Colonel Riumshyn’s case. Interview from behind bars
The trial of former commander of the 155th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine "Anne of Kyiv," Dmytro Riumshyn, has been ongoing for over eight months. He was detained on January 20. He is accused of deliberately failing to notify the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) about cases of AWOL among his unit’s soldiers, of including in the training lists for France individuals who had been subjected to administrative liability, and of failing to conduct legal education for the servicemen.
At the time, the Pecherskyi Court imposed pretrial detention with the alternative of bail set at 90 million hryvnias. Later, at the defense’s request, the amount was gradually reduced to 10 million, but even that sum remains unaffordable for the serviceman. As a result, Riumshyn is still held at the military prison of the Military Law and Order Service. Despite these circumstances, he agreed to answer our questions in writing. To better understand the legal side of the case, we also spoke with his lawyer, Andrii Yosypiv. This article is essentially two interviews in one.
Dmytro Riumshyn: "No one covered up cases of AWOL."
- What are the conditions of your detention? How are you treated?
- I, together with other officers, am held in a cell measuring 6 by 3 metres. Once a day, they take us for exercise into a similar cell, 3 by 3 metres, with a grate on top. Smoking is allowed during exercise. You can take a shower once a week. Family visits are permitted once every three weeks.
As for the guards' attitude, I can say it is adequate, as far as that's possible in a prison. I'm not accused of corruption or murder, and, knowing that I'm from the armed forces and that I took part in many combat operations, they treat me with respect.
- In your view, why weren't you initially released on surety, and later on personal recognizance? Why are you still being kept in custody? Is this pressure?
- In my opinion, this is done deliberately to show all servicemen that merits before the Motherland and state awards mean nothing. If you have the courage to hold your own view on certain events, they'll put you in prison, fabricate evidence, and turn a hero into a criminal.
- Why do you think they initially set such a high bail, 90 million hryvnias? What does that indicate?
- I believe this was done to make release on bail impossible and to keep me in custody. If the bail had been reasonable and I had been released, society could have learned the real state of affairs in the military, which would have affected the ratings of the military-political leadership. That's why the hearings were held behind closed doors.
- You are accused of the fact that, under your command, AWOL (absence without official leave) among the brigade’s servicemen became widespread, and that you covered it up. How were you supposed to respond to such incidents, and how did you actually respond? Did you notify law-enforcement about mass AWOL in the brigade? If so, whom did you notify? The investigators claim you did not.
- In fact, I am accused of something else entirely, namely, that out of 2,100 AWOL incidents (according to the investigation’s version), I failed to send 186 notifications to the SBI, and that because of me or rather poor selection, out of 1,900 people sent for training in France, 56 servicemen went AWOL. As for the number of AWOL cases, I can say it would not have mattered who commanded the brigade. The number could have been much higher if the unit’s command had not taken certain measures. The conditions of formation, the constant turnover of personnel (out of 4,000, some 2,500 motivated servicemen were pulled out just before the training in France), and poor material support all contributed to an increase in AWOL.
No one covered up AWOL incidents. When a report on AWOL came in from a unit commander, a report to the senior commander and a notice to the Military Law and Order Service were promptly submitted. An internal investigation was also initiated. The materials of the internal investigation, together with the notification, were sent to the SBI and the Specialized Prosecutor’s Office. In total, more than 1,500 notifications were sent to the SBI. Roughly 600 out of those 1,500 AWOL cases were not reported to the SBI because, unfortunately, my staff and I were absent, we had left for training in France. However, for each case, a report was sent to Operational Command West (OC West) and a notice to the Military Law and Order Service. After returning from training, we began to correct the situation by conducting investigations and sending the notifications.
The investigators’ claims are an outright lie, aimed at leaving no doubt about my guilt. Anyone can come to the court hearing and see for themselves that what I say is true.
- AWOL incidents, as reported in open sources, also occurred in EU territory where the brigade underwent training. It also emerged that you allegedly drew up the lists for temporary duty (TDY) to France using "unmotivated" soldiers, including those previously held administratively liable. Were you aware of this information?
