One very good serviceman said: "If Syrskyi decided so, you won’t change anything," – Armed Forces of Ukraine Captain Oleksandr Shyrshyn
Oleksandr Shyrshyn is a Major in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the former commander of the Magura Battalion.
Welcome to Radio Liberty. Today we have an interview, and our guest today is someone I am sure the Radio Liberty audience, for the most part, knows very well and remembers from his appearances on our broadcasts — Oleksandr Shyrshyn, a serviceman of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, a major, and the former commander of the 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade "Magura."
Greetings.
Glory to Ukraine.
Glory to the heroes. I am very glad you were able to make it here. We are sitting in Kyiv, in the Radio Liberty studio, and you are here for literally just a few days. We managed to talk before the broadcast; you are coming from the hospital. You published your latest Facebook post from a hospital setting. I would like to quote what you wrote on March 16: "Gentlemen of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, what is this circus for? If you want to list me as AWOL retroactively, then why look for excuses? Just do it. I already know you are f#ckheads."
This needs explanation. What happened? What prompted you to make such a post?
I think there will be another reprimand after this for disclosing official state information. What happened was this: a call came to the hospital from the General Staff, instructing them to check if I was in my ward. And if I were absent, to discharge me retroactively. This is a phrase that was conveyed to me directly by the staff members who were looking for me at that moment. Discharge me retroactively, they said I was supposedly somewhere in Kyiv and had gotten into some kind of trouble. That’s it. To me, this was so unpleasant; it was a low move by the General Staff because these are people who have been trying to find leverage over me for a long time, trying to put a spoke in my wheels. That is why I made that post; below it, I briefly described what I am telling you now.
So you were in the hospital, and they wanted to discharge you retroactively and declare you AWOL?
Exactly. That was the task from the General Staff. They thought I wasn't there; perhaps they thought my stay was fictitious. So I took a photo, showing that I had just undergone surgery. Literally a day or two ago, I don't remember exactly, I had just had surgery.
And what happened to you?
It’s just an injury. A scheduled surgery that had been planned earlier, but there hadn't been time to do it before. I went through various consultations and preparatory stages, and once I found the time, I checked in immediately. I checked in, and they decided to have a bit of fun.
Did the General Staff not believe you were in the hospital?
Apparently. I don't know why. I'll tell you this: the hospital staff members were in such shock; they were running around wide-eyed, asking, "Whose toes did you step on that the General Staff called about you, and only you, in the entire region?"
Do you know who called?
They gave me names, but I don't remember exactly right now. I voiced them, later calling people, representatives of the Armed Forces, my superiors, asking who it could have been because I don't know that person.
So they are looking for dirt on you, aren`t they?
Most likely.
What for?
I don’t know.
Well, I mentioned at the beginning that our audience knows you very well, and of course, I will provide some backstory. We spoke in the summer of last year, almost a year has passed, after you made a public statement criticizing the command for idiotic tasks and the senseless loss of personnel. Later, you explained that in the Kursk region and the border area, you faced tasks that by all indications were doomed to fail. You explained that you spoke out publicly because your appeals were ignored. The General Staff promised to look into it in response, and then there was some kind of internal review, and as a result of this review, you were deemed undisciplined. Did I reconstruct the timeline correctly?
Yes, exactly right.
Then you disappeared from the public space for a year, well, almost a year. That is, you did not give interviews, did not give comments, very, very few, and in very small doses. What happened to you during this time?
I was transferred to another unit and removed from my position. And basically, nothing else out of the ordinary. They tried, yes, there were various attempts to organize commissions and inspections to find flaws in my work, an opportunity to bring me to account. During this time, my lawyers and I filed lawsuits to appeal the decisions regarding the reprimands and the remarks made by representatives of the Commander-in-Chief and the brigade. Well, and all this is still ongoing now.
Later on, Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi commented on this story. And when asked what Shyrshyn was talking about, he said that Shyrshyn just needed attention. And you even came out then wearing a t-shirt saying, "I need attention."
