Mindichgate versus capitulation
Allegations of corruption against President Zelenskyy, as portrayed in the media, cannot compel the Commander-in-Chief to accept ruscists’ so-called peace terms.
Contrary to the sensational media allegations, a genuine agreement to surrender cannot take any form other than Zelenskyy’s own signature.
So adding this material evidence of high treason to ‘Vova’s house’ is a thoroughly disastrous decision.
On the contrary, the anti-corruption campaign demands that the president demonstrate effective efforts towards a Ukrainian victory.
And certainly not towards a deal with the world’s two biggest autocrats, so that they have something to show their electorates in the autumn elections to Congress and the State Duma.
This, incidentally, is what fundamentally distinguishes the current anti-presidential ‘tape scandal’ in Ukraine from the first, anti-Kuchma one.
Back then, society’s search for the truth, led by the opposition, appeared to be—and to a large extent was—a purely domestic political process.
And even the foreign policy damage in the form of President Kuchma’s partial international isolation—he was suspected of ordering the Gongadze murder and the ‘chain mail scandal’—was perceived by his opponents as beneficial for the country.
It was only much later that it became clear how a genuine popular protest could not only be exploited but also manipulated by experienced imperialist revanchists.
However, even when putin’s career was only just beginning, and most of the current agents of Kremlin influence and outright traitors were making successful careers for themselves in the young state of Ukraine, the achievements of that attempt to create internal turmoil for geopolitical purposes proved to be rather limited.
Instead, the Ukrainians learnt a great deal.
Thanks, in particular, to this lesson, over the next quarter of a century the country underwent two revolutions, weathered a twelve-year war for independence, and rose to the level of geopolitical players who are shaping the rules of the new world order.
Consequently, the current ‘tape scandal’ concerning deeply systemic and widespread corruption is a challenge for the country’s law enforcement agencies.
But by no means a tool for achieving any hostile geopolitical goals.
For regardless of the president’s actual degree of culpability in corruption, the very public suspicion surrounding "Vova’s little house" serves as a "barrier detachment" behind Zelenskyy.
So that he can focus exclusively on the successes of the Ukrainian army, the effectiveness of the Ukrainian government, and the recognition of Ukraine’s victorious role in the world.
Regarding "Vova’s little house"
The version that causes the greatest outrage is that it was built during the war and at the expense of money stolen from the state – that is, money intended for the country’s defence.
But why was it built in Ukraine rather than abroad – if the "Mindich mafia" project was based on the standard intention of "making a hundred rubles and run away"?
In fact, Zelenskyy, as they say, has "little houses" in both London and Italy, and he had them even before 2022.
Obviously, these "little houses", just like "Vova’s cottage", are in no way comparable, for example, to the palaces of the Ukrainian Akhmetov, each worth 500 million dollars.
But if he were to flee, Zelenskyy had somewhere to go.
And he settled here, in Ukraine, in an exclusive estate where such little houses are a dime a dozen…
No, this is not a valid reason to ‘bring down’ the president before the investigation and trial of those involved in Operation "Midas" have been concluded.
This is merely one of the potential charges in an impeachment process, which can only take place after victory in the war.
Unless, of course, the subject of the impeachment turns out to be actual treason. Compared to which ‘Vova’s little house’ looks like a mere vaccine…
Instead, there is a far worse episode among the recordings that have been made public. One that points to a potential halt to the funding of arms projects, as if provided for by government resolutions, in the event of the signing of some sort of ceasefire.
Did the Ukrainian government really adopt such resolutions?
This is precisely what needs to be investigated as thoroughly as possible. Because this is exactly what constitutes hightreason.
Surely Ukraine cannot halt funding for its armaments in the event of some hypothetical ceasefire, that is, whilst awaiting fresh aggression from a rested and revitalised neighbour.
But this excerpt from the recordings supports the ‘accusation’ against Zelenskyy and his entire ‘team’ that the war is in their interests and that is precisely why they do not want to end it.
