Chance for reform: what Fedorov’s appointment means for front and army
We are dedicating this stream to a very important event that took place in the Verkhovna Rada. A new Minister of Defense has been appointed — Mykhailo Fedorov. The position of defense minister, which effectively shapes Ukraine’s entire defense policy, has always drawn close attention. And this appointment is truly worth a separate discussion and a clear assessment so that you and I can understand where we are headed in the war.
So, here is what I would like to say about Mykhailo Fedorov.
For the first time, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has personally appointed the defense minister. In all the years of his leadership of the country. Previously, under Zelenskyy, defense ministers were appointed exclusively by his chiefs of staff. First, it was Andrii Bohdan who effectively determined the candidacy of Andrii Zahorodniuk, and then it was Andriy Yermak who exclusively appointed defense ministers. They were his people, entirely his team: he appointed Reznikov, he appointed Umerov, and then Shmyhal was appointed for a very short term. For most of the war, the Ministry of Defense was led by Reznikov and Umerov. Both were removed amid corruption scandals, and Yermak himself was also removed. And after the all-powerful "Ali Baba" left the Office and, as he said, went to the front, Volodymyr Zelenskyy gained freedom of choice and, for the first time, personally selected the candidate of the defense minister.
The second thing that happened for the first time. For the first time, a person has been appointed defense minister who, to be blunt, is respected within the army among most of the commanders working with unmanned technologies and UAVs, I can’t speak for everyone, and who has tangible achievements. And that knowledge is indeed of a fairly high level.
Previously, we did not see competent people being appointed to positions. As a rule, the appointees were people with no real clout and no expertise, people who could be easily pushed around, or who immediately folded and carried out any orders from whoever was overseeing them. And that leads to scandals like the eggs at 17 hryvnias affair and similar cases. In other words, people appointed to government typically had no established track record. And here, for the first time, a person has been appointed who has a reputation built over time, specifically, in the sphere of war. I cannot say that this record is flawless, there were scandals as well, and we will talk about them a bit later, but there are tangible achievements that really deserve to be noted, and they are what built Mykhailo Fedorov’s track record. And that is exactly what we will discuss in detail.
And the third point I would like to note is that, for the first time, a new defense minister, upon taking office, announced a concrete concept of his actions, clearly outlining what exactly he intends to do and where he wants to move. And for the first time, this defense minister stated that the model for changes in the army and the sources of information on what needs to be done in the role of defense minister are specific frontline commanders. And all the commanders named by Fedorov are indeed well-known leaders of Ukraine’s best combat units, people with the strongest combat reputations. In other words, his assumption of office and his work are directly tied to his assessment of interaction with these commanders. This cannot but spark interest, and as a starting point, in order to form an assessment, it is essential to quote exactly what Fedorov said in the Verkhovna Rada.
What I would note first is what Fedorov said at the outset.
"Today, a large number of problems remain that need to be addressed. A paper-based army, Soviet-era approaches, excessive bureaucracy, and disruptions in supplying the front. All of this prevents soldiers on the front line from operating at maximum effectiveness and reliably defending their land."
I would note that Fedorov is taking office as a leader who already has the creation of the Diia system to his credit. Therefore, I hope these words will be put into practice and that this paper-based, entirely unnecessary bureaucratic machine in the army will indeed be optimized through electronic documentation, making a large share of internal correspondence redundant.
"Soviet-era approaches" is a broad slogan.
Excessive bureaucracy, yes, unquestionably, it is simply very extensive in the army. As for disruptions in supplying the front, I think this is also obvious to everyone.
Fedorov then went on to speak about himself.
"I am taking up the position of defense minister not as a minister who built a digital state and created Diia, but as a person who has spent a great deal of time working on the war since 2022. Thanks to the work of our team and the support of the president, Starlink terminals appeared in Ukraine."
Here I want to say that yes, indeed, I personally received a batch of Starlink terminals back in May 2022, in fact, in late April 2022, specifically from the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine: 300 Starlink terminals. This was the first substantial batch that the state allocated to the troops, I merely helped speed up their distribution. I want to emphasize that this was truly an outstanding event at the time, because for the first time, several military units fighting at the front received 300 Starlink terminals at once. Later in 2022, more than 5,000 Starlink terminals entered service with the army. This was a major development that genuinely made our war network-centric. So that is true.
Specific projects. Army of Drones and the Line of Drones. These are projects that are still being implemented. Brave1, as well as the e-points motivation system, here too, I can confirm Fedorov’s role. I had the opportunity to speak with the minister in January 2023. At that time, he asked about my perspective, based on my trips to the front, on how drone development was progressing. And I said then that we needed a real system for tracking hits, a clear record of what each brigade actually eliminates. So that it would be possible to recognize how effectively each unit is performing. And this system has to be based on video data. Because at that time, most hits were recorded through written reports, essentially "by eye."
