Situation on frontlines in October. Yurii Butusov’s livestream
Livestream by Yurii Butusov, platoon commander of the 13th "Khartiia" Brigade, on the situation on the frontlines in October
There has been a lot of work and many official duties that require full focus and concentration, so I was simply extremely busy for a long time. I now realize we need a conversation about what is happening in the war; we have to talk about it, articulate the questions and problems, and jointly look for solutions. We also understand that in the modern world, proper communication is a weapon as well: it helps improve combat readiness and helps us find people, like-minded people within the unit, those who can assist our work, facilitate it, and, for example, share things that may still be insufficiently clear to me but that someone else has already figured out.
So, friends, today I will first give a brief overview of what is happening on the frontlines, and then I will respond to your messages coming from YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram.
What is happening in the war right now? The enemy continues its offensive actions, unfortunately, across the entire front. The most difficult situation, the heaviest fighting, is taking place in the directions of our newly designated Hero Cities. The most critical area at the moment is, without a doubt, Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad. In the Donbas region, the enemy is making every effort to capture Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad and continues its advance toward Dobropillia. Despite several successful counterattacks by our forces in this area, the enemy is maintaining its offensive. Near the Dobropillia area, Russian troops are attempting to reach the city and completely encircle Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad. The situation there is difficult, meeting engagements continue, and the enemy keeps reinforcing its forces in an attempt to seize Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad as soon as possible.
Seizing Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad would allow the enemy to reach Dobropillia, i.e. to cut along the Donetsk region border, and at the same time, it offers the most convenient staging area for massing forces for an offensive toward the Dnipropetrovsk region, which is already unfolding across a broad sector. The enemy has already crossed into the Dnipropetrovsk region and is attempting to push deep. For now, the fighting is taking place in a belt along the administrative border between Donetsk Oblast and the Dnipropetrovsk region; nevertheless, the enemy keeps scaling up its effort. The battle for Myrnohrad, for Pokrovsk and Dobropillia, the battle for the Dnipropetrovsk region is underway right now. And this is, without question, the most intense sector of the front at the moment.
It should also be noted that the enemy is striking and attempting to seize ground in the Kharkiv region, currently focusing on the Kupiansk area. Kupiansk has now been designated a Hero City, and street fighting is underway in the town. The principal threat on this axis is that earlier this year the enemy forced a crossing and, near the village of Dvorichne, established a bridgehead; from the north, it is advancing into Kupiansk. They are trying to build up there and capture the entire town. Russia’s dictator Vladimir Putin recently spoke about Kupiansk, claiming their forces are advancing and that the town will be taken. The fighting for the town is extremely heavy, and the outcome is far from decided. I believe the Ukrainian command recognizes the gravity of the situation at Kupiansk and will do everything to prevent the enemy from entrenching in the town and to drive the Russian occupiers back. There are every opportunity and capability to do so, and I believe the competent Ukrainian commanders operating here, and the Ukrainian soldiers who understand Kupiansk’s significance, everyone understands Kupiansk’s significance, will undoubtedly make every effort to defend it. I want to stress that Kupiansk is effectively a corner of the front, a key sector on the Oskil line, at its northern end. Let me remind you that the enemy is trying to reach the Oskil River along the entire line, to seize Kupiansk, and to hold a staging area for a further offensive into the Kharkiv region. The defense of the Kharkiv region now hinges on holding this Oskil line; otherwise, the enemy will take Kupiansk, push toward Izium, and try to push into the Kharkiv region from the east. That is why the Kupiansk area and the Izium area are currently zones of very heavy fighting, and our soldiers are now fighting for the Oskil line.
At the same time, the enemy is trying to set conditions for the full capture of Donbas. Rolling up the front along the Oskil line would allow them to approach Lyman from the north; taking Lyman is the key to Sloviansk. The enemy is attempting to seize Siversk, very heavy fighting is ongoing there as well, to take Siversk and reach Lyman. The fight is underway for the key commanding ridgeline of Shandryholove–Drobysheve, which effectively controls the last natural defensive line shielding Lyman. The enemy is trying to capture Yampil, Drobysheve, and Shandryholove and push on to Lyman. From the Chasiv Yar and Toretsk area, the enemy is also trying to break through; the offensive toward Kostiantynivka continues. And the enemy is simultaneously attempting to seize Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad while pressing the offensive toward Dobropillia. It is plainly evident that the Russian command is trying to seize the whole of Donbas and is driving from multiple axes toward Sloviansk–Kramatorsk. This is a key urban agglomeration; in effect, Sloviansk–Kramatorsk is the gateway, the natural gateway, to Donbas. The terrain there has always formed this hub: Sloviansk–Kramatorsk–Izium and, on the Kharkiv side, Sloviansk–Kramatorsk–Izium–Barvinkove. These four towns are the key lines for controlling Slobozhanshchyna, for controlling the gateway either into Donbas or further west into Ukraine. Control of this strategic area, this strategic line, saw very heavy fighting in World War II, and the fighting continues there today.
