems, strike UAVs, and fixed-wing drones used by the enemy, this zone has expanded to nearly 20 kilometers. So just imagine: we need to develop and codify a completely new set of tactical principles for operations within our area of responsibility — at least 20 kilometers deep. That’s regarding the enemy. Another critically important issue is logistics. We need to reach the position, take it, hold it, and maintain supply lines. As they say in NATO countries: no logistics, no missions. The National Guard of Ukraine is known for its logistical capabilities. We operate under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The corps will also incorporate select units from the State Border Guard Service, which have demonstrated strong performance in procurement, ammunition handling, and logistical support, including equipment and materiel.

I believe this will significantly strengthen the Second Corps. That’s why each corps commander, together with their staff, becomes a very interesting kind of administrator and manager — one who must understand how to supply their forces and what depends on it.

Very often, we get support from people with business backgrounds who have already been mobilized. Some of our officers are top-level managers from companies like Nova Poshta, MHP, and Agrotrade. It’s extremely helpful when they share new knowledge about how things are done in the civilian world. And it actually works in the military environment as well. We document and formalize these practices by developing our own SOPs — standard operating procedures. For now, they’re being implemented partially at the unit level through internal orders, but soon they’ll be introduced across the corps as formal regulations — procedures that help save lives.

NATO standards begin with planning. It starts at the company level. There is a process called the Troop Leading Procedure, it is TLP, as well as the Military Decision-Making Process, it is MDMP. These are among the core standards that guide operational planning. While carrying his weapon, he moves from cover to cover. Then come battalion-level standards: how to construct a shelter, what specifications it must meet, and how to secure its entrance. Every soldier’s procedure, from how they lace their boots to how they handle their weapon and wear their helmet, follows established standards. These SOPs are designed to ease the execution of their tasks and help them stay alive.

- So, for a mobilized army, this serves as a unified action protocol?

Which is constantly improving — as new weapon systems are introduced, new gear becomes available, and new patches are released, all of which must also be put to use. New tactics are emerging, tactical actions of the soldier on the battlefield, how they take up firing positions, how they maneuver. This is also part of the SOP; it’s a procedure that needs constant analysis.

- So the idea, as I understand it, is that every action must be codified in a protocol, and a service member is trained based on a full set of SOPs. Electronic warfare, camouflage, movement, drone defense, various forms of combat and you're planning to provide all of this to each individual...

When I was managing one of the production facilities, there was a key section called the "primary intake" — this is where raw materials were received for further processing. And God forbid that intake stopped even for a minute or two — the entire process, the entire plant would come to a halt. Our task now is to make sure that no such intake ever stops. Our goal is to keep this process continuous and constantly improve it because our key performance indicator is the lives of our soldiers. The second is mission accomplishment.

- How will the deployment of a corps, up to 100 kilometres, five brigades, as you mentioned, affect cooperation among these brigades and the manoeuvre of forces and assets?

Most likely, logistical support will be positioned within the corps’ defensive sector. The supplies provided by the state, the National Guard of Ukraine, and the Defence Forces will be available to us, but moving all those assets forward will depend on the corps commander and his responsibility. At this stage, we see that the enemy is expanding the area of logistics strikes.

- And we’re seeing the problems our forces face in certain areas — where brigades are fighting on the front line, but there’s a need to establish protected road sections in the rear, shielded from drone strikes. There’s a real gap: troops are engaged in combat, yet behind them, there’s no engineering support and no protection for logistics routes. So the question is who’s going to handle this? Will the corps take on that responsibility?

Of course it will. Regarding rear areas, the corps will establish at least one battalion — which will be expanded into a support regiment — responsible for roads, concealment, camouflage, and the full organization of rear-area logistics. Within the corps, an air defense unit will also be created, starting at the battalion level. Our air defense is currently transitioning from using ZU-23s and Stingers to drone-based systems that provide aerial coverage not just over the front line, but also in the rear. The task is to shoot down the enemy’s eyes — Orlan-type drones and other fixed-wing UAVs. We've already learned to shoot them down effectively using drones. Previously, it used to cost nearly $100,000 — the price of a Stinger missile — to take down a target like that. Now, it costs just $1,500 to $2,000. This area is getting a lot of attention, because the primary objective is to blind the enemy. If they can’t see — we can move, and we can stay safe. The Khartiia Corps is placing great hopes on this capability, and we’ll be developing it as a dedicated direction. At this point, drones account for nearly 60% of the battlefield, you could say. We conduct minelaying with drones. We deliver food and ammunition with drones. We eliminate enemy forces with drones. Even certain fire positions. The same applies to the automated turrets we’re deploying; we’re also manufacturing drones.

