Audit of losses and mass UAV procurement: Defense Ministry’s new course
Platoon commander with Ukraine’s National Guard 13th Brigade Khartiia, Yurii Butusov, analyzes in a live broadcast the 2026 war plan presented by Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov.
The topic of the livestream is planning Ukraine’s war in 2026. The key figure who can introduce changes to that planning is, without a doubt, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the new defense minister he appointed, Mykhailo Fedorov. It is Fedorov who now determines the planning of our financial resources, the planning of our defense industry, the planning of procurement, and the planning of supply and distribution. What matters most to me is that in his speech in the Verkhovna Rada, when taking office, Minister Fedorov for the first time outlined a fairly clear, coherent concept of his next steps. This concept can be criticized, it can be debated, and now we can watch how Mykhailo Fedorov delivers on the commitments, goals, and priorities set out there. For me, the main point in Fedorov’s words was what he said: I am not responsible for procurement, I am responsible for the war. In other words, he assumed responsibility for planning Ukraine’s victory. And that is what our country is giving all its strength and blood for. That is why this is our number one issue.
So after his first speeches, Fedorov had already begun announcing specific initiatives. Some of these initiatives have sparked active debate, because behind the minister’s words and plans come decisions, money, changes in organization, and lives.
So the main thing happening in the army, in the Defense Ministry, and across the Defense Forces, is that people are waiting for the financial planning of the war. What will Ukraine fight with, and how, in 2026? And in 2027 as well, because we understand these will be systemic changes. What is fundamentally important is that the first drone procurements have already been carried out. The first batches of drones have been purchased, as we understand it, these are Chinese-made reconnaissance drones that have already been publicly announced. And the sums are significantly higher than what was allocated for such purchases in previous years. This is encouraging, but the army needs drones of many types, and it needs strike capabilities of many types as well.
So at this point, the first procurements of Mavic-class reconnaissance drones have already been completed, and what is now beginning is the planning of long-term procurement of strike drones. That is what truly concerns the entire country, because I think there is hardly a person in Ukraine today who does not use drones, or does not buy drones, or does not donate at least a small amount toward them. That is why drones and the drone war are now the main national project, a project of the Ukrainian nation that enables us to resist and successfully strike the world’s second-largest army by manpower.
So there are questions about drones, about shell procurement, and about artillery development. And there are also questions about the minister’s initiatives that, in my view, are very important. One of them is an audit of losses. I believe this initiative can genuinely change the overall situation in operational planning and in the organization of Ukraine’s military.
I believe Fedorov’s desire to conduct an audit is the right intention. Every minister, every state leader, must conduct audits. And this audit must be transparent enough so that his own actions and words can later be audited in the same way.
The fourth issue that must be mentioned concerns mobilization and replenishing personnel. The minister now intends to address mobilization, the recruitment of foreigners, and the issue of servicemen who have gone AWOL. I was surprised that some pro-Russian politicians in Ukraine sharply criticized Fedorov’s statements about recruiting foreigners.
Among the strategic measures are also changes in the approach to defining requirements, including certain automated models that would allow brigades and corps to supply themselves more effectively through direct ordering mechanisms. In other words, this is a fifth strategic point that should be noted.
Questions from the audience
Where do these 35,000 Ukrainians mobilized every month actually go?