Did you have any communication with the Commander-in-Chief?
No, I sought communication with him. I reached out to brigade representatives, not just him. First, I reached out to my commander, then I tried to establish communication with those who directed the operation in the sector where we were operating. I reached out to representatives, to various representatives. I simply do not want to name these surnames right now. Those who could have influenced the making of this decision. I explained, I laid out the task. And one very good career military officer, who is doing an incredible job in our country right now, said to me, "I will," he says, "talk to the Commander-in-Chief, but if he has decided so, you won't change anything." That was the phrase used. And in the end, that is exactly how it happened.
Alright, let's get more specific now. What did you want to convey to the Commander-in-Chief? And generally, what is the whole problem? Because back then you said, and I quote, "someday I will tell the details, but the idiotic loss of personnel, trembling before a clueless general staff, leads to nothing but failures." Can you tell the details now?
Yes, I definitely believe I can share some of these details. We repeatedly received tasks to deploy personnel behind enemy lines, while lacking sufficient forces, resources, and logistics. And already at the planning stage, it was clear that this task was doomed to fail. That's one, secondly...
At the planning stage of what? The Kursk operation?
No. We were already operating in the Kursk region, but these were the final stages, when we were withdrawing, a part was entering, when everything started falling apart. Falling apart at a rapid pace, when the f**kers had already entered the Sumy region, when we were operating in the Belgorod region, in the Sumy region, already after the fall of Sudzha.
What time was this?
It was the spring of 2025.
And what tasks were you receiving?
That is, it meant hypothetically deploying about 10 personnel 5 kilometers deep through the b#stard's battle formations. I will give you an example. We were operating with the 425th Regiment; the task was to assault one settlement, then the next. They sent, if I am not mistaken, 4 squads. They sent about 20 personnel to clear a settlement where at least a battalion was stationed. This was an advance behind the line of contact of about 5 kilometers. At the very least, you need to organize support using mortars, artillery, the assets you have, medical provision, rotation... Many aspects that should have been planned were simply impossible in the task as we received it.
So they were sending personnel into the unknown for an unknown result.
The task was to assault a settlement with 20 or 15 personnel.
And what happened?
Out of those personnel, 1, maybe 2 returned... I had to relieve "Skala" at the positions they had occupied without clearing the territory behind them. The men were advancing through the fields. Relying on luck, at night. They advanced once—they weren't noticed, twice. On the third time, the routes were blocked. Our personnel were stationed there. I wrote, I appealed that we needed to implement certain measures, create corridors, post guards, establish a secure passage for the operation to be successful, so we could provide support to our troops on the frontline. We started suffering casualties, our men were getting hit, there were constant assaults, and we could neither rotate them nor provide medical aid. And you say that the personnel must be withdrawn, you cannot keep them there, they will die. There is no other option. That's it. We need to plan now, concentrate our firepower on specific sectors to allow them to retreat. Out of that encirclement, they are in, which they walked into. To which everyone shouted at me: "No, the general said no, we continue." I say, "What is the goal?" "To further assault the settlement." I say, "Seriously? With four squads, a couple of wounded, someone dead? And then what? Okay, they will assault half the settlement, what about the rest? The town is encircled 10 kilometers from the line of contact. What then?" "This is an order; an order is not up for discussion." That was the response of one of the officers. In the end, I had already planned to withdraw my personnel because it was impossible to keep them in such a place.
So I planned the task: who should deliver fire damage and where, how the withdrawal should proceed, the sequence. And at one point, the personnel simply broke psychologically and ran. They just ran. They were gunned down. All of them were gunned down along the way, some hit tripwires because nothing had been done to ensure the execution of this task. And that was it; I think only one or two men from this group survived. After which, I received an order to bring in 10 more men. I say, "Are you out of your fucking minds?"
Are we talking about the territory of Russia? Bringing in 10 more people?
