Stopping Russia right now is purely managerial and organizational issue, - Yurii Butusov
The stream is dedicated to the situation at the front. In literally one more week, greenery will emerge everywhere, flowers and grass will bloom, and these will be the optimal conditions for the enemy to advance and conduct offensives, or for Ukrainian infantry to carry out effective counterattacks.
And we understand that the current Putin offensive in 2026, just as in 2025 and 2024, was halted due to the effective employment of drones and very cold weather, which enhances the operational efficiency of thermal imaging sensors and UAVs. Infantry struggles to survive on the battlefield, providing optimal conditions for drones to eliminate Russian infiltrations. Consequently, the frontline has stabilized. It requires grueling effort; the enemy continues its offensive, but the pace of the advance has decreased.
In March 2026, the enemy advanced, continuing their offensive and capturing 160 square kilometers, according to data from the DeepState portal. Thus, while the pace of the enemy offensive has decelerated, they continue to push forward, and this is before the emergence of foliage. Greenery will emerge now in the final week of April; everything is already turning completely green, and in May, conditions for camouflage will improve.
What should be done, what will happen at the front, and can we stop the Russian offensive? I am speaking about this now because I hear a multitude of claims suggesting that everything is supposedly fine and the front is more stable than ever. I hear such statements every April and every March; one can look at our leaders, who announce stabilization every year. In reality, there are no grounds for such assertions, and we will only be able to stop the enemy through very heavy fighting. As we understand, the main battle will continue to unfold in the Donbas and Zaporizhzhia regions, just as before. The enemy seeks to seize by force the territories it has incorporated into the Russian Federation, but in fact, battles will be waged across the entire front line. The Russian strategy of permanent offensive involves pressure along the entire line of contact to prevent the maneuvering of reserves, deny our army and the Defense Forces any rest, deplete resources, and thereby leverage their numerical superiority. Conversely, the Security and Defense Forces of Ukraine must likewise deliver strikes along the entire front line, eliminating the enemy to achieve the key strategic goal announced by Minister of Defense Mykhailo Fedorov in the Verkhovna Rada: to eliminate the maximum amount of enemy personnel.
Russia mobilizes approximately 35,000 to 40,000 people per month, funnelling them into the army through contracts using any means, including fraudulent ones. I am certain that if even 30,000 to 35,000 Russians are eliminated monthly, they will be unable to conduct offensives. Any serious offensive operations become impossible if 50,000 occupiers are eliminated per month, as Minister Fedorov announced. If we organize and transform our army to achieve this target of 50,000 per month, it is feasible. In principle, the enemy would be unable to carry out any active operations; furthermore, with such losses, they would be incapable of either advancing or even maintaining a defense.
Where will the Russian offensive be successful? It appears this could be the hottest summer in the Donbas. And the question remains: will Sloviansk and Kramatorsk survive, or will they be destroyed?
We see that the enemy has already been actively destroying Sloviansk and Kramatorsk for a long time, and we understand that the Russian army, following its scorched-earth strategy, a scorched Donbas, will do everything to completely destroy all cities within its reach. Therefore, unfortunately, I must state that Sloviansk and Kramatorsk face very difficult trials ahead.
Is there a real threat to Sumy?
The threat to Sumy is real, but the enemy has no chance of quickly capturing the city or even approaching it rapidly. Heavy fighting is ongoing near Sumy; the enemy is exerting pressure and attempting to widen the offensive front toward the city, but the area around Sumy is characterized by dense forests. These are highly advantageous locations for organizing effective defense and combat operations. Therefore, I am confident that our warriors will not allow the enemy to approach or significantly close in on Sumy this year. We observe that the Russians are attempting to destabilize the frontline in the Sumy direction by expanding the scope of their active operations. They cannot break through directly to the city and are trying to overstretch our forces with attacks along the front. Based on my observations, I expect they have no chance of breaking through closer to Sumy, even throughout the summer. However, the pressure will continue; wherever the enemy identifies weak units in this sector, the Russians do not look for specific areas where they must break through at any cost. Instead, they seek vulnerable points in our defense, where our troops are weakened or overstretched, where command is poorly organized, or where supplies are insufficient, and they apply constant pressure there. They are looking for similar sectors in the Sumy region, and their advancement there is actually linked to their probing for such gaps in battle formations or our insufficiently organized units; unfortunately, this also occurs frequently at the front, which is why the offensive is progressing there.