The main task of the corps and the task of our team is to think about the maximum safety of our personnel, to provide a defence line where personnel will be used to the best of their ability.

- So your goal is to minimize the direct involvement of personnel in frontline combat?

I’ll repeat: having worked in business, I realised that the most efficient approach, one of the most effective things in any enterprise, is automation. Humans remain crucial in this process, able to supervise and carry out very delicate, precise tasks. But the bulk of the job, the way we now hold the front line, should be handled by a Mavic conducting observation. Machine guns mounted on Shablias (remote-controlled combat modules – ed.note) must be deployed at firing positions and kept operational. FPV drones must cover those Shablias. Our ground and aerial drones should be laying mines ahead of them, deploying barbed wire and low-wire entanglement to form engineering obstacles. Logistics drones should bring our personnel ammunition, supplies, and everything else. So the task of the corps is to minimize troop movement and reduce the amount of time infantry spends on the front line. You could put it that way.

- Uh-huh. Got it

But you realize what it takes to do this with proper planning? What kind of people need to implement all this, what kind of experience is required to plan it all out? You need to study the complete technical specifications and know every type of weapon system, every drone, what each one is capable of.

I found this particularly interesting, I’ve been studying it recently. The U.S. has already made some of this experience publicly available. They’re creating a new type of company called a "Multi-Purpose Company," which integrates drones, robotic dogs, and paired systems where a Mavic operates together with an FPV drone, a Hunter and a Killer. What surprised me the most is that the commander of this company is directly involved in planning how the unit is used. Even in the U.S., they’ve come to understand that officers with no direct combat experience using these tools simply cannot plan or assess how to employ this kind of equipment effectively. That’s why the commander, someone who’s been trained and understands how to use these systems whether a captain or, most commonly, a junior major, must participate in the planning of the battalion’s defense or combat operations. I believe we’re not fully utilizing.

For some reason, we tend to think that every commander must be smart and perfect at everything, yet we don’t give them the time they need to prepare. That’s why one of the key priorities will be training within the corps. There are already many people who’ve mastered drone operations, and they should be conducting training or involved in operational planning. They need to be granted access. But this is still a foreign concept to certain categories of our officers — when a civilian expert walks in, someone who knows how to use their drones, and advises a battalion commander or chief of staff on how best to employ them in a particular area. These kinds of conflicts will happen because this is something we still don’t fully accept. But that’s okay, we’ll learn to work through it.

- How will coordination and mutual support between brigades be organised within the corps? How will the manoeuvre of forces be executed when there is a single chain of command?

First of all, let’s put it this way: the corps’ primary task right now is force generation and ensuring that incoming units are properly trained. But the key objective is to establish a sustainable rotation cycle. So that three to four brigades can hold the front, while one brigade is always in recovery or able to rotate out and rest. This is extremely important. We’ve experienced firsthand what it means to go a year or more without rotation — when personnel begin to treat their own safety with disregard.
They become too accustomed to the battlefield, and that’s a problem. To reset that mindset — and I know this from personal experience — you need to pull the soldier off the front line and give them not just two weeks, but ideally a full month, or even two. At least one month for rest, and a second month for training — integrated into their unit. That’s when a soldier starts to psychologically feel fear for their life again. And that’s a good thing — it needs to be there. It’s absolutely critical. When that fear is lost, we suffer disproportionate casualties. This is very bad.

It has already been confirmed by the Commander of the National Guard and the Minister that the full responsibility for BCAT (Basic Combined Arms Training) will lie with us. And that’s really great — we’re grateful for it. Because we also have our own training system. And most importantly that brings us back to the issue of SOPs. We refresh our knowledge almost every month. The battlefield is so dynamic that we have to respond quickly. If a month or two ago, during training, we were simply dropping pyrotechnics from a Mavic so that people could experience what it feels like. Now, we’re trying to simulate an FPV strike in every single training session. To hit every training session with training FPV. Even when they’re digging a trench, they need to understand that an FPV can fly right into it. To make this work, and to bring it to other training centers, it has to be demonstrated — it has to be shown. I think it's really cool when we train our own soldiers ourselves. That’s one thing. Second, commander-level training is also critical. And again, we’re coming back to one of the most important issues: motivation.