In fact, the problem with mobilization and replenishing the troops lies in the fact that responsibility for staffing combat units is highly fragmented. The Territorial Centre of Recruitment and Social Support (TCR & SS) have their own mobilization plan. A certain number of people are mobilized, the police locate them, and bring them in. In fact, the police are currently bringing in everyone who appears in the database and is listed as wanted. A large number of people are now being taken to the TCR & SS, and those centers have their own targets. The issue is that there is the TCR & SS plan, and then there is another one. People first end up at the TCR & SS, and then they are transferred to training units within military formations. And that’s where a second set of targets kicks in. The TCR & SS plan may indeed be around 30,000, as has been officially stated. But far fewer people are actually transferred to training units. Perhaps around 20,000. Along the way, some people obtain medical certificates, lawyers, or legal grounds not to serve and not to proceed to the training unit. Some simply flee, because once people leave the TCR & SS premises, they cease to be the TCR & SS’s problem. The TCR & SS ticks the box and considers the target fulfilled. What happens next becomes the responsibility of the training unit. When a person reaches a training unit, the same process begins again. Lawyers appear, illnesses flare up, medical certificates of unfitness are produced, or exemptions from service are found that prevent the person from continuing. Then again, some people flee from these training units as well, since training lasts a long time and there is not particularly strict oversight. There is always an opportunity to leave from there, too. At that point, it is no longer 20,000, as you can understand, it is even fewer. Those who do complete basic combined arms training are then sent to military units. Upon arrival at the unit, commanders gather these personnel, get acquainted with them, and assess them. They determine who can be sent to the infantry, primarily to combat units, and who can be assigned to UAV roles. Drone operators are immediately selected by capable commanders, as are infantry soldiers. They then assess how many among those who arrived are actually ready to fight and capable of performing those roles. It turns out that while there are plans at the TCR & SS level and at the training unit level, some of the people transferred have serious illnesses or major health issues. Others simply lack motivation and do not want to serve. Some of those who arrive at a military unit and learn that they will have to deploy to positions again refuse to go. It is a small share, but it happens. Some already go AWOL. As a result, the army does not receive 30,000 people, nor 20,000. Not even 15,000, and I suspect not even 10,000. The army ultimately receives a much smaller number of personnel, those who actually perform the work and fill the roles in highest demand. That means infantry and operators of weapons systems. In reality, far fewer people actually reach combat units as reinforcements, and far fewer carry out combat missions. That is the core of the problem.
One must also understand the issue of the 35,000 figure in terms of replenishing the army with personnel. The war has already been going on for more than four years. Physically, it is extremely difficult to endure this for so long. Even among conscientious soldiers who perform their combat duties responsibly, illnesses occur, and family problems arise. Parents may require real care, which is a genuine issue, as well as children or family members with disabilities. A person cannot fight indefinitely under such difficult conditions. For many, health and life circumstances objectively do not allow it. As a result, people leave the army. They do so for various reasons, not necessarily because they are killed or wounded. Many leave for natural reasons as well, since our legislation allows it. Having three children, certain illnesses, the list of such grounds is actually quite limited.
Unlike the Russian army, where only the loss of a limb may discharge a person from military service, the Ukrainian army, as the army of a democratic country, has a number of legally provided possibilities not to serve. As a result, the 30,000 reinforcement figure exists only in reports. In reality, it does not. The army is not actually getting 30,000 people a month. And there is a natural outflow of personnel from the army, even beyond combat losses. That is why there is a shortage of people.
Audit of losses
As Fedorov stated: "We are beginning an analysis of every loss on the battlefield. The audit will help identify key problems and make management decisions for their systemic resolution. Human capital is the highest value. We will fight for the life of every soldier."
I believe this is a fundamentally important statement that, in my view, could allow us to completely change the doctrine of war, the doctrine of how combat operations are conducted, and how forces are employed. The main reason we suffer large and significant losses, many of which could have been avoided, is that Ukraine lacks any mechanism for studying and learning from its own combat experience. I have said this thousands of times and written about the absence in Ukraine of a key basic NATO standard — the After Action Review, a mechanism for professionally establishing the circumstances of a battle and conducting a professional analysis after an operation. Instead, we only have legal mechanisms, internal investigations that lead to administrative liability, and criminal investigations that lead to criminal liability. But there is no professional analysis. Because of this, no one wants to receive severe reprimands or face criminal cases. As a result, the real circumstances of what happens in the war are concealed from the bottom up, and especially from the top down.
Information becomes distorted. Nowhere is information distorted as much as at the very top, where decisions are made. This is not unique to Ukraine; it happens in any army because the military is a hierarchical structure with a rigid chain of command. It is an executive mechanism. That is why every army, in every country, seeks to introduce improvements and institutional changes. In NATO countries, such changes are embodied in standards such as the U.S. Army doctrine TC 25-20 After Action Review. This is precisely the standard Ukrainian generals categorically refuse to implement. They seem afraid of NATO standards that they like to talk about so much in words. In my view, the introduction of a loss audit by Minister Fedorov could become exactly such a mechanism, if it is actually implemented.
This raises key questions: who actually bears responsibility? How can the situation be improved? How should lessons be drawn from experience? How can the lives of our soldiers be protected not just in words, but in orders and combat directives, while still carrying out dangerous combat missions?
