Chance for reform: what Fedorov’s appointment means for front and army
We are dedicating this stream to a very important event that took place in the Verkhovna Rada. A new Minister of Defense has been appointed — Mykhailo Fedorov. The position of defense minister, which effectively shapes Ukraine’s entire defense policy, has always drawn close attention. And this appointment is truly worth a separate discussion and a clear assessment so that you and I can understand where we are headed in the war.
So, here is what I would like to say about Mykhailo Fedorov.
For the first time, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has personally appointed the defense minister. In all the years of his leadership of the country. Previously, under Zelenskyy, defense ministers were appointed exclusively by his chiefs of staff. First, it was Andrii Bohdan who effectively determined the candidacy of Andrii Zahorodniuk, and then it was Andriy Yermak who exclusively appointed defense ministers. They were his people, entirely his team: he appointed Reznikov, he appointed Umerov, and then Shmyhal was appointed for a very short term. For most of the war, the Ministry of Defense was led by Reznikov and Umerov. Both were removed amid corruption scandals, and Yermak himself was also removed. And after the all-powerful "Ali Baba" left the Office and, as he said, went to the front, Volodymyr Zelenskyy gained freedom of choice and, for the first time, personally selected the candidate of the defense minister.
The second thing that happened for the first time. For the first time, a person has been appointed defense minister who, to be blunt, is respected within the army among most of the commanders working with unmanned technologies and UAVs, I can’t speak for everyone, and who has tangible achievements. And that knowledge is indeed of a fairly high level.
Previously, we did not see competent people being appointed to positions. As a rule, the appointees were people with no real clout and no expertise, people who could be easily pushed around, or who immediately folded and carried out any orders from whoever was overseeing them. And that leads to scandals like the eggs at 17 hryvnias affair and similar cases. In other words, people appointed to government typically had no established track record. And here, for the first time, a person has been appointed who has a reputation built over time, specifically, in the sphere of war. I cannot say that this record is flawless; there were scandals as well, and we will talk about them a bit later, but there are tangible achievements that really deserve to be noted, and they are what built Mykhailo Fedorov’s track record. And that is exactly what we will discuss in detail.
And the third point I would like to note is that, for the first time, a new defense minister, upon taking office, announced a concrete concept of his actions, clearly outlining what exactly he intends to do and where he wants to move. And for the first time, this defense minister stated that the model for changes in the army and the sources of information on what needs to be done in the role of defense minister are specific frontline commanders. And all the commanders named by Fedorov are indeed well-known leaders of Ukraine’s best combat units, people with the strongest combat reputations. In other words, his assumption of office and his work are directly tied to his assessment of interaction with these commanders. This cannot but spark interest, and as a starting point, in order to form an assessment, it is essential to quote exactly what Fedorov said in the Verkhovna Rada.
What I would note first is what Fedorov said at the outset.
"Today, a large number of problems remain that need to be addressed. A paper-based army, Soviet-era approaches, excessive bureaucracy, and disruptions in supplying the front. All of this prevents soldiers on the front line from operating at maximum effectiveness and reliably defending their land."
I would note that Fedorov is taking office as a leader who already has the creation of the Diia system to his credit. Therefore, I hope these words will be put into practice and that this paper-based, entirely unnecessary bureaucratic machine in the army will indeed be optimized through electronic documentation, making a large share of internal correspondence redundant.
"Soviet-era approaches" is a broad slogan.
Excessive bureaucracy, yes, unquestionably, it is simply very extensive in the army. As for disruptions in supplying the front, I think this is also obvious to everyone.
Fedorov then went on to speak about himself.
"I am taking up the position of defense minister not as a minister who built a digital state and created Diia, but as a person who has spent a great deal of time working on the war since 2022. Thanks to the work of our team and the support of the president, Starlink terminals appeared in Ukraine."
Here I want to say that yes, indeed, I personally received a batch of Starlink terminals back in May 2022, in fact, in late April 2022, specifically from the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine: 300 Starlink terminals. This was the first substantial batch that the state allocated to the troops; I merely helped speed up their distribution. I want to emphasize that this was truly an outstanding event at the time, because for the first time, several military units fighting at the front received 300 Starlink terminals at once. Later in 2022, more than 5,000 Starlink terminals entered service with the army. This was a major development that genuinely made our war network-centric. So that is true.
Specific projects. Army of Drones and the Line of Drones. These are projects that are still being implemented. Brave1, as well as the e-points motivation system, here too, I can confirm Fedorov’s role. I had the opportunity to speak with the minister in January 2023. At that time, he asked about my perspective, based on my trips to the front, on how drone development was progressing. And I said then that we needed a real system for tracking hits, a clear record of what each brigade actually eliminates. So that it would be possible to recognize how effectively each unit is performing. And this system has to be based on video data. Because at that time, most hits were recorded through written reports, essentially "by eye."