The situation is difficult and merits attention: the enemy is pushing toward Zaporizhzhia and the Dnipropetrovsk region; fighting is underway for the town of Stepnohirsk in the Zaporizhzhia region, effectively the gateway to the city of Zaporizhzhia. The enemy is trying to seize it, establish control, and create a threat to one of Ukraine’s largest cities. That is the overall picture. We can see the enemy has a major advantage in forces, primarily in manpower, as well as a certain advantage in ammunition, and superiority in airpower and strike assets; this allows them to retain the initiative. The enemy is also conducting a large number of drone and missile strikes to damage our economy and undermine Ukraine from the rear. The situation is therefore difficult. It should be noted that every step where the enemy advances comes at a very high cost for the Russians. Russia faces a genuine manpower crisis; replenishing assault groups is not easy. All the talk about Russia’s inexhaustible manpower, I have said this before and can repeat it now, is not borne out by the actual mobilization capacity of Russia’s economy. Putin does not want to wreck his economic base, and therefore, they are trying to avoid a full mobilization, another wave of mobilization; instead, they are driving people into the army through the police, through social services, and through state agencies.
By my calculations, based solely on the Russian Federation’s official statements about how many people in Russia’s Armed Forces and the Rosgvardiya are sent to the front, take part in the " SMO (Special Military Operation - ed.note)," are counted among the losses, or terminate their contracts for various reasons, Putin has employed at least about 2.5 million people for combat operations since the start of the war. That is based only on official statements, on those currently taking part in the war and those who did so earlier. This is simply the sum of the official figures released by the Russian leadership. But if you also factor in mobilization in the occupied territories; other components beyond the Russian Armed Forces, including the Rosgvardia and other security agencies Russia has committed, the police, the FSB, and the Border Service, to participation in the "SMO"; plus conscripts and other service members, as well as troops not counted among the "SMO" forces but deployed on combat missions and fighting Ukraine along the Russian Federation’s borders, then in total Russia has employed up to 4 million personnel in the war to date.
If you add up all the components they have committed over this period, that is, if Putin says there are 700,000 in Ukraine at the moment, then in the fourth year of the war it is still 700,000, and take into account those previously killed and wounded, those who for various reasons terminated their contracts and left the service, medical losses, and those rotating in and out, the total can be estimated at up to 4 million people, both on the territory of Russia and directly in Ukraine. This is a large figure, and it shows that even such million-strong forces over these four years, which Russia has deployed, have not produced total superiority in the war. It indicates that sheer manpower, by itself, cannot collapse the front, and Ukrainian units and soldiers are doing everything possible to inflict losses on the enemy and prevent them from building up those forces. Because, according to Putin’s own statements, the "700,000 in Ukraine" figure was there a year ago and two years ago, and they have still not surpassed that 700,000 threshold actually inside Ukraine. Although, according to official statements, every year Russia either mobilizes or signs under contract at least about 500,000 people for the army. These are Russian figures. That includes the Armed Forces and the National Guard, those they send to the combat zone. In other words, each year they field roughly 1.0–1.5 million service members. They carried out a 300,000-strong mobilization in 2022, and on the occupied territories, they also mobilized around 200,000 at least in 2022–2023. They recruit mercenaries wherever they can; there are even Koreans fighting on their side. Nevertheless, 700,000 is the maximum number Russia can concentrate in Ukraine. If they could field more, they would. They simply do not have more at the moment. And Ukrainian soldiers are steadily attriting that occupying force.
ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS
200,000, possibly even 250,000, service members. And instead of deciding what to do about them, we simply abolished… Now, de facto criminal liability for AWOL has been reinstated. The mechanism for transfers between units and formations has not been worked out. Transfers through the Army Plus system do not function in practice, because commanders simply refuse to approve them. So we have this odd situation in the army where a person who, for certain reasons or conflicts, even a conscientious person, a good fighter, wants to transfer from one unit to another, cannot do so. It’s a paradoxical situation. There are people who have been fighting since 2022. They want to transfer to another unit, but they have no such right; their transfer requests simply go unsigned. At present, there is only one mechanism: months of litigation, going through the courts, applying to the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI), proving that you are acting in good faith, an honest soldier who wants to serve in a serious combat post in another combat unit. But that is through the courts; there is no lawful administrative procedure. There is this very lengthy bureaucratic process, with no apparent rationale. My view is that if a person has fought for at least a year, has served honestly at the front, especially in combat units such as infantry, UAV units, mortar teams, artillery, combat engineers, and has carried out combat missions directly in the combat zone, on the first or second line, that person should have the right, after a year of conscientious service, to transfer to another unit. They should be able to submit a transfer request, and it must be approved within two weeks. No ifs or maybes, it must be approved. Fine, not two weeks, a month. But the transfer must happen. They have earned it through faithful service. And we have people who are genuine tigers of war, who have been fighting since 2022. For example, something in their unit may not be acceptable to them, the level of competence, perhaps of the commanders; logistics; treatment; the organization of combat operations; planning. There are many factors. A person may want to do their own thing. But if someone wants to keep fighting, just in another unit, to do their job and transfer not to the rear but to a combat element at the front, on what grounds can you even deny that? There must be a guaranteed right that a person who is fighting and has served honestly for a year, in our case, two, three, now the fourth year, simply files a request and it is approved without argument. Because that whole high-profile "Army Plus" story just doesn’t work. And right now in Ukraine, there are essentially no mechanisms for a normal transfer from one unit to another. There aren’t, because no commander will simply let any of their soldiers go. And I understand the logic. Commanders, on their own, will not release personnel from their units. It’s a very complicated process of mutual agreements, rare exceptions. But why do such restrictions even exist? If a person has fought honorably, they should have the right to choose where to continue fighting. For example, I am staffing a unit with personnel who were AWOL. I did this while it was permitted by law, up until August 30 of this year. I have about 30 service members carrying out limited missions, effectively volunteer fighters, and I did not pull anyone from active units. These people long ago left their formations, some have spent two years AWOL and have open criminal cases. I tracked them down through various channels, and some AWOL personnel contacted me themselves. I recruit people who are not serving in the regular army or who do not want to serve in their assigned units. I do not put them on rear-area duties. That is, in positions as UAV operators, Mavic operators, primarily Mavic, Autel operators, and FPV pilots. This work is also carried out in zones of direct enemy engagement, and a UAV operator is a priority target on the battlefield.
Still, this can only be resolved through the courts. None of the transfer mechanisms are working. Only a court and informal agreements can do it; people have to go to investigators at the SBI, persuade them and provide evidence. The investigators must carry out lengthy work, after which a court date can be set. I have soldiers in my unit who have been listed as AWOL for four months. They are here with me now. For two months, they have been carrying out all tasks, serving like regular servicemen, honestly, conscientiously and effectively. Yet they receive no pay. I cannot officially send them to frontline positions where they are supposed to fight, because if something happens to them, their status is unresolved. Nevertheless, some of them voluntarily take on very risky assignments.
What should be done? This situation requires serious attention and a solution. I hope the country’s leadership will analyse how many people listed as AWOL are unable to perform combat duties because they do not want to return to the unit where they have served for a long time and where there are problematic issues. I am convinced that if a person has spent a year in combat, they should be able to transfer to another combat unit and a different combat post without difficulty. One can argue that transfers to the rear should be limited; I agree with that. But if a person wants to join a combat unit in a combat role, what is the point of restricting them? They are not fleeing the front or evading hard combat duties. Unfortunately, this AWOL problem has no solution at present; there is no effective use of the human resource represented by hundreds or even tens of thousands of competent, capable people who could fight if they were treated properly and given the option to transfer calmly into a combat-ready, effective unit. This is a problem. I’ve appealed to many people already. I can say that I alone have an entire platoon listed as AWOL, and I still can’t have them formally reinstated as servicemembers, despite working on this for a long time. I hope to keep speaking and writing about it. As for the AWOL issue, a large share of those listed as AWOL are ready right now to rejoin the ranks, fight effectively, and could be excellent soldiers, but they need a unit. They must be given the opportunity to be assigned to a unit that can employ them effectively.
We need to replenish the ranks of the Armed Forces in a way that first and foremost creates a vertical chain of responsibility. What is lacking at every level today?
