On first results of 3rd Army Corps’ combat performance

Author: Yurii Butusov

I have been writing about the need to create army corps for three years and have been monitoring how their formation affects the situation on the front, since the main reason for our losses is not the enemy’s skill but systemic problems in the organization and command of the troops.

Therefore, it is important to look at the changes that have taken place in the sector of the 3rd Army Corps, commanded by Colonel Andrii Biletskyi, since the corps was one of the first to be deployed and took responsibility for the sector on June 4 amid an extremely critical situation.

According to open sources, the corps’ sector covers approximately 120 km along the Oskil River line. On this axis, our forces are being attacked by the Russian Armed Forces’ 20th and 25th Combined Arms Armies, reinforced by elements of the 1st Tank Army. The 1st Tank Army and the 20th Army are part of the Moscow Military District and have the best supply and replenishment.

From 1 January to 4 June 2025, within the sector held by our two infantry brigades, where, according to the DeepState map, the enemy achieved its deepest advance, the Russian occupiers captured 198 square kilometers.

Since 4 June, the entire corps’ frontage, including these two brigades, has been placed under Biletskyi’s command. Over a month and a half in June–July, the enemy managed to seize 16 square kilometers, but as a result of counterattacks, the 3rd Army Corps liberated 8 square kilometers. At present, the situation remains difficult: several of our positions are encircled, but all attempts by three Russian armies to break through the front are being repelled.

Now, the most important part—our losses. I have detailed information, and the statistics regarding irrecoverable losses show that average monthly casualties have approximately halved compared to the period before the corps was formed. These figures refer to average monthly losses from 1 January to 4 June.

And this is despite the increased intensity of combat operations in June.

Could it be that the 3rd Corps received substantial reinforcements? No, brigade replenishment is being outpaced by losses.

Could it be that the 3rd Corps received funding for drone purchases or began receiving large-scale supplies? No, the 3rd Army Corps conducts about 90% of its combat using UAVs bought with philanthropists’ money and donations from the public.

Perhaps they are receiving a lot of artillery shells? No, they receive fewer compared to the Donetsk direction.

Then what has changed?

1. The 3rd Assault Brigade, which has become the backbone of the corps, is accomplishing the incredible — it has stretched its front to 60 km (!) This is an absolute record of the war. One brigade and three attached battalions hold 5% of the entire active combat front and 50% of the corps’ entire frontage. Meanwhile, personnel from the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade are being used to establish the corps headquarters and corps-subordinate units.

2. The corps command has changed its defensive tactics across the entire sector. Meeting engagements and continuous counterattacks have been halted. Chaos on the front line has disappeared; units are being introduced into battle in an orderly manner. The interaction and coordination of reconnaissance and fire damage are systematically improving.

3. Biletskyi has broad authority to promote command personnel under his responsibility; such trust from higher command allows for the rapid scaling of successful organizational and management models. As a result, dishonesty in situation reports among commanders at all levels within the corps has disappeared, and coordination has improved. All positions in encirclement remain in contact, including with the corps; personnel are receiving assistance and efforts are being made to rescue them.

4. Each brigade has begun receiving, though still very limited, planned reinforcements in personnel and ammunition that could have been absent for months before. Now brigade commanders can rely on some level of support and plan accordingly. Brigades have stopped being broken into small groups to plug gaps in adjacent units.

Conclusions:

1. Andrii Biletskyi has proven that a competent commander of a combat-ready brigade, when granted authority for independent organization of work and at least minimal trust and support from leadership, can significantly improve combat outcomes across a large front sector within two months.

2. It has suddenly turned out that if the corps headquarters properly organizes the defense, controls the frontline, and establishes a system for UAV, artillery, and all types of reconnaissance operations, there is no need to plug gaps in the front with masses of troops or grind down battalion after battalion in fights over scorched treelines. Instead, Russian assault groups are methodically ground down, while Ukrainian losses are seven to ten times lower than the enemy’s.

3. The work of the 3rd Corps is facilitated by the fact that all brigades within it operate in a single sector. Unfortunately, we have corps whose brigades are split across different directions and attached to various other commands, which prevents those corps from playing a stabilizing role and improving the situation.

4. The continued Russian offensive is, above all, the result of shortcomings in the command and organization of our forces. Rapid deployment and reinforcement of corps, the dismantling of tactical groups, trust in corps commanders and their independent authority over personnel decisions at the corps level, and planned monthly reinforcement with personnel, UAVs, and ammunition will, in short order, improve the situation on any sector of the front, reduce our losses, and increase the enemy’s.

Yurii Butusov, Censor. NET