Mykola Melnyk: "It is fact that we will lose Pokrovsk, as follows from balance of forces and assets"
Today, Pokrovsk is not just a point on the battle map but a true "nerve" of the frontline. Recently, it has become one of the main flashpoints in the confrontation between the Ukrainian army and Russian occupiers.
The situation is extremely difficult and critical: the Russians, having a resource advantage, are trying to encircle the city and push Ukraine’s Defence Forces out, but our troops are putting up fierce resistance. On Monday, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy held a meeting of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s Staff, after which he said the enemy has made no gains there and that Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi is personally in command of the defence of Pokrovsk.
"The Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad agglomeration is in a semi-encirclement, with logistics effectively cut," said Armed Forces of Ukraine officer Mykola Melnyk, commenting on what is happening. "Ukraine’s Defence Forces control less than 50% of Pokrovsk. I wrote three months ago that the enemy would capture it precisely by encirclement, as that was the most logical course and the enemy has taken it."
- People`s Deputy and Colonel Roman Kostenko says the loss of Pokrovsk is only a matter of time. What is your take on this?
- Everything in this world is a matter of time. We’re just trying to understand exactly how much. Unfortunately, even if you simply look at the DeepState map, you’ll see that the gap between the Russians’ flanks, between the ‘grey zones’ from the north and the south, from the Krasnyi Lyman side and from the Pokrovsk side, respectively, is only four kilometres. And that’s after stabilization measures that were carried out, even with the involvement of Defence Intelligence fighters. In effect, we have a semi-encirclement. Logistics are cut, which means nothing can get through south of Myrnohrad.
Accordingly, the key question is how to withdraw people from the Promin–Chunyshyne line with minimal losses. Our troops there are already in a very broad semi-encirclement (if the word ‘encirclement’ itself scares us, we can call it that). They need to be pulled back to the Myrnohrad–Pokrovsk highway. That is the first task that should face responsible commanders — the ‘fathers’ of their units.
Second, we must recognize that we will not hold Myrnohrad either. The next step is to pull back further west and try to stabilize in Pokrovsk. Urban fighting is still possible there, but only on one condition: the enemy must not break through beyond Rodynske and advance roughly five kilometres west of that settlement. If that happens, the fate of Pokrovsk will be fully sealed. That’s why I say we must already be thinking about new defensive fortifications beyond the Pokrovsk line. Because, in my view, the command will, as always, cling to those tree lines nobody really needs until the last. And we will once again end up in the same situation, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s Staff often puts it: ‘No unit was encircled. Only individual soldiers ended up encircled.’ We had that under Kurakhove, near Avdiivka, and especially near Sudzha, when our guys walked out on foot for 20–25 kilometres, and we were simply very lucky the Russians were afraid to pursue us actively. By the way, near Sudzha, the 1st Battalion of the 47th Brigade made a stand and enabled others to withdraw.
I want us to avoid a situation where fortifications are built, but there is no one in them because those who could have been sent there are already encircled or have been killed in unnecessary fights for tree lines.
- But the enemy had been trying to take Pokrovsk for more than a year. Why has it managed to get so close now and advance into the city?
- First, they began advancing into the city three months ago. They saw how porous our defences were. I can only assume the brigades stationed there were battle-weary. Manpower was insufficient, and the ‘kill zone’ set up by our Unmanned Systems Forces and line units could not always react to one or two Russian soldiers infiltrating the city limits. When those ‘one or two’ became dozens, these infiltration groups created a critical mass on the outskirts and started pushing further in. If you look at the map, you can see almost all of Pokrovsk is ‘grey’. That means fighting is unfolding in a staggered arrangement; it’s no longer fully clear where friend and foe are. Units of the Unmanned Systems Forces keep pulling back westward to maintain effective support for the infantry. But the infiltration tactics used by the Russians produced results. Yes, they suffered massive losses. It has been a ‘bloody’ city for them, but they achieved their objective. That’s the first point. Second, our brigades were exhausted. And third, our lines of communication had effectively been under enemy fire control for at least a month or two. Accordingly, this weakened us. When you lose a significant share of equipment and personnel on the way up to the positions, after a while, you simply have nothing left to defend with. That’s what happened.
- You’ve written about the reasons for the enemy’s advance — the exhaustion of units, lack of manpower, the enemy’s overwhelming superiority, and even flowerbeds being built instead of defensive structures. Who should be held responsible for this?
- There are the relevant heads of the military-civil administrations. They’re appointed to run the city, taking the military situation into account. On the administrative side, there are surnames, first names, and patronymics. On the military side, whatever happens, no one will be held to account, because I’m more than certain that, as always, there was micromanagement, with the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief deciding where to place which observation post.
A lack of trust in the junior officer corps will constantly breed a lack of initiative. For the Ukrainian army, that is fatal, because the only way to outplay a stronger adversary is initiative. Yes, any initiative in the military has to operate within certain bounds, but right now, it is paralyzed across most units.