I believe a loss audit could become exactly such a mechanism, in my view, a revolutionary one. I want to fully support this initiative by the minister and believe that if it is implemented within the Defense Forces, such a mechanism should certainly be supported, and all efforts should be made to establish the full circumstances of events. For example, just as the Mission Control mechanism has now been introduced in the Delta system. This is a very high-quality change implemented by Mykhailo Fedorov’s team, Mission Control for drone flights. Every sortie is recorded, the cause of the loss of each drone is recorded, the munitions used are recorded, the types of drones are recorded, everything is tracked. The activity and the entire combat workload of our units become visible. And all of this can be independently and objectively verified.
Fedorov has already introduced a loss audit for drones. This is a reality. That is why I trust this initiative, and I believe the real revolution in Ukraine’s war will happen when we have Mission Control for the life of every serviceman. When a soldier goes out on a combat mission, whether an assault or a defensive task, those who have access in the Delta system, of course, the commanders, should be able to see it. Yet there are positions where soldiers remain for 100, 200, or even 300 days. Yesterday I spoke with the battalion commander of a mechanized brigade. He was trying to rotate personnel on the positions. He had been assigned a battalion and given a sector of responsibility. He discovered that within his sector, there were ten positions where soldiers had been sitting for 250 to 300 days. Imagine that, ten positions, not one or two or three. Soldiers simply left on those positions. The battalion commander immediately began rotating the positions. He replaced half of them, pulled the soldiers out, and effectively saved them. He replaced them with fresh troops and ensured their withdrawal. Because of completely misguided decisions higher up, this caused conflicts and scandals, questions were raised about why he was rotating troops instead of attacking. As a result, the battalion commander was removed from his position after just two weeks. Meanwhile, some of those other positions continue to be held for more than 300 days even now. It is absurd, simply absurd. All of this happens because there is no Mission Control in the war when it comes to the lives of soldiers. The number of days soldiers spend on positions is of interest to no one except commanders who genuinely care and the families of those serving there. This is a problem that must be addressed. Just like the problem of controlling drones.
We are the only ones who understand that human life and a drone are completely incomparable things. Therefore, I strongly expect that, just as Fedorov introduced Mission Control for drones, a Mission Control for people will soon become operational within Delta. We have sufficient technical means to monitor movement where a service member is heading and where they are being deployed. Technical means of movement control exist. Communications, drones, I won't go into detail, but they are available. We need to record when a person sets out on a combat mission, whether there is communication with them, and how long they remain on duty. Then it will immediately become clear why losses are so high and why there are so many missing in action.
There is no need to immediately send an SBI investigator to a commander. First, a professional question should be asked: why did you lose your personnel? Because currently, the procedure for writing off property is very lengthy, while it is easier to write off a human being. It should not be this way. Any instance where a group of people goes missing, where a group or an individual is captured, or where a group or an individual is sent to conduct an assault far beyond their deployment line into enemy-occupied territory, this is a massive risk that demands accountability and control. The time personnel spend on their positions must be monitored. All of this can be done through Delta. The technical tools exist. All that is needed is the will to make human life truly accounted for. And so that we look not just at an individual, but at how this process unfolds, in which units, and how many people are going missing or being killed.
And we need to analyze: who issued the order? How was the mission assigned? I have repeatedly spoken with the families of those missing in action during assault operations. I frequently encounter the same questions: What was the reason? Why was the planning so poor? Why did they go missing? Why did they die? Time and again, I hear the same story: a mission is assigned in the evening to storm or move into a location by morning. There is no time for planning. There is no opportunity for detailed reconnaissance. The situation marked on the map does not reflect the reality on the ground. The deployment line that was supposed to be the starting point has, in fact, long been held by the enemy. As a result, instead of the intended objective, they find themselves forced to assault entirely different targets.
In essence, the primary cause of combat losses that I personally encountered, especially when asked why so many lives were lost in a particular area, is objective planning failures and inadequate mission assignment. If you look at the verdicts and the lens of criminal cases to see who is held accountable for losses, for the loss of positions, and for everything that goes wrong at the front, in the vast majority of cases, accountability stops at the company commander level. They are our most accountable tier of leadership. That is where it ends. Beyond that, political narratives take over.
A loss audit is therefore a key issue. I strongly believe in it and hope it will begin working in the near future. I will certainly continue covering this issue. Once a loss audit is in place, there will be an objective opportunity to ask commanders, within the framework of a professional investigation rather than an administrative inquiry or a criminal case, why such losses occurred. Was it negligence? Was it incompetence? Or were you given such an order by someone else, to rush into a village or a tree line within a few hours and then hold it to the last man without support?