But Sumy will remain Ukrainian.
Disorder in the Third Army Corps.
Look, I am a serviceman of the 13th Khartiia Brigade, a platoon commander. I no longer have the opportunity, as I did when I was a journalist, to travel somewhere or speak with anyone at my convenience; I simply do not have that capacity. Therefore, I cannot provide an assessment of every detail you might ask about. While we have the freedom to ask questions, the freedom of the response depends on my level of awareness, my presence on-site to speak with participants and witnesses, and the ability to factually verify specific information.
How do you see the situation at the front for the spring-summer period?
The Russians will attempt to act vigorously across all sectors of the front—in the Kharkiv and Sumy regions, the Donbas - Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhzhia regions. They will no longer launch offensives in all directions as they did previously; instead, they will try to create relatively narrow strike zones. In these areas, they aim to impose an intensive tempo of combat, essentially, a war of attrition. They seek to force an exchange in sectors tactically advantageous to them, where they can maximize our infantry losses, destabilize our battle formations, and exploit organizational issues, low troop strength, or poor command and control to push through our forces. This strategy was utilized by the enemy in 2024 and 2025; now, it will involve a constant search for such sectors. This year, the enemy may employ its tactics of infiltration and advancement in small groups, effectively "assaults in pairs", where they send soldiers two at a time to their death until they find a gap in that direction through which they can advance further. This permanent "assault in pairs" will continue, but what makes the enemy dangerous now? It is the vast number of UAVs. We quite rightly and reasonably state that the Armed Forces of Ukraine hold aerial superiority in drones and that we are effectively eliminating the enemy. According to statistics provided by our leadership, at least 35,000 Russians were objectively hit, meaning killed or wounded, by UAV strikes in March alone. However, regrettably, the problem is that the enemy is also scaling up its UAV capabilities. The enemy is currently deploying and increasing the size of its unmanned systems forces. The Russians are establishing regular UAV units at every echelon, which was not the case before. Now, the enemy is deploying new brigades, regiments, and battalions of unmanned systems forces across all levels of the military hierarchy: army, front, district, division, regiment, and brigade. Unfortunately, the enemy's priority is also to strike our fighters. Consequently, casualties from UAVs are rising not only for the enemy but for us as well. While the enemy suffers losses several times higher, their capacity for replenishment is significantly greater. This is because our mobilization issues have not disappeared. Of those mobilized, based on the plan reported by the TCR & SS, only 50% actually reach the troops. Furthermore, only 50% of those who reach the troops actually make it into the infantry. Therefore, the enemy is replenishing its infantry and holds an objective advantage in reinforcements, not all at once, but over time, of approximately 4 to 5 times our capacity. That is a conservative estimate. Naturally, such numerical superiority is based not only on higher replenishment rates but also on the enemy's efforts to inflict as many personnel losses as possible. This factor must be considered: the enemy can now support these frontline breakthroughs with a much larger number of drones and a significantly better level of drone command and control organization. This is a major threat. Therefore, the stability of the front currently depends on the resilience of battle formations, primarily UAVs, which must cover their infantry. If the management of UAVs, including both aerial drones and UGVs, is insufficiently competent, if the organization is poor, or if there is a shortage of equipment, then even the most heroic infantry will find it virtually impossible to withstand this constant Russian pressure and the sheer volume of drones in the air on their own. Consequently, the entire army and all of us are now working exclusively to support the infantryman, providing cover, supplies, and rescue. This is a very serious challenge that requires commanders to possess not just tactical decision-making skills regarding troop movements but also managerial talent and the ability to secure reinforcements, rotations, comprehensive supplies, full fire support, drones, and everything else for their troops. This will be a severe trial, and unfortunately, I must say the situation will become very acute. If the enemy pushed through 160 square kilometers in March, they will undoubtedly continue to capture more and more territory throughout the summer unless we change faster than they do and adapt to this tactic. This is a significant challenge for 2026.
