Yurii Butusov: Year of corps. "Triika" and Khartiia
The livestream is devoted entirely to the topic of the army corps. A few days ago, Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi, commander of the Third Corps, and Colonel Ihor Obolienskyi, commander of the Second Army Corps, held a meeting and discussed the results of a year of work by their corps and their joint work plans.
So, both Triika and the Second Corps, Khartiia, began developing actively over the course of the year and achieved significant results that can be discussed, but at the same time, there are also problems in the development of the corps that are worth addressing. I consider it an extremely important development that both Khartiia and the Third Corps have jointly decided to implement combat training programmes. This is the backbone for continuing force generation, above all, to create standard operating procedures and standard programmes for training soldiers, training the NCO corps, and training the officer corps. The topic is more than relevant and is of key importance because the army begins precisely with training and manning, and that is where force generation begins. All the more so since yesterday, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine announced that training programmes for soldiers, that is, rank-and-file infantry troops, abroad are being discontinued. I believe this is the right decision, and this training programme for troops will take place in Ukraine.
This is precisely the urgent issue. The experience of the two world wars, just like the experience of our own war, shows that the training of infantrymen and the training of sergeants must take place first and foremost in the training and replacement units of brigades and corps. That is the highest-quality training: training delivered by people with direct combat experience, and training conducted by the units themselves, which are the ones most interested in the quality of their servicemen. Therefore, I welcome the fact that a joint programme has now been created. I hope that such horizontal links, which make it possible to unify the soldier training programme, the sergeant training programme, and the junior officer training programme, primarily at the entry-level position of junior lieutenant, are exactly the foundation that should genuinely be spread across the Defense Forces. And it is very good that corps have become a sufficiently influential structure in the army to make it possible to share experience, combine experience, and thus improve their own combat capability. I hope that other army corps will also join this process. This is an evolutionary path toward eventually changing, unifying, and standardising the modern combat training system across all army corps and the entire Defense Forces. It is very good that such changes are taking place.
I will answer some questions right away.
What about the TDF?
The TDF, the Territorial Defense Forces, actually, two army corps have also been created on the basis of the TDF. We have many corps; each branch of the forces has its own army corps. Therefore, I hope the TDF can also join. Again, this is an initiative of the corps itself. Anyone can join this initiative. I am confident that this needs to be disseminated as widely as possible to exchange experience and develop the best joint practices.
Are volunteer units fighting at the front? If they still exist, what is their condition, and does the volunteer movement have prospects?
Right now, I cannot give you the latest information. I have not updated it, as I am currently in the service myself and exclusively handle my own duties; I have not traveled along the front line, across all sectors. In the sectors where I am stationed, I do not currently see autonomous, independent volunteer units like those in 2014. In reality, a large number of structures have been created within the Defense Forces, where there is a place for everyone for any tasks and areas of application. And, as far as I know, all volunteers are already serving somewhere.
Is Khartiia still operating in Kupiansk?
Interesting question. Why do you ask? As far as I know, yes, Khartiia continues to carry out its tasks in the Kupiansk direction, and quite effectively. As is known, Khartiia closed the passage to Kupiansk, completely blocked it, cut off the Russian troops' lines of communication, and now our soldiers, the "Kupiansk" tactical group, are successfully completing the full clearing of Kupiansk from Russian assault units. And Khartiia reliably holds the defensive line and does not let the enemy through, repelling all attacks of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division and the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade, which are still trying to break through into Kupiansk.
Good evening, I am 20 years old, and I am graduating from a military college. What are the chances that I will not end up in the infantry if I join you in Khartiia?
A strange question. Look, you are 20 years old; if you have the desire to get into another branch of the military, you have the opportunities. There is currently a considerable amount of time to acquire the military specialty that interests you the most. We still have individuals liable for military service, meaning for us it is 25 years old; you are 20, you have more than enough time to acquire the specialization that interests you in the war.
Will there be any other corps integrations along with K-2 or the 47th Brigade?
Those are not corps; those are other units.
Could these positive changes on the part of Khartiia and the Triika be inconvenient for the General Staff?