And the majority of hits in the army were not confirmed. I recall that in 2023, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Oleksandr Moisiuk delivered a briefing and said that, according to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, only 10% of destroyed and hit enemy forces were confirmed by video evidence. And I spoke about this, that a tracking system was needed; that hits should be counted exclusively based on video data; that anything not recorded on video does not exist, and such enemy losses should not be taken into account. And I spoke about this, that a tracking system was needed; that hits should be counted exclusively based on video data; that anything not recorded on video does not exist, and such enemy losses should not be taken into account. He did it and implemented it in practice, which is far more difficult than merely putting forward an idea. I merely voiced the idea, while he turned that idea into a real system and a real plan, secured resources for it, and built a verification system. He built a tracking system through Delta, a situational awareness system that exists thanks to his direct involvement and is now so widely used across the army.
Next, I want to say that not everything is smooth with the e-points system, of course. I want to state right away that I viewed e-points exclusively as an incentive pool, not as the primary system for distributing all resources. But the fact that there is a verified system for tracking hits is unquestionably the achievement of Mykhailo Fedorov, and this must be acknowledged.
Industry.
Yes, the industry has indeed expanded. Fedorov said that at the start of the invasion, Ukraine had seven companies producing drones; today, there are more than 500. There were two companies working on electronic warfare (EW); today, there are 200. There were no private companies producing missiles; today, there are more than 20. There were zero companies producing ground robotic systems; now there are more than 100. Undoubtedly, the role of the United24 fund in the development of all these sectors has been decisive, and it was Fedorov who pushed through the DOT-chain system, which is also an idea developed by his team.
There is also a concrete and vivid example here. The National Guard’s Lazar Regiment, which we supported from scratch, destroyed enemy equipment worth $15 billion. This is true, and I can confirm it, because I also followed the development of the Lazar Regiment, and this is indeed the case. It was the Lazar Regiment, under the command of Colonel Pavlo Yelizarov, that became the first unit in Ukraine to scale the mass use of bomber drones and strike drones across the entire front, drones that were able to inflict truly irreversible losses on the enemy. And this became possible because once Lazar had built its drone system and formed its team, it was Fedorov who scaled up production and genuinely brought in major state investments. The result is well known: Lazar is simply not a heavily publicized unit, one that we only began to hear about toward the end of 2025, but in reality, it is the largest and most effective unit of Ukraine’s Defense Forces in terms of its combat tally. And the losses they inflicted on Russia’s war machine, I believe, will inevitably go down in history. Therefore, Fedorov’s role here was truly decisive in terms of funding and responsibility for this line of effort.
Next, there was a joint project with the SBU's Alpha group, which destroyed more than 300 enemy air defence units in 2025 alone. A line of drones that destroys every fourth target on the front line. Yes, and to the work, to the outstanding results of "Alfa", which is truly a unique unit in terms of its current capabilities, performing unique tasks. In the last month alone, Alpha destroyed over 2,000 infantry units. This is one unit of one service. And 300 enemy air defence units in 2025. Yes, this is definitely confirmed and destroyed equipment. This is definitely an outstanding result.
And then there is the drone line. This is a well-known project. Of course, Fedorov also plays a key role here. In terms of allocating resources and lobbying, he is key to promoting this project in general. Therefore, when it comes to the presentation part that Fedorov talked about, I confirm everything. The only thing I don't know is why he didn't mention the Delta system, but the Delta system is also an important story that he supported and defended. The people involved in the creation and development of this system are also grateful for this. I think that everyone who is fighting understands that Delta is one of Ukraine's advantages in the war. It was only at the end of 2025 that the enemy deployed a system that is supposed to copy Delta, a situational awareness system. But this is a very complex architecture, and I think it will take the enemy more than a year just to catch up to the level that Delta already has.
"Today, we cannot fight with new technologies and an old organisational structure. Comprehensive changes are needed. Our goal is to change the system, carry out army reform, improve infrastructure on the front lines, eradicate lies and corruption, and make leadership and trust a new culture. So that people who deliver real results are rewarded and given the opportunity to grow further."
These are very ambitious goals and the right words. And it is a serious challenge. We have to see what Fedorov can actually do. Because in order to carry out army reform, coordinated action is needed from all levels of the state system, starting with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief himself, and his entire subordinate chain of command: both in the Ministry of Defence and in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Improving the infrastructure on the front line requires joint efforts with the leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other defence structures. I think these are truly global and correct goals, and I believe it is very good when such high standards are set, especially in the fight against lies and corruption, which, unfortunately, are widespread in our state structures, including the Defence Forces, of course. To eradicate this, systemic changes and reforms are needed. Political will is needed, communication with the army is needed, and we need to understand what is happening in the army. It is only possible to separate lies from the truth by having a thorough understanding of the situation.