Yes, into the encirclement. Where the rest died, where they were gunned down, blown up on tripwires. To bring in 10 more people?
And after that, you wrote about idiotic...
That wasn't the only task like that.
And how many such tasks were there? Just to understand the scale. Was it every day?
Many such tasks.
Last time we spoke, you refused to talk about casualties. Now?
I will not disclose casualty figures. I believe it is wrong. But I will tell you this: some units executing such tasks, especially assault regiments, suffer massive, unjustified casualties. If we compare their losses with the execution, that is, with what they achieve, it is disproportionate. For example, if we take Air Assault Forces units, which also perform complex tasks, they do their job much more effectively. We can see this now in the sector where they are operating, in the southern part of Ukraine. In other words, the achievements there belong not to the assault regiments, but primarily to the Air Assault Forces. We can look at brigades like the 93rd, we can look at other units that carry out tasks of the same complexity and have drastically lower casualties.
We will talk about these assault regiments separately. It's just that what you just described was, as you said, the last straw; you wrote about idiotic tasks, you wrote about what you wished, as you put it, upon the generals...
that their children would execute these tasks they assign to us at the brigades. Or the battalions, or the companies.
Within the framework of this review, which was later allegedly announced by the General Staff and military leaders, that an investigation would be conducted and an assessment given—and you were deemed undisciplined. Tell me, please, what exactly did this review and investigation entail? Did anyone speak with you? Did you tell anyone at a higher level what you are sharing here?
Look, no one from this review spoke with me. All they did, just as it was before, when a General Staff review came to me regarding the Belgorod region. All they did was check the documents. And in our army, a document carries more weight than a human life. More weight than a person. An incorrectly filled-out piece of paper is simply a tragedy, but a company that died — that's war. And all they checked were documents. When my chief of staff asked if they were going to speak with the battalion commander, he said, "Oh no, why would we need to speak with him?" That was the response of the representatives. A day before the commission arrived, I believe it is worth mentioning this so there are no attempts to manipulate this later by the General Staff representatives, a day before, I was summoned, I believe to the Military Law Enforcement Service (VSP), and told that there would be a review, they are arriving tomorrow, starting their work tomorrow. Could I explain the situation? I told them in general terms, without any specific details, and wrote an explanatory note. I have a photograph of this explanation, and you can see when this photo was taken and when this review began. And that's it. No actual investigation or proper review was conducted. No assessment was made.
Do you know to what extent Oleksandr Syrskyi was aware of or informed about what is happening, about what you are recounting?
I am more than certain that he was informed.
Didn’t he try to get in touch with you?
No.
And did you try to contact him?
I looked for opportunities, yes. I wrote, and they asked me, "What, should we give you his number?" I said, "Give it to me." I don't have this barrier regarding ranks and positions. I will write, I will call, and say that this is an idiotic task. They didn't give me the number then.
Well, you saw his statement where he said that Shyrshyn wants attention or self-realization. Why did he react that way?
You should ask him that. I think he thinks... he thinks I think in the same categories as he does. For half a year prior to that time, I hadn't gone public at all; I deleted my social media, I was nowhere to be found. What self-realization? I wasn't giving interviews to anyone, even though people asked. I wasn't in a single, I think, a single news report. Well, at least I definitely didn't speak anywhere there. I tried to put my soldiers forward everywhere. I didn't need self-realization or attention.
And how did your brothers-in-arms react when you left your position?
As one of the representatives of our old guard, an awesome guy, told me: "Commander, are you ready to lead an AWOL battalion? If you leave, we leave with you." I had fairly good relations with my soldiers. Everyone understood what they were there for; they were ready to work. There was never a situation where I said something, and they said, "We won't do it."
Did you join the military a month before the full-scale invasion?
A month before the invasion, I signed up for the reserves. I tried earlier, but there were bureaucratic nuances. And eventually, I signed a reserve contract with the 80th Brigade a month before the full-scale invasion.