I do not see any problems here for other command structures of the Defense Forces. I believe, on the contrary, the initiative of Khartiia and the Second Khartiia Corps, and the Third Army Corps, is a positive that actually shows the possibility of rapid changes, the possibility of dynamics in the Defense Forces of Ukraine. And such flexibility, such an ability to implement innovations at the organizational level, is, in my opinion, one of Ukraine's key advantages in the war, which we must realize. The initiative and the scaling of the initiative at the corps level are essentially the operational-strategic level. Therefore, undoubtedly, I personally believe, I have spoken about this, perhaps someone is not yet aware, just in case I will repeat, that regarding the creation of corps and the need to wage war with corps, with corps army structures, with divisional corps army structures, I have been writing since 2014, and since the beginning of the active phase in 2022. Therefore, in our conditions, army corps must be the key hubs for resource allocation, for the planned replenishment of personnel, equipment, weaponry, and drones, for personnel training, and for the deployment of troops. These must be structures that take responsibility for a sector of the front and are responsible for the result.
What are the results of the corps in the army? Let's look at the past year. Let's start with the positive. There is not much positive, but it exists. The reform of the army corps has significantly improved command and control and accountability in the army. Because now brigades have corps commanders who very often can command, employ, and organize a certain part of their brigades, taking full responsibility for the entire vertical. This applies to both administrative decisions and combat employment decisions. This is an important step forward because, until last year, the entire command of the Armed Forces from an organizational point of view was chaos; we had 112 brigades, the management of which was completely fragmented. Administratively, they were subordinated to Operational Commands, but at the front, they were subordinated to temporary formations: Operational-Tactical Commands. The Operational-Tactical Commands were responsible for the conduct of combat operations, but they were absolutely not responsible for organization, personnel, the transfer of command staff, or the quality of combat training. All of this was the responsibility of the Operational Commands, which were not responsible for the war because they sat in the rear, essentially administering permanent deployment locations and sending commissions to the front. An absurd structure, fragmentation, and a disconnect in accountability. There was no such precedent of command disconnect in either the First or Second World War in world history, in any country in the world. And only Ukraine, unfortunately, distinguished itself in military history in such a bureaucratic, absurd way, when our war was waged exclusively by tactical formations, brigades.
Fortunately, in the fourth year of the war, the country's leadership realized this problem and began to solve it, and this is already a step forward. What about the positives? We see that some corps have significantly improved their command and control and organization. We see the example of both the Third Corps and the Second Corps. In reality, command has improved at the level of other corps as well, but the Second and Third Corps are already implementing serious reforms to increase combat capability and force generation. This is exactly what we have severely lacked in the army.
But there are also problems. In fact, over an entire year, according to the deployment plan, only one single army corps out of the 18 declared has been formed, employed, and deployed as it should be. Only the Third Army Corps is fully deployed in its sector with the full complement of brigades subordinated to it. One corps. In all other corps, including, unfortunately, Khartiia, a completely mixed managerial mishmash remains in our country. For example, Khartiia’s units are scattered; out of the five brigades within the corps, all five are dispersed among other corps. One brigade is in one corps, the second in another, and the third in yet another. No one has gathered them into a single sector of the front in a whole year. Unfortunately, the situation is the same in all other corps. That is, the corps are organized, but there is no improvement in their employment because the troops are fragmented and scattered across the front, and unfortunately, no one has resolved this managerial mishmash in an entire year. And so it continues. I would understand if there were an active phase of the war, chaos, and the enemy were doing something immediate that caused a mixing of combat formations, troops, and so on. But that is not the case. We have a stable front line; the enemy is advancing without any surprises. They move along the same directions, and all these directions are clear. In reality, the organized pressure of the enemy, who fights with divisions, corps, and armies, must be countered by our organizational structure. Our brigades and corps. But this is not happening. Therefore, it must be noted that despite the creation of army corps, the advantage in the organization and employment of troops at the organizational level, at the operational-strategic level, remains, unfortunately, on the side of the enemy. And this is not a subjective opinion; it is simply the objective picture provided by military science. I do not even want to reference the Russian experience here. It is enough that all our generals and political leaders like to say "we are moving toward NATO, toward NATO standards." Unfortunately, none of our decision-makers has read the US Army Field Manuals. There is a "Manual" there titled "The Army, Corps, and Division." It explains exactly that during a large-scale deployment, troops must fight within these specific organizational structures. Not because it is fashionable or aesthetic, but because there is a vast sector, a large mass of troops, and specific echelons of command. These are obvious things to any person educated in military affairs, even at a basic level, at least at the level of those same NATO standard manuals that are so often spoken of here. Yet, in reality, no one is implementing them. Therefore, unfortunately, many words are being thrown around, while the corps reform remains the responsibility of the corps commanders themselves. Unfortunately, at the highest level, the leadership of Ukraine has not yet gotten around to the organization of the corps. This is a major problem; we see that our leaders simply do not understand the managerial and organizational issues they need to rectify. And this is not just my opinion. This is the stance of the US Army Field Manuals. This is the conclusion of several centuries of military history, dating back to when army corps were established as permanent structures during the Napoleonic Wars.