Question from the audience
What do you think about the situation involving the head of the State Border Guard Service, Serhii Deineko?
To be honest, I am simply shocked by this news. Like everyone else, I heard the official statement from the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, which includes a recording where a voice alleged to belong to Serhii Deineko, Colonel General and head of the State Border Guard Service, is heard in his office laying out illegally obtained money, tens of thousands of euros, and discussing how one pile of 70,000 will go here and another pile will go somewhere else. The man is removed from his post and then becomes the commander of a combat unit again. And what about NABU? How is this supposed to be explained? So he was allegedly dividing up millions there, and now he is commanding another unit. Deineko has not made a single statement explaining what that money was, why it was being divided in his office, or what issues were being decided there. What kind of officer is that? What kind of general hides like a frightened child and waits to be given some new position in order to wash his reputation clean? What kind of kindergarten is this? This is a general, and he is acting like a rag. I simply cannot understand this. Colonel General Deineko must prove that he is an officer, a general, and worthy of commanding Ukrainian units in this war. To do that, he must honestly explain where that money came from. From his subordinates? Instead, no one says anything, and he is quietly appointed to, another position. It is simply nonsense. Namely, divide up enough money, collect the cash, and you will not only be able to buy your way out, you will even be appointed to another position. No need to worry. That is the signal the state is sending to the Defense Forces. And everyone treats it as normal, no reaction, everything is fine. It is complete absurdity.
Baseline drone provision for brigades
We are launching a baseline provision of drones for brigades. This ensures a guaranteed monthly supply of FPVs, reconnaissance bombers, and other UAVs. This is in addition to state deliveries, 'e-points,' and other procurement channels. It will allow brigades to plan their defense with confidence in their available resources. We are also working on centralized supplies for the army, including Starlinks and pickup trucks.
Yes, this is a critical development. Currently, the military is actively discussing strike assets and drones, the primary means of modern warfare. What exactly will this procurement scheme look like? How will it function? What will be the budget allocation and ratios? What authority will commanders have, both in defining their requirements and in fulfilling them? We need a balance. I speak with many heads of Unmanned Systems Services. I am constantly fundraising for drones and other equipment myself. This is an incredibly costly war. But it is better to fight with drones than with people. That said, there is a major question regarding the logic behind the procurement framework. We need an objective accounting of the assets and resources required by the army and the defense forces. We also need to assess the competencies and technological capacities of manufacturers. For instance, we have excellent equipment from high-quality producers, but we cannot place orders for millions of units. They simply wouldn't be able to fulfill them due to a range of factors: raw material shortages, component deficits, technological constraints, and risks.
If we place all our orders with a single manufacturer, they could, as we have unfortunately already seen happen, be hit by a strike. This leaves you with a contract that the manufacturer simply cannot physically fulfill because they have lost their warehouses or production lines. This is a serious problem. Therefore, regarding procurement, I would like to see, and I hope that Minister Fedorov, who has his own logic, will not do this publicly, I would very much like the Minister of Defense to present this, perhaps via video conference, to avoid gathering people in one place. He should explain it to those who, in my view, are the key links in defense planning and troop employment. This includes the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Commander of the National Guard, and the army corps commanders who hold their respective sectors. Ultimately, the primary decision-making hub for defining operational requirements must be located at the command echelons responsible for Ukraine’s defense and for specific sectors of the front. These are the levels accountable for all troops engaged in combat there, for technological assets, and for the engagement and elimination of the enemy in the execution of combat missions.
I believe that such critical matters as defense planning for drones, artillery, communications, and command-and-control should, after the analytical work is done, be discussed and presented as a holistic model within a small, closed-door circle for those who carry the primary burden of responsibility.
As I mentioned in the last broadcast, the two key deficits in the army that prevent us from defeating Russia are accountability and honesty. These are not moral or ethical issues; they are strictly organizational problems stemming from poor organization and weak planning. Thus, I believe the logic mentioned by Fedorov, providing a certain baseline of funding, should go toward scaling complex manufacturing processes. This includes heavy strike assets, such as bombers, as well as attack and reconnaissance fixed-wing UAVs. In these areas, the technological production cycle is very long, involving complex components that are scarce on the market and must be imported, making us dependent on those imports. In such cases, a baseline minimum must be issued immediately to those manufacturers capable of producing equipment that is already being utilized by the troops.