But I am glad that such a high bar has been set. After all, this is the first time we have had a defence minister who says what he is going to do. We have had ministers who did not say anything specific in the Rada at all.
"The President has set a clear task – to build a system capable of stopping the enemy in the sky and on the ground, and to intensify asymmetric cyberattacks on the enemy and its economy.
To make the price of war for Russia so high that it cannot bear it. To stop the enemy by force."
For the first time, a defence minister is taking office who is putting forward a specific concept for his actions. And I can say that this is the first realistic task that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief has set for the Minister of Defence in all these years. Therefore, stopping the enemy by force is really what I have been talking about for many years. And here it is up to the Minister of Defence to do it. As for stopping the enemy in the air and on the ground, I can say that it is completely impossible to stop the enemy in the air, but it is possible to significantly reduce the effectiveness of enemy strikes. Of course, stopping the advance on the ground, as I have said many times in almost every stream, is a realistic task that Ukraine can now accomplish. We have the people, resources and weapons to do this. No, there is simply a lack of managerial and organisational steps. Next, to carry out army reform, well, that's a complicated story, I've talked about it. Next, to intensify asymmetric cyberattacks on the enemy and its economy. Of course, the price of war for Russia must be increased. I particularly like this phrase, the logic is clear – to stop the enemy by force. This slogan is realistic and necessary for our country right now. And this is precisely the principle by which all actions, everything that is happening in the state and on the front lines, should now be evaluated. Does what is happening on a specific section of the front line contribute to stopping the enemy or not? And this definitely needs to be highlighted. And this is now everyone's business, because it is a call from the Minister of Defence. It is, in fact, his reputation at stake.
Fedorov went on to say that we must start working in the information and cognitive domain and counter Russian propaganda, particularly in enemy territory. Our strategy led to the enemy losing a record 35,000 Russians in December. These are verified losses. There is a video for each strike. Here, I can only remark that it should not seem that everything is completely smooth and beautiful, because in reality, war is a difficult story. And the enemy suffered 35,000 strikes on video, but, of course, not all of these are irretrievable losses, or losses that the enemy cannot recover from. I think that in reality, the enemy suffered around 30,000 killed and wounded in the videos. But in my opinion, this is indeed a correct and completely objective demonstration that the current strategy of exhausting the enemy with losses can lead to success. We have discussed this.
I believe that 40,000 Russians killed, not wounded, will completely stop the Russian invasion. The enemy cannot sustain such a rate of losses. Can we do this when we have 35,000 casualties? Absolutely. It's a straightforward technical and mathematical task. We have the structures, we have the people, we have the tactics. It's clear what needs to be done. I like that a specific figure has been announced and that a strategy of action must be tied to it. We need to see how it will work.
"We have launched a market for interceptors that shoot down tens of percent of all Shaheds. We are already destroying Russians at sea and at their own airfields."
All I can say here is that it is impossible to take out the Shaheds with drones alone. Under certain conditions, unfortunately, significantly fewer Shaheds are taken out, and our infrastructure suffers. It is obvious that, in addition to interceptors, anti-aircraft missile systems are still needed here. Without this, it is impossible to build a reliable air defence system. And now one of our challenges is precisely mass anti-aircraft missile systems that can strike at least low-speed drones, which cause us such heavy losses, in various weather conditions.
"We were the first in the world to create drone assault regiments, one of which was the striking force for the recent de-occupation of Kupiansk."
Yes, I can confirm that the 475th Assault Regiment, commanded by Hero of Ukraine Oleksandr Nastenko, was indeed one of the leading strike forces in the liberation of Kupiansk. And I am proud that we are operating near Kupiansk as part of the Khartiia Corps, because Oleksandr Nastenko is truly one of our best regimental commanders, a man who has mastered the tactics of using drones and infantry, the tactics of breaking through the circle zone, so I can say that this is indeed a fair comment.
... I want to say that the losses in the 475th regiment are significantly lower, but they do exist, and for us, the death of every soldier, every fighter, is a heavy loss. But these losses, compared to the enemy's losses in the Flint area, are approximately 1 to 25, to 30, according to objective records, according to the official records of these targets. And the losses in Flint during the assault operations, the losses in Alexander Nastenko's regiment, call sign Flint, so, Nastenko's losses in the 475th regiment during this operation were lower than those of one of the mechanised brigades, which simply took up defensive positions in the area and conducted defensive operations. This is because the organisational and managerial decisions made by Nastenko are indeed the right model, which I hope will be used to modernise other separate assault regiments of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' ground forces. This requires a lot of drones, of course, as well as the allocation of funding, control of this funding, and organisational development. And we must stop dividing these assault regiments into 10 pieces, into 10 tasks in different directions. The effectiveness of the 475th regiment was precisely because it operated in one area, and the Khartiia command did not spread it across all areas. It was concentrated in one area. If all our assault regiments work this way and are reinforced with drones, then it will be drones, not people with machine guns, that will attack the enemy. And people will stop being afraid of this name and will understand that the assault regiments have a special attitude, the most powerful support, and that there you can fight, win and survive in war.
