Kudrytskyi out on bail but pressure is still on. What next?
The case of Volodymyr Kudrytskyi remains in the public spotlight. What’s more, this is only the beginning. On October 28, the State Bureau of Investigation detained the former head of NPC Ukrenergo; the following day, the Pecherskyi District Court remanded Kudrytskyi in custody for two months with bail set at 13 million on charges of "abuse of office and misappropriation of funds of a state-owned company."
Censor.NET informed you about these and other interesting circumstances in the article "Pecherskyi court’s travesty of justice returns: how Kudrytskyi was arrested over non-existent losses."
"AT THIS STAGE, THE PROSECUTION HAS NOT PERSUADED ME, AS THE DEFENSE, THAT THIS CASE HAS ANY PROSPECT IN COURT."
And on October 30 at 5:45 p.m., Kudrytskyi was released from the pre-trial detention center on bail. His family met him outside.
Censor.NET was interested in who posted the bail, but lawyer Mykola Hrabyk decided to maintain an air of mystery, noting he was not authorized to disclose it.
"But I can say it was a legal entity, not an individual, and it is not connected to Volodymyr Dmytrovych," he added.
Mr. Hrabyk was less guarded in answering Censor.NET’s other questions. At times, it sounded like a lecture on the finer points of legal practice. (At one time, Mykola Viacheslavovych worked as an investigator for the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), so, in this game, he knows the moves on both sides of the board.).
- At the moment, the tenor of commentary on this case is in your client’s favor," Censor began. "At the same time, more cautious commentators suggest the prosecution may have stronger evidence of Volodymyr’s guilt…
- …They do not. There isn’t a single such argument there and there cannot be.
- But perhaps they will present those arguments at a later stage of the proceedings?
- Look. Speaking from law-enforcement practice: they cannot. To argue the gravity of the offense and to justify the need for the most severe pre-trial restraint, the prosecution sets out those arguments in its motion to impose the measure of restraint.
This is not me making a baseless claim that they have nothing. What we are discussing now is that the prosecution submitted materials to the court in support of its position. We are not saying that Volodymyr Dmytrovych committed a crime, are we? At this stage, that question is not under discussion. What is being examined now is the sufficiency/insufficiency of the evidence and whether the suspicion is well-founded (as well as the existence of the risks set out in Article 177 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine). And the prosecution must substantiate these matters with the relevant case-file materials. They cannot simply assert that he is this or that, or that he did this or that. They must, using the materials of the criminal proceedings, provide reasoned proof of each particular act (or omission), and so on.
- So, in your view, did they prove it?
- The seven volumes of case materials provided to the defense contain no evidence, not only none showing that Volodymyr Dmytrovych misappropriated funds by fraudulent means (which is precisely what he is suspected of), but nothing pointing to anything of the sort at all. Meanwhile, the risks they presented to the court to justify detention, namely remand in custody with the alternative of bail set at 13.7 million hryvnias, were based solely on an operative’s report. Incidentally, that operative drafted the report the very same day he received the investigator’s instruction to carry out such measures. And what’s more, at 09:57 a.m. that same day, when the instruction was sent to the operative, Volodymyr Dmytrovych had already been detained on the basis of that report. Do you see my point?
- Hard not to.
- So let’s be objective: the prosecution must establish the risks and present evidence, not merely say "we think so" or "that’s our view."
- Then let me ask you directly: do you think the prosecution has come into this process unprepared?
- I’ll put it differently: at this stage, the prosecution has not persuaded me, as the defense, that this case has any prospect in court. And having spoken with my client and understood what happened and how during that period (the contract signings and subsequent processes), there is no conclusion to reach other than that Kudrytskyi had no involvement whatsoever in these events. I say that objectively!
On November 5, the defense will receive the full text of the October 29 court ruling. Mykola Hrabyk has already told Censor.NET that he will file an appeal.
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EUROPEANS ON PROVIDING US WITH FUNDS ARE UNDERWAY. AND ZELENSKYY AND HALUSHCHENKO THREW A WRENCH INTO THAT PROCESS.
Meanwhile, as Kudrytskyi was being released on bail, debate over his case continued in the public sphere. The case has plenty of pressure points, so each commentator had something to focus on.
For example, Serhii Fursa, an investment banker at Dragon Capital and columnist, put it bluntly: "…because we understand there is political will at the highest level to throw a person in prison. A person who worked for many years at a state company. And the tame law enforcement are given the order to SIC him. And off they run to carry out an unlawful order. And can’t find anything."
Blogger and civic activist Valerii Pekar inventively coined Article 501 of the Criminal Code: "I don’t like you."
And, say, Oleksii Kucherenko, first deputy chair of the parliamentary Committee on Energy and Housing and Communal Services, was dripping with sarcasm: "No matter how smart, handsome, haughty, self-absorbed, English-speaking you are, with handsome slicked-back hair and excellent connections abroad, and no matter how much you think you’re a brilliant super-manager of our time who can take on the shareholder with the help of foreign lobbyists and your MP friends…"
Among the many posts on the topic, a piece by journalist Yurii Nikolov stood out. It addresses the gaps in the prosecution’s arguments, who gave the order to "sic" law enforcement on Kudrytskyi, and the possible reaction of Ukraine’s foreign partners.
A day later, Censor.NET asked Nikolov:
- Yurii, over the past day, have you answered the question for yourself: who needed to put Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, who has long since left public affairs, behind bars (or at least rattle his nerves), and why? Is it really all because of his interviews and comments critical of the current energy leaders?