A vertical of responsibility. There must be someone responsible for each person. Anyone who comes to serve or is brought in, mobilized by various means, must be needed by someone in particular: a person who looks after them because they are needed to carry out tasks. And that attitude must be felt from the very first steps? when they cross the threshold of the TCR (Territorial Center of Recruitment and Social Support - ed.note)
How to do this? We need to connect the manning system. Right now, our manning system is a thing unto itself. It has to be linked directly to frontline combat units. There must be a vertical chain. Every commander in the Defense Forces, starting with the company commander should have a stake in mobilizing people, specifically those who will serve under them. To achieve this, in my view, we need the following… We now have 20 army corps formed, as well as separate units and force groupings. Each of these groupings, every military unit, should be assigned to specific regional Territorial Centers of Recruitment. In other words, a defined set of corps, brigades, units, and separate regiments is attached to a defined set of regions. Working together with the Territorial Centers of Recruitment, they would ensure higher-quality mobilization. They would support this effort and assign their own personnel to carry it out. And the manning plan would no longer be generic, it would be tied to the needs of specific units. This would create a clear logic as to whom, how many, and how they are assigned. It would also create buy-in: unit commanders become stakeholders because they are directly involved in the mobilization process. We have a large pool of people who can do this, and that is a great source of motivation for me.
Mobilization has to be integrated. We need recruiters from frontline units at every TCR, coordination with brigade HR services, and active brigade support for mobilization. So that when anyone crosses the threshold of a TCR, under the existing allocation plan a specific unit knows: today, on this date, people with these specialties, this health status or these skills are coming to us. That way, each unit recruits accordingly. This creates accountability for each person, making it clear that someone needs them. What makes a person strong in war, what lets them keep moving and acting, is knowing they are needed. Knowing someone cares about them; that when they join the army, they won’t be thrown somewhere at random but will become part of a unit for which they matter. They will join a team where they can be effective, where they are respected, and where they know exactly who their commanders are. That is the key story of war.
But in reality, that is not a systemic solution. I believe we genuinely need pre-conscription training for service members, for young people starting at 18. In my view, between ages 18 and 20 a person should be required to undergo training, ideally based at Territorial Defense Forces units; in wartime conditions, this could take the form of a package of courses: survival, basic military training, drone piloting, land navigation. In other words, young people must be prepared for modern life, because the war is ongoing and the army needs personnel who are trained in advance. When a person is confident, they can be brave, when they feel ready for life’s tests. Without such training, people will keep trying to hide. I consider it very harmful that, for some reason, it is assumed people under 22 should not train at all and should instead leave the country. That is a grave mistake. If we truly care about young people, we shouldn’t be sending them abroad and creating conditions that push them to emigrate; we should be preparing them to fight the enemy and to defend themselves, their families, and their country as effectively as possible. I believe people should not be sent to war before age 20, but they should receive training before 20. By training, I mean that at 18 a person can serve in auxiliary units, gaining valuable technical knowledge, a specialty, and training; performing tasks in rear units, where people are also needed; and acquiring a wide range of skills that will help in adult life. And from age 20, people are simply irreplaceable in war. I can tell you I have a service member who is 18 he came from Germany and he is one of the best FPV pilots currently in training. His reaction time is excellent, and he knows how to work off the screen. In reality, young people are the ones who perform best in these high-tech specialties, first and foremost, UAV operation. Those aged 18 to 22 may well have the best motor skills they will ever have in life. Both the nervous system and motor skills matter, as does the ability to learn and master new technologies. That is why I do not understand this decision; it is, in fact, a mistaken one. So, putting ages 18–24 on contract is a good idea, but in reality, we need mobilization of those aged 18–24 with the right employment of these people. Not into infantry, for example, I would support an approach whereby 18–24-year-olds are not sent to the infantry but are assigned, for instance, as UAV operators, electronic warfare specialists, and to work in electronics. Into rear-area positions tied to logistics and sustainment. That is a reasonable approach: a person learns, gains skills, and serves the country at the same time. In my view, that would be the right way to do it. Nevertheless, decisions are being made that are hard to explain, I do not understand them. And frankly, many in the army don’t either; I haven’t met anyone who supports this. Friends, the situation at the front is such that when understrength units are being employed, yes, everyone gets sent forward. Near Kupiansk, as I know from service members who reached out to me, UAV operators and UAV technicians from unmanned systems battalions, one of the mechanized brigades, also sent them into the trenches with assault rifles to set up a strongpoint and hold the defense. Because there are not enough people to carry out the missions. And so, unfortunately, we have this problem of how personnel are employed: there may appear to be plenty of troops, but, as always, there are not enough infantry. In other words, our mobilization capacity to replenish the infantry does not meet the need. Yet our units are not being downsized; they remain. It’s just that we end up sending headquarters staff, UAV operators, and others into the infantry, people who should not be pushed forward, because they have been trained for other specialties that are also critical in combat. An infantryman cannot be effective if command and control or communications are lacking, for example, or if a UAV operator is not covering him from above and observing. That, too, is a misuse of forces.