The situation at the front is far from stabilized, and as we understand, even 35,000 killed Russians is absolutely no reason for Putin to stop. On the contrary, if they sacrificed 35,000 to capture 160 square kilometers, Putin would expend another 50,000 for another 200 without a second thought. Therefore, while this strategy of inflicting cumulative losses must be implemented, it is equally important that we stabilize the front. Stabilizing the front now is an organizational and managerial issue above all, depending on commanders at all levels, starting from the top. I have said many times that even now, right now, we have a sufficient number of personnel, drones, and ammunition, and most importantly, the people, to reliably hold the line, reduce our own losses severalfold, and significantly increase those of the enemy.
What are your thoughts on the possibility of opening another front? Is this feasible for the Russian Federation?
I do not believe this is possible, friends. Russia is currently so weakened and so bogged down in the war in Ukraine that it has concentrated absolutely all its forces here. Russia is now committing nuclear arsenal security personnel, ballistic missile guards, sailors, and security staff, anyone they can, to assault operations. They are scraping together everyone who can be forced into the army. The enemy already faces serious issues with armaments, which they acknowledge themselves. Objectively, they are throwing everything they possess here against us. Therefore, Ukraine, through its current heroic resistance, continues to save the entire world, all of Europe, and the Baltic states included. And credit must be given to our Baltic allies; they are providing maximum support to Ukraine and doing everything in their power to sustain our combat effectiveness and defensive capabilities.
When you predicted in 2022 that the war would last for five years, it seemed like a very pessimistic forecast. Now, it looks like optimism. Would you adjust the timeline now in answering this question?
I actually do not recall giving a five-year forecast straight away, but I did predict a minimum of three years, and then I extended it by a year or two. Many people reproached me, claiming that Butusov was spreading defeatism, that we would win soon, and it would only take two to three months. People succumb to emotions; they do not know the forecasts I made regarding the war before the war began. All my strategic forecasts have completely materialized. I wrote about the organizational problems of the army corps back in 2014. I have been writing about the issue of military command and control since 2014. Unfortunately, by the way, I have repeatedly addressed many topics, such as with those corps and the topic of the After Action Review, and all of this is repeating itself. Now, many people are talking about it. But I respect the fact that many people are simply going online or starting to think about these things for the first time. I want to tell you, friends, that my forecast is as follows. I have spoken about this extensively. The war, of course, will not end simply due to some desire or the peaceful will of Putin. If we continue to lose even 160 square kilometers per month in this manner, Putin will not end the war this year, nor next year, nor in 2028, and not even in 2030. Because for Putin, this constitutes success. For Putin, defeat means the stabilization of the front. I have also spoken and written at length about the fact that the war in Ukraine can only be halted according to the Korean scenario. The scenario of the end of the Korean War in 1953, where there is no peace treaty. There is simply a state of war between the two countries, a stabilized frontline, and a ceasefire agreement, meaning the state of war continues, but a ceasefire regime is in effect along the de facto frontline established between the two countries. This Korean scenario is realistic, but what needs to be done? The frontline must be stabilized. For now, we see that the war will continue because the enemy manages to intrude somewhere, break in, and exploit our shortcomings, our problems, and our constant repeating of the same mistakes, which unfortunately continues at many levels, including the highest, and our leaders, regrettably, draw no conclusions whatsoever. I am not even talking about military history, but about their own history, even in recent years. From Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Vuhledar, Huliaipole, and Kupiansk. All of this needs to be done, analyzed, and the right conclusions drawn. And we will stop the enemy. I think no one should have any doubts about this now. And there were no doubts before. This is a managerial issue. Managerial and organizational. And as soon as the army and the Defense Forces stabilize the front, and the enemy is losing those 30,000 to 35,000 personnel without being able to advance anywhere, that is when diplomats will be needed again. They will no longer be the subject of jokes, but will begin resolving certain important issues. Then, conditions will emerge where international mediators from NATO countries can force Putin into such a ceasefire, because Putin understands that this war holds no prospects for him. Only defeat, only collapse, and only the immiseration of this Russia, which he is currently simply smashing to pieces. This is the scenario for us, the forecast toward which we must move. If we want to end the war sooner, it is within our efforts to do so.
Not in 2026 anymore, because to change the situation at the front and prevent the enemy's offensive, a lot must be done, and we are not doing it. Our army corps system is still not functioning. What is there to even say? In the 12th year of the war and the 5th year of active combat operations. Therefore, I believe that once the necessary changes are implemented, Ukraine could stabilize the front in the winter of 2027. And then, already in 2027, the conditions and prerequisites will be in place to allow for discussions about peace. But first, to even talk about peace, we need to learn how to fight in an organized and effective manner along the entire front line. And not just in those isolated sectors where our combat-ready brigades have stopped the enemy and refuse to let them advance a single step.