By the way, I want to say that the established structure of army corps, corps, divisions, regiments, was first scaled up and introduced by Napoleon at the beginning of the 19th century. And this structure was fully applied in the First and Second World Wars across the world, except in one country — Ukraine. Just imagine that. Why do we differ in things like this? It is simply ridiculous. I want to say that history will be written, and I want to tell our leaders that military history will say about you that, unfortunately, you read books poorly, or, more likely, did not read them at all. You do not understand what proper force organisation looks like during a great war. You do not read US Army standards, NATO standards, you do not know the basics. It is regrettable to say this. I have read them, and I can only stress this once again. I hope that the country’s leadership in 2026, and I place great hope in Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, will pay attention to the fact that this is not criticism — these are the basics of military science, and they need to be implemented, or at least studied, and discussed with corps commanders who understand them. Take the Third Army Corps. It is now the largest operational-strategic formation in Ukraine. Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi commands a corps that includes nine brigades. Nine brigades deployed in one sector. It holds about 12% of the active front. Twelve percent. Just imagine how much that is. Is it really not obvious that one should listen to the advice of a commander who holds 12% of the front, where the enemy has been unable anywhere along that 12% to advance and break through our lines, where the enemy has been completely stopped across that sector, and in some parts of that sector pushed back by our successful counterattacks? Is it really not clear that one should at least listen to the person who accomplished this and ask why he succeeded? Could this not be scaled up to other sections of the front as well? Why, for example, not ask Colonel Obolienskyi, commander of Khartiia’s Second Corps, who, with minimal forces, effectively saved Kupiansk from complete capture by conducting a small-scale operation, cutting the enemy off from Kupiansk, beating it back, and fully driving it away from the approaches to the city? He was at the head of a corps-level grouping that included units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the National Guard. This was a successful operation carried out with limited forces and relatively low losses. Why not ask about that experience? I cannot understand it. Why, in the fifth year of active combat operations, do we have so much politicking and so little pragmatism? Why is military history not valued here, why is experience ignored, why is analysis ignored? Why are NATO standards only words? Why is after-action review... I want to give credit where it is due: I heard for the first time about the introduction of after-action review from Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov. I am very much waiting for the moment when an order is issued to the troops. I hope Mykhailo Fedorov succeeds in organising and implementing an after-action review in the army in practice. Then everything will become obvious. We have to learn from our own experience. We are not learning. We are not learning from global experience. We are not learning from our own experience. And I believe that this unwillingness to learn, or inability to learn, incapacity to learn, is Ukraine’s main problem in this war. In fact, Ukraine has every capability right now to completely halt and crush the Russian offensive. What we are seeing, the losses the enemy is suffering now, are losses it cannot afford. And the corps, the operations carried out, for example, by at least the Second and Third Corps, show that the enemy can be beaten. Yes, the Russians have the advantage. They have an advantage in the number of drones, a complete advantage in aviation, in the number of aerial bombs they constantly launch at us. They have an enormous advantage in ballistic and cruise missiles. They have a major advantage in assault troops, in the cannon fodder they throw at us? wave after wave. But, friends, they cannot turn this into results at the front when we act in a properly organised way in defence, when we act in a properly organised way in offensives and attacks. It is impossible. The enemy cannot cope with that. Everywhere we have a competently organised defence, where there is stable command and control, the enemy is stopped and cannot advance a single step. More than that, it