"Artificial intelligence has become Ukraine's ally in the war. Hundreds of artificial intelligence solutions are working on the front lines and are being used in military operations. We are moving towards complete autonomy on the battlefield, from machine vision to data analytics to drone swarms. This is still in the research stage. Fewer losses. More technology and fewer deaths. The lives of Ukrainian heroes are the highest value. We have no right to make decisions that cost the lives of our heroes."
Well, unfortunately, that's how it is. Look, the goal is to reduce losses. I absolutely support this; it should definitely be the first thing we do when reforming the army. Do we have the right to make decisions that cost the lives of our heroes? I think that in war, there are no decisions that can be made without losses at the planning stage. We must strive for this and do everything we can to achieve it. I want to say that we simply have these slogans, which is why I am so sceptical about this. I have heard these slogans hundreds of times from senior state officials. Reducing losses, saving every life, a people-centred army — even our leader has put forward such ideas. Friends, in reality, all this has remained just empty words. It is no coincidence that there is so much talk and criticism in the army and in society about all these meat operations. We need a system of truthful accounting, reporting and after-action reviews in order to make an objective analysis. Yes, we need to quickly and permanently change the system of training Ukrainian military personnel.
"High-quality training means fewer losses and greater efficiency. The problem of the TCR cannot be ignored. After a comprehensive audit, we will propose a systematic solution to resolve the accumulated problems while maintaining the country's defence capability."
This is vague. I want to say that there is no problem with the TCR in Ukraine. Ukraine has a problem with the complete irresponsibility of the authorities, the lack of an electronic accounting system, and the problem of shifting responsibility from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to TCR military personnel in the absence of a system of general mobilisation and accounting for all conscripts. This problem exists. As soon as a unified accounting system for conscripts is established, this corrupt system of hundreds of points of sale for evading the army and fleeing abroad, which exists and enriches itself, will disappear. And, first of all, there will be logic, people will understand that no one can evade, and there is a logic in the use of people, in determining who is needed in the defence industry and who is not, who is needed for infrastructure and who is not, who should be called up in what order, and who should be prepared for what positions. And this can only be done through management decisions. And if military personnel from the TCR receive orders to catch people on the streets, it is not their fault, but those at the top who give such orders. This needs to be changed a little. The TCR are simply people doing what they are allowed to do. And what is required of them, to be honest.
"Everything must be based on data; that is the priority. We will measure the effectiveness of everything."
I strongly support this thesis and want to say that this is indeed a very innovative breakthrough solution. Accounting for results and resources spent is something that is completely absent in our Defence Forces. That is, we have a bureaucratic reporting system for writing things off. But there is no system for accounting for the results achieved. Why was it spent? It should be a system that does not burden the performers with reporting. It should be a resource accounting system that allows you to control the actions of senior and middle management. And not interfere... but we have a bias. We only account for and control those who are directly fighting on the front lines. And there is no need for additional control links there. Control is needed over the people who make decisions and take responsibility for specific sections of the front line. And over those who determine these sections of the front line and make strategic operational decisions. That is where resource accounting is needed. Definitely. I hope that this data accounting and performance measurement will lead to these results.
"We must scale up the strong and help those who are ready and working for results to grow. Access to development opportunities must be equal for all. Therefore, one of my first decisions as Minister of Defence will be to ensure a basic level of drone staffing for brigades, which is clearly lacking. This will increase predictability and the quality of planning."
Yes, this is definitely the number one problem. In 2024-2025, we experienced a catastrophic collapse of the entire system of planning and distribution of drones. This is because the funds that should go to drones are being used to maintain certain separate units, branches of the armed forces, forces that have been created, centres and structures that are supposed to deal with drones. And all the money goes there, instead of looking at where drones are needed most, where development is needed most. The greatest development is needed by those troops who are responsible for their section of the front line. There, a planned, constant supply of drones is needed. And so, some units are needed to provide qualitative reinforcement for special tasks, for scaling up operations. The Commander-in-Chief's reserve units, which are concentrated and create a numerical advantage, perform special tasks on specific objects, tasks, points, and sectors. But the key issue for us is that we must stop the Russian offensive. Therefore, the best stable supply must be there, where it produces results and holds the front line. That is, if we leave the infantry without Mavics, if we leave the infantry without the support of reconnaissance drones, without all the infrastructure. If we do not replenish the losses of this equipment, what will happen? What is happening to us now will happen. Every week, the enemy captures several dozen square kilometres and advances further. In other words, the drone forces are growing, but the enemy is still advancing. And we cannot build defence zones, as they are absent in most areas of the front. We cannot equip them or prepare them for defence. Therefore, it is nice to hear such a statement from Fedorov. This is indeed a statement, which I hope will be followed by very quick and concrete decisions.