- The Khartiia Brigade released a film about the liberation of the forested area near the village of Lyptsi near Kharkiv, an area that had served as a defensive position for a Russian motorized rifle regiment from the 18th Motorized Rifle Division, which has been conducting offensive operations for over a year. Please tell us about this operation and what enabled achieving superiority over the enemy.

We won’t go into full detail about how exactly we achieved it, but I can say this — our main advantage was in planning. It came down to planning the operation itself and continuously training our personnel. Plus the planning of operations involved the deployment of drones. One of our strengths was having time, drones, and a team ready to execute the plan. Planning involved not only the headquarters staff but also battalion officers. We went all the way down to the lowest level —trainings were conducted, and every soldier, every commander knew their movements, even the timing of each phase.
We reconstructed a nearly identical terrain model. Every spot a stormtrooper had to enter — he knew it. He had studied it through photos and maps. He knew exactly how many steps it would take from the vehicle drop-off to his position, and he knew where enemy fire could come from.

- What forces did the Russians deploy in the battles for Lyptsi?

If we look at the historical record, we stopped the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment that was advancing here. We halted them near Lyptsi, and then it all started... They were highly motivated and well-trained. Tough enemy . We fought them hard for about three to four months, but thanks to our troops’ training and motivation, and special respect to the drone operators, we brought the 9th Regiment ceased to exist. Approximately 350 infantrymen of 9^th Regiment were killed on our soil. That figure comes from our own personnel’s count. The bodies left on our land, the ones our guys buried there.

After that, the Russians realized that the 9th Regiment was unable to accomplish the mission, so the 7th Regiment was brought in to support them and deployed alongside the 9th. They tried to break through our defenses. That attempt also failed. Things dragged on a bit with the 7th Regiment, because we also suffered some personnel losses. It hit us hard but the troops were so motivated and angry over those losses that we came back at them with renewed force and started grinding them down.

We fought against 7th Regiment for about five to six months. According to preliminary estimates, around 1,100 personnel from the 7th Regiment and attached units were eliminated in the "Berlin Forest."

- The Berlin Forest?

Yes, that’s what they called it. When we captured prisoners, we learned that they had nicknamed every tree line and position after European cities — Berlin, Warsaw, and so on. They used those names to navigate. It didn’t help them.

- What kind of losses did the enemy suffer in terms of POWs? Because we conducted interviews, and I know that even company commanders were captured. How did that even happen? A company commander isn’t just a regular soldier — and not even a platoon leader.

Most of this happened in direct combat — these were already firefights, as our troops stormed enemy positions. But thanks to drone operators and proper planning, we created conditions where the enemy couldn’t even step out of their shelters. They were also running logistics with their own small drones using them to deliver supplies. But the moment a hand reached out from shelter to grab a package, everything we had would already be flying at them. Therefore our drone operators are crazy guys - special thanks to them.

As for the first company commander — the conditions we created were so effective that he raised his hands, came out, and walked toward us with a white flag. He asked us not to shoot and said he was ready to lead out the remaining troops from his company, who could no longer defend themselves.
After our soldiers brought him into the dugout, he used his radio to call on the rest of his company to surrender. About five of them made it out. Another group of five tried — there were around 18 people total — but the enemy, the Russians themselves, prevented their own troops from surrendering.

-They put up barrier detachments, didn’t they?

They started targeting them directly with Mavic drones and artillery. They just began shooting their own. So whoever managed to surrender — made it out. Everyone understands it’s better to surrender to us than to be left behind in the enemy’s rear. So we took them in — they gave us a full breakdown of their positions and where the rest of their people were. We planned an operation, encircled the area, and took the remaining personnel captive.

- How would you assess the current state of the Russian army fighting here near Kharkiv?
What’s your view on their level of training, organization, and logistical support?

Right now, they keep sending their soldiers to die, purely to keep us under constant pressure, to make sure we don’t relax. We’ve learned how to deal with that kind of tactic. We have certain personnel, those on forward positions and specific command posts—actively working on this. The rest are preparing for larger-scale operations. So I believe the enemy is currently preparing for broader offensive actions. And across the entire frontline, the Khartiia Brigade understands this and we’re preparing for it too.

- What is being done to ensure the frontline is supplied with drones? And you mentioned that wars should be fought with equipment, not just people. But that requires resources. What kind of equipment support does your corps receive?