And the majority of enemy hits in the army were not confirmed. I remember that in 2023, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Yurii Moisiuk delivered a briefing and stated that, according to the General Staff, only 10% of destroyed and hit enemy forces were confirmed by video evidence. I said at the time that a proper accounting system was needed, that hits should be counted exclusively based on video footage: anything not recorded on video does not exist and should not be included in enemy loss figures. And I will say this frankly, I am impressed. Because Mykhailo Fedorov actually did this. He did not merely voice an idea; he implemented it in practice, which is far more difficult than simply proposing a concept. I only articulated the idea, while he turned it into a real system and a real plan: he secured the resources, built a verification framework, and established an accounting system through Delta, a situational awareness platform that exists thanks to his direct involvement and is now widely deployed across the armed forces. And it truly became a functioning system. As a result, in 2023, the most effective units actually received direct funding.
Next, I want to say that not everything is smooth with the e-points system, of course. I want to state right away that I viewed e-points exclusively as an incentive pool, not as the primary system for distributing all resources. But the fact that there is a verified system for tracking hits is unquestionably the achievement of Mykhailo Fedorov, and this must be acknowledged.
Industry.
Yes, the industry has indeed expanded. Fedorov said that at the start of the invasion, Ukraine had seven companies producing drones; today, there are more than 500. There were two companies working on electronic warfare (EW); today, there are 200. There were no private companies producing missiles; today, there are more than 20. There were zero companies producing ground robotic systems; now there are more than 100. Undoubtedly, the role of the United24 fund in the development of all these sectors has been decisive.
There is also a concrete and vivid example here. The National Guard’s Lazar Regiment, which we supported from scratch, destroyed enemy equipment worth $15 billion. This is true, and I can confirm it, because I also followed the development of the Lazar Regiment, and this is indeed the case. It was the Lazar Regiment, under the command of Colonel Pavlo Yelizarov, that became the first unit in Ukraine to scale the mass use of bomber drones and strike drones across the entire front, drones that were able to inflict truly irreversible losses on the enemy. And this became possible because once Lazar had built its drone system and formed its team, it was Fedorov who scaled up production and genuinely brought in major state investments. The result is well known: Lazar is simply not a heavily publicized unit, one that we only began to hear about toward the end of 2025, but in reality, it is the largest and most effective unit of Ukraine’s Defense Forces in terms of its combat tally. And the losses they inflicted on Russia’s war machine, I believe, will inevitably go down in history. Therefore, Fedorov’s role here was truly decisive in terms of funding and responsibility for this line of effort.
Next, there is a joint project with the SBU’s Alpha Group, through which more than 300 enemy air defense systems were destroyed in 2025 alone. The Line of Drones, which destroys every fourth target on the front. Yes, and as for the work and outstanding results of Alpha, it is indeed a unit that is currently unique in its capabilities and performs truly unique missions. In the past month alone, Alpha eliminated more than 2,000 enemy infantry. This is a single unit within a single service. And 300 enemy air defense systems in 2025. Yes, these are unquestionably confirmed hits and destroyed equipment. This is unquestionably an outstanding result.
And the Line of Drones. This is a fairly well-known project. Undoubtedly, Fedorov’s role here is also one of the key ones. In terms of allocating resources, lobbying, and overall promotion of this flagship project. So if we speak about the presentation part outlined by Fedorov, I confirm all of it. The only thing I do not understand is why he did not mention the Delta system, because Delta is also an important story that he supported and defended. For this, those involved in the creation and development of the system are also grateful. I believe that everyone who is fighting understands that Delta is one of Ukraine’s advantages in the war. And only at the end of 2025 did the enemy deploy a system intended to replicate Delta, a situational awareness system. But this is a very complex architecture, and I think the enemy will need more than one year simply to catch up to the level that Delta has already achieved.
"Today, we cannot fight with new technologies and an old organisational structure. Comprehensive changes are needed. Our goal is to change the system, carry out army reform, improve infrastructure on the front lines, eradicate lies and corruption, and make leadership and trust a new culture. So that people who deliver real results are rewarded and given the opportunity to grow further."
These are very ambitious goals and the right words. And it is a serious challenge. We have to see what Fedorov can actually do. Because in order to carry out army reform, coordinated action is needed from all levels of the state system, starting with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief himself, and his entire subordinate chain of command: both in the Ministry of Defence and in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Improving the infrastructure on the front line requires joint efforts with the leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other defence structures. I think these are truly global and correct goals, and I believe it is very good when such high standards are set, especially in the fight against lies and corruption, which, unfortunately, are widespread in our state structures, including the Defence Forces, of course. To eradicate this, systemic changes and reforms are needed. Political will is needed, communication with the army is needed, and we need to understand what is happening in the army. It is only possible to separate lies from the truth by having a thorough understanding of the situation.
But I am glad that such a high bar has been set. After all, this is the first time we have had a defence minister who says what he is going to do. We have had ministers who offered no specifics whatsoever in the Verkhovna Rada.