"Today, the top 50 units out of 400 provide 70% of enemy strikes. Imagine the potential of the Defence Forces if we help the remaining 350 to grow."
I think it's fair to say that a comprehensive solution is needed here, not only in terms of the organisation of the drone units themselves. I think we have a lot of these units and operators. The problem is how to increase the effectiveness of all the existing calculations, the survivability of those calculations that hold the front line, which primarily provide situational awareness. Someone has to search for that very infiltration. And it is not only those who inflict damage that need to be controlled. I hope the Ministry of Defence will pay attention to those who find targets. Because the war depends on the positions of operators of reconnaissance drones such as Mavic and Utel. They are the foundation of the Defence Forces' battle order. I hope the minister will pay attention to the quality of tactical reconnaissance organisation on the front lines and ensuring situational awareness. This allows the enemy to infiltrate our battle formations.
"Based on my own experience of cooperation and joint projects with Madyar, K2, Biletskyi, and Obolenskyi." Madyar is Robert Brovdi, commander of the unmanned systems forces. K2 is Kyrylo Veres, commander of the K20 brigade regiment. Andrii Biletskyi is the Third Corps. Ihor Obolenskyi is the Second Corps "Khartiia." Flint is Oleksandr Nastenko, 465th Regiment, "Achilles," Yuriy Fedorenko's brigade, "Phoenix" is the SBU border guard regiment. Rarog is a separate unmanned systems brigade. Khmara, Yevhen Khmara – commander of the SBU's Alpha special forces centre, who is currently acting head of the SBU. Perun – Nemesis. Perun is the commander of the First Separate Assault Regiment. Perun's friend is Dmytro Filatov. Nemesis is a separate brigade. Radish is the commander of the First Corps. And many other incredible military personnel. We saw an example of true leadership."
This is very important to me. Here, Fedorov shared the opinions of the military personnel whose vision of the war he relies on. It should be noted that all the people mentioned here are indeed key figures for the front in general and for many sections of the front in particular. And such a choice of people with whom communication is carried out certainly gives rise to great hope and high expectations that this communication will be implemented in the specific organisational and managerial decisions mentioned in the speech.
"Today, anyone who steals during the war is our enemy."
Let's see, because we remember that the issue of reputation will be decisive for Mykhailo Fedorov. Indeed, when we see that there is respect for the resources that the state collects with such tremendous effort for the war, of course, everyone in the army wants to see that the Ministry of Defence is a model where money is not stolen, that the money that is collected with such difficulty goes precisely to the war. I hope that this will be a story of reputation, that anti-corruption is a priority, a foundation, and that Fedorov will act transparently and comment, preserving the reputation he has managed to build. I would like to remind you that there were critical issues in his work, and there was a corruption scandal that directly affected him. And the activities of those structures that purchased drones jointly with United24.
In 2024, there was a well-known scandal about the purchase of drones. And then there were two scandals involving Mykhailo Fedorov, one concerning the purchase of Autel drones, which were supplied to the army, i.e. the army received invoices stating that the drones cost twice as much as they could be bought on the market from the state. And the second was a story when one of the manufacturers who produced certain types of drones that were initially supplied to the army, that is, if you took these drones, vampire drones, you could get the most out of them at the expense of these Yebals. It was very profitable, it was a sales incentive. So I think these were two instructive stories for Fedorov, which could have destroyed the reputation of what he is doing and what United24 is doing. But after that, the situation was levelled out, and now, in principle, there is equality in terms of points. And, as far as we know, now, in principle, all types of bombers are being supplied to the army without any problems, and they are already of sufficient quality for people to decide for themselves what is good and what is not. Since then, people have been buying vampires themselves with their own money, and other types of drones that come in are also bought with money. But this was a corruption risk that could have dealt a serious blow to Fedorov, and he tried with all his might to resolve the issue at the time. I hope that this was a lesson for him, as were the lessons from Reznikov and Umerov, who were simply removed from their posts due to corruption scandals and corruption, which they were unable to combat at all and, in principle, even allowed to develop.