When we were forming the Khartiia Brigade and were deployed to hold the defensive line near Lyman, we received standard supplies through the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Defense Forces under the General Staff. But when we were redeployed to the Kharkiv region to stop the enemy, we needed rapid assistance. That’s when the Head of the Office of the President, Andriy Yermak, responded very quickly. He’s one of the people we met with back when we were still a Volunteer Formation of a Territorial Community (VFTG). He assessed whether we could be trusted with personnel and whether a brigade could be built from a VFTG unit. We’re grateful to him for that, and to the President of Ukraine for authorizing the creation of our brigade. From that point on, Yermak became something of a curator for our brigade. As soon as we were redeployed to the Kharkiv region, we reached out to him. And we received not just drones and ammunition — even the search and procurement of M113s was stepped up, because we had proven they were effective.

- So, what task did the state leadership assign when establishing the Second Corps of the National Guard?

One of the key tasks, set directly by the Commander-in-Chief, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy, was to create conditions that would allow us to stabilize the frontline. To find a solution that would enable us to hold a steady defensive line and halt the enemy’s advance. We understand that one man in the field is no warrior. We understand that the President is doing everything he can to fight for Ukraine on the international stage. That’s why our task is to create best conditions for a negotiation position— to hold the front line and ensure the Russians can’t push any further. And that’s exactly what we’re doing.

- Andrii Biletskyi, commander of the Third Army Corps, mentioned that you have a good comradeship. He visited Khartiia and said he adopted one of your command organization practices — specifically, the battle captain system which is now also being deployed in the 3rd Assault Brigade. Could you tell us more about your conversations with Biletskyi and what this battle captain system is? What advantages does it bring on the battlefield?

Well, what binds us to the Third Brigade is that we’re both always looking to grow. Whenever the Third Assault Brigade encounters a negative experience, they would look for solutions if they couldn’t fix things on their own. So we stay in constant contact as brother-in-arms brigades: our officers and NCOs travel to them for training, and their officers come to us. Right now, a group of our sergeants is heading over to take their squad-leader course and absorb their commanders’ experience. Their training programme and morale-building system are extremely effective. We’re working on that ourselves, and we still need it, so they’re always open. It’s great when brigades can talk like that. We can call each other and discuss operations they’ve run, how the enemy behaved, or he’ll ring me to ask what we’d do in certain situations—just to get my view. It’s a continuous learning loop aimed at preserving our personnel. Back in 2024 a manual on this came out. We simply adopted it and started using it in Lyman. The core idea is to decentralise command. It's extremely difficult for a single commander to respond to multiple engagements at once. That’s why we introduced the position of battle captain — the most highly trained officer in the brigade, who undergoes constant training at the positions, especially when new weapon systems are introduced.

We adopted the system from U.S. Field Manual FM 6-0. His task is to conduct the brigade’s fight when the brigade commander and the chief of staff can and must focus on planning. The primary task of the battle captain is to free them from operational duties. This position enables 24/7 real-time control of the battlespace while the commander and staff perform their core duties. We currently try to forecast the enemy’s actions 72 hours in advance. So when Andrii came and saw all of this, I told him: "If I have to come to the TOC (Tactical Operations Center) and start getting involved, it means the brigade staff and I either failed to plan something or planned it incorrectly."

- Something extraordinary is happening if the brigade commander walks into the command post.

And the main point is, we calculated the monetary cost of a single day of war, we calculated the cost of a battle-captain shift in money, and we calculated what the enemy costs.

- How much does it cost to eliminate each enemy soldier?

Yes.

- Do you track that cost?

We keep extensive statistics and it’s even become a kind of competition for our battle captains. Their goal is to run an efficient shift. What does that mean? They must spend as little money as possible on munitions while killing and destroying as many enemy assets as they can. So each time they weigh whether to fire a 155 mm shell that costs almost €4,500 or use an FPV drone. It’s like in Call of Duty or other new online shooters where you select the weapon system and ammunition you’ll fight with. We’re almost at that stage now. Good idea, by the way. We’ll implement it so the battle captain can choose the weapon type on a tablet before engaging. Cool. That’s how it is.

- So, how much does it cost on average to eliminate one soldier from the 18th Motorized Rifle Division here near Kharkiv?

Roughly $2,500 to $3,000 per soldier. That’s our current estimate.

- So that’s the average amount you spend — ammunition, drones. One Russian soldier costs up to $3,000 to eliminate. In other words, war is turning into a production process. You apply a military tactic, attach business administration to it, management principles, and you track your expenses like production costs, right? Everything is in spreadsheets.