"The President has set a clear task, to build a system capable of stopping the enemy in the air, halting advances on the ground, strengthening asymmetric cyber strikes against the enemy and its economy.
To make the cost of the war for Russia one it cannot sustain. To stop the enemy by force."
For the first time, a defense minister is taking office while putting forward a concrete concept for his actions. And I can say this is the first realistic task that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief has set for a defense minister in all these years. So "stop the enemy by force" is indeed what I have been talking about for many years. And here it is the defense minister who has to deliver it. As for stopping the enemy in the air and halting advances on the ground, I can say this: it is impossible to stop the enemy in the air completely, but it is possible to significantly reduce the effectiveness of enemy strikes. Undoubtedly, halting advances on the ground, I say this repeatedly on almost every stream, is a realistic task that Ukraine can accomplish now. We have the people, the resources, and the weapons for this. What is lacking are simply the necessary management and organizational steps. Next, to carry out an army reform, that is a complicated matter, and I have said as much. Next, to strengthen asymmetric cyber strikes against the enemy and its economy. Undoubtedly, the cost of the war for Russia has to be increased. I particularly like this phrase, the logic is specific: stop the enemy by force. This is exactly the slogan that is realistic and necessary for our country right now. And this is precisely the principle by which all actions, everything happening in the state and at the front, should now be assessed. Does what is happening on a particular sector of the front contribute to stopping the enemy or not? And this unquestionably needs to be covered. And this is now everyone’s responsibility, because it is a call from the defense minister. This is what his track record is built on.
Fedorov then said that we must begin work in the information and cognitive domain and counter Russian propaganda, including on the enemy’s territory. Our strategy led to the enemy suffering a record 35,000 Russian losses in December. These are verified losses: there is video evidence for every hit. One caveat is needed so it does not look perfectly smooth and pretty; in reality, war is hard. The enemy has 35,000 hits on video, but of course, not all of them are irreversible losses or losses that the enemy cannot replace. I think the videos realistically show up to about 30,000 killed and wounded. Still, in my view, this is a correct and fully objective demonstration that the current strategy, wearing the enemy down through losses, can lead to success. We have talked about this.
I believe that 40,000 Russians not hit but killed would completely stop the Russian invasion. The enemy is not capable of sustaining such a rate of losses. Can we do this when we already have 35,000 hits? Absolutely. This is a purely technological and mathematical task. We have the structures, we have the people, and we have the tactics. What needs to be done is clear. I like the fact that a concrete figure has been stated and that a strategy of action must be tied to it. We need to see how this will work in practice.
"We have launched a market for interceptor drones that shoot down double-digit percentages of all Shahed drones. We are already eliminating Russians at sea and at their own airfields."
All I can say here is that it is impossible to take out the Shaheds with drones alone. Under certain conditions, unfortunately, significantly fewer Shaheds are taken out, and our infrastructure suffers. It is obvious that, in addition to interceptors, anti-aircraft missile systems are still needed here. Without this, it is impossible to build a reliable air defence system. And now one of our challenges is precisely mass anti-aircraft missile systems that can strike at least low-speed drones, which cause us such heavy losses, in various weather conditions.
"We were the first in the world to create drone assault regiments, one of which was the striking force for the recent de-occupation of Kupiansk."
Yes, I can confirm that the 475th Assault Regiment, commanded by Hero of Ukraine Oleksandr Nastenko, was indeed one of the leading strike forces during the liberation of Kupiansk. And I am proud that we are operating near Kupiansk together as part of the same grouping within the Khartiia Corps, because Oleksandr Nastenko is truly one of our best, unquestionably, regimental commanders, a person who has mastered the tactics of employing drones and infantry, as well as breakthrough tactics in kill zones. So I can say that this is indeed a fair assessment.
… I want to say that casualty figures in the 475th Assault Regiment are significantly lower. They do exist, and for us, the death of every warrior, every soldier, is a heavy loss. But compared with the enemy, in Flint’s sector, the ratio of irreversible enemy losses is roughly 1 to 25–30, based on objective accounting and official records of these targets. As for losses during assault operations under Flint — that is, in the regiment commanded by Oleksandr Nastenko, callsign Flint, the casualties sustained by Nastenko’s 475th Regiment during this operation were lower than those of one mechanized brigade that was merely holding defensive positions in its sector and conducting defensive operations. This is because the organizational and command decisions made by Nastenko represent a correct model, one that I hope will be used to modernize other separate assault regiments of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This requires a large number of drones, of course, the allocation of funding, oversight of that funding, and organizational development. It is also necessary to stop tearing assault regiments apart into ten fragments for ten different tasks across different directions. The effectiveness of the 475th Regiment was directly linked to the fact that it operated in a single sector, and the command of the Khartiia Corps did not disperse it across multiple areas. It was employed in a concentrated manner on one sector. If all our assault regiments operate this way and are reinforced with drones, then drones, not people with rifles, will be assaulting the enemy. And people will stop being afraid of the very term "assault regiment," understanding instead that such units receive special treatment, the strongest support, and that it is possible there to fight, to win, and to survive the war.