is pushed back. Why can we not do this along the entire front? Because the enemy has greater numbers? No. This is purely a Russian offensive right now. This is purely our own Ukrainian organisational and command problem. And I very much hope, I truly believe, that what Mykhailo Fedorov, the new defense minister, is trying to do with reforms at the level of the entire structure of the Armed Forces, I hope that will bring change. Because in fact, if the system is reformed from the top down, success will come. And Ukraine is now capable of completely crushing the Russian occupiers. What are our advantages? We can significantly improve the command and organisation of the forces. We have examples, we have a sufficient number of commanders. We have a large number of trained, competent UAV crews. We have a significant number of UAV commanders. We have infantry. We are increasing the number of foreign infantrymen. We are learning to hold the forward edge with minimal forces. And where the infantry is supported by drones, supplies, and logistics, the personnel hold their ground very worthily and effectively. Therefore, we have all the resources in our hands to achieve victory. Victory for us means stopping the enemy and pushing them back at least to the natural boundaries of the terrain that are convenient for us to defend. For this, we simply need order. That is all. And the corps, the implementation of the corps reform, the return of brigades from various corps to their respective corps' sectors of responsibility, is the first basic, key step that must take place. The fact that these corps brigades have been scattered across the entire front is a mess and a display of irresponsibility. Nothing less. Because there is no necessity to shuffle troops like decks of cards at the front. The enemy does the opposite. They have designated sectors for armies, divisions, and corps, and they operate continuously, year after year, in the same sector. The command understands the situation; they know the landmarks and the problems. This significantly streamlines things and allows the enemy to organize and plan their actions. We do not have such an opportunity. Why? It is absurd. Therefore, I hope for the victory of intellect, and I hope that Minister of Defense Fedorov will succeed in raising these issues at the strategic level and getting them moving. I am confident that Fedorov is supported by all commanders at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. He will be supported by all our Western advisors and all Western military missions because what I have just told you is obvious to any militarily educated person. I have not told you anything extraordinary just now.
Too much advance praise for Fedorov.
We currently face such a critical situation that we must support those people who at least declare progress. And I want to say that I already see some of Fedorov's initiatives, that is, steps he has already taken regarding the financing of individual combat units, the organization of troops, the recruitment of new military personnel, and the recruitment of foreign personnel. And these are effective steps. Perhaps it is not worth talking about everything right now, but we will definitely discuss it. There will be Fedorov's 100 days, and I will definitely do a separate broadcast about this, focusing on the results of his work. And if something is not done, I will just as honestly tell you what I see.
I am pleased that Fedorov is implementing matters concerning the National Guard, the Second Corps, and the First Corps, together with the Minister of Internal Affairs, Ihor Klymenko. I hope that such cooperation at the government level is exactly the kind of beginning I would like to believe in systemic changes within the Defense Forces.
What about Sloviansk-Kramatorsk? Will they still be under our control by the end of the year, what do you think?
It depends entirely on managerial and organisational decisions. We have sufficient forces there, and the tactical situation allows us to completely halt the enemy on the approaches to Sloviansk-Kramatorsk. The terrain there is advantageous; it is a favorable natural boundary. There is still enough time to prepare them for even stronger defences, effective cover, the construction of defensive lines, and changes in the organisation and deployment of troops. I absolutely believe that we can not only stop the enemy in the Donbas but push them back.
Could you tell us what is known about the 425th and 225th Regiments? Some investigative journalism reports paint a negative picture; is it true that those forcibly mobilized mostly end up there?