Over the past week, the enemy has been actively striking Bohodukhiv. Do the Russians have any concentration of forces on the border of the Sumy and Kharkiv regions, or are these strikes exclusively for the purpose of terror?
The enemy strikes wherever they can hit our infrastructure that impacts the front as well as the broader economy, and this includes terror, aiming to force people to flee. Bohodukhiv is an important communications hub. The enemy possesses a vast number of assets. Between what they receive from Iran and what they manufacture themselves, the Russians are acquiring thousands of drones. Consequently, the enemy's inventory of aerial attack assets has multiplied. This allows the Russians to search, just as they maintain a permanent offensive on the frontline, they do the same in the air, they look for vulnerabilities in our air defense forces, and attempt to strike everywhere. And they probe: drones were shot down there, shot down there, shot down there, but here they got through. (Their logic is: - ed.note) We must inflict maximum damage here and thereby force our air defense forces to redeploy, waste time, and expend resources. Therefore, this is the enemy's combat tactic, and it will continue. For this same purpose, for instance, we periodically witness massive strikes even on Lviv, in the west of Ukraine. Why does the enemy do this? The enemy exploits the fact that, for such a massive territory, we simply lack a sufficient number of radar stations capable of providing layered airspace control at low altitudes. In this way, they attempt to strike where our battle formations are most dispersed and where resistance is the weakest. Russia's objective at this stage of the war is not merely to strike our military facilities, but simply the destruction of Ukraine. This includes the destruction of economic infrastructure and all critical life-support systems. And the enemy is actively working on this.
If our warriors eliminate 50,000 Russians a month, will we be able to conduct a counteroffensive and liberate our territories?
I have stated this more than once: eliminating 50,000 a month is possible only if we completely reorganize the Defense Forces. Currently, in the existing format, I believe 35,000 a month is an outstanding success for Ukrainian UAV operators. Eliminating Russians is, in fact, very difficult work; the enemy does not want to die and takes many measures to reduce their casualties. To further increase enemy losses, we must deliver strikes at an even greater depth and further improve the density of our battle formations and UAV strike operations at the forward edge. A lot must be done to achieve this. If we can impose a casualty rate of 50,000 per month on the enemy, which, imagine, means over 1,500 casualties a day, at least direct, confirmed ones, we will undoubtedly be able to go on the offensive under such conditions. Absolutely. The enemy will not sustain such losses; the Russians will not withstand such a tempo of casualties.
Are there political decisions that directly harm the military?
I believe there are; I do not understand the logic behind allowing citizens under the age of 22 to travel abroad. What is the point at all? Do we not need young, trained people later on to defend the country? Or, instead of these people aged 18 to 22 who have now gone abroad, a significant portion of whom will not return, is someone bringing us new people, new fighters, to replace them? No. It is simply naked populism. Let's see, why only up to 22? Following this logic, other age groups could be exempted as well. Take the army, for example; look at any army, I will not even mention examples from the World Wars, let's look at the age of soldiers currently in NATO armies. They are young people, 20-year-olds; there is a huge number of them in the US and in any European country. Well, this is not because someone has no pity for the youth. I have said many times: okay, if the goal, which can vary, is the political strategy of the country's leadership, I treat that with respect. For instance, the country's leadership says we must preserve the youth. I agree with this. But where will this youth live if their state is destroyed, if their territory is taken away? Well, they will no longer be the youth of this state; they will simply have no future in Ukraine. If the argument is that we need to protect the youth and provide them with an education, my view is this: even youth between the ages of 18 and 22 should prepare and defend the country. And to provide them with the best knowledge, so they know how to fight using their minds, intellect, and skills, young people should, in my opinion, simply be integrated into the appropriate units. Primarily, UAV units. If all our youth are directed as reinforcements and mobilized to fight in UAV units, believe me, it will be sufficient; every loss is painful for us, but the casualty rates will be low. This would be an investment in intellect, the creation of citizens of a new nation. They will not be isolated or abandoned people. On the contrary, they will be young people. Young pilots are an invaluable asset. Every unit simply strives to have such people, and we pay great attention to this. And then the country's leadership suddenly says: we do not need young warriors, go abroad, work there, someone else will defend the state you are supposed to live in. This is utter absurdity. I will tell you frankly, I do not know a single person in the Defense Forces, nor have I ever met anyone who would support this initiative or say anything approving, anything good at all, about this decision by the leadership, our political leaders. Everyone says it is an absolutely foolish and senseless decision that severely harms Ukraine's defense. And I remain convinced of this now. I believe that for youth from the age of 23, meaning our current conscription age is 25, which I think is too high a bar, we must, at a minimum, lower the conscription age to 23 right now, this year, and remove draft exemptions for those over 25 who, for whatever reason, want to go to university. This is very good and necessary, and I support education; it is very good, but the country must be defended. And if some people do not understand this voluntarily, then it must mean mobilization. These young people are perfectly suited to reinforce UAV, communications, and command units. Ours are understaffed. I can tell you that the best pilots, for instance, for FPV drones, the best pilots in general, are young people. They have excellent motor skills, excellent reflexes, healthy eyes, and a high degree of concentration and attention. They know how to operate gadgets.