I was initially a platoon commander, transferred to the 47th, became a company commander there, then a deputy battalion commander, and finally a battalion commander.
And already as a battalion commander, you went through Zaporizhzhia, Robotyne...
While still a company commander, I participated in the counteroffensive.
Then, Donetsk Oblast – Avdiivka, Pokrovsk; you were redeployed to Kursk Oblast, Belgorod Oblast; in Sumy Oblast, you made that statement and were dismissed. Did you write a resignation report?
A report requesting to be relieved of my position. Because when I refused to lead personnel into an encirclement, the commander said, "Write a report regarding your refusal." I said, "No problem." It wasn't a refusal; it was a justification of why. I wrote that under such conditions it was impossible, and said, "If that doesn't suit you, remove me from the position."
Then you were removed from your position. To the extent it is possible to tell, where were you transferred?
As the Commander-in-Chief said, "We will transfer him wherever he wants," and he transferred me wherever he himself wanted. He threw me into headquarters, an army corps, to a "fetch-and-carry" position, paperwork, pointless paperwork. Just to shut my mouth. Like that.
How do you feel there?
I feel fine.
And already from this job, you took sick leave, ended up in the hospital, where you had a scheduled surgery, and from where they tried to discharge you retroactively. Do you connect this to the events of almost a year ago, or are there new reasons?
Well, I didn't stop writing about certain problems, critical issues in the army; I even partially wrote about the measures we need to take to improve things, and they don't like that. Every post of mine is followed by a phone call and an attempt to explain that it's forbidden, that we are in the army, you can't write, it will only make things worse, you are just setting everyone up, and so on. And I think that because I still won't stay silent, they are looking for ways to influence me, to somehow make things worse for me.
When we last spoke, you said your goal was to achieve change. I remembered this quote; you said, "I believe we have already paid too high a price just to die for nothing," and that we need to push for some changes. Looking back now, to what extent have you achieved what you wanted?
I will say this: certain short-term or rapid changes did happen when, after that post, those idiotic tasks were taken off my battalion, and we were given tasks we could actually execute; at the very least, we stopped losing personnel for nothing, and there were no tasks we were incapable of realizing. That's one. If we are talking about systemic changes, there are no systemic changes. And, firstly, I believe they cannot be made or achieved so quickly, but I do not give up hope that they can be achieved.
Could you list them, so it's clear even to people who are not connected to the military—what systemic changes are you talking about in general?
I think, first and foremost, we must pay attention to the quality of our command and control. Because so much depends on how and who manages the battle. Once, a close comrade in arms, a very cool military officer, told me: "You understand that they will keep giving you personnel anyway because you have strong command posts." He was in our brigade then, and it's true: a strong command post enables the execution of many tasks. For a command post to be strong, we must have correspondingly high-quality officer and sergeant corps, and proper training. We must have education, continuous professional development, experience, there are specific measures for this too. I described some of this in my post, and I presented some of it at a so-called roundtable at the General Staff.
The next point. We have what we discussed earlier—the issue of motivation and reward. That is, when people receive ranks simply by holding a position because the time has passed for them to receive those ranks. No, these things should be awarded based on competence, based on results, based on the responsibility a person takes on.
The next point. We must understand that when we have well-trained personnel and officer corps, based on their knowledge and experience, we can give them, let's say, entrust them with certain work. That is, not to interfere, not to say, "Here is a task from above, you must stand there." No, not like that. A battalion commander, a company commander should decide how they will execute their task. And not just do it because, damn it, there is an order from above to do it this way and no other way. Also, I think that on this basis, if we have effective commanders, effective command and control, the infantryman, the serviceman, will have a little more trust in their commander, which will ensure better execution of tasks. There are many things. There are issues concerning rotation, rest, the question of who should be in which position—that is, how personnel is selected, how they are motivated.
But all these issues, aren't they somehow being resolved over time? Have there been absolutely no improvements in four years of full-scale war?