If we have long-term contracts, that is, a planning horizon for manufacturers and, secondly, competition among producers, our defense industry will continue to develop and will be able to outpace the enemy technologically. I very much hope the right conclusions will be drawn from some of the 2023 procurements, when, because we did not yet have much experience with complex large-scale contracting, major orders were placed with manufacturers who were, in principle, decent and competent people, but simply could not scale.
I hope we will not delve too deeply into this, and I will not go into the history of the problem, but I do want to say this: some very well-known bomber-type drones and FPV systems that were fielded in practice performed very poorly. Yet because a market exists in Ukraine, the state ended up ordering, unfortunately, tens of thousands, even hundreds of thousands of low-quality FPVs and thousands of low-quality bomber drones, and we spent substantial public resources in a completely incompetent way. Now we need to draw conclusions. Funding should be allocated to those manufacturers who can drive development and competition, who can scale, and who can source components through different channels and from different countries, so that we have at least a basic minimum of competition at the development stage. And then there should be a budget, including a bonus pool in the form of e-points, but it also cannot be large: it should be up to 10% of the budget, no more.
Incentives are not a distribution mechanism. In my view, the primary budget should operate through a DOT-chain mechanism. Specifically, approximately 30% should be a baseline minimum allocated to launch production and scaling for manufacturers who possess the necessary expertise. Another 10% should go toward an incentive fund, while the remaining capital should be managed via a DOT-chain, but not just any DOT-chain; one that is shaped by army corps commanders and commanders of operational groupings. That is where we need to look at the distribution. If we do this, the people responsible for the operational employment of these assets will have no reason to complain. Currently, the loudest critics of failed procurements are the military itself, unit commanders who are issued substandard drones and ammunition, and the manufacturers of high-quality weaponry who find it impossible to secure sales. Unfortunately, this happened before Fedorov, and it happened under Umerov, Reznikov, and all their predecessors: a minister arrives, immediately signs a contract with someone, and then those contracts are never fulfilled.
According to data from the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), contracts worth over $1 billion were signed in 2022 under Reznikov with suppliers who failed to deliver any weaponry. Imagine this: a war is raging, every penny counts, people are crowdfunding, everyone is shouting "give us drones," while some bureaucrats in suits sit in their offices, go home to their families in the evening, and casually allocate a billion dollars to shell companies that are physically incapable of fulfilling an order. And where is Reznikov now? Not in prison. Neither is his young team. I would very much like to ensure we don’t return to a system where money is siphoned off to companies that promise the world but deliver nothing.
It is very important to recall the artillery example. Artillery, in case some people are not aware, is no less important a tool on the battlefield. And in modern warfare, its role, especially in spring, summer, and autumn, is simply irreplaceable. It is one of the key weapon systems that cannot be substituted. In reality, we have a shortage of artillery shells, no matter what anyone says. And we also lack guns, especially 155mm self-propelled artillery systems. We had a downright shameful situation when, in 2024, the Pavlohrad Chemical Plant received an order worth more than 50 billion hryvnias, over $1 billion, to set up production of many types of shells. In other words, in 2022, it was Reznikov and a $1 billion deal; then the minister changed to Umerov, and another scheme worth more than a billion followed. The order was placed with the Pavlohrad plant. It is a state-owned enterprise with its own record of achievements. But it had neither the expertise nor the production lines, nor the propellants, components, or fuzes in the required quantities. And it did not perform a miracle. As a result, the state poured in enormous sums and did not receive the munitions it expected. The money was effectively frozen for a year. And that was it. We lost that time while scraping together small sums for weapons, and once again, this money simply went into a void.
The director of the Pavlohrad plant and several of his managers have been detained, and a criminal case is underway. But what does that change? This was obvious beforehand. How can people produce hundreds of thousands of shells when they lack propellant? Where are they supposed to get it? Propellant is produced by only a few plants worldwide. It doesn’t grow in a backyard. I hear some claims like, "Let’s only order long-range, guided shells that fly 30 to 40 kilometers." But those capabilities simply don't exist. You have to study the market and see what propellant is actually available. You can calculate exactly how many charges for long-range shells can be manufactured because the global producers of long-range propellant are well-known. Production orders can be projected. The same goes for fuses. Yet, Defense Minister Umerov failed to do this. The Ministry for Strategic Industries and the Ministry of Defense handed over more than a billion dollars for things that were never manufactured. Imagine, we lost a year's worth of funding that could have been working for us. With those billions, we could have purchased drones, shells, explosives, anything. But we just lost it. Can you imagine?