I hope that now the Ministry of Defence will be able to demonstrate a completely different level of transparency, and that any issue will be resolved as quickly and transparently as possible for those involved, not for society as a whole, but for those who make decisions, those who implement decisions, and those who depend on these decisions. I am confident that this work must be done. I think that journalists, of course, after Fedorov made such ambitious statements at this level, which are indeed worthy of respect, any stain now, unlike Reznikov, anyone there, Umerov, will now be scrutinised under Fedorov's microscope even at the stage of signing, at the stage of planning these documents. Therefore, I hope that the challenge that Fedorov set for himself in this speech will be adequately met.
"We will take the development of the Ukrainian defence industry to a new level. Defence technology will become a key industry for Ukraine on world markets, a driver of the country's economic growth. Yes, this is for the future. We need to do our homework to create a Ukrainian air defence system and our own laser-guided artillery."
I think we need to make many more technological decisions that will change the war, including these. And we will see what tasks will be set and where the funding for our new developments will come from. Creating a Ukrainian air defence system is, in my opinion, an eight-year task, if we move very quickly and very correctly. Laser-guided artillery shells, in principle, can be made fairly quickly. And such developments are underway in Ukraine.
"In the near future, we will conduct a thorough audit of the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces of Ukraine to find additional opportunities to improve the financial and social security of military personnel."
This will be an interesting task that will affect the entire army.
"We have a clear vision and goals for the war, which have been agreed upon by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the president. Everyone who helps achieve the goals of the war will receive the necessary resources to move forward. Those who fail will leave the system."
The statement is quite harsh and direct. It will be interesting to see what criteria will be defined.
"The defence system needs real, visible changes that are felt at the personnel level, reduce the internal turmoil of the system, and truly improve the capabilities of the army and the condition of the people who serve in it."
"Finally, I want to say that my hometown of Vasylivka in the Zaporizhzhia region is occupied. Russian troops came to Vasylivka in the first days of the invasion. I am proud of my city because the residents and the military began to resist. Thanks to this struggle, the Russian advance was halted in this direction, and this influenced the defence of Zaporizhzhia. For the last four years, I have been living to de-occupy Vasylivka, so my story is personal."
I think this is the right motivation, but I think that right now the most important thing for all of us is to defend Zaporizhzhia and other Ukrainian cities, because the enemy continues its offensive. I think that even if we are unable to de-occupy anything in the near future, but if in the near future, as Minister Fedorov said, we stop the front line, that will already be a strategic victory for us and a defeat for Russia. And after that, of course, we can talk about de-occupation in some areas of the front.
Now I will briefly answer the question
- E-points led to Mavic appearing before the attack, everyone scattering. Everything for accounting.
We have to choose. E-points are not the most perfect accounting system in the world; nothing is perfect. And there was no accounting in principle without e-points. What do we choose? Of course, this is a question of data interpretation and analysis. We have problems with this because very often these analyses are collected by Yebali, and in some specific cases they are not actually verified objectively. Or they are verified only superficially. Therefore, there are some real exaggerations, or there are three different pilots from three different units flying towards one target, and each one counts something for themselves. This also needs to be addressed and combated. But this is a management system, it does not depend on the quality of accounting. There is no alternative to the Yebaliv accounting system. But the analysis of data and the conclusions to be drawn from it depend on the commanders who use it and the commanders.
- How open is communication with Mr. Fedorov? Is it possible to call him directly and raise the issue?
I don't think the Minister of Defence has the opportunity to communicate directly with everyone during the war. You need to contact his deputies, the minister's office, the Ministry of Defence hotline, journalists, MPs, anyone who can publicly or privately contact the Ministry of Defence.
- There has been talk of improving military training. What do you think the military training system should be like?
Friends, we have many high-quality commanders. They are the ones who should determine the quality of training. I think that where there are corps commanders and commanders of separate assault regiments, they should create their own training system. It should be adapted to their vision. And all training units that train ordinary infantrymen, soldiers, drone operators, i.e. those who are directly holding the front line, should be transferred to the army, rather than kept in separate centres where narrow-profile specialists are trained. That's all. Now, by the way, the Khartiia Corps and the Third Army Corps of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, corps commanders Andrii Biletskyi and Ihor Obolenskyi, have agreed to develop a joint combat training programme, which will thus be gradually scaled up in the Defence Forces. And I think this is a very good precedent when corps commanders, who are responsible for the lives of their soldiers and the fulfilment of tasks, jointly create their best practices and combine their instructional experience in order to create unified programmes, which, if effective, can then be scaled up to all defence forces. I believe that during such a mass mobilisation for war, corps commanders and commanders of individual units directly subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief should have the freedom to train and provide military specialities in the main areas, i.e. infantry, sappers, UAV operators, meaning that there should be training units for their specific tasks. This is not my personal opinion, it is simply the usual military historical experience of the last 300 years, when mass armies have been at war. We obviously understand that in both World War I and World War II, there were training units directly within specific infantry divisions and army corps, which, in fact, engaged in combat operations.