There are improvements, in any case. We are definitely not the army we were before 2022. A large part of the changes was brought by civilians who came from various sectors. And people, especially those who had managerial experience there, or another profession. There are units where such things are being implemented. There are units where this is welcomed. And because of this, they have decent results or good results on the battlefield. But if we are talking about a system, it doesn't exist systematically anywhere at all.
Alright. If I look at your Facebook feed, your social media, I see that you are generally deeply pained by the loss of people. You repost topics related to demographics. And similarly, where it concerns the loss of people in the military context. So I want to go over one specific instance now. You recently published a photo of an advertising banner for the 225th Brigade, more precisely, an assault regiment. This is one of the so-called Syrskyi's regiments, as they are called. And the banner featured Oleh Shyriaiev; for those who don't know, he is the commander of this 225th Regiment. You accompanied this photo with a long post where you rather ironically or even maliciously called them super-troops. And you pointed out that... well, you made it clear that there is something wrong with these troops. I will quote: "Our mistakes cost us dearly; we don't have time to play along with the whims of generals. We cannot erase human lives and potential in mindless assaults just because we have 15 battalions that are replenished on demand." Just in case someone doesn't know, this is Oleg Shyriaiev; his command, as I understand it, comprises 15 battalions. He said so himself in an interview. But let's talk about what is wrong here. For people who don't know that there are separate assault regiments directly subordinate to Syrskyi. Why do you believe that human lives are being erased there, that mindless assaults are taking place there, etc.?
At the very least, because I have seen some of these assaults with my own eyes. I also know how these units are manned and the working methods of these units. The most terrifying thing is that these working methods are supported by our Commander-in-Chief. No one pays attention to this. As the saying goes, "we won't stand for the price." But we must look deeper, strategically. Every army must serve an overall political, strategic goal. And if we kill all the people we have, the potential, the defense capability—what is the point of all this?
Is this complaint specifically about the 225th, or is there a number of regiments?
There is a number of regiments, but this is one of the units where, in my opinion, various types of crimes occur in the most concentrated manner. Actions that have the hallmarks of a crime.
Shyriaiev, he is a Hero of Ukraine, isn't he?
I am very glad. Boiko is also a Hero of Ukraine. It's the same gang. OPZZh (Opposition Platform — For Life).
Why?
Oleh Shyriaiev was Kyva's crony; he headed his wing, some part of it.
I didn't know that, honestly. You said that their actions have the hallmarks of a crime, and you have seen or know their working methods. What do you mean?
The way personnel are deployed to positions, how they deal with so-called "refuseniks." Often, they are deployed to positions through deception or by force.
How do you deploy personnel to a position through deception?
By saying that no one is there. And leading the men, damn it, right into the bastards' dugout.
For what purpose?
To execute the task set by the higher command.
I have voiced a part of what they do. Similarly, as I am telling you, the task. This was when we were working with the 425th Regiment. Roughly the same thing.
Is that "Skala"?
Yes. When you lead people into an encirclement, who knows where, and from this encirclement you go to assault even, damn it, deeper, having neither proper communication nor proper support. Simply because it is an order, and an order is not up for discussion. There are your working methods. That's it. I know, I will tell you one example. One example that took place at my positions, when units of one of these regiments arrived. And they reached my men; they were being yelled at over the radio that they must not take a single step back, move forward, forward.
And the guys say to my men, "Are we morons? Do we not understand that we will die right there?" And so they simply threw a grenade, stuck out, damn it, their arms to get wounded. That is, people were ready to get wounded before even reaching the position, just to avoid executing a task that they realized, firstly, made no sense, and secondly, could not be executed, and in which they would die.
If you know, how do they deal with, as you said, the refuseniks in these regiments?
They use force.
How exactly? Do they beat them?
Of course. Well, haven't you seen the appeals? There are units whose commanders have had cases opened against them by the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI). Look at how many appeals there are from relatives.