So this is, yet again, a recurring problem that needs to be addressed. I told those UAV operators, by the way, that if they go out there, spend a week digging in that position, and are not pulled back, we will raise the issue much more loudly, because employing UAV operators as infantry is prohibited by General Staff orders. It is utterly absurd to develop technical specialists, invest money and drones in their training, and then suddenly say, "No, go fight as infantry." What for, then? How are we supposed to wage the drone fight?
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Simply striking select segments of the enemy’s industry is not enough. Russia is a large country with a large economy; our strikes on oil refineries inflict significant damage, but we understand that targeting a few industrial segments will not collapse the country. From the standpoint of military strategy, I believe we should concentrate more effort on destroying Russian infantry on the battlefield, infantry, artillery, and UAV operators and increase the resources the state allocates to combat operations specifically to address these key tasks. The Russians are far more short of infantry. Fuel prices matter, that is fine, but it is about resource allocation. We need drones, strike assets, more capabilities and tools to eliminate the enemy at the front. The state is providing support, but the needs are by no means being met in full so as to enable the most effective killing of the enemy by technical means.
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Infantry must be the priority, that is an absolute fact. Infantry is the key branch of the armed forces. In any world war, in any country, infantry is always in short supply. These are the most important people. To preserve them effectively, we need proper organization of all other forces and enablers, everyone who sustains them, covers them, and delivers fires, so that the infantryman knows he is protected on all sides. That is how you support him.
Yurii, if you’d like, I can send you a video of who we were assigned to our combat brigade for augmentation.
Friend, I’m very much looking forward to it. Please send it either here, to my messages, or to any of my accounts — Facebook, Messenger, Instagram. Wherever is convenient for you, this matters. We’ll take a look.
Why are military and police pensioners under 60 not hired?
I honestly don’t know what the statistics are on who isn’t being taken. It’s hard to say. What I can say is that mobilization, in terms of how people are being sourced, has improved, because the police have started handling this much more competently. As for whether military or police retirees under 60 are indeed not being taken, I’m not sure. I think a large number of categories are being taken.
How do you assess the chances that the enemy reaches Zaporizhzhia by around 2030 and, in doing so, captures all of the Donetsk region?
Yes, friends, I believe that unless we implement changes and outpace the enemy in adapting, they will continue the war and keep trying to seize all of Ukraine, not just Zaporizhzhia, not just Donbas, not even only Kharkiv region. They have set, and constantly proclaim, that their objective is the capture of Ukraine. Wherever we stop the enemy, that is where the front will stabilize. This can certainly be done. We can grind down all the reinforcements Russia sends to the front. The quality of Russian infantry is very low, and their confirmed losses are increasing.
How do we make sure Russia takes losses but makes no advances?
We must organize the defense the way it is organized in those Ukrainian units that are well run and have held their sectors for a long time. The recipe is straightforward. This means engineering the defensive line, well-organized reconnaissance, and infantry, the key combat arm, with rotations, training, reliefs, and replenishment, thereby gaining an edge in combat effectiveness over the enemy. It also means effective employment of drones and all types of high-tech equipment, and indispensable competent employment of artillery, without which holding the front is impossible. And the same goes for all other forces and enablers. All of this can be done. It is difficult work but it is achievable.