Yes, I brought this kind of statistical tracking from business. I used to work at certain enterprises, and I’ll say this — without statistics, there’s no success. We should as Sun Tzu wrote: "Know yourself and know your enemy, and in a hundred battles, you will be victorious a hundred times." To know ourselves, we have to study ourselves. That means analysing not only how the unit is employed but also ammunition, equipment, and weapon systems. We even track the use of fighters’ protective gear and injuries. In order to understand what we can better protect and reduce fatalities or injuries. If we see that enemy frequently drops VOG grenades on us during movement, causing limb wounds, legs or arms, we immediately procure specific ballistic inserts to protect those body parts.

And again, let’s go back to the business, there’s a lot we can borrow from it. In every TOC, in every shift that comes on duty, the people involved need to have a certain mental connection with one another. How do you achieve that? Well, again, I’ve read a lot from the business world, including Ray Dalio’s book, it’s about life principles and building a team based on the idea of baseball cards.

Stephen Covey’s book The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People is also of great interest to our officers. It is an important book—worth reading to understand what a leader should focus on and how to develop the necessary skills. There’s also "Building the Organization of the Future", it’s worth paying attention to this book as well, as it explains how and why to build such a structure. We’re part of the Red Team — a standing, professional army. It’s like a tribe, with a chief or a leader; you’re expected to organize everyone. It’s about drill sergeants, constant supervision, shouting, control, and training. Today we are fighting with a mobilised army. Confronted with a mobilised force, I have slightly altered my approach to leadership: I have become not a dominant chieftain but a humble leader who allows personnel to make mistakes and seeks to employ each individual’s abilities. We strive to develop our people and enable them to find their place in this war and in this battlespace.

- It’s fascinating how warfare is evolving. Today, to conduct combat operations with mobilized personnel, you already need to build, to take Ray Dalio’s principles and transfer what works in business to the battlefield. You said the commander must focus primarily on planning, while the battle captain actually runs the planned, ongoing combat operations. But how can you plan when the enemy is also engaged in combat actions? How do you plan if an assault on the unit is already under way? How do you command the battle in such circumstances? The enemy, after all, also wants to impose the initiative.

Okay. We’re dealing with over 1,200 kilometers of active frontline. The enemy is mobilizing around 35,000 to 40,000 personnel every month. If you and I divide 35,000 by the full 1,500 kilometers of the frontline, we get about 30 to 35 troops per kilometer. Okay. But is that how it actually works? No. This brings us back to the operational art. We need to identify our weak points, the spots where enemy personnel will try to break through or make things difficult on one sector of the front or another. What must we do to prevent such a build-up in any one area? We need to eliminate about thirty enemy troops on our sector. We've run the numbers—it’s about 350 enemy personnel per month. Over a 15-kilometre frontage we need to eliminate 350 enemy soldiers every month; then the enemy will have no chance to amass forces. If, God forbid, they manage to build up —and because of drone employment and our battlespace already digitised, that would be at distance at least 25–50 kilometres from the line of contact, we are developing procedures to detect the enemy and react rapidly: to prevent them from reaching the line, or, if they do, to engage them with minimal forces so that the infantry could simply do their job, kill the personnel, and demoralize the enemy. That’s why it’s a form of mathematics combined with the commander’s creative thinking, creating a powerful synergy capable of holding the front line.

- So planning is about staying one step ahead of the enemy’s intent?

Yes, it’s about seizing the initiative. The enemy will always plan an offensive, always look for your weak spots but only if you let them. And how do you let them? You’re not engaging in active defense — you’re merely reacting to enemy actions. Your task, given this unbelievable setup and, forgive me, the menagerie of drones we have, both in terms of drones and their applications, we can use them across the entire front line. The primary task is logistics and sustaining the supply of these munitions. To have these capabilities, we return to administration, to management. To sustain it and maintain feedback loops, you need a direct connection with the manufacturer. You generate a request, send it in, they produce the munition or the drone and you expand your response zone. It’s about time, ammunition, and creative thinking.

- So, based on what you’re saying, seizing tactical initiative in war means taking the initiative during the planning phase of your own actions?

Yes.

- So you’re fighting at the planning stage — not at the stage where you’re reacting to the enemy’s actions.

You know, yes. But the planning phase is already the result of identifying the center of gravity I’m going to target. And that’s the outcome of extensive analysis — both mine and what my intelligence provides.
Planning begins the moment I understand where to strike.

- That’s the point of effort.

Once I know where to strike, I have to sell the idea to my staff and commander — to convince them that we need to act. And that it will produce specific results.

We’re not tasked with "let’s take this patch of land just because." No. The main objective is to make people believe it matters — that it will lead to real change. That’s why the mission is communicated all the way down to every soldier.