I have looked at some data, talked to people, and I am also interested in the question of where people end up in the army. So, I can give you some information; I will not go into detail, but generally, I can say that I have data for February. For February, regarding those who entered according to the general plan of the mobilization directive, that is, mobilized individuals out of the total number in the army, approximately, let's say, no more than 15% of the service members who were enlisted into the Defense Forces according to the mobilization directive ended up in assault regiments. Into all structures of the Defense Forces. I cannot speak for previous months; I think the proportion was higher then, but now everything has leveled out. From what I see now, the air assault regiments received the same amount of reinforcements in February as the assault regiments, and the Ground Forces received more people than both the Assault Forces and the Air Assault Forces. Therefore, I can tell you the information that, in principle, has been voiced at the official level. But, undoubtedly, there is a priority for staffing assault regiments and Air Assault Forces through the so-called reserve battalions, that is, where people are enlisted who have gone AWOL. Transfers are carried out through them. There is a significant number there; again, these are not mobilized individuals. These are people who were already in the army and are service members. People tell bad stories. Indeed, I want to say, we have a problem. Assault Forces probably require a separate study. I believe that Assault Forces as a whole within the Ground Forces are, in my opinion, necessary. I think that for every army corps, or perhaps for every two army corps, at a minimum, one assault battalion or one assault regiment needs to be created to carry out tasks of conducting assault operations, clearing operations, for example, addressing the infiltration of Russian infantry, or conducting counterattacks. This should be a reserve, an operational reserve of the corps commander, deployed in certain priority directions. And the purpose of assault forces is to conduct intensive combat operations. The intensity of combat operations must be ensured primarily by maneuver fire and the maneuver of assault troops, the fighters. I believe this is effective. For example, in Khartiia, where assault operations were conducted by designated assault units from the brigade in the Kupiansk, they demonstrated the high effectiveness of such specialization, the creation of specialized assault units. Undoubtedly, it is effective when there is not only discipline but also the necessary planning and organization of coordination with drones. And such drone-assault regiments are definitely needed. Well, in principle, Mykhailo Fedorov has spoken about this, so I hope that the assault forces will receive the necessary number of drones, funding, and the correct tactics and organization. For now, at this moment, the concept of employment of the Assault Forces, the Ground Forces, and its distinction from the concept of employment of the Air Assault Forces has not been formulated in our country. And currently, within the country's leadership, as far as I know, discussions are ongoing. There is a draft law on the creation of Assault Forces. This draft law has not been adopted; fierce debates are underway regarding the organization of the chain of command for assault regiment commanders, the commander, the commanding officer, or the head of the Assault Forces directorate. Discussions are ongoing, and so far, these discussions have not yielded a result, but there is a high probability that this draft law will soon be submitted to the Rada.
Could you tell us a bit, has the situation around Kupiansk stabilized; is the left bank holding?
The left bank of Kupiansk is holding thanks to, without exaggeration, the heroic efforts of the 116th Mechanized Brigade, the warriors of the 116th Mechanized Brigade and the 14th Mechanized Brigade, as well as individual battalions and units supporting them. Very heavy fighting is ongoing; the enemy has not abandoned its intentions to knock us out of Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi, that is, from the left bank, but nevertheless, our soldiers are holding their ground. There are many enemy infiltrations, that is, the penetration of small groups or even individual infantrymen through our combat formations; nevertheless, all these infiltrations are gradually being eliminated. The fighting is very heavy, the enemy has a huge number of UAVs, and there is a very difficult struggle for air superiority there. In fact, the enemy has turned Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi and Kupiansk itself into actual kill zones, where there is a huge number of drones, and movement, any maneuver, is very severely restricted by enemy drones. Combat operations there are very difficult; our soldiers are holding their ground and inflicting huge losses on the enemy.
Is it possible to push the enemy back beyond the Oskil?
It is entirely possible; this is not just my assessment. I was not simply there and participating in combat operations; I was in Kupiansk, and I was in other sectors right by the Oskil. I can tell you that this is the assessment of the majority of competent commanders in the sector. We have all the capabilities, including in 2026, to completely push the enemy back to the line of water boundaries throughout the entire Kharkiv region. All the prerequisites exist for this. Again, this is exclusively a problem of planning at the strategic level. The prioritization and the correct organization of troops. I want to say that if the brigades that were taken away and scattered across the front are simply returned to the sector of the "Khartiia" corps, then in our sector, it is realistic. And in the sectors of other corps defending the Kharkiv region.
What about the plans to kill 50 thousand enemy personnel per month?