I don't know what should be done with these people during wartime, considering the cost in lives and blood. Every planner in the Ministry for Strategic Industries and the Ministry of Defense who allowed this is a criminal. They are criminals who must be held accountable. First, they fail to supply shells and mortar rounds, or they deliver low-quality ammunition, and then they start writing reports claiming the army is fully equipped and there is no such need. It’s absurd. Every unit commander knows that shells and drones are needed not only to kill the enemy but to suppress them with fire and maintain fire control. You can never have too many high-quality drones or too many shells in war. Everyone is facing a shortage. To develop weaponry, you need planning.
If we want to fight not with people but with shells and drones, we need planning, and we need an analysis of manufacturers’ capabilities. That is what I want to say here and to warn about.
The statements the new defense minister is making are based on analysis and logic. Fedorov has been to the front, is visiting the commanders of our best combat units, corps, regiments, and brigades, gathering input and forming analytical groups. I think that in the near future we will see systemic decisions that are genuinely grounded in experience, including the negative experience we have had.
I would put it this way: before an audit of losses, we need an audit of failed managerial and political decisions that have dealt a very damaging blow to our defense and continue to do so today.
Large-scale recruitment of foreign nationals into Ukraine’s Armed Forces
Mykhailo Fedorov has said things that, in my view, I strongly agree with: one of the solutions that could help address the manpower shortage, first and foremost in the infantry, is large-scale recruitment of foreign nationals. I was genuinely stunned to see this statement criticized not by some opposition figure or professional naysayers, but by the governing camp, by Danylo Hetmantsev from Servant of the People. I want to remind you that Danylo Hetmantsev, a serving MP, spent many years as a full-time aide to MP Volodymyr Sivkovych, a traitor to Ukraine who is the subject of a criminal case for high treason in Ukraine, who lives in Moscow, is linked to an operation by Russian special services against Ukraine, and was exposed as a long-standing FSB agent. And so when Danylo Hetmantsev spoke out, I was as surprised as it gets. For some reason, he did not like Fedorov’s remarks about foreigners.
He stated, in particular, that he could not welcome Fedorov’s brilliant decision to solve mobilization and AWOL issues by recruiting foreigners. The main thing, Hetmantsev said during the presentation, is that the plan doesn't end up like it usually does with Fedorov staying only as a presentation, and that the foreigners recruited under this plan don't end up fighting exclusively within the "Diia" app. Vivid, striking, brilliant, but only in the author’s imaginary reality. It is a great sin to force a science fiction writer of such caliber to repair a water main. Frankly, I thought this was just some kind of nonsense, but Danylo Hetmantsev is known as one of the most influential figures in the Ukrainian government. For many years, he essentially micro-managed the tax service. I even had a public conflict with him before my military service, during which I leveled accusations against him at a Verkhovna Rada committee meeting.
I would like to invite Member of Parliament Danylo Hetmantsev to our unit, if he has questions regarding the recruitment of foreigners and whether it is effective or not, provided he has the time. If he has time not just for posting on Facebook, but for seeing the actual reality of war. He doesn’t consider himself a science fiction writer, does he? Or does he? I believe that if MP Hetmantsev, who earns 200,000 UAH a month, which is more than the soldiers on the front line, and who voted for this salary himself this year, stands by his words and the salary he receives from taxpayers, then he should come to the front. He should visit the units where foreigners are fighting and only then speak on the subject. Because this is simply a clumsy statement; if it is not retracted or clarified by Hetmantsev, it truly looks like nothing more than playing into the hands of Russian propaganda. I want to point out that in my unit, foreigners make up over 10% of the personnel, and they have proven themselves to be highly effective.
You can watch my report, I was in Kupiansk, and I filmed one of the combat days there on December 24, 2025; the report is here on the channel. I was moving with an assault group from Khartiia Brigade’s 4th Battalion. It was a group of Latin American fighters. I did not show that in the video for security reasons and because of the sensitivity of the information at the time. Now I can say this: we were trying to move in on a target to assault a position, and during those assault actions, we came under attack. Two of the assault group’s fighters were killed when enemy drones struck. I want to emphasize that all the fighters, all those warriors we moved with that day, were fully committed, exceptionally brave, and they carried out combat tasks to defend Ukraine very effectively. So if MP from Servant of the People Danylo Hetmantsev has any questions about whether employing foreigners is "inappropriate," as Fedorov put it, he has every opportunity to verify it. I can personally help and go with him to Kupiansk or another hot sector where foreign nationals are fighting, and he can see for himself whether this is an effective solution or not, if he is used to standing by his words.