"Artificial intelligence has become an ally of Ukraine in the war. Hundreds of AI-driven solutions are operating on the front line and are being applied at the level of military operations. We are moving toward full autonomy on the battlefield, from machine vision and data analytics to drone swarms. For now, this remains research. Fewer losses. More technology and fewer deaths. The lives of Ukrainian heroes are the highest value. We have no right to make decisions that cost the lives of our heroes."
Unfortunately, this is already framed as a goal, reducing losses. I fully support this; it should unquestionably be the primary reason for carrying out army reforms in the first place. Do we have no right to make decisions that cost the lives of our heroes? I think that in war, there are no decisions that can be made entirely without losses at the planning stage. This is something we must strive for and do everything possible to achieve. The reason I am skeptical of such slogans is that I have heard them hundreds of times from senior state leaders, reducing losses, safeguarding every life, a human-centered army; even our leadership has put forward such theses. Friends, in reality, all of this often remained just empty words. It is no coincidence that so much criticism is voiced within the army and society about so-called "meat-grinder" operations. What is needed is a system of truthful accounting, reporting, and after-action reviews to conduct objective analysis. Yes, we also need to quickly and once and for all change the system of training for Ukrainian servicemen.
"High-quality training means fewer losses and greater effectiveness. The issue of the Territorial Centers of Recruitment (TCRs) cannot be ignored. After a comprehensive audit, we will propose a systemic solution to address the accumulated problems while preserving the country’s defense capability."
This is vague. I want to say that there is no TCR problem in Ukraine. What Ukraine does have is a problem of total irresponsibility on the part of the authorities, the absence of an electronic accounting system, and the shifting of responsibility by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s Headquarters onto TCR servicemen amid the lack of a unified system for general mobilization and the registration of all those liable for military service. That is the real problem. Once a unified registry of those liable for military service is established, the corrupt system of hundreds of points of sale for draft evasion and illegal border crossings, which currently exists and enriches those involved, will disappear. There will also be logic to the system: people will understand that evasion is not an option, and that there is a clear rationale for how manpower is used, who is needed in the defense industry and who is not, who is required for critical infrastructure and who is not, who should be mobilized first, and who should be trained for which positions. This can be achieved solely through management decisions. And if TCR servicemen receive orders to detain people in the streets, they are not to blame, the responsibility lies with those at the top who issue such orders. That is where change is needed. TCRs are simply people doing what they are allowed to do and what they are required to do, to be honest.
"Everything must be based on data, this is a priority. We will measure the effectiveness of everything."
I strongly support this thesis and want to say that it is indeed a highly innovative, breakthrough approach. Tracking results and tracking resources spent is something that is entirely absent in our Defense Forces. What we do have is a bureaucratic reporting system designed to write things off. But there is no system for accounting for achieved results. And the key question, what were those resources spent for? This should be a system that does not overwhelm executors with reporting. It should be a resource-tracking system that allows control over the actions of senior and mid-level leadership. Instead, we have a distortion. We account for and control only those who are directly fighting on the front line. But that is precisely where additional layers of control are not needed. Control is needed over those who make decisions and assume responsibility for specific sectors of the front. And over those who assign these front-line sectors to them and make strategic and operational decisions. That is where resource accounting is required, unquestionably. I hope that this data tracking and measurement of overall effectiveness will lead precisely to these outcomes.
"We must scale those who are strong and help those who are ready and working for results to grow. Access to development opportunities must be equal for everyone. Therefore, one of my first decisions as Minister of Defense will be to ensure a baseline level of drone provision for brigades, something that is clearly lacking. This will improve predictability and the quality of planning."
Yes, unquestionably, this is problem number one. In 2024–2025, we saw a truly catastrophic breakdown of the entire system of drone planning and distribution. Funds that are supposed to go toward drones are instead being spent on maintaining various individual units, branches, forces that have been created, centers, and structures that are supposedly responsible for drones. All the money goes there, instead of asking where drones are actually needed most and where development is most critical. The greatest development is needed by the forces that are responsible for their own sectors of the front. That is where planned, continuous drone supply is required. And yes, there is also a need for high-quality reinforcement units to carry out special missions and to scale operations. There are also reserve units of the Commander-in-Chief that are concentrated to create numerical advantages and carry out special missions against specific targets, tasks, points, and sectors. But the key issue for us is stopping the Russian offensive. Therefore, the most stable and reliable supply must go precisely to those who deliver results and hold the front. If infantry units are left without Mavics, if they are left without properly supported reconnaissance drone positions and without the necessary infrastructure, and if losses of this equipment are not replenished, what will happen? What will happen is exactly what we are seeing now. Every week, the enemy captures several dozen square kilometers and continues to advance. In other words, drone forces are growing, yet the enemy still keeps pushing forward. And we are unable to build kill zones in defense, they are absent across most sections of the front. We cannot properly equip them or prepare them for defense. That is why it is encouraging to hear such a statement from Fedorov. This is a statement that, I hope, will be followed very quickly by concrete decisions.