A drone operator is essentially a person working with a gadget that is in the air or on the ground. We need young people. Therefore, I strongly advocate for the repeal of this absolutely absurd decision that legally allows individuals to travel abroad after the age of 18. And I believe the conscription age must be immediately lowered to 23 in order to provide individuals with technical knowledge and replenish the army with qualified youth.
Why are the corps not fighting with their own set of brigades? What were they created for, then?
Friends, much of what happens in our country occurs exclusively under public pressure. Oddly enough, I simply cannot relay all the details right now, but someday the time and opportunity for this will come. The decision to create an army corps is a decision lobbied for by Ukrainian civil society. Unfortunately, far from all leaders currently understand what an army corps is and why they are created. Why they are created, for example, in the US Army, why divisions, corps, and armies are stipulated there by regulations. And why it has been this way throughout history, why these divisions, corps, and armies existed in other countries that mobilized a million people. In world history, across all other countries. And Ukraine is the only country in the world, the only one. The first corps, the corps structure, was created by Napoleon. Since the 19th century, you will not find an example where a country develops a million- or half-million-strong army, yet its structures fight, and the commander-in-chief fights exclusively with individual units, like we do. There is no such example. You know, historians will later describe the war and say that, unfortunately, there were no people in the Ukrainian leadership who had simply read basic books on general military history. Therefore, they did not pay attention to the creation of a stable command and control structure, which has worked and continues to work worldwide for the last 300 years. It will be sad to read this, that this is how it was for us, but it will happen. And, unfortunately, we have a very long road from when people speak up, leaders start to move—they hear some idea is popular in society, and say, "Well, let's do something." And then a huge amount of time passes before anything actually starts working. In our case, corps were created over a year ago, and we are still talking about it. Imagine this: in reality, a country that truly desires rapid changes and an advantage over the enemy mobilizes its efforts for those rapid changes, primarily in the organization of command and control, in order to be better than the enemy. It saddens me to say this, but it is a fact. The level of military command and control organization in Russia at the operational level is higher than Ukraine's, because the enemy has built its troop organization on a stable structure—armies, corps, divisions. And they fight with this organization; they have it. We do not. I do not know why. I do not know why. I believe this is simply a shortcoming, a sheer deficiency. The Russians do it this way because it is written like that in their books from the Soviet era. But we do not have it, due to an unwillingness to read books and study military experience.