- I did not compile the personnel lists planned for training in France. Two commissions were set up for that, the unit’s commission and that of Operational Command West. My task was to bar from departure anyone flagged by military counterintelligence or given a negative conclusion by the commission. Whether someone had criminal or administrative liability was verified by military counterintelligence under a separate instruction. How they cleared those people is a question for them. Regrettably, they could think of nothing better than to backdate and falsify an official warning memo. A criminal case for document forgery was even opened over this. Not a single serviceman whom I personally approved went AWOL. Not one.
- The SBI’s communications adviser, Tetiana Sapiian, claimed that in this way, you helped so-called draft dodgers leave the country: "So-called draft dodgers made it onto the lists for training in France. These are people who try to cross the border illegally, find those who help them, and pay for it. This scheme was uncovered; it operated within the brigade." What is your response?
- Every word spoken by the SBI spokeswoman, Tetiana Sapiian, is an outright lie. There is not a single document in the case file that would corroborate even one of her claims. Sadly, it is impossible to hold her accountable for this falsehood. Our laws are like that. So spokespeople can go to the press and say whatever they want, and nothing will happen to them. At most, in a year or two, a court may order her to apologise, and that’s it.
- What were the selection criteria for the soldiers sent to France for training? How were those lists compiled, and by whom?
- The main selection criteria were moral and professional qualities, a clean record, and no outstanding debts. The lists were formed by commissions based on nominations from unit commanders. First, the unit’s commission; then the OC West commission reviewed our commission’s work. Every serviceman went through two commissions. The lists were then approved by me and, after I left for training, by the acting commander. Next they were vetted by military counterintelligence, and then submitted for approval to the OC West commander and further up the chain.
- Do you know what caused some of the soldiers sent to France for training to desert?
- The reasons for AWOL in France are the same as in Ukraine, namely:
1) in practice there is no punishment for AWOL, since the first AWOL offence is exempt from punishment;
2) law-enforcement bodies essentially do not search for AWOL soldiers, and those who are caught bear no liability whatsoever, not even administrative;
3) the absence of fixed terms of service under martial law;
4) the mobilisation of people who in reality tried to evade military service or had low motivation;
5) it had an impact when the unit’s motivated personnel began to be taken away to other units. People inside the unit thought they would be thrown into battle without preparation, which, in effect, later happened;
6) deploying personnel to the combat zone by order of OC West without commanders, straight from the border. The brigade and battalion staffs and headquarters were still in training in France, while the rank-and-file were sent to the Pavlohrad area;
7) repeatedly sending the command and staff on long training courses (the same ones three times), which affected the quality of command and work with the personnel.
However, of all these reasons, unfortunately one stands out above the rest: distrust of the country’s military-political leadership, specifically the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
- Was this examined during the pretrial investigation? If so, what was established?
- During the pretrial investigation, they looked only at how many notifications I failed to send to the SBI on time and how the selection for France was carried out. The SBI had no interest in anything else.
- On January 1, Yurii Butusov published a piece about the circumstances of the brigade’s formation and functioning, in which he described the problems that existed at the time, particularly with personnel and inadequate supplies. The question arises: why is the investigation not focused on those responsible for the brigade’s formation process, namely the command of OC West and the Ground Forces Command? Did you inform the pretrial investigation authorities about the state of affairs in the brigade during the investigation?
- Throughout my entire time in custody, there was only one interrogation, and the investigator asked solely about the AWOL notifications. The SBI was not interested in anything else. Although from the case materials it is clear they already know everything. Why aren’t they investigating this? The answer is simple, there was no order. Don’t think of the SBI as a law-enforcement agency. This structure more closely resembles a political secret police of the communist era. They are given a target, and they work on that person.
- Who do you believe is behind your case?
- Behind the case could be a state official with the power to influence the court and give instructions to the SBI and military counterintelligence. Who is it? I won’t tell you, because I don’t know, but there aren’t many such people.
- Overall, why was a criminal case opened against you?
- In my opinion, there are three reasons: 1) to appoint a scapegoat for the failure in forming the brigade;
2) to remove a commander who asked too many uncomfortable questions and constantly demanded what was necessary for the war;
3) to show other military commanders what will happen to them if they dare to have their own opinion.