I do not think that is possible at the moment. The enemy does not have 50 thousand assault troops per month. It is necessary to effectively strike not only the enemy's assault groups, not only the forward edge, but also to strike the enemy at a significant depth of their combat formations, that is, to paralyze logistics at a great distance from the front. So what is needed for this? Organization, planning, and a sufficient number of strike assets, primarily drones. Artillery is also acutely needed. If this is provided, then 50 thousand can be killed. Otherwise, Russia, from what we see according to our intelligence data, sends approximately 30 thousand people to the front, perhaps 35. They drive them into the attack, well, and they lose approximately 30 to 35 thousand killed and wounded. Therefore, such an exchange, to kill more, yes, well, if you kill more, then simply everything will be destroyed there.
What is the situation near Stepnohirsk? The offensive has been stopped.
The situation there is difficult. Actually, near Zaporizhzhia right now, in the area of Stepnohirsk and Huliaipole, heavy meeting engagements are practically underway. The enemy has concentrated its operational reserves there; the main forces of the elite troops of the Russian Federation are deployed there. The main operational reserves created by Russia are divisions and brigades of the Naval Infantry of the Russian Armed Forces. Two divisions and two brigades of Naval Infantry, as well as a significant number of combined arms units.
It would be interesting to hear your view on the division of powers, tasks, and objectives between the Unmanned Systems Forces and the unmanned systems units of brigades, as well as the unmanned systems regiments of corps, particularly regarding operations against enemy drone pilots.
This is, in fact, a broad, overarching issue. What is the problem? We have a problem with fragmented areas of responsibility. So when responsibility for a sector is properly organised, when we have a corps commander with a defined set of brigades and forces under his command, when the corps commander is the main authority distributing a large share of the drones, replacement personnel, ammunition, communications equipment and logistical support, when the corps commander has his own sector, his own people and his own sustainment plan under his command, then the attached forces, including the Unmanned Systems Forces, must also be subordinated to that corps commander. Then, where a corps has a weak unmanned systems service, I believe experienced and competent commanders of Unmanned Systems Forces brigades and regiments should assume responsibility for such organisation, and not simply support that sector with their own units, but also contribute their command decisions to the organisation of the unmanned systems component. Or where corps have their own unmanned systems regiments, their own strong component, then they should be reinforced with units that also receive long-term directives, long-term combat orders, with the understanding that you enter a sector for at least a year, you work there, set up positions, work together with those forces, interaction improves, cohesion improves, and then the Unmanned Systems Forces and the troops responsible for that sector, including the assault regiments operating in the same sector on the same principle, will complement one another, there will be synergy, there will be integrated action. Right now we have a huge jumble and chaos. And the Unmanned Systems Forces themselves are suffering from this. Just like the entire army. They assign a sector to a brigade of the Unmanned Systems Forces, and then suddenly it is, give a battalion there, give a battalion there, command is disrupted, employment is disrupted. For the effective work of unmanned troops, the Unmanned Systems Forces, and in principle, all UAV units, the key factor is being tied to their own sector. Because in their own sector, troops operate with the greatest confidence and effectiveness. They know the landmarks, they know the nature of the enemy’s actions, they know how logistics are organised, both on their own side and on the enemy’s. And they operate at maximum effectiveness, far more so than those units that are constantly shifted back and forth, have to learn everything on the spot, and whose deployment is even associated with losses.
What percentage of drones do you receive from the state, and how many from volunteers?
At the moment, the majority of the drones in my unit are those we received thanks to the community of the city of Kyiv. For this, I am very grateful to Kyiv residents. Despite such a difficult situation, strikes on the energy sector and infrastructure, the city of Kyiv has allocated resources for a number of units where Kyiv residents serve. This is not just for me; my share is actually not that large, but I am very grateful for this assistance. I thank the city of Kyiv and Kyiv residents for their support. We are fighting now, defending Kharkiv with the drones that Kyiv gave us. Unfortunately, for the defense of the city of Kharkiv, the city of Kharkiv found no resources for our brigade or our corps. It is very regrettable, but it makes it even more valuable that Kyiv residents appreciate this, protecting their city at such distant boundaries and providing support. So, I personally thank Kyiv residents and the Kyiv authorities for their attention and their systematic, non-promotional support for the military.
Could the enemy succeed in breaking through the front line near Lyman?