"Today, the top 50 units out of 400 account for 70% of enemy hits. Imagine the potential of the Defense Forces if we help the remaining 350 to grow."
That is one way to put it, but I think this requires a comprehensive solution, not only in terms of organizing drone units themselves. We already have a large number of such units and operators. The problem lies in how to increase the effectiveness of all existing crews and the survivability of those crews that hold the front and, first and foremost, provide situational awareness. Someone has to detect infiltration itself. And oversight should not focus only on those who deliver strikes. I hope the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine will pay attention to those who identify targets. Because the war depends on the positions of reconnaissance drone operators using platforms such as DJI Mavic and Autel Robotics. They are the backbone of the Defense Forces’ combat formations. I hope the minister will focus on the quality of how tactical reconnaissance is organized on the front line and on ensuring situational awareness, because shortcomings in this area are what allow the enemy to infiltrate our combat formations.
"Through his own example of cooperation and joint projects with Madyar, K2, Biletskyi, and Obolienskyi." That is, Robert Brovdi (callsign Madyar) is the Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces. Kyrylo Veres (K2) is the commander of a regiment within the K2 Brigade. Andrii Biletskyi commands the 3rd Army Corps. Ihor Obolienskyi commands the 2nd Army Corps Khartiia. Flint is Oleksandr Nastenko, commander of the 465th Regiment. Achilles Brigade is led by Yurii Fedorenko. Phoenix Regiment is a regiment within the SBU Border Guard component. Rarog Brigade is a separate unmanned systems brigade. Yevhen Khmara commands the SBU Special Operations Center Alpha and is currently serving as acting head of the SBU. Perun — Nemesis. Perun is the commander of the 1st Separate Assault Regiment. Callsign Perun is Dmytro Filatov. Nemesis Brigade is a separate brigade. Denys Prokopenko (Redis) commands the 1st Army Corps. Along with many other remarkable service members, we saw an example of true leadership."
This is very important to me. Here, Mykhailo Fedorov explained which military leaders’ views and whose vision of the war, he relies on. And it must be noted that all the people named here are indeed figures who, in many respects, are decisive for the front as a whole and for many specific sectors of the front in particular. Such a choice of interlocutors, those with whom communication is conducted, undoubtedly inspires strong hope and positive expectations that this communication will be translated into concrete organizational and managerial decisions, which are referenced in the speech.
"Today, anyone who steals during the war is our enemy."
We will see, because we remember that the issue of reputation will be decisive for Mykhailo Fedorov. Indeed, when we see respect for the resources that the state gathers for the war with such tremendous effort, everyone in the army wants to see the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine as a benchmark, a place where money is not stolen, where funds collected with such difficulty are spent on the war itself. I hope this becomes a defining track record, that anti-corruption is a priority and a foundation, that Fedorov will act with the same transparency, will comment publicly, and will safeguard the reputation he has managed to build. I want to remind you that there were also critical issues in his work, including a corruption scandal that directly concerned him, as well as the activities of the structures that procured drones jointly with United24.
In 2024, there was a well-known scandal over drone procurement. In fact, there were two scandals involving Mykhailo Fedorov. The first concerned the procurement of Autel drones supplied to the army: units received invoices showing prices roughly twice as high as the market price at which these drones could be purchased with public funds. The second case involved a manufacturer producing certain types of drones that initially entered army service. If a unit chose these drones, the so-called Vampire drones, they could acquire the largest quantities using e-points. This created a strong incentive and effectively stimulated sales of that particular product. I think these were two instructive episodes for Fedorov that could have seriously damaged, reputationally, both his work and the work of United24. However, the situation was later corrected, and at present the e-points system has largely been equalized. As far as is known, all types of bomber drones are now supplied to the army without major issues, and their quality is sufficient for units to independently decide what works well and what does not. Since then, Vampire drones have been purchased by units with their own funds, as have other types of drones entering service. Still, this was a corruption risk that could have dealt a serious blow to Fedorov, and at the time, he made every effort to resolve the issue. I hope this was a lesson for him, lessons also learned from Oleksii Reznikov and Rustem Umerov, who were removed from office due to corruption scandals and an inability or unwillingness to effectively confront corruption, effectively allowing it to take root and expand.
I hope that the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine will now be able to demonstrate a completely different level of transparency, and that any issue will be resolved as quickly and as transparently as possible for the stakeholders, not for society at large, but for those who make decisions, those who execute them, and those whose work depends on these decisions. I am confident that such work must be carried out. I believe that journalists, after Mykhailo Fedorov made such ambitious and indeed respectable statements at this level, will scrutinize any potential blemish far more closely than before. Unlike the cases of Oleksii Reznikov or Rustem Umerov, under Fedorov even the planning and signing stages of documents will now be examined under a microscope. Therefore, I hope that the challenge Fedorov set for himself in this speech will be met with dignity and successfully fulfilled.