Currently, mobilization is a pressing topic. Once again, we lack a systemic approach to the issue of troop staffing. For us, mobilization has been reduced exclusively to the fact that the TCR & SS are currently doing a poor job of catching people on the streets, and bad videos are being filmed. So let's come up with a way to avoid having bad videos. But in reality, the problem lies elsewhere. We have such situations and so many scandals with this mobilization because we simply do not utilize all our available resources. For instance, how many foreigners do you think our military structures managed to bring into Ukraine in total over the four months of this year? I do not know the exact figure; I will not say. I can tell you that it is approximately 500 service members. But all these 500, almost all, not all, but almost all, 95% of these people, were brought in by a single unit, the Second Corps "Khartiia". Why is this the case? Why do we lack the focus to bring in a few tens of thousands of fighters to Ukraine from a world with 8 billion people, fighters who could undergo training and perform some basic combat tasks on the frontline? Why are we not utilizing this? This, again, in my view, is a serious political mistake and demonstrates a lack of attention to this critical issue. If we had systematic work across all specific spheres related to mobilization, there would not be such an acute situation and such a necessity to drag and catch so many people. This is also a very serious problem. I want to note that personally, in my company at this moment, about 25 foreigners are effectively working, serving, and fighting. Mostly, they are Spanish-speaking: Colombians, Spaniards, and Argentines. According to my civilian diploma, I am a Spanish translator. I sincerely thank the Institute of International Relations at KNU and my teachers, Elissa Yehorivna Voronchuk and Marharyta Mykhailivna Voronina, for this knowledge. I would also like to thank the Head of the Foreign Languages Department, Valentyna Daineko. I want to say that, thanks to the Spanish language, I can now understand my fighters, and I want to say that they are excellent soldiers. They are very effective, highly hardworking, and accomplish a great deal, carrying out an immense volume of combat work in the kill zone. I do not understand why we are not making systemic efforts to have more of such people in our army, people who are ready to take risks and who fight as volunteers. They are sufficiently motivated, and such a human resource exists. We are constrained only by the fact that our process for recruiting foreigners is disorganized. It all happens based on the initiative of individual commanders. That is all. Instead, we have many discussions, with everyone just talking.
For some reason, there are videos filmed of someone being caught by the TCR & SS. Instead of focusing on ready individuals, those who are prepared to fight and take risks, whom we do not need to catch on the streets, we are not expending resources or effort to bring them in. It is simply absurd. For some, it costs blood, while for others, those actually responsible for mobilization and defense in the country, they are simply too lazy to work and think. And they are lazy because they will not be caught on the streets; neither will their children, business partners, or friends. Everything is fine for them, and they have settled everything. The issue of staffing is a problem for society and for the commanders themselves. That is how it turns out for us. At this moment, I hope and sincerely believe what Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov said: that we will systematically involve foreigners. And I am eagerly waiting for this correct idea, announced back in January of this year, to be implemented. I am confident that if this is done, it will provide a very serious impetus to strengthen our defense capabilities and reduce casualties. Primarily, the casualties among Ukrainian citizens.
Can we maintain our positions with such an approach to mobilization? Will this impact the frontline?
We can maintain our positions even with the current level of mobilization. I reiterate: stopping Russia now is exclusively a managerial and organizational problem. We have enough people, enough drones, enough talented commanders, and resilient warriors—competent, strong individuals who are eager and able to defeat the Russian army and completely halt Putin in all directions. To force Putin to peace.
Does Khartiia accept 50-year-olds?
Friends, look at how old I am. They do. If you have certain competencies, abilities, and health, by all means. 50 is an age when you are accepted everywhere. Therefore, everything else depends on you, on your abilities, your state of health, what you can do, and how you prove yourself in real combat situations. Please, you can write to me privately. I want to say that we need everyone; everyone who wants to fight and possesses the health, knowledge, strength, and will to do so. So, please do.
Foreigners need to be paid. Why do that if you can drag people by force?
In reality, I want to clarify that foreigners receive the exact same monetary compensation as Ukrainians. There is absolutely no difference. The grounds for calculations are exactly the same.
Is there a place for a female surgeon in Khartiia?
Yes, there is. Specialists, particularly qualified medical personnel, are undoubtedly needed. Please write to me, reach out, and I will connect you with the personnel department.
What has changed in the SBU after Khmara replaced Maliuk?
Friends, I cannot tell you at this moment what specific changes have occurred in the SBU. Lately, I simply haven't had the time to pay attention to this. When I have the opportunity to speak with someone from the SBU, okay, I will gather the information.
What is the salary of foreigners in the Armed Forces of Ukraine?