- Your case has drawn public attention. What would you like to say to the public?
- First of all, I would like to thank all concerned citizens, my brothers-in-arms, and Members of Parliament for the support you have given me and my family during this difficult period.
Time has shown that all the accusations against me from law-enforcement agencies are either unsubstantiated assumptions or outright lies voiced to the public by incompetent SBI spokespeople.
In the fourth year of the full-scale invasion, government officials have found no better solution than to publicly accuse and humiliate the honor and dignity of servicemen for their own mistakes.
A country where ratings are valued above the pursuit of victory will never defeat such an authoritarian state as Russia.
But I still believe that all the sacrifices of our people for the sake of freedom and independence have not been in vain. So let us hold the line! Glory to Ukraine!
Lawyer Andrii Yosypiv: "The duration of the trial depends, in particular, on the preventive measure applied to Riumshyn."
- Has the investigation proven that Riumshyn deliberately failed to notify the SBI about AWOL cases? What evidence does the prosecution actually provide?
- Here, we need to talk not only about the evidence, but also about qualification, the existence of the elements of a crime, and the fact of the crime itself. Riumshyn is charged under Article 426, which provides for three forms of its commission. First, failure to respond to a criminal offence, meaning failure to stop it. Second, failure to report such an act. Third, other intentional failure by a military officer to fulfil duties imposed by their job description, statutes, or other documents. He is suspected precisely of allegedly failing to send a notification to the SBI about the commission of a criminal offence. But AWOL does not immediately become a criminal offence. This is not like a fight, a murder, or some other event with obvious criminal signs. Absence without leave only becomes a criminal offence on the fourth day after a serviceman’s absence from the unit or duty station has been established, or when they fail to return after TDY, medical treatment, or leave. Even then, it is necessary to establish whether there was a valid reason. So, he is accused of not reporting AWOL to the SBI. When he was notified of suspicion on January 20 this year, they cited 630 such cases. These incidents were taken over the entire period of his command, from February to December 2024. Two-thirds of that time, he was away on temporary duty — in Poland, in France, as well as attending training at a university. When on temporary duty, the unit commander issues an order appointing an acting commander. At different times, these were Mr. Kosovskyi and Mr. Zinoviev. Accordingly, these individuals received the authority to react to offences, i.e., to notify the SBI about AWOL incidents. According to our analysis, out of all 630 AWOL cases in that period, 449 occurred when the unit was led by acting commanders. Only 161 cases fall within the time when Riumshyn himself was present.
For an act to be considered a crime under Article 426, intent must be established. A person must clearly understand why they are doing it and that their actions are unlawful. When we talk about direct intent, both motive and purpose of the crime must be established. What exactly prompted the person to act in that way, and what goals did they pursue? Now, returning to the 161 cases that occurred when Riumshyn was personally in command, in order to call each of them a crime, all these components must be established separately in each case. If, in the case of a serviceman, say, Petrenko, Fedorchenko, or anyone else, no motive or purpose is established, then intent is absent, and thus there is no crime. And so the number of alleged crimes drops to zero. If there is no intent, there is no corpus delicti. The same applies to the element of substantial harm. To classify an act as a crime under this article, the state must have suffered substantial harm or serious consequences must have been established as a qualifying factor. In our case, they refer only to "substantial harm" in general. And here arises a question for the legislator: what exactly should be considered substantial harm? It can be either material or non-material. In our case, they refer to non-material harm, linked to disciplinary breaches, reduced combat readiness, and so on. This is a subjective and abstract matter. How can one establish whether the brigade’s combat capability really decreased? One would need to be present in the unit, constantly on site, observing and analyzing to draw such a conclusion. Neither a judge nor, especially, an investigator at the pretrial stage can make such an assessment. The existence of substantial harm must also be established for each individual case of failure to report AWOL to the SBI. And what does the prosecution do? They generalize! They claim that failure to report such a large number of cases created conditions for reduced discipline, lowered combat effectiveness, hindered the search and return of servicemen, and discredited the military-political leadership. But will such negative consequences be present in a separately considered AWOL case? The investigation avoids answering that question.