"We will take the development of Ukraine’s defense industry to a new level. Defense tech will become a key Ukrainian industry on global markets and a driver of the country’s economic growth. Yes, this is about the future. We need to do our homework to create a Ukrainian air defense system and our own laser-guided artillery round."
I believe we need to deliver far more technological solutions that can change the course of the war, including these. We will see what specific tasks are defined and where funding for new developments is directed. Creating a Ukrainian air defense system is, in my view, an eight-year task at best, even if progress is fast and decisions are made correctly. A laser-guided artillery round, however, can in principle be developed relatively quickly, and such projects are already underway in Ukraine.
"In the near future, we will conduct a deep audit of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Armed Forces of Ukraine to identify additional opportunities to improve the financial and social support provided to service members."
This will be an interesting task that will affect the entire army.
"We have a clear vision and clear war objectives, approved by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the President. Everyone who helps achieve the goals of the war will receive the necessary resources to move forward. Those who fail will leave the system."
This is a fairly tough, direct statement. It will be interesting to see what criteria are defined.
"The defense system needs real, visible changes that are felt at the level of individual service members, reduce the system’s internal hell, genuinely improve the army’s capabilities, and improve the condition of the people who serve in it."
"Finally, I want to say that my hometown of Vasylivka in the Zaporizhzhia region is occupied. Russian forces entered Vasylivka in the first days of the invasion. I am proud of my city because residents and service members began to resist. Thanks to this struggle, the Russian advance in this direction was halted, which contributed to the defense of Zaporizhzhia. For the past four years, I have lived with the goal of liberating Vasylivka, so this story is personal to me."
I think this is the right motivation. But right now, the most important task for all of us is to defend Zaporizhzhia and to protect other Ukrainian cities, because the enemy continues its offensive. Even if we are unable to liberate territory in the near term, if in the near future and this is the core task articulated by Minister Fedorov, we manage to halt the front line, that alone will constitute a strategic victory for us and a defeat for Russia. After that, it will certainly be possible to speak about de-occupation in certain sectors of the front.
Now I will briefly respond to the question.
- The e-points system has led to situations where a Mavic appears before a strike, everyone scatters. Everything is done for the sake of accounting.
- A choice has to be made. E-points are not the most perfect or flawless accounting system in the world, but perfect systems do not exist at all. And before e-points, there was essentially no accounting whatsoever. So what do we choose? Clearly, this is an issue of data interpretation and data analysis. And this is where we have problems, because very often analytical summaries based on e-points are, in certain cases, not objectively verified or are verified only very superficially. As a result, there are real exaggerations, or situations where three different pilots from three different units engage the same target, and each one credits the result to themselves. This also needs to be addressed and dealt with. However, this is already a management issue, and it does not depend on the quality of the accounting system itself. The e-points accounting system has no alternative. What conclusions are drawn from the data and how it is analyzed depends on the commanders and senior leaders who use it.
- How open is communication with Mr. Fedorov? Is it possible to call him directly and raise the issue?
I don't think the Minister of Defence has the opportunity to communicate directly with everyone during the war. You need to contact his deputies, the minister's office, the Ministry of Defence hotline, journalists, MPs, anyone who can publicly or privately contact the Ministry of Defence.
- There was a discussion about improving military training. What, in your view, should the military training system look like?
- Friends, we have many capable commanders. They should be the ones determining the quality of training within their own units. I believe that corps commanders and commanders of separate assault regiments should build their own training systems, tailored to their operational vision. All training units that prepare infantry soldiers and drone operators, those who directly hold the front, should be transferred into combat units, rather than being kept in separate centralized centers that are more suitable for training narrow-profile specialists. That’s essentially it. At present, the 2nd Army Corps Khartiia and the 3rd Army Corps of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, under corps commanders Andrii Biletskyi and Ihor Obolienskyi, have agreed to develop a joint combat training program, which can then be gradually scaled across the Defense Forces. I believe this sets a very strong precedent: corps commanders who are responsible for the lives of their soldiers and for mission execution jointly develop best practices, combine instructor experience, and create unified programs that, if proven effective, can later be scaled across the entire Defense Forces. During a war involving mass mobilization, I believe corps commanders and commanders of separate units directly subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief must have freedom of action in training and assigning military occupational specialties, infantry, combat engineers, and UAV operators. In practice, this means they should have their own training units designed specifically for their operational tasks. This is not merely my personal view, it reflects standard military-historical experience from the past 300 years of large-scale warfare. It is well understood that during both the First and Second World Wars, training units were embedded directly within specific infantry divisions and army corps that were actively conducting combat operations.
- What level of education does this Minister of Defense have to make decisions? What falls within his competence?
