Yurii Butusov: Expanding kill zone. How does it affect the war?
The stream focuses on the frontline situation. Conditions for an effective kill zone: radio horizons, camouflage, logistics.
The expansion of the kill zone is what we are obviously witnessing on the frontline. I want to state right away that the quality and operational efficiency of our unmanned forces and UAV units are indeed growing and expanding significantly. We see the heavy losses the enemy is suffering from precision strikes, and we see the statistics: up to 35,000 strikes per month. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Russian unmanned systems forces are currently undergoing an equally rapid growth. A major threat to us is not only that we do not yet have a sufficient quantity, we are short of personnel on the frontline, short of infantry, and there are certain issues with the number of drones. The major problem is that the enemy is also inflicting substantial losses on Ukrainian defenders, specifically using drones. This year, the enemy is expanding the numerical strength of its unmanned systems forces. USF Commander Madyar stated that the enemy is increasing its unmanned systems forces to 168,000. And this is actual growth, considering that the total number, the overall strength of the Russian army on the territory of Ukraine, is 700,000. Meaning, one can already calculate the proportion: 168,000 out of 700,000. In fact, the Russian unmanned systems forces are becoming a major component of the army and are no longer inferior in numbers to assault infantry units.
So, the major problem is that, besides us inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, which is a positive factor working toward our victory, the enemy is also inflicting heavy losses on us. Right now, a key, significant challenge for us is to strike Russian unmanned systems forces. Today, I see Yelena Mikhina writing: "When the guys are withdrawn from Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, do not stay silent." I want to say that yes, the main problem now with the defense of the northern outskirts of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, most of these cities, unfortunately, have been lost by us, is that the enemy, utilizing high-rise urban areas, has placed the antennas of their UAVs on high-rise buildings and has now gained a significant air advantage, specifically in these sectors. And speaking from the perspective of organizing UAV command and control in this area, our continued holding of positions on the northern outskirts of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad has ceased to offer a tactical advantage, because the enemy has created a kill zone, the enemy has expanded the kill zone. Now our soldiers have to fight their way through just to enter these positions, and exiting also comes with great risk. Neither normal logistics, nor regular supply, nor the evacuation of the wounded is possible. Under such conditions, I see no rationale in holding positions where we sustain heavier losses than the enemy. I believe that modern, high-tech warfare allows us to do the opposite; instead of falling into enemy kill zones, the tactical art of commanders and military leaders now consists of forcing the enemy to operate within our kill zones, precisely where our UAVs hold technological and tactical advantages in eliminating enemy manpower, and avoiding such traps ourselves. When we talk about a kill zone, it is necessary to note that the kill zone is currently the primary form of ground combat. And to achieve a tactical advantage, one must create conditions under which your UAV operators work more effectively than the enemy's UAV operators. In other words, the enemy is forced to operate in environments where they can be easily located and killed, while our own positions remain protected.
This means that a kill zone is an area with favorable radio horizons for our drone operations, where our drone operators establish their positions on advantageous high ground with good radio horizons, and where the sparse "greenery" in front of our positions is thin enough so that the approaches to our lines are clearly visible. Conversely, our own positions are sheltered under natural camouflage, and similarly, the logistical routes and roads to these positions are also under natural camouflage, allowing resupply to be conducted, for example, along tree lines or through forests. This prevents the enemy from isolating the combat zone, ensures our effective logistics, and creates problems for enemy logistics.
What is the situation in the Siversk area? The 54th and 81st Brigades.
Yes, the situation there is very difficult because resilient combat formations have still not been established in this sector. Significant efforts are being made, but so far, it has not been possible to completely stabilize the frontline. These are the consequences of that command and control crisis, which previously led to the loss of Siversk. Restoring combat formations there now, after the depletion of our troops, is extremely difficult. Nevertheless, the enemy's advance has been halted in this sector, and I hope that the "greenery" will still allow us to improve and deploy our combat formations, as well as the combat formations of our UAVs, in this area. The situation there remains uncertain, and it continues to be difficult in the sector of the 54th and 81st Brigades.
Where are our guided aerial bombs? Two years ago, it was said that they were supposed to appear.
The development of guided aerial bombs took a considerable amount of time. This year, we are ready to produce KABs. There have been successful trials, and this issue is under the control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine command. However, we have many ideas that are not being scaled up. The primary guided aerial bombs on the frontline are NATO munitions; increasing the number of KABs is critically necessary.
An offensive from Belarus.
I do not consider an offensive from Belarus realistic right now. It is being discussed; perhaps there are some political reasons. At the moment, I see no prerequisites for it. There are no problems with this; as soon as there is any maneuver in the Belarusian direction approaching our borders, modern NATO reconnaissance assets and satellites allow for it to be detected very quickly and with high quality. So far, there are no such reports, photos, satellite images, or drone footage from the air, so for now, I regard this purely as a political matter.
How many days has Shufrich gone unbeaten?
Friends, yes, I also regret that, unfortunately, this counter is not being updated, though it should be updated regularly.