When it comes to evidence, the situation is the opposite. They send requests to the military unit. One time, it provides one set of information, the next time — another. They questioned several servicemen. Those who handle analytics naturally maintain some internal statistics. They use Excel files and Word documents in their work. These files may have various names "initial," "final," "final_new," "verified," and so on. But these are not official documents, just working files of a serviceman trying to bring some order to the AWOL issue. And what happens? They interrogate a witness, and as part of this investigative action, they essentially take the serviceman, put him in a car, bring him to his workplace, his computer and flash drive. He provides this working flash drive with his Excel files, where everything is highlighted in different colors, with no system at all, and it is simply impossible, for a rational mind, let alone a military one, to understand whether this analytics is valid. Because these are merely rough draft working files created by the serviceman for himself, according to his own understanding, as he sees it, in an attempt to compile some analytics. These are not documents, not records, not mandatory reporting, just an internal tool. But again, when we talk about calling something a crime, we cannot just take a number, say, 630, 186, or 161, and declare: that’s it, here is the crime. No. For each individual case, it must be clearly established that the information about AWOL reached the commander, Riumshyn himself. There must be confirmation that Riumshyn, as unit commander, was properly notified of the AWOL incident. And what do we actually have in the case file? 58 reports with Riumshyn’s personal resolution "To the order" and his signature. In these 58 cases, he clearly reacted as the unit commander, instructing the issuance of corresponding orders to remove the servicemen from food and payroll lists, etc. Thus, in these 58 cases, he responded properly, which is documented. So, if we consider the fact of informing the commander about AWOL cases, in practice, the whole story boils down to this number. Coming back to intent. Notifications to the Military Law and Order Service were made in absolutely all cases. Even the prosecutor acknowledges this. It is stated in the suspicion itself. Moreover, notifications were also sent to Operational Command West, the higher command to which both Riumshyn and the entire unit report. The decisions are made there. This eliminates any selfish motive Riumshyn could allegedly have had. Failure to notify only the SBI, while notifications were made to the Military Law and Order Service and to OC West, makes it impossible to evade the search for a serviceman and thus eliminates any vested interest in not notifying. Even more so, the presence of notifications to higher command nullifies any motive tied to career advancement. We emphasize this in court hearings.
Each of the 630 cases, which are being reduced in number, was subject to an internal investigation. Following each one, an order was issued approving the corresponding report. The form is standard. At the end of each, two provisions are repeated. First, to notify the SBI about the AWOL case. Second, the obligation to notify lies with the serviceman conducting the investigation. If we talk about the corpus delicti and the subject of the alleged crime, who is it? Is it really Riumshyn? After all, it was he who ensured the internal investigations were carried out and did everything to make sure the SBI was informed. If an officer failed to notify the SBI, then perhaps that officer should be considered the subject of a crime under Article 426, not Riumshyn. In other words, there is no proof of intent, substantial harm, or any of the elements that make an act a crime.
Let me remind you: at the time all this was happening, the 155th Brigade, as a military unit, was still in the process of formation. The act confirming its combat capability appeared only in December 2024. During the formation period, a so-called "unit-former" is established, a military body responsible for communication with the outside. All AWOL notifications during that time should have been provided by that body.
And another point concerning the so-called substantial harm. The prosecution claims that failure to report AWOL cases allegedly disrupted the mechanism of searching for servicemen, as stipulated by Article 281 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine. This article regulates the search for a suspect in criminal proceedings. That means the serviceman must first obtain this status, be formally notified of suspicion, and only then can a search be initiated. We submitted a request to the military unit: how many notifications were sent to the SBI in a given period, and how many extracts from the Unified Register of Pretrial Investigations (URPI) were received in response? Approximately 1,098 such notifications were sent to the SBI during the requested period. Only 108 extracts were returned, about 10 percent. This shows the SBI does not even react to the cases that do exist! At the beginning of one of the court hearings, I asked the prosecutor whether proceedings under Articles 407 or 408 had been initiated in connection with those 630 AWOL cases. Were they entered into the URPI? The answer: "We didn’t know about them." Eight months have passed. I continue to ask the same question, both in writing and in court: have you initiated criminal proceedings for these cases? Have you notified anyone of suspicion? You are already aware! They don’t know. I send a written request to the SBI. Their reply: "We do not analyze." It turns out they still have not initiated criminal proceedings for those 630 cases! They say we violated the established mechanism for searching for servicemen, while they themselves have not even entered these cases into the URPI! You already have the hard data. You have the full names. Back in January, you wrote to me: who, where, when, and under what circumstances went AWOL. But the most important point here is that the search for servicemen is handled by the Military Law and Order Service. This is clearly regulated by its governing law and provisions. The SBI, as a law-enforcement body, can only initiate a search for a suspect in a criminal case on general grounds. Let me remind you that in all AWOL cases, notifications were sent to the Military Law and Order Service. Therefore, the clear and logical question arises: who disrupted the established mechanism for searching for servicemen — Riumshyn, or the officials of the Military Law and Order Service?