- Everything regarding competence is defined by law and by what I am saying here. As for the level of education, I believe that in the modern world, education is a foundation that allows a person to move forward. After that, a person continues learning independently. That said, the overall level of education in our country, including military education, is very low. And relying exclusively on a person’s formal education after eleven years of war is quite naive. For me, having formal education, especially military education, and particularly Ukrainian military education, is unfortunately far from being a guaranteed indicator of competence. That is why we have successful commanders who do not have higher military education.
For example, the Minister of Defense himself cited specific names. Let’s look at whom Mykhailo Fedorov described as the best: Robert Brovdi (Madyar) does not have military education; Kyrylo Veres (K2) does not have higher military education; Andrii Biletskyi (3rd Army Corps) does not have higher military education; Oleksandr Nastenko does not have higher military education; Yurii Fedorenko does not have higher military education; Phoenix likely does; Rarog Brigade does not; Dmytro Filatov (Perun) does not; while Denys Prokopenko (Redis) obtained higher military education only after gaining practical combat experience.
Thus, most of the people whose judgment Fedorov relies on are commanders with proven combat reputations, a new type of commander who drives innovation. But a significant portion of them, though not all, do not have formal military education. Those who do have higher military education largely taught themselves many things beyond it. They do not rely solely on the knowledge acquired through formal military schooling. So let’s not fixate on this issue. In reality, military education has no direct relevance to the political position of the Minister of Defense.
- Will Fedorov reform the military education system, and in your view, what changes are needed in military education?
- During a war of this scale, training, preparation, and personnel advancement should be delegated to the level of army corps, military formations, and larger operational groupings.
- When and how will the problems in individual assault regiments, such as the 425th and 225th regiments, be addressed?
This is in fact, a serious challenge for Minister Fedorov. I know that the 425th Regiment, Skelia, and the 225th Assault Regiment are part of the program to create drone-assault regiments, and they are currently being reorganized. Additional unmanned systems battalions are being formed within them, and the number of UAVs is being increased. I want to emphasize that these regiments can be reformed, but the key condition for reducing problems in assault units and overall casualties, which Fedorov speaks about, is the proper assignment of missions to all military units. It is impossible to avoid heavy losses when assault regiments are deployed simultaneously across 12 directions — 12 different sectors. A single regiment, which in reality has one fully staffed and competent headquarters with one regimental commander, is split across 5, 6, 10, or even 12 sectors. Can effectiveness be achieved under such conditions? No. None of our assault regiments can operate effectively on more than two sectors. They simply cannot. The optimal employment model to reduce losses is a single sector. This was demonstrated by Flint, Oleksandr Nastenko, in the Kupiansk direction. And this is an example, not only for regimental commanders, but primarily for those who assign them missions. If you want effectiveness, if you want maximum enemy losses and minimal own losses, if you want missions accomplished while preserving the combat capability of assault regiments and avoiding heavy casualties, then stop tearing these regiments into ten pieces. End this foolish and criminal practice.
I will outline my view of what Fedorov can do and what the main risks are.
The first risk is that the goals are extremely ambitious, but there are serious caveats. What is the caveat? First, Minister Fedorov is not the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine. And not all of the issues he articulated so accurately and precisely in his strategy depend entirely on him. Above all, success depends on whether the vision articulated by Fedorov in his speech is not only heard but also taken into account at the highest level. Specifically, whether Volodymyr Zelenskyy, as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, takes Fedorov’s words into account. It is Zelenskyy, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who chairs the Commander-in-Chief’s Headquarters, receives briefings, and assigns tasks, on whom it ultimately depends whether all of this will be implemented. This is the primary risk.
Will the President view the war and army reforms through the framework shaped by Fedorov? Will he be able to earn that level of trust? Because, friends, if missions for assault regiments continue to be assigned the way they were before, if assault regiments and the front-line forces as a whole are given emotionally driven tasks and assessed emotionally, and if the actions of individual commanders are guided by emotion, then it will be impossible to build a coherent, structured system. This is the core risk.
Because this logic exists in Fedorov’s thinking, but the execution and implementation of that logic must be supported by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. And that is the fundamental risk whether Volodymyr Zelenskyy will provide that support.
On the positive side, it is worth noting that Volodymyr Zelenskyy kept Colonel Palisa as Deputy Head of the Presidential Office for military affairs. From what I see and hear, he is indeed someone who tries to provide the President with fairly realistic assessments of the situation on the front. I think this will reinforce what Fedorov is saying and make it more grounded. That does create a measure of hope. That said, we live in a system built on emotions, not rational ones, but information waves, PR, and competition for ratings, rather than on common sense and rational decision-making. So whether Fedorov will be able to introduce rationality into the Commander-in-Chief’s Headquarters remains a major challenge.
The second major risk is that Fedorov could simply be obstructed. His appointment is now linked to the fact that Andriy Yermak has finally been dismissed. Yermak was effectively Fedorov’s political opponent within the government. I hope that Fedorov will not face internal sabotage and will be able to work normally, without the kind of resistance from within the authorities that he previously encountered.