Our colleagues from another Radio Liberty project did a report about how fighters from the 225th Brigade allegedly kidnapped—but then there was supposedly some miscommunication—fighters from the 108th Territorial Defense Brigade, which was simply operating in the adjacent sector. Kidnapped, tortured, detained them, but later, as they explained, a miscommunication occurred, and they had taken them for training.
Understood.
But explain to me, how does that sound to you?
Exactly as it sounds to you, it is untrue. Obviously untrue. Firstly, after what I have seen, I have no trust in these regiments, none at all. What they said very often, that we supposedly set them up there, that because of us, because of the 47th, they suffered casualties. No, damn it, we suffered casualties because of them, and they suffer casualties because of themselves.
When we say "Syrskyi's regiments," is it correct to say "Syrskyi's regiments"? It's an informal name.
It is an informal name.
Assault regiments. What number of people, brigades, battalions are we talking about in general? Do you have an idea, or you never done so?
The number of personnel? No, you see here, it turned out that we have as many as 15 battalions in a regiment. And secondly, which number are we talking about: the people who are still alive, or the total number that was supplied to this unit? That is, it's not a small number of people. But the main ones among these regiments are the 225th and the 425th, which are the most notorious and where the biggest problems occur.
Based on what you know and observe, to what extent does the information correspond to the reality that these regiments are under the direct command of Oleksandr Syrskyi?
Yes, possibly.
And is that a bad thing or a good thing?
It is hard for me to answer whether it is bad or good, but speaking generally, detaching from personalities and what is happening there, but if we are talking about actions that have the hallmarks of a crime, and I am more than certain that he knows about it, then it is bad. It cannot be like this. That's one. And the second point. There is this aspect, which we might call total accessibility and total permissiveness. Due to the fact that these units are closest to the Commander-in-Chief, they are manned as a priority, they receive resources, and everything is aimed at ensuring this unit executes the task. If so much effort had been directed toward units that show greater effectiveness, I think that today we would have a better result with fewer casualties.
The next point: due to their loyalty to the higher command, they are precisely the ones who bear no responsibility for their actions. And they hide behind, let's call it this, the authority not of Syrskyi himself, but simply the position of the Commander-in-Chief. No one can do anything there. And because of this, they are rewarded. They are given awards so that they become Heroes of Ukraine, so that they remain loyal to the system, so that they remain faithful to the system. And this is how they are kept in line. In this sense, it is wrong. For some reason, we have equals, and then we have those who are more equal.
Tell me, please, does the information correspond to reality, if you have seen it or know it, that there is a system of penal battalions in these troops?
I have not seen it, but based on what I have heard from people I trust, then most likely, with a high degree of probability, it is true.
And do you think Syrskyi knows about this?
Of course.
But here they almost went even further. And in Ukraine, the goal was to create assault troops as an official structure. Right now, they are called assault troops, but it's not an official designation, correct? As such, assault troops do not officially exist. They wanted to create them. But something went wrong. Do you understand what went wrong?
As Manko said, that he had 4 enemies, well, I think 4 enemies is hypothetical. I think there are people who understand, who realize the threat of creating such troops, at least at this stage, and with what is happening here. And they probably just didn't allow it to happen.
This is Colonel Valentyn Manko, who was supposed to be the head of these assault troops. But something went wrong there too, because, as I understand it, he was dismissed. And when he was dismissed, you ironized about him a lot on your social media. And when he was dismissed, you wrote that he shouldn't just be removed, he should be jailed.
Well, I wasn't writing about him when I said he should be jailed. I believe that...
Well, you just published his photo.
Yes, I wrote that I believe the commanders of the 425th and 225th are people who belong in jail.
That is a loud statement. A court must prove their crime.
Of course. This is my subjective, incorrect opinion. A court must prove it; that is what I believe. I believe it, but nothing more.