- On 2 November, former Deputy Defense Minister Vitalii Deineha wrote a very tough post about the situation in Pokrovsk, noting that in effect we have already lost the city and need to pull our troops out. I’ll quote: ‘We need to rescue those who refuse to leave without an order. And we shouldn’t fear a drop in ratings, because there will be no elections: next year will be another year of war. And someone will have to fight it.’ What’s your take?"
- I always start from this: before saying ‘we have to pull out,’ we need to establish whether we have sufficient fortifications so we don’t repeat Avdiivka. There we withdrew, but where did we then stop? We withdrew rather quickly. Why? Because beyond Avdiivka, there were no properly built field fortifications, and units had to fight out in the open.
So we must make sure those fortifications exist (as far as I know, they do). That’s the first point. Second, the withdrawal must be phased. If we pull back from Pokrovsk but remain in Myrnohrad, everyone left there could be killed. Likewise, if we pull back from the Myrnohrad–Pokrovsk line, there are also units further south that could be left stranded. That’s why I support a phased withdrawal, and not because I like repeating the mantra ‘let’s just withdraw, our boys are there.’ It’s because fighting in a semi-encirclement for utterly pointless tree lines is foolish and the only fan of that is our Commander-in-Chief."
We need to preserve personnel, pull back gradually, step by step and save our soldiers. I wouldn’t say there’s no one left to fight. We have simply failed our information and mobilization policy. Why? I don’t want to criticize the authorities right now and spoil my mood.
- But, frankly, mobilization has failed…
- If you listen to some members of the relevant parliamentary committee, they think mobilization is fine. That’s what Horbenko, an MP from Servant of the People, says, a man who used to install light bulbs at the Kyiv City State Administration and, after climbing the career ladder, now says all AWOL personnel should have their bank accounts blocked. The problem is that this person has no understanding of defense matters, yet is in charge of this issue.
- Let’s return to Pokrovsk. Can these battles for the city be compared to the situations in Bakhmut or Avdiivka?
- I wouldn’t compare Bakhmut with Pokrovsk. There may be similarities in terms of supply-route interdiction and the envelopment of the flanks that occurred then. It is a fact that we will lose Pokrovsk, given the balance of forces and assets we can bring to bear there and from what is happening now. So the question is fairly simple: how do we minimize the damage from what will occur? The problem is not the loss of Pokrovsk per se, but ensuring that all those defending it do not die.
- In the press, including foreign outlets, the question is raised of what happens if Pokrovsk falls. They write that Russia would gain advantageous observation and firing positions to push toward Kramatorsk and Sloviansk; that losing the city would complicate the Armed Forces’ supply line; and that defending the region would require reallocating our forces, potentially weakening other sectors. What’s your view?
- I don’t see how the loss of Pokrovsk would worsen logistics with Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, since the road through Pokrovsk was cut six months ago, so that isn’t the issue. As for having to realign the frontline, yes, we will. We’ve been doing that for two years
Once again: we need to build enough fortifications that meet modern requirements, anti-drone protection, concrete, everything as it should be. Yes, Pokrovsk sits on the heights. Fine. So what do we do?! We pull back to better positions. There is no choice. The only question is preserving personnel so we don’t repeat the situation near Dobropillia, when the first line was breached and then the trenches behind it were empty, which created a 15-kilometre enemy salient. If that doesn’t happen, and if there are sufficient forces beyond Pokrovsk to hold the enemy further, there will be no catastrophe.
- You mentioned the Defence Intelligence (GUR) operation, that air insertion that set social media abuzz. Many call it audacious. What went through your mind when you learned about it?
- Desperation. The answer is fairly simple. Entering the engagement envelope of Russian MANPADS and drones and inserting infantry, even the most highly trained, within small-arms range of the enemy is extremely risky. It’s good the operation was well planned and we didn’t lose helicopters or personnel. I hope all Defence Intelligence special operators are alive. I don’t know their ultimate fate. But it was desperation.
- By the way, media reported that Kyrylo Budanov led the operation. Photos were published purportedly showing him there.
- If a general starts commanding twenty soldiers, that means there are problems in command. Yes, in general a general should be on the frontline with the troops. If our brigade and battalion commands were a bit closer to the soldier, they might better understand what war is. We’re already raising a cohort of officers who have only seen war on screens, who haven’t stormed tree lines themselves yet know exactly how best to do it.
- And the President said the Commander-in-Chief is personally handling the defence of Pokrovsk and that Oleksandr Syrskyi is there as well. Doesn’t that also point to command-and-control problems?
- Then why do we even have operational-tactical group (OTG), operational-strategic group of troops (OSGT), corps commands and the rest if, in a critical situation, we send the Commander-in-Chief himself?! This is Syrskyi’s old, familiar micromanagement, a man who hasn’t fought a single day with a rifle, yet still knows exactly how others should fight. We have a whole cohort of ‘armchair’ generals who spent years running the army down, then during the ATO told everyone how to fight and now they’re in command.