- So you plan offensive actions when you see they help fulfill the goal of eliminating 350 enemy troops per month?

I constantly plan offensive actions because we need to push the enemy back to the border and drive them out. Until we reach the border, I will keep planning offensive operations.

- Will the corps commander have the authority to replace command personnel in brigades? Brigade, battalion, and company commanders?

Yes, absolutely. This issue was discussed during our meetings at the Ministry — that the corps commander will be granted the authority to assess personnel, including both brigade commanders and staff officers, and to submit proposals for personnel changes. But such decisions must be justified. I believe it’s a very sound decision. You have to meet the standards, physical fitness, tactical knowledge, and so on…

- Does such a person and understanding exist in the Khartiia Brigade?

Right now, we’re testing this at the sergeant level. We're rolling it out among sergeants first. Most likely, we'll be testing it within the 13th Brigade. To take on the role of a company commander — for the state to entrust you with responsibility over 120 to 150 people — that’s, excuse me, nearly 1.5 billion hryvnias.

- The cost of a fallen soldier, multiplied by a hundred, amounts to 1.5 billion hryvnias.

We fight for every commander. We fight for every soldier. We’re looking for leaders.
The main goal is to find a replacement who’s better than you. Before I stepped into this position, I had already found at least three brigade commanders I had prepared to take my place.

- Better than you?

They’ll be better than me. Much better and I’m sure of it. The Khartiia Brigade will be stronger and more effective without me and without the original team that was there with me. Because we had our own strategic vision but this younger generation has been operating at the tactical level this entire time. They know how to fight effectively. They know how to kill the enemy. That’s why they’ll be much better than we were.

- How do you gain the upper hand in the drone war, and what does that advantage consist of today?

Let’s be honest, it comes down to effective planning, skilled operators, and the number of drones.
But here’s the thing: we have a battle captain, and even the United States doesn’t yet have this position. We have a battalion SO a separate individual responsible for drone operations. He serves as the battle captain’s assistant specifically for drone employment. He oversees ISTAR personnel, drone reconnaissance, and manages where and how systems are repositioned essentially the technical side of things. But we’re moving further, we now understand that we’re writing and building an entirely new chapter. We are drafting completely new procedures for employing robots, robotic systems, and drones on the battlefield. Unfortunately, we still don’t have a formal combat manual for drone employment. That’s why we’ve created a dedicated unit to handle this. There’s a separate dispatcher center — meaning, apart from the TOC that manages the fight, there’s now a dispatcher, like in a taxi service or a civilian big logistics company. Which drone flies where, what it delivers, picks up, or brings back — all of that is coordinated. There’s the human physical component, and separately, there’s now a dedicated drone dispatch center being developed and already operating.

- Nova Poshta, for example.

Yes, even Nova Poshta, in terms of delivery. If we think of a kamikaze drone as something that delivers and eliminates a target, that’s basically Nova Poshta in action. That’s why we’re actively cooperating with them and planning to adopt some of their practices. A visit to their facilities is already scheduled. And then next comes lean production — can you believe it? To improve all of it.

- So what is lean production in warfare?

Oh my God. That’s a whole separate topic. How to put it correctly — in wartime, right? To maximize the elimination of enemy forces with the least possible cost on our side. To achieve that, we need to analyze tons of data, tons of information. That’s exactly what we’re working on right now — the military "Nova Poshta" add-on that’s being built. We are committed to ensuring the efficient use of all funds and resources allocated to us by the state. The task isn’t just to kill, it’s to kill efficiently. Cheaply. To kill cheaply. Something like that.

-Yeah, Neither Clausewitz, nor Moltke, nor Sun Tzu wrote about this, but as you can see, the commander’s task in modern warfare is not just to kill but to kill efficiently and cheaply.

Yeah

- Interesting phrase. It’s a broad question, but definitely a relevant one. Is the Ukrainian army, at this stage, capable of halting the Russian advance and defeating their assault units with the people and assets currently available?

My answer, and my personal opinion, is yes. We can do it with the people we have. Even with this mobilized force. Over the three years of full-scale war, we’ve developed a truly professional infantry.
And only now are we starting to see the emergence of real, smart tactical commanders who still need some development. And the army we have today, and the infantry we have today, is capable of doing it.
But only in combination with robotic systems and with proper planning and the use of drones, both ground and aerial. That’s when we’ll succeed. We can no longer rely solely on a soldier and a rifle. Every commander needs to plan their actions based on FPV and Mavic drones. That’s when success will come.