Now, I would like to reiterate a few things about the kill zone. In reality, the kill zone exists on both sides of the frontline, but when we use this term, it does not mean it is a zone of total annihilation where survival is impossible. The current nature of the war is such that, as Madyar stated, the kill zone reaches up to 25 kilometers on both sides of the frontline, varying across many sectors. Where the terrain is open, such as in the Zaporizhzhia sector, for example, I think yes, up to 25 kilometers is a realistic range. Why such a range? This range is likely the effective operating distance for the largest number of modern drone types. The main kill zone, however, the zone of the most concentrated strikes, where the risk to personnel is highest, is the zone reachable by Mavic-type reconnaissance copters. Mavics currently use batteries; in fact, I am raising funds for batteries for my unit, and I want to note that there are now modern batteries that allow a drone to stay in the air for an hour or an hour and 15 minutes. That is, I have seen Mavic-type drones fly 15 or even 17 kilometers deep into the frontline. Of course, this provides a short transmission time, but efforts are currently being made on both sides to equip drones with modern power cells, enabling a Mavic to easily observe positions with its zoom from 10 or 12 kilometers away from its launch point and transmit a video feed for some time. Therefore, a zone extending up to 7-8 kilometers from the line of contact in both directions is a zone of dense observation by copters, an area where it is extremely difficult to hide, where constant camouflage is required, and where close attention must be paid to surveillance. Then there is another zone spanning about 10 kilometers. This is an area where fixed-wing drones regularly fly and where fiber-optic drones are actively deployed, most of which have 20-kilometer spools. Further beyond this sector, past the 15-kilometer and 20-kilometer zones, the strike density decreases significantly. When we talk about a kill zone, it does not mean that absolutely everything is destroyed. In fact, there is a large number of examples, well, perhaps not large, but a significant number of examples, where our soldiers masterfully breach the kill zone with minimal or often no casualties at all, thanks to modern tactics, training, coordination, and action planning. They pass through it, fight their way through, infiltrate, and no drones can stop the assault groups. Such things happen. Unfortunately, this can only be accomplished by highly trained troops, troops that consist not only of courageous infantry but also possess strong drone support.
Drone-assault operations, yes, they allow for breaching this kill zone, breaching the enemy's defense, and UAV combat formations.
The Russian-Ukrainian war draws parallels with the war between the USSR and Afghanistan. Following the end of which, the USSR, having ostensibly achieved its goals, was forced to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan.
No, this parallel is inappropriate here. I have said many times since 2022 that the primary historical model and prototype is the Korean War. The war between North and South Korea. So, North Korea, which is trying to kill us, is exactly its ally and represents the image of modern Russia. And peace is currently impossible altogether. I believe that as long as Putin is around, there will be no peace. The situation will remain like this; hostilities can only cease under a ceasefire regime along some stable frontline, breaching which would be too costly, and the price of the war will rise so much for Russia that it will simply be physically forced to stop. And I see no prerequisites for peace; I only see prerequisites for Russia to drown in its own blood and be forced into a ceasefire along the active frontline, just as it was in Korea.
Why are dead bodies exchanged at a ratio of one to thirty?
It is a simple question, actually. First, Ukrainian soldiers do not waste time collecting the garbage that the Russians abandon, their comrades on the battlefield. Second, the enemy is on the offensive, and the unconditional evacuation of bodies under such conditions, when our units are forced to hold their ground in combat or withdraw, is naturally impractical, and the evacuation is extremely difficult. Therefore, when Russians capture a certain territory, they begin collecting bodies there. Well, we can see, in fact, an objective calculation of casualties in this war, it is the calculation of casualties based on drone videos, because the war is now being fought with drones from both the Ukrainian and Russian sides. And one can look at the ratio of such casualties. For example, the famous Russian unmanned systems center "Rubicon," which is a key military unit in Russia for the combat deployment of UAVs operating across the entire frontline, claims approximately 6,500 strikes on Ukrainian soldiers per month. This is their statistics from last month. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces and Ukrainian UAV units of all types report 35,000 video-confirmed strikes on Russian soldiers per month. In other words, the ratio of video-confirmed strikes is significantly higher in favor of Ukraine. Undoubtedly, besides Rubicon... If we look at the videos, the strike ratio is 1 to 3, or 1 to 2.5 in favor of Ukraine. This means the strikes on Russian soldiers are multiple times higher. I believe this indicates the ratio of actual casualties. And the evacuation of bodies is not really an indicator; it is merely a Russian propaganda trope that constantly tries to talk about this body exchange as if it were an objective casualty count. This is not the case; it is a propaganda trick by the Russian Ministry of Defense, which conceals its losses and deceives the Russian public and the Russian leadership. In principle, this is advantageous to us because such Russian lies will not, fundamentally, worsen the outcome of the war for us.
Will you say anything about Yermak?
Well, what is there to say? The person is currently, as far as I know, in a detention facility. This is a matter for the law enforcement agencies. I am glad that the law enforcement system is working in Ukraine. All our allies see that Ukraine has independent anti-corruption bodies capable of bringing even top officials to justice. Therefore, I believe this strengthens the trust of our foreign partners who supply us with weapons and finance Ukraine; when they observe the work of the NABU and the SAPO, they understand that there are no untouchables here. I think this is a good signal.
Would you consider changing your nickname to Yurii Feng Shui to get the authorities to listen to your advice?
A funny joke, actually. Friends, in reality, even within our government, which, let's say, does not demonstrate any extraordinary intellectual abilities, there are nonetheless motivated people whom I trust, who are trying to do a lot for victory. Such people exist. They are not the majority, but they are also in the system. Therefore, I actually try to influence things, demonstrate actions, and show certain things, including within my own unit operating on the frontline, thereby influencing the thoughts of those making decisions so that we can bring our shared victory closer.
Will cutting off logistics