- Were any of those who went AWOL interrogated?
- I have not seen a single interrogation of such individuals in the case materials. But I am convinced that none of them were questioned, although it should have been done. We will certainly raise this issue at the trial stage. We want to ask each of them: "Dear friend, what made you go AWOL? Because the accusation against us is that, allegedly, the reason for your absence without leave was that the SBI had not been informed about your friend who had gone AWOL before you. And this supposedly became your motive. Or was it rather supply issues, combat operations, personal fears, or the fact that you went straight from France to Pokrovsk in a tracksuit?"
Another point: under the previous suspicion, Riumshyn was also accused of allegedly failing to conduct awareness-raising work on criminal liability for AWOL and desertion. And supposedly, this is why people went AWOL. The claim was that they did not know about Articles 407 and 408 because Riumshyn had not explained it to them. And this, according to the prosecution’s logic, became the reason for AWOL. That was the convoluted construction. But now it has been removed. It simply no longer fits the logic. The investigation also argued there was a direct causal link between a soldier going AWOL and the alleged failure of Riumshyn to explain responsibility for absence without leave. Other circumstances that might have led a soldier to leave the unit or their duty station were never considered and still are not being considered. This circumstance, which was earlier imputed to Dmytro but has since been dropped, was de jure the basis for imposing such a preventive measure as detention.
- The investigation highlights 56 servicemen who went AWOL during training in France. They claim that when the deployment lists were being formed, Riumshyn allegedly included "unmotivated" soldiers. Some of them had supposedly committed administrative offenses. According to their logic, Riumshyn failed to carry out proper vetting, and such people were more inclined to commit offenses because their motivation to serve was lower. What about those lists?
- This story is even more complicated than the issue of reporting to the SBI. Riumshyn is accused of deliberately and unlawfully including in the training lists for France, between September 10 and 13, 2024, servicemen about whom warnings allegedly already existed in directive documents from higher command. Specifically, an order from the Operational Command "West" dated September 11, 2024, that is, the day after he had supposedly "failed to comply" with it. Do you see the paradox? This directive indeed contains restrictions against sending to France servicemen who had been subjected to administrative liability for attempting to cross the state border or who were mobilized by Territorial Centers of Recruitment (TCRs) outside their registered place of residence. But there is confirmed information that neither Riumshyn nor the military unit ever received this directive, and thus he could not have followed it between September 10 and 13. In reality, Riumshyn, acting on another directive, this one from the Ukrainian Ground Forces, not the OC "West", issued an order to establish a commission for the selection of personnel for training. The military unit began its work and started selecting candidates. But they acted not on the September directive from the OC "West", but on the July 2024 directive from the Ground Forces. That document contained no restrictions whatsoever against including servicemen with prior administrative offenses or those mobilized by TRCs outside their registered residence in the training lists. Not a word about it! I submitted an official request to the military unit, and to this day it has confirmed that it acted solely on the basis of the July directive from the Ground Forces. It also stated that the Operational Command "West" directive of September 11, 2024, was never registered with them and they had never received it. And this is important because the army has a strictly regulated system of record-keeping. Such a document could not have simply been lost. There is no evidence in the case files proving that Riumshyn was ever made aware of this Operational Command "West" directive.