You know, when I spoke with people who could be called defenders or advocates of the assault troops, they say that it is not exactly slander, but these things are said by people who want to undermine Syrskyi's authority. And the second point: look at where these assault troops hold the defense. In the hottest, fiercest, most difficult sectors of the front, so it is not surprising that these units have the highest casualties. How would you respond?
In which sectors do the 80th Air Assault Brigade, the 95th, 93rd, 66th, and the rest of the truly cool, good brigades hold defense and conduct assaults? For some reason, I write nothing about them; for some reason, they do not have such casualties and working methods as these regiments. And for some reason, they show results. Why? I do not see the issue of undermining the Commander-in-Chief's authority here. There are factors here that indicate incorrect, ineffective work, which leads to unjustified losses.
You were in the Zaporizhzhia sector, in the Donetsk Oblast, Pokrovsk, Avdiivka, the Kursk Oblast, the Belgorod Oblast, the Sumy Oblast. And you remember the counteroffensive of 2023. In your subjective opinion, what went wrong?
Many things. First of all, attention should have been paid to planning. The b#stards knew we were going to attack specifically in that sector. They seriously prepared their defense line. This was probably the most heavily mined sector, in my opinion, the most heavily mined region, the most heavily mined sector where we advanced. A lot of anti-tank trenches, dragon's teeth, many correctly built, concreted positions where they could hold and control. When we took a position before Robotyne, we simply saw that from that side, it was like a shooting range. Like Tokmak for defense, having fenced it off, too. That is, they understood all the key points that could, in the future, if we were successful, help us collapse the front. And they did everything to prevent this. The second point is the issue of employing new units. It's a matter of coordination, a matter of unit cohesion.
I will give you one example of what happened to us. I was at the positions, and one of the brigades that was supposed to enter behind us rolled in and just bluntly started assaulting my men. I ran there shouting, sorting it out, everyone who was there caught hell. I say, "What are you doing?" They say, "We are assaulting the tree line." I say, "My people are stationed here." And the people didn't even understand where they were going. They stopped earlier than they were supposed to. Their company commander was generally somewhere else. You call him, ask, "Do you understand what is happening?" He says, "Well, no, my people are over there." Not even understanding where his unit is. This is also one of the reasons — the lack of coordination.
And one more point. There was an information leak, and the b*stards received our entire planning: which brigade was going where, behind whom, in which sectors they would enter. They published it; they detailed it. And this was very successfully ignored by the higher command. Although, again, such an error was present before. In the Second World War, in the First World War, and in various armies. For some reason, generals are not always ready to change their own decisions. On the one hand, sometimes it is correct, but not in such moments when you have so much at stake.
And then Avdiivka and Pokrovsk. You were in both places. Please tell us about the defense of Avdiivka.
When my battalion entered not Avdiivka itself, a part of my 47th unit was in Avdiivka at the Coke Plant. Our initial task was to assault certain positions in Krasnohorivka. We planned it, set out to assault the positions, and at that time, there was this massive offensive that you saw, there were 90 or 100 pieces of equipment. And when I was told that this column had been forming in Yasynuvata since 3:00 AM, nobody simply informed me of anything. I would not have sent 6 squads when such an offensive with such an amount of infantry and equipment was forming and advancing.
After that, we moved to the Stepove line. We held it, I think, for 4.5 months. We destroyed, I believe, over 60 pieces of equipment. The majority, probably, was destroyed by Bradley IFVs. In Stepove, there was already nothing left to hold; it was just ruins. When I went in for the last time, almost right before our withdrawal, I remember when I first arrived at the beginning, bringing the men in, and at the end, I was just walking, and there are sticks, craters, massive craters. And just a destroyed village, stones, foundations. I don't know how the guys somehow stood there and held it all. They couldn't fortify their positions, understandably, but it was very difficult for them. And still, we held those positions until they started outflanking us. We had to retreat to another line.