What level of education does this Minister of Defence have to make decisions? What is within his competence?
Everything about his competence is stated in the law and in what I am saying here, but as for the level of education, I believe that in today's world, the level of education is the foundation that allows a person to move forward. Then a person begins to learn on their own. So, the level of education in our country, including military education, is very low. And to rely solely on a person's education after 11 years of war is quite naive. For me, education, military education, especially Ukrainian military education, is, unfortunately, not always a confirmation of a person's competence. That is why we have successful commanders who do not have higher military education.
Well, for example, I want to tell you, the Minister of Defence quotes, let's see who Minister of Defence Fedorov named the best: Robert Brovdi (Magyar) – no military education, Kyrylo Veres (K2) – no higher military education, Andrii Biletskyi (Third Corps) – no higher military education, Oleksandr Nastenko – no higher military education, Fedorenko – no higher military education, Phoenix – I think he does, Rarog – no higher military education, Perun – no higher military education, Redis – obtained higher military education after gaining practical experience in war.
Therefore, most of the people whom Fedorov relies on are people with a combat reputation, new-type commanders who create innovations. But a significant part of them, not all, are people without military education. And others who have higher military education have learned a lot in life on their own. They studied, and they do not live on the knowledge that military education provides. So let's not dwell on this. In fact, military education has nothing to do with the position of political defence minister.
Will Fedorov reform the military education system, and what changes do you think are needed in military education?
During such a war, training, preparation and promotion of personnel should be delegated to army corps, military units and formations.
- When and how will the problems in individual assault regiments, such as the 425th Regiment and the 225th Regiment, be resolved?
This is a serious challenge for Minister Fedorov. I know that the 425th Regiment, the Rock, and the 225th Assault Regiments are part of the programme to create drone assault regiments, and they are being reorganised. Additional battalions of unmanned systems are being created in them, and the number of UAVs is increasing. I want to say that these regiments can be reformed, but the main condition for reducing the number of problems in the assault troops and, in principle, the number of losses that Fedorov is talking about, is the adequate setting of tasks for all military units. Significant losses are inevitable when assault regiments are deployed simultaneously in 12 directions, 12 different areas. One regiment, in fact, which has one fully staffed competent headquarters with one regiment commander, is taken and torn apart in 5, 6, 10, 12 areas. Can this be effective? No way. None of our assault regiments can operate effectively in more than two areas. They cannot. The optimal use to reduce losses is one area. This was demonstrated by Flint, Alexander Nastenko, in Kupiansk. And this is an example. An example not only for the regimental commanders themselves, but for others as well. It is an example for those who set tasks for them. If you want efficiency, if you want maximum enemy losses and minimum losses on your side, if you want tasks to be completed and the combat capability of assault regiments to be preserved, if you want there to be no major losses, do not split these assault regiments into 10 pieces. Stop this stupid and criminal practice.
I will share my vision of what Fedorov can do and what the main dangers are.
The first danger is that the goals are very global, but there are major caveats. What are the caveats? First, Minister Fedorov is not the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine. And not all of the issues that he so aptly and accurately expressed in his strategy depend entirely on him. First and foremost, success depends on whether the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, will listen to and take into account the vision that Fedorov outlined in his speech. Because it is Zelenskyy, as Commander-in-Chief, who heads the Commander-in-Chief's headquarters, who listens to reports and sets tasks, who determines whether all this will be done. This is the main risk.
Will the president view the war and reforms in the army through the lens of Fedorov's vision? Will he be able to gain such trust? Because, friends, if we continue to assign tasks to assault regiments, what will this lead to? If we assign emotional tasks and emotional assessments to assault regiments and all troops on the front line, and the actions of certain commanders are determined by emotions, then this coherent system will not be achieved. This is the main risk.
Because this logic is in Fedorov's head, and the implementation of this logic must be supported by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. And that is the main risk.
On the positive side, it is worth noting that Volodymyr Zelenskyy has left Colonel Palisa as Deputy Head of the President's Office for Military Affairs. And I think that he is indeed a person who also tries to give the president what I see and hear, which are quite realistic assessments of the situation at the front. I think this will reinforce what Fedorov is saying. And make it realistic. Well, it gives us hope. Again, we live in a system that is built entirely on emotions, and not on rational emotions, but on some kind of information waves, PR, the struggle for ratings, and absolutely not on common sense and rationality. Therefore, whether Fedorov will be able to introduce rationality into the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters is a big challenge.
Secondly, there is a great risk that Fedorov may simply be hindered. His appointment is now linked to the fact that Andriy Yermak has finally been dismissed. Yermak was effectively Fedorov's opponent in power. And I hope that Fedorov will not be hindered and that he will be able to work normally without the internal resistance from within the government that he faced before.