And the most important point in this story: in order to call it a crime that Riumshyn included in the lists soldiers about whom the command had issued warnings, one must establish not only that he was aware of these directives but also that he knew those soldiers had been held administratively liable. In fact, the vetting of servicemen had earlier been assigned to the military counterintelligence service of the SBU. Therefore, it was counterintelligence’s responsibility to check, including whether servicemen had administrative liability. A commander does not perform such checks, he has neither the means, nor the personnel, nor the tools. He or members of the commission could only ask the soldier, but the soldier could conceal the truth. We began raising this issue in January, and a few months later, a very curious letter appeared in the case materials, dated September 19, 2024, allegedly sent directly to Commander Riumshyn. In it, counterintelligence, specifically, Colonel Anatolii Radchenko, head of the 5th Department of the SBU’s Military Counterintelligence Directorate, who signed the letter, "did not recommend" sending certain servicemen to France. Some of them, remarkably, only became servicemen in October 2024. We received responses from TCRs, certificates, and mobilization orders confirming this. Meaning that at the time this counterintelligence letter was supposedly sent, they were not yet even mobilized. This letter was forged. Thus, in order to fabricate the appearance of a crime allegedly committed by Riumshyn, the SBI and SBU military counterintelligence themselves committed a crime by falsifying the key document that underpins the allegation that Riumshyn was notified of these servicemen’s prior administrative liability.
- It should have been registered and assigned an outgoing number.
- You are absolutely right. I asked the military unit: "Did you receive this letter?" No. We filed a complaint about the commission of a crime. Unfortunately, the investigating body here is the same SBI. By decision of the Shevchenkivskyi Court, they were obliged to finally respond to our complaint, to enter the information into the URPI under Article 366, falsification of documents by an official. And supposedly, they initiated a pretrial investigation.
- What about the lists of those allegedly included by Riumshyn?
- They don’t exist. If you claim that Riumshyn himself drafted a list or deliberately inserted the names of servicemen into it, then produce it! But no, the prosecution does not have such a list and cannot have one (unless they fabricate it themselves)! I raised this issue in court hearings but never received an answer.
Instead, we submitted a request to the military unit and received a response with the names of those 56 servicemen, a nominal list. Of them, only 22 had previously been held administratively liable, and 15 were mobilized by TRCs. There are readiness acts for the personnel. There were 11 such groups of servicemen sent for training. Only the first three were not even compiled by Riumshyn but merely approved by him. In other words, the commission drafted them, and the commander only signed off. And what is telling is that there is not a single overlap between the servicemen approved by Riumshyn in those readiness acts and those who went AWOL while in France.
- And who approved the rest?
- Those who were temporarily acting commanders.
You know, at one of the court hearings the prosecutor let something slip. The investigating judge asked what was going on with France, referring to the need to explain my objections to this episode. He said: "We allege, perhaps, that he did not quite control everything there." But that is not Article 426! Let me remind you that this very legal qualification was the basis for Riumshyn’s detention and for setting bail at 90 million hryvnias as an alternative.
Then, on August 23, they "changed their tune," and the whole story with France, as well as part of the cases of failure to report AWOL incidents to the SBI, was reformatted into negligence, under Article 425. Now they claim that he failed to ensure and to control. What is interesting is that if we talk about negligence, of those 630 cases, 186 were left with him, but what about the rest? They also throw them under negligence. Also under Article 425. And they argue that Riumshyn failed to control the obligation of the acting commanders to send such notifications to the SBI. Yesterday (September 11. – O.M.) at the court hearing, I cited the provisions of the Statute on the principle of unity of command. Who is the superior officer over an acting commander? Not the commander who is away on assignment, but the Operational Command "West". So whose duty was it to exercise control?! You see, in this story I am forced to do the most basic things. For example, sending a request to the OC "West": "Tell us, who was the superior officer for Riumshyn and for the acting commander of the unit at the time of his absence?" Their reaction was as if to a fool, how could one even ask that? But they gave the answer: control over the acting commander is exercised by the Operational Command "West". But even that is not the main issue. In order to qualify something as a crime under Article 425, four key elements must be established. It must be determined what specific duty he had to perform but did not. Whether he had a real possibility to perform it. What the substantial harm was. And the causal link between his actions and that harm. But when we speak about the duty of a serviceman, it must be defined either by the Statute, by official job instructions, or by other documents. Not by acts of individual actions — such as orders, directives, or assignments. Why? Because there is a separate article of the Administrative Code that establishes liability for failing to comply with a lawful order or directive of a commander. So if you say we failed to comply with an order in some respect, then what exactly? Which document imposed on Riumshyn the duty to monitor the acting commander to ensure he was sending notifications to the SBI? Show us the Statute provision, the instruction, or any other document obliging Riumshyn, while in France, to pick up the phone and ask: "Kosovskyi, report, did you send the notification to the SBI?" No such document exists. Accordingly, there is, in principle, no need to answer the subsequent questions, whether he had a real possibility to do it, what the consequences were, and so on.