I do not think the enemy near Lyman has any chances right now because Lyman has just been transferred to the sector of Andrii Biletskyi’s Third Army Corps. Thanks to this, the crisis at the tactical level was overcome; the commanders of the brigade defending Lyman were replaced. Now, these are all warriors who came from the Third Assault Brigade, meaning there is cooperation and cohesion at the command level, and the employment of troops is improving. The enemy is currently stopped; there have been no advances at Lyman for a long time at all—on the contrary, our warriors are acting very actively and have improved our position in many sectors.
In your opinion, when can we establish a proper defense?
As soon as we have an orderly organization of command and employment of troops. Then planning, logic, and appropriate resource allocation will emerge. And that is it—a miracle will happen. We do not need to build some insurmountable wall. We need to build perfectly normal engineering structures, things that can be done effectively by the troops themselves with minimal use of engineering equipment. And if we have ammunition, mines, and drones, the enemy can be destroyed and stopped with these means. For this, again, reforms at the corps level are needed. And the corps reform is not completed.
What is the situation regarding communication with foreigners in Khartiia? I am fluent in Spanish; how useful could I be?
I personally invite you, please write to me on Messenger, in private, anywhere. We are waiting for you; we very much need translators, specifically for Spanish. By the way, this is an appeal to everyone. We are improving and increasing the number of Spanish speakers, and I want to say that in my unit alone, there are already 13 Spanish-speaking service members. They fight brilliantly, excellently, professionally, and responsibly; we respect them very much, and they are an integral part of our team. Therefore, other units of Khartiia also need translators. Please reach out; we are looking forward to it.
Will you be meeting with the Supreme Commander?
My official position is platoon commander. I do not think there is a need for that, honestly. I have my own command, and that communication is quite sufficient for me.
You have not mentioned any other corps commanders besides the second and third. Are there really no other successful ones? Do the first, seventh, and eighth have worse results?
I am fighting as part of the Second Corps, and our neighbor is the Third Army Corps. I can speak authoritatively about them. As for other corps, I cannot act as an expert right now, as you clearly understand. To truly understand something, I previously could travel across the entire sector as a journalist and provide deep, competent assessments. Currently, regarding the sectors where I am not present, I have certain judgments based on the words of people fighting there. But I have not actually looked into the problems or achievements of other corps at that level, and I simply cannot give you an objective account. I just do not have the necessary information in its full scope.
Transferred from an anti-aircraft missile brigade to the infantry retroactively. Five days until deployment. Alternatively, they threaten with being AWOL. Please advise what to do.
Well, I do not know what to advise you, friend. Certainly, in war, you have to look at whom you are going into battle with. And you must have trust. Anyone who goes AWOL must understand the consequences of these events. Therefore, this is a matter for every service member—their conscience, responsibility, and understanding of the situation they find themselves in. I do not know your situation, which unit, and I do not know what is happening with you. You can write in more detail, but based on these words alone, I cannot give you any advice.
I am very grateful to you for being here; I am grateful to those who support the channel. I want to say that today, being in the Defense Forces, I am more confident than ever that Ukraine has all the resources, has the people, and has all the capabilities. Yes, it is difficult for us, but I see on the front how difficult it is for the enemy as well; it is also difficult for them. What losses the enemy sustains, how hard it is for them to find people, what problems they have in their formulaic actions, and how we can exploit them. I see how we are achieving victory; I see how we can achieve success. I see this myself in Kupiansk. Therefore, I am confident that the fate of the war and the results in the war are entirely in Ukraine's hands. As for the initiative the enemy currently holds, actually, as soon as we organize ourselves, we can quickly knock it out and swiftly seize it. We have these opportunities to change the course of the war. Therefore, I urge all of you who have interest, and desire to join the Forces of Victory. In particular, I invite you to my unit. Come on, before you are summoned to the TCR & SS, you can make a choice independently. You can join a high-quality team, acquire a military specialty, receive training, and apply modern technologies, be part of a high-quality, effective team. Therefore, I invite everyone, thank everyone who supports the channel, and thank our tireless sponsors of the "Butusov Plus" channel, thanks to whom we exist, and who support us. Thank you for being with me, and see you soon. Glory to Ukraine!