I don’t know whether this is the President’s decision, I won’t presume to discuss it. But if you don’t let subordinates develop, if you place any serious situation on a single person, that one person simply won’t be enough. This is a delegation problem. God willing, Syrskyi succeeds. Everyone is for that! I’m talking about something else: if we can’t entrust this situation to the generals who are paid to handle it, if we don’t trust the corps and brigade commands on the ground, then what structure have we built in the army at all? What kind of system is it when Syrskyi has to explain which observation post to hold? We won’t get far that way.
- There was another interesting episode. On 29 October, the Russian president claimed the Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk and Kupiansk were supposedly ‘encircled.’ He then proposed halting hostilities in those sectors so Western and Ukrainian journalists could ‘see with their own eyes’ that what he said was true. What do you make of that statement? What was he trying to show?
- Nothing, other than an attempt to disorganize the attention of Ukraine’s political leadership. His words carried no military weight. He understands perfectly well that Ukrainians will no longer go along with proposals for a ‘one- or two-day ceasefire’. Because, as experience shows, the Russians use that time to dig in quite effectively. So it was a straightforward attempt to manipulate our political leadership. It’s good that didn’t happen.
- Putin also said he was ready to come to Pokrovsk. Is that some kind of muscle-flexing?
- I think Putin would just send another body double, that’s all.
- Why have they latched onto Pokrovsk and devoted so much attention to it? Is this part of their plan to capture all of Donbas?
- Pokrovsk has significant logistical importance. If they start expanding here, Kramatorsk will sooner or later find itself encircled. The Russians operate by envelopment. Yes, they assault frontally, but on the strategic map they try to envelop our strong defensive logistics hubs. So it’s fairly logical. Within the campaign to seize Donbas, Pokrovsk plays a key role.
If they seize the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad agglomeration, they can continue advancing on Dobropillia and to the north without much difficulty. In that case, Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka would end up, so to speak, in a logistical semi-encirclement, because the Russians would bring the roads under fire control and wear down the units defending those cities. So in the context of taking Donbas, Pokrovsk is indeed important, both politically and militarily.
- The Russians keep setting deadlines, including when they plan to take Donbas. What does this urge to impose timelines tell you? Is it a holdover of Soviet thinking?
- They draw on their old, jingoistic tradition, "a five-year plan in two years," "we’ll deliver coal by January 1," and so on. In practice, this hurts Russia itself, because it forces units and commanders to conform to politically driven planning. That’s fine, let them keep doing it. What matters is that we don’t copy it.
- Because then "a small Soviet army will never beat a big Soviet army"?
- Fortunately, we’re not going to become a Soviet army, we’ve gone our own way and made real progress. Unfortunately, that logic is sometimes imposed on us. What I mean is a small army is fighting a big Soviet army, sometimes by Soviet methods. That’s the problem.
- At the start of last year, in one interview you said: "The more we fight on Russian territory, the less we will fight in Ukraine. Sadly, the Russians aren’t going anywhere. We won’t forgive them for coming to our land, and they won’t forgive us for not surrendering. This war will last decades. So it’s better to take the fight to their soil." Do you still think so now?
- Yes. I said it then in the context of taking the fight into the Kursk region. That was absolutely the right call. The problem is that we then turned that offensive into a standard defence. And when I and other military personnel pointed out that our logistics were cut and that we were losing two thirds of our personnel before they even reached the positions, I was told I knew little about warfare. The people responsible were promoted anyway. They squandered a large share of our infantry, lost a lot of equipment, mortars and everything else and still got promoted, because they were following the Commander-in-Chief’s order to ‘hold to the end’, not their own end, but at the expense of the soldiers fighting there. So I stand by my view: taking the fight onto the enemy’s territory is the right approach. We do it almost every night. And yes, the Russians will never forgive us for not surrendering. There may be ceasefires, but after that will come a new escalation and a continuation of this war of attrition.
- Can taking the fight onto their soil ‘sober’ the Russians up in any way?
- No, they can't.
- Why?
- How do you ‘sober up’ maniacs?! There’s nothing you can do with them. They are a threat.
- How do we prepare our society for the fact that this war will be long
- I’ll repeat what I said in 2022. There must be basic military training for everyone. Civic and patriotic education should be compulsory from kindergarten, not the sham we have now. Proper military training for students, not what we’re seeing today. We must finally close the borders, work to bring draft dodgers back from abroad through criminal prosecution, and change our information policy. The President must finally side with the state, with the soldier who is fighting. Because when the President tells me an AWOL serviceman is simply someone who is tired, the question arises: who is the one still fighting?! Some have been at it for more than ten years? are they not tired?! There is no societal condemnation of desertion. The state uses its coercive power for anything and everything except protecting the mobilization system, which is critical.
I won’t even start on the competence of those running the defense system, politically and practically. Fine, suppose there’s no one else; even so, people simply don’t want anything to do with a certain political leadership. But what I’ve listed is the baseline, without it, society cannot keep fighting. As for the army, the list could go on and on.
- Why isn’t this being done?
- I’d rather not offend the President.
Olha Moskaliuk, Censor.NET