The third major challenge for Fedorov is his relationship with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi. This is because Volodymyr Zelenskyy has stated that Syrskyi remains Commander-in-Chief, and the minister will therefore have to coordinate all of his plans and strategies with Syrskyi at this stage. Without Syrskyi, none of this can function at all. Accordingly, effective working relationships are required with Zelenskyy, with the Presidential Office, and with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. All of this must be implemented in practice. Otherwise, if there is no mutual understanding, a conflict will emerge and it is far from certain that such a conflict would ultimately produce a positive outcome. This makes it another very serious challenge.
And the fourth point. A potential breakthrough into Kharkiv Oblast is a serious challenge. For us, another major challenge is the enemy’s attempt to seize the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk agglomeration. The enemy is pursuing this with all available forces, advancing from multiple directions. They are already effectively within 25 kilometers of Sloviansk, dangerously close. In Zaporizhzhia, we also see the front line effectively just 20 kilometers away. All of this constitutes extremely serious challenges. Can we stop the enemy? Yes. But all of these decisions must be made under intense enemy pressure. Fedorov has no time for prolonged deliberation. He needs to conduct analyses and audits very quickly and make decisions just as rapidly, taking responsibility upon himself. Because a minister who loses his native Zaporizhzhia, one of Ukraine’s largest cities, the fifth by population, and one of the country’s major industrial centers, would be facing a catastrophe. The loss of Zaporizhzhia would be a catastrophe for the Ukrainian nation and the Ukrainian state. If Donbas is lost entirely, including the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk agglomeration, Druzhkivka, Dobropillia, Kostiantynivka, and Lyman, then all of these words will remain merely history. A history with a bitter aftertaste, not just a heroic one. And implementing these plans may no longer even be possible. Because the front line is moving. And it must be noted that Fedorov has found himself in an extremely difficult situation. He was appointed not at a time of peak expectations, not when there was ample mobilization potential, and not when the Ukrainian economy and state still had substantial resilience reserves. Fedorov stepped in when the situation is critical, acutely critical. Correcting the situation under such conditions means making hard decisions, taking responsibility, and not always doing what is popular. It also means not always being able to avoid confrontations and conflicts, something Mykhailo Fedorov had previously managed to navigate skillfully during the Zelenskyy years. This is a position that sometimes requires saying "no." Possibly even saying "no" to Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself. It requires entering into conflict with those who execute orders, with those who command and lead, and even with those whom Fedorov does not have the authority to remove from office. This is an exceptionally serious challenge. And even under such constraints, even if his room for maneuver is limited, he must still remain effective.
So I want to say that everything I have said here are things I genuinely believe in. I believe this can be done. I believe it is possible to be an effective minister of defense. And I believe Mykhailo Fedorov has both the vision and the capacity to do it. But there are also risks. There are risks that someone will again try to finance political weapons projects that suit interests at the top, to funnel money into yet another set of initiatives with unproven effectiveness, projects of which, unfortunately, we already have far too many. Someone may want to say, "No, only I can appoint certain commanders; only I can determine their effectiveness." Someone may want to once again send troops to specific points, "take that position, take that tree line, hold it, and don’t think." That can happen. From now on, Fedorov bears personal responsibility for all of this. From now on, everyone will turn to him and he will have to answer for what he has said.
Will he be able to take on all these internal conflicts, resolve them in a way that allows him to stand behind every single word, every correct word, spoken in this extremely important and symbolic speech for our country? This is a major challenge and a serious question. But I want to be clear: if what Mykhailo Fedorov outlined is implemented even by 50 percent, we will win this war. That is not rhetoric, it is reality. I do not trust promises, and I do not trust expectations. Unfortunately, the current authorities have shown over many years that they are sellers of hope, expectations, and, quite often, empty air. But for the first time, I can say that I trust this particular personnel appointment to such a critical position. I trust the personnel decision made by Volodymyr Zelenskyy. I can say this objectively, because what I know about Fedorov’s track record gives me concrete, rational grounds to believe that there will be results here. And now we will see. God willing, all of this will be implemented.
It depends on each and every one of us whether we achieve victory together. We are all on the same team. And if words start to diverge from actions, I am certain that Ukrainian society, as it always has, will not stay silent and will not allow anyone to evade responsibility, responsibility for both words and deeds. That is exactly why I say we can achieve results here. I believe in this. And any mistakes will be exposed. That is why, friends, today I genuinely believe this is an outstanding day, one that, under the right conditions, can change the course of the war. And I, as a platoon commander in the Khartiia Brigade, will do everything in my power to make that happen. I believe in this. And I can say the same to all of you and to all my soldiers. Thank you for the stream. Thank you for supporting Butusov Plus with your donations. Thank you for your trust, your attention, and our shared work in the defense of Ukraine. Glory to Ukraine!
Yurii Butusov