I believe that recruiting foreigners is a highly effective strategy, and I fully support the initiative announced by Mykhailo Fedorov. I would also like to highlight that the initiative to involve foreigners is also supported by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Ihor Klymenko. These two ministries are acting in coordination on this matter, and I intend to do everything in my power to facilitate this effort. Foreigners are already fighting, and scaling up the presence of foreign nationals within the armed forces is an absolute necessity. From every perspective, this is a completely sound and advantageous initiative for Ukraine.
Are there any "fighters" in Kupiansk?
The "fighters" are still there. There are a few houses where they remain dug in. In fact, at this point, there are two strongpoints that the enemy is defending across the entire city. And there is a particular problem there: the enemy has concentrated a very large number of UAVs. You can watch my report, but I want to tell you that enemy drones are simply in the air there nonstop, in large numbers. They lie in ambush, conduct reconnaissance, and carry out strikes. I believe more than 100 enemy UAV positions are operating over Kupiansk to perform all kinds of tasks. That is why active operations there take place very rarely, only when the situation allows, when the drone threat allows it. Ukrainian commanders are trying to preserve the assault units that are carrying out clearing operations inside Kupiansk; they try to work in a highly targeted manner to avoid losses. The enemy constantly tries, under the cover of fog, to slip at least one or two additional men across the Oskil along the riverbed. Their losses in these infiltration attempts are simply enormous, but by continuously attacking the perimeter of our defenses, the enemy slows down our task of eliminating these residual groups. Nevertheless, Kupiansk will be fully liberated, and I have absolutely no doubt about that. At present, we control roughly 95% of the city.
Will there be problems with the casualty audit in Syrskyi’s "meat regiments"?
I believe that if some officers or generals are unhappy about Minister Fedorov conducting a casualty audit, they are effectively admitting their professional unsuitability, incompetence, and unfitness for duty. On the contrary, I hope that all generals and all regiment, brigade, and corps commanders, unanimously, as they sometimes do when posting messages of support on Facebook, will voice their backing for the expediency of a casualty audit once it is formalized by an official order. I expect commanders at every level to support this, write about it, and declare it publicly. Furthermore, implementation must begin immediately, from day one. We are now waiting for the relevant order from the Minister of Defense. I hope that following these statements, this matter will be resolved within the next week or two.
Krotevych says that in Syrskyi’s "meat" regiments, losses in a single month are higher than in combat brigades over an entire year.
Here, I cannot agree with you, because, unfortunately, we have brigades where losses are higher than in assault regiments. Maybe not in every operation, but it happens. So you have to look at the specifics, it depends on the conditions under which combat operations are conducted. Situations differ, but there are engagements where, when you analyze an operation, it turns out that regular brigades with weak organization, lacking commanders, sustainment, and weapons can suffer losses on defense, simply on defense, significantly higher than an assault unit. That is a fact, and that is exactly why we need to learn.
I hope all the initiatives Mykhailo Fedorov is talking about will begin to be implemented, because Fedorov is trying to work with numbers and to build a logical basis for his statements. That is why I support it: in politics, I believe the key quality of a politician is consistency. What a politician sets out to introduce must be delivered.
That is why I very much hope that in the near future we will be talking not about initiatives, not about promises, not about visions, but, very soon, by the 100-day mark of Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, about decisions that begin to change the Ukrainian military. Changes in planning procurement of drones, artillery, shells, and other strike capabilities; an audit of personnel losses; Mission Control; and oversight through the Delta system of all processes in the military that can be technologized. These are revolutionary changes in the war. Of course, every one of us is interested in victory. Ukraine is capable of winning this war. I am not talking about marching on Moscow. I am talking about winning the war, for us, that means stopping the front, defeating the Russian army, not allowing Putin to seize our territory and our cities, and protecting our freedom, our independence, and Ukraine’s existence as a state and a nation. So, friends, I will support everything positive and constructive that works toward this goal. And we will speak about what does not and give it a proper assessment. Thank you for the livestream and glory to Ukraine!