One detail is missing from this version – in the statements of today’s critics of Zelenskyy.
How exactly can the war be ended if one does not ‘profit’ from it and does not ‘artificially’ prolong it?
Presumably, Zelenskyy’s opponents and rivals mean that, without embezzling from the budget, one could simply defeat rashka quickly by de-occupying the seized territories and Crimea?
But Ukraine has already gone through the utopia of a quick victory. And at present, the calculated and reported sums of stolen resources, including the ‘Dynasty’ estimate, somehow do not add up to the potential scale of the budget required for a full-scale victory.
So the circle is complete. The only quick solution is surrender.
On the procedure
If, under pressure from public outrage, President Zelenskyy were to announce his resignation (unlike the resignation of MPs, the president’s resignation does not require parliamentary approval), his powers would pass to Speaker Stefanchuk.
We have, of course, heard about the plan for a parliamentary coup, which would create a new coalition and see EU leader Poroshenko take the Speaker’s seat, whilst the government would be led by Batkivshchyna leader Tymoshenko, or vice versa…
But even in this fantastical scenario (and not because Poroshenko is under sanctions and Tymoshenko is on trial for corruption. It’s simply that, side by side, they would be unable to turn a blind eye and think about Ukraine), any Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada would be protected from participating in the capitulation.
After all, it is precisely this option for signing a ‘peace’ agreement that has not merely been used as a ‘Russian PSYOP’, but was directly demanded by putin to halt his aggression.
Consequently, the mere fulfilment of putin’s demand to replace Zelenskyy with the Speaker will provide grounds for accusing the latter of high treason, as soon as he or she takes up the cause of ‘peacemaking’.
Incidentally, and just in case: as acting president, the Speaker cannot, under the Constitution, call a referendum. Neither on territory, nor on anything else.
Nor can he appoint the Prosecutor General – should he suddenly decide to step up the fight against corruption.
And regarding the international context, which 25 years ago proved unfavourable for Kuchma.
In Kuchma’s day, there was no talk of "roadblocks" set up all over the world – from the Strait of Hormuz to sky-high tariffs on everything that moves. In other words, there was something to compare Ukrainian abuses of power with.
Now, however, internal corruption in Ukraine clearly does not define the role of our Armed Forces in defending Europe, which has been deprived of US protection.
In other words, apart from "concern" – a genuine halt to funding specifically due to Mindichgate – we should not expect anything from our partners.
We should fear another capitulation: to a mafia-style model of governance that depends less and less on the president as time goes on.
And it will not change at all simply by switching to a parliamentary form of government. Look at Hungary’s experience.
Incidentally, this model in Ukraine was passed down from one president to another through tacit "security guarantees" to the predecessor, where, in fact, the inviolability of assets acquired by who knows what means served as that guarantee.
That is exactly how ‘Kuchmagate’ ended back then.
And "blaming everything on the predecessor" was, for the most part, merely a political ploy.
Zelenskyy broke this rule only in relation to Poroshenko.
And now there will be no "security guarantees" for Volodymyr Oleksandrovych himself, no matter how the war ends.
Instead, Zelenskyy has experience of "guarantees" from putin.
When, under these "guarantees", he gave the order to Azov to surrender to ruscists' captivity. And what happened to the Azov fighters afterwards.
It is hard to imagine now Commander-in-Chief Zelenskyy ordering the army to withdraw from Donbas, let alone the Defence Forces carrying out such an order.
Therefore, President Zelenskyy has no grounds to oppose the ‘Midas’ investigation.
There are grounds to fight for Ukraine’s victory in de-occupation and internationally recognised borders.
And there is no point in Zelenskyy’s enemies chasing after him to feign a fight against corruption. It makes sense to assist the investigation.
Does NABU lack certain powers?
So now is not the time to ask what to do!
Iryna Pohorelova, for Censor.NET