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Why not scale up the recruitment of volunteer fighters, bringing in people from different countries, to find replenishment for the infantry. In my platoon right now, there are six Colombians, to be precise, five Colombians and one Argentine. These are people who have fought in Ukraine as infantry for a long time, at least six to nine months. They have already signed a second contract to fight, and some have been wounded. In other words, they are seasoned fighters and highly effective. We are now employing them, training them as Mavic operators, and they work diligently and to a high standard. Replenishment for the infantry and for UAV units, for drone infantry, should also be sought abroad. These mobilization avenues exist. We have to understand that the war will be protracted, and for a long war, we must seek resources not only inside Ukraine. We need to bring in people who are willing to fight, volunteer fighters who are ready to serve. I should note that foreigners here often have better service terms than Ukrainians. A foreigner signs a six-month contract and can choose not to extend it. There is no criminal liability for foreigners who terminate such a contract early, they are not subject to prosecution; it’s six months, and that’s it. You can hold them until the term ends, but once the six-month contract is up, it’s over. So, for foreigners, we have favorable conditions. In many countries, the pay and support provided by the Ukrainian army is a very strong incentive.
Yurii, what kind of mobilization is this? It’s a disgrace for this government.
Friends, a lot in our country actually does not work very well. We must understand that the problem is not only mobilization, it affects many sectors. But we need to talk about these issues and raise them so the authorities look for solutions. We need to help find those solutions. So I want to say: we have problems with mobilization, but if we want to survive, if we want to preserve Ukraine, and we do, we must all work on this together. That’s why I’m talking to you about it. I will write more as I can; I will address the AWOL problem. It worries me and is very topical for me. There are outstanding fighters, brave warriors and worthy citizens of our state who, for various objective reasons, have gone AWOL. I am currently fighting to have them formally registered. This is therefore an important issue for me. As for mobilization, some of them have been mobilized, so be it. Mobilization must exist; it happens in every country during any mass war where general mobilization is required. And of course, it needs improvement; there are problems that must be fixed.
Will the war never end?
No, friends, the war will end as soon as Russia loses the ability to advance by throwing those disposable, lemming-like assault groups at our defenses. In other words, once we build a sufficiently organized defense so that those two- or three-man storm groups are destroyed one after another, day after day, week after week, month after month, a positional stalemate will emerge. For Russia, a positional stalemate is defeat; stopping Russia means they lose the war. It is in our interest to build a defensive line, to construct a robust, pre-prepared defensive belt that small assault groups will not be able to breach. That requires advance planning of engineering works, organized construction of such defensive lines, and the timely occupation of them by our forces. Troops must be withdrawn onto these lines so that we do not simply lose positions, as often happens on some axes, but instead conduct organized withdrawals to them.
A word about myself. We are in the process of staffing the unit and recruiting people wherever possible. We have Latin Americans serving whom we selected. Two English-speaking fighters from Western Europe will also join service here, they, too, decided to take part in Ukraine’s defence. There is a large group of fighters, up to 30 people, who left their units without authorization (some as long ago as two years). We vet them through real missions that demonstrate genuine combat experience and assess those who are diligently trying to carry out tasks. We are likewise working with those currently in training. Literally two or three people arrived via mobilization. There is a core to the unit, a small group of experienced pilots. They are few in number, but they are excellent mentors and are already carrying out missions. At several positions, we are operating Mavic drones and FPV drones. We are delivering a certain tempo of operations while simultaneously forming up, training, and conducting missions. We aim to scale up so we can execute a significantly larger volume of combat tasks. Why does this matter? The mission of the new unit we are forming is to fight the enemy’s UAV operators. Let me reiterate: combat formations in modern war, on both our side and the enemy’s, are now built around UAV operator positions. In other words, from which positions you can field Mavics and FPV systems, and from what ranges you can control the front. How far from the line of contact you can strike enemy positions, observe them, block them, and prevent enemy pilots from operating, that determines how far you can advance. Everything in modern warfare is interconnected, and the backbone of combat formations is the UAV operators’ positions. The Khartiia brigade and corps understand this. To accomplish these tasks, we need to expand the number of units dedicated to targeted counter-UAV operations against enemy pilots. That is our mission. So I appeal to everyone: friends, if you are looking for a way to take part in Ukraine’s defense within a unit pursuing this new specialized line of effort that we are now scaling up, I would be very glad to serve and fight alongside you. And I appeal as well to those who can support our effort: the drone war is very expensive, and if anyone has the means to help, I would be deeply grateful. We genuinely need that support.
Now, friends, thank you for the broadcast and for being here together. I will go live more often, speak with you more, and answer your questions more frequently. The war continues and will last a long time. No peace, as I told you before, has been in sight, nor is it now. The enemy can be stopped only by force, by unity, and by our collective effort. This is our task, yours and mine, the task of our generation and our society. Thank you, friends, for being here. Until the next broadcast and glory to Ukraine!