Thirdly, a major challenge for Fedorov is his relationship with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi. This is because Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said that Syrskyi will remain Commander-in-Chief, and the minister will undoubtedly be forced to coordinate all his plans and strategies with Syrskyi at this stage. Without Syrskyi, none of this will work at all. Therefore, he must have good relations with Zelenskyy, with the Office, and with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. All this must be put into practice. Otherwise, if there is no mutual understanding, a conflict will arise. And it is far from certain what the outcome of such a conflict will be. So this is also a serious challenge.
And fourthly, breaking through to the Kharkiv region is a serious challenge. For us, the challenge is the enemy's attempt to capture the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. And the enemy is striving for this with all its might, attacking from all sides. The enemy is already 25 kilometres from Sloviansk. They are getting very close. And in Zaporizhzhia, we can see the front line 20 kilometres away. So, these are all serious challenges. Can we stop the enemy? Yes. But all these decisions have to be made under intense pressure from the enemy. Fedorov has no time to think. He needs to do all the analyses and audits very quickly and make decisions quickly. He needs to take responsibility. Because the minister who loses his native Zaporizhzhia, one of the largest cities in Ukraine, fifth in terms of population, and one of the leading industrial centres of Ukraine, will be held responsible. The loss of Zaporizhzhia would be a disaster for the Ukrainian nation and the Ukrainian state. If the Donbas is lost completely, that is, the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, Druzhkivka, Dobropillia, Kostyantynivka, Lyman, if all this is lost, then all these words will become history. But it will be a history that, unfortunately, will have not only a heroic but also a rather bitter aftertaste. And it may not even be possible to realise all this. Because the front is moving. And Fedorov, it should be noted, found himself in a very difficult situation. He was appointed not when expectations were highest, not when there were large mobilisation resources, not when the Ukrainian economy and state still had reserves, large reserves of stability and stocks. Fedorov arrived when the situation was simply critical. Simply critical, acutely critical. And to rectify the situation in such conditions means making decisions, taking responsibility and not always doing popular things. It is not always possible to avoid clashes and conflicts, which Mykhailo Fedorov has skilfully managed to avoid all these years under Zelenskyy. This is a position that sometimes requires saying "no," perhaps even saying "no" to Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself, which requires entering into conflict with those who carry out tasks, entering into conflict with those who manage, who command, even with those whom Fedorov cannot remove from office. And this is a serious challenge. And even in such conditions, if he does not have such opportunities, he must be effective.
Therefore, I want to say that everything I have said here is something I believe in. I believe that it can be done. I believe that it is possible to be an effective defence minister. And that Fedorov has the vision and the opportunities to do so. But there are also risks. There are risks, including the risk that someone will want to finance political projects in the field of armaments that are needed by someone at the top, to pump money into some new stories that have unproven effectiveness, into some projects, of which we have many, unfortunately. Someone will want to simply say that no, only I can appoint certain commanders, only I can determine their effectiveness. Someone will want, for example, to send troops to certain locations again, to say, go to that location, go to that landing site, hold it and don't think. That could happen. Now Fedorov is personally responsible for all this. Now everyone has to turn to him, and he has to be accountable for what he said.
Will he be able to take on all these internal conflicts, resolve them in a way that is beneficial, so that he is accountable for every word, every correct word that was said in this very important and very significant speech for our country? This is a big challenge and a big question. But I want to say that if what Mykhailo Fedorov said is implemented even 50%, we will win the war. And that is a reality. Because I do not trust promises and I do not trust expectations. The current government, unfortunately, are sellers of hopes and expectations and peddlers of hot air. Unfortunately, they have demonstrated this over many years. But for the first time, I can say that I trust this particular appointment to such a key position. I trust the appointment made by Volodymyr Zelenskyy. I can say this objectively because what I know about Mykhailo Fedorov's work gives me specific, objective reasons to believe that there will be results here. Well, let's see now. God willing, all this will be implemented.
It is up to us, each and every one of us, to work together to achieve victory. We are all on the same team. And if words do not match deeds, I am sure that Ukrainian society, as always, will not remain silent and will not allow anyone to shirk their responsibility. Responsibility for words and deeds. That is why I say that we can achieve results here. I believe in it. And any mistakes will be exposed. Therefore, friends, today I truly believe that this is a remarkable day, which, under certain conditions, can change the course of the war. And I, as the commander of the Khartiia Brigade platoon, will do everything I can. I believe in it. And I can say the same to all of you and all my soldiers. Thank you for watching. Thank you for supporting the Butusov Plus channel with your donations. Thank you for your trust, your attention and our joint work to defend Ukraine. Glory to Ukraine!
Yurii Butusov