This was already Berdychi. And so on, gradually. Then the flanking units lost Ocheretyne. We found ourselves in a double encirclement and withdrew our personnel. I think, even without casualties. We established a new line, and again, for a long period, we held the sector with attached units; at that time, it was the guys from the 134th Territorial Defense Brigade. These are some of the best people I have ever worked with. It was 2024, and at that time, I hadn't seen such motivated, trained, and manageable people in a long time. Well, and then gradually we reached as far as Novohrodivka, from where we were redeployed to the Kursk Oblast.
You initially supported the Kursk operation. You said it was an opportunity for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to demonstrate their skills, but at some point, the situation spiraled out of control, and the decision to withdraw should have been made earlier. And this became, to some extent, the beginning of your end in the 47th Brigade.
Tell me, in your observation, who is the better Commander-in-Chief — Zaluzhnyi or Syrskyi?
I cannot answer this question. It is difficult. Let's just say, Zaluzhnyi is more humane.
And how do you know this? Have you encountered it directly?
I saw it through certain actions, through certain decisions. There are things by which one can judge this. If we are talking about Syrskyi, he built a stronger system. It is hard to evaluate. I do not know what to tell you about this question. The military system. How it functions, that is... On the one hand, it is good; on the other hand, not so much.
What would you say to Oleksandr Syrskyi right now?
I don't want to say anything to him.
But they did call you from the General Staff, at the hospital.
Yes.
Well, some clerk couldn't have just picked up the phone and called on his own volition.
I see. Well, I am saying, I am ready to talk to him, with other representatives. I offered to them back then: let me come over. Through my command to him, I say. I will come, I am ready to come alone, you can gather everyone there. I do not need support, I am ready to talk. I have many questions that I can voice, I am afraid of nothing. I will not hide anything there; I have no intention of being loyal when such things are happening.
Right now, Ukraine is trying to review its mobilization policy, because there is no end to the war in sight. You probably see that fewer and fewer people are ready to join the military voluntarily. Because of this, there is a certain tension in society over mobilization, and notification groups suffer, and civilians suffer, injuring each other. In general, do you see a way out of this situation?
If we are talking about a way out that would yield some result right now — I do not see one. The fact is that we must make systemic changes, which are primarily related to the responsibility of commanders and other individuals. For example, TCR & SS offices have been attacked many times, but who has actually been held accountable? We must understand the issue of justice. Someone can be exempted by paying money to the person making the decision. And someone else has to bust their ass in the army until they die. I believe this is not entirely the right policy.
The issue of management is very important. If people do not trust their commander, they will not execute the task or join the military. This is a crucial component that can be corrected by increasing competence, through a series of measures.
Military service must be made such that people want to go there: financial provision, vacations. So that people are not slaves: you can get in, but you cannot get out.
You became publicly known long before you made the post about idiotic tasks: historian Timothy Snyder shared a photo of you lying in a trench reading the book The Road to Unfreedom. What is the road to unfreedom like?
Probably the easiest of all possible ones. It is when there are attempts to stifle various opposition movements, attempts to cover up crimes, not allowing publicity or coverage, when there is a lack of accountability, when loyal people are appointed to positions instead of competent ones. This is part of this road to unfreedom. We can cite many examples of what happened in the Russian Federation. I would not want us to go down this road. And this is the explanation for why I make such appeals, such statements. I understand that at some point I may become toxic to the system, to society. At some point, all of this might be muffled, forgotten. That happens. But I do not intend to sit and stay silent. And then regret it, to have my conscience tormented that I did not do something, that I did not speak up in time, and that we suffered greatly because of it. That’s not an option for me.
Oleksandr, thank you very much for this conversation. I hope you will not have problems after it? Or could there be?
I’m not worried about that.
Thank you very much. I wish you to achieve the changes you are striving for. Thank you very much. And I address our viewers: if you have any questions, reflections, or thoughts left, share them in the chat under this video, and we will definitely return to this topic. Thank you very much.