Absolutely the same as for Ukrainians. Currently, for executing combat missions on the front line, infantrymen operating within company strongpoints, designated by combat orders and at coordinates specified in those orders, receive an additional payment for 30 full days. That is, for a full calendar month of 30 days, the combat bonus is 170,000 hryvnias. Servicemen who are within company strongpoints and are not engaged in direct combat but are on the front line performing tasks receive a bonus of up to 100,000 hryvnias per month. This is in addition to the base salary, which ranges from 20,000 for a private to 35,000 for a junior lieutenant. But again, for these 100,000 or 170,000 to be accrued, these bonuses are calculated daily. For every combat day, there is a specific rate of monetary compensation. Therefore, of course, the 100,000 and 170,000 figures I mentioned are the maximums; achieving this requires performing combat missions for 30 days, a full month, so that the maximum allowance is applied for each day.
Open the borders for everyone, and whoever wants to can defend the state voluntarily.
Friends, if a citizen does not consider it necessary to defend the state, it does not mean they can just do whatever they please. The state is defending itself, and the state has passed laws mandating general mobilization because it is the only way to preserve this state. And, undoubtedly, it is a duty, not an option. Unfortunately, this concept—the understanding of duty—is heavily neglected here solely because a powerful, multi-level corrupt network has been created in the state. At all levels, there is an entire series of corrupt groups where certificates are simply sold, alongside the rights to travel abroad, and access to databases that register or deregister individuals from military accounting. All of this is sold at every level so that civil servants of all ranks can profit, accumulating tens of millions of dollars for themselves. This is why there is such disillusionment. However, the fact that such corruption exists, and that we have a large number of legally exempted draft evaders who calmly leave the country or are not subject to mobilization, does not mean that duty can be ignored. Duty cannot be ignored.
A meager salary for warriors; unfortunately, this needs to change, and salaries must be increased.
I want to say that the base salary itself is indeed meager, but with combat bonuses, it is no longer meager; in fact, it is higher than the national average. That is what one can earn if engaged in combat operations on the first or second line. However, I agree with you that for the infantry, specifically for the infantry, for infantrymen, the salary should be significantly higher. Furthermore, primarily for infantrymen, and secondarily for all other combat specialties, but especially for those warriors who have been at war for a long time and possess significant combat experience, I believe there should be a special bonus program every year for each additional year of service. A person should receive an additional two to three weeks of paid leave for each year of service, perhaps even a month, rather, of additional rest for each year of service. And annual bonuses for the fact that a person continues to fight based on their experience and character. Because the combat effectiveness of the army critically depends not simply on the number of mobilized personnel crammed into it, but on those individuals who possess combat experience dating back to 2022, experience in modern warfare, who possess modern military intellect, willpower, character, an understanding of people, and an understanding of military administration and management. These individuals must be given an additional annual opportunity to recover, to continue their combat participation in the war, and to address their financial problems. Imagine five years of intensive combat operations: people can do nothing; they are completely detached from civilian life. They cannot handle their domestic family affairs, they cannot do anything for themselves, build anything, or engage in any normal activities; the war consumes it all. And we have created a system where the only opportunity to rest, the only opportunity to attend to even some personal affairs, is either to be discharged, searching for legal grounds for discharge, and leaving the Defense Forces, or going AWOL. There are no other options. Because no matter how long you have served, in your fifth year of the war, you will receive about two weeks of mandatory leave, plus, say, 10 days for personal circumstances; well, maybe it will stretch to a month if they even grant it to you. But this must be a guaranteed right, increasing with each year, so that people do not wear out or become exhausted, and so we do not lose people to illnesses. It is simply hard to imagine the sheer volume of non-combat losses. Non-combat losses in the army, including from illnesses, where simply conscientious people contract severe diseases, such losses are even greater than those from combat wounds. Therefore, it is imperative to preserve our people, and it requires both money and time to ensure that we preserve them, allowing individuals to recover and regain their strength. Strength, health, and motivation. All of this is in our hands, and I want to say that the state does have the resources to reward the infantry in this manner, to reward those who conduct combat operations at the front. It is not as massive a number of people as it might seem to some. It is an entirely manageable figure and a completely feasible budgets. As far as I know, the Ministry of Defense is working to ensure such a salary increase takes place. We shall see when and how this will be implemented.
Friends, thank you for the broadcast. I want to say that today, as always, I am absolutely convinced that Ukraine will win, and that this victory is in our hands and depends solely on us. We can break the neck of Putin's regime, force Russia to peace, and preserve Ukraine for ourselves and our children. Thank you for the broadcast, and Glory to Ukraine!