- I think that by punishing one person, the corrupt camp is trying to scare all the other anti-corruption people. Just as in the NABU case, where the SBU arrested two detectives on trumped-up allegations, the same is happening here: they are targeting Kudrytskyi to intimidate all his other supporters who still work at the state company NPC Ukrenergo. You see, as of now, Ukrenergo is an island of trust in Ukraine for foreign investors. They know perfectly well how this company operates; they extend financing to it without hindrance (unlike Energoatom, which no one funds with a single dollar or euro). And so, for those who, in the authorities’ view, are still defending this anti-corruption ethos at NPC, punishing Kudrytskyi is meant to signal that they should stop resisting the worst practices.
- So you seriously suspect our authorities of systematically persecuting those who try to uphold transparency in business and public affairs?
- I don’t suspect it; I observe it, and it’s plainly visible almost everywhere.
- And who, in your view, is the ideological driver of this tactic?
- If we’re talking about the energy sector, there’s nothing to invent here: the chief overseer of all processes is Herman Halushchenko, who headed the Ministry of Energy for several years. And now that seat is occupied by someone very close to him — Svitlana Hrynchuk.
- In your post, you wrote: "I know for a fact that foreign donors and embassies are keeping this story under close watch. For them, it’s now one more marker of Zelenskyy’s conduct." … But Zelenskyy and Yermak have likely already been told that Europeans no longer regard them as untouchable leaders of a country at war. These are the same Europeans who, since Trump’s departure, have controlled financial assistance to Ukraine.
Which leads me to this: how does that work in practice, this accumulation of foreign irritation with the Zelenskyy team’s autocratic practices? Do the diplomats convene and ponder: "This time they detained Kudrytskyi (and are fabricating a case against him on trumped-up grounds). Has the moment come to signal our governments to scale back weapons deliveries and financial injections to Ukraine?"
Here’s what I mean: these autocratic practices have been going on for a while, and you (Nikolov, Shabunin, Kaleniuk) keep sounding the alarm that the Europeans’ patience is about to run out and they will halt (or sharply reduce) assistance to Ukraine. Yet you warn, and the Europeans hold firm and impose no sanctions.
- I reject that kind of bipolar disorder: as if Kudrytskyi’s arrest automatically meant our weapons supplies would stop. Let’s not overstate it; the point is that Europeans are currently the largest donors to Ukraine’s state budget, not only in terms of arms, but in actual money. This is the money that ultimately pays pensions and salaries for doctors, other medical staff, those same employees of the Ministry of Energy, and everyone else. And the volume of these funds (let alone the reliability of disbursements and the conditions attached) is the leverage Europeans have. That is why I say the Kudrytskyi case has become one more marker for them. Our authorities have landed themselves with yet another headache they will have to keep dealing with, convincing the Europeans to maintain funding for Ukraine at least as it stands. All of Europe is now figuring out where to find the money; we are trying to shake loose €150 billion in seized and frozen Russian funds there.
It’s all part of a negotiating process. And now Zelenskyy and Halushchenko have thrown a wrench into that process. As if to say: "Look at the outright lawlessness going on here, so, European donors of democracy, will you still give us more money?"
"DO WE REALLY BELIEVE HALUSHCHENKO COULD HAVE ORGANIZED ALL OF THIS ON HIS OWN: THE COURT, THE STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE SWIFT NOTICE OF SUSPICION, AND THE MEDIA?"
And how did Ukraine’s political class and the top managers in government and state-owned companies react to Kudrytskyi’s arrest and court case?
In Ukraine’s socio-political culture, there’s a familiar pattern: if a friend, colleague, or even a close companion ends up on the receiving end unjustly (or even justly), you don’t rock the boat by publicly defending them. Years of good relations and close friendship? So what? What if trouble comes down from above and, God forbid, you lose your job? Better not make waves. Just whisper, "Hang in there, I’m with you," and move on with a well-practiced poker face.
That is why, on the day of the hearing for a well-regarded energy-sector top manager, we saw only a small "mighty handful" of MPs and Kudrytskyi’s close friends in the Pecherskyi courtroom. And that was it. One attendee, MP Yaroslav Zhelezniak, posted a striking comment on Facebook about it.
In a conversation with Zhelezniak, Censor.NET developed the theme further:
- Yaroslav, in your post, you fault certain technocratic figures in the government who, quote, "have stuck their tongues up their a**es and are keeping quiet." How many such people are there, and what feedback did you get to your post? Has anyone responded?
- Well, it’s hard to respond when your tongue is THERE (he laughs. – E.K.)... No, I haven’t seen any reaction.
- What are people in our political circles saying about this case in general? I don’t mean those who showed up in court or commented on the proceedings, but those who chose to say nothing at all.
- They say it’s outright lawlessness and a political hit job.
- And did you ask them why they won’t say it out loud?
- I’ve stopped trying to get people who haven’t grown the things you dye for Easter in six years to suddenly grow them in the seventh.
- There are two theories about who ordered this: first, the upper echelons of the Office of the President, who dislike the freewheeling interviews of the former official Kudrytskyi; and second, revenge by Minister Herman Halushchenko. Which version do you subscribe to, and why?
- What difference does it make? It’s the same thing. Do we really believe Halushchenko could have organized all of this on his own, the court, the SBI, the swift notice of suspicion, and the media? Of course not. It was clearly under direct coordination with at least part of the President’s Office.
Do I draw a line between Halushchenko and the President’s Office? No. Halushchenko is, effectively, part of it, responsible for many sensitive matters. So what’s the difference?!
Yevhen Kuzmenko, Censor.NET
Kudrytskyi's photo. Source: Suspilne.