- Is anything known about the fate of the 56 servicemen who went AWOL in France?
- No. But I am confident we will learn about their fate in the future. I will file a motion in court and request that they be questioned. The prosecution claims that, once again, because we allegedly failed to respond to repeated cases of AWOL, they acted that way. Allegedly, the absence of reaction. So I want to ask them directly: what really motivated you?
Another interesting detail: along with the unit, representatives of the Military Law and Order Service went to France, those responsible for ensuring control, monitoring that no one left their post, and searching for those who did. And it was precisely among the servicemen of the Military Law and Order Service that a larger share went AWOL in France than among those they were supposed to supervise. That raises the real question: who failed to provide proper control? Riumshyn points to quite interesting facts about how work was carried out to minimize AWOL cases. For example, even while in France, they tried to motivate servicemen, arranging meetings with relatives, and concerts by Ukrainian and foreign performers. All this was done precisely to reduce the risk of negative attitudes toward the command or military service in general.
- You realize such cases can drag on for years…
- Yes. The length of the trial depends, in particular, on the preventive measure imposed on Riumshyn. If he remains in custody, the trial will proceed significantly faster. Even then it may still last for years, but less so than under other preventive measures. This is because judges pay much closer attention to deadlines when a person is detained, in order to avoid a ruling from the European Court of Human Rights on undue delays. For us, the number one priority at this stage of the proceedings is to secure Riumshyn’s release from custody.
As for prospects, I believe he will not remain detained throughout the entire trial. The preventive measure may not be changed at the preparatory hearing. Therefore, we will have to present our arguments and attempt to change the preventive measure at later stages. The next hearing is in a month, and we will be working to achieve either a reduction in bail or a change of preventive measure. There had previously been a positive trend of lowering the bail amount, but this virtually stopped before the change of suspicion. At present, not only has the new suspicion significantly softened Riumshyn’s position, but also the very fact that the pretrial investigation has been completed, and the prosecutor’s minimization of risks (dropping part of the risks provided under Article 177 of the Criminal Procedure Code), make further detention of Colonel Riumshyn impossible.
- What is the maximum bail amount under such articles?
- 240,000 hryvnias. A higher bail may only be applied in exceptional cases with proper justification from the court and the prosecutor. But in this case, no such justification exists.
In fact, the bail amounts were unreasonably inflated, tied to certain political processes. On January 20, Colonel Lapin and Generals Horbenko and Halushkin were detained. The court immediately set bail for Lapin at 5 million hryvnias. It was posted, but the next day, as he was about to be released from the pretrial detention center, he was served a new notice of suspicion. If I recall correctly, Petro Poroshenko even declared his readiness to vouch for him and pay the bail. The system responded by raising bail for military personnel to astronomical sums. This was done deliberately so that no one could pay and turn such cases into political capital. That’s why, the very next day at our hearing, Riumshyn was randomly assigned 90 million. Meanwhile, his income is 27,000 hryvnias, his wife makes around 40,000, his mother about 12,000, and his father lives on a 4,000 pension. On top of that, he pays alimony and is still studying. There is simply no logical or legal justification for such enormous bail.
We have filed a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights. This is a fairly standard case concerning disproportionate bail, lack of sufficient suspicion, violations of access to justice, and closed court hearings. The review may take a year, two at most. But it is a real avenue of defense.
Olha Moskaliuk, Censor.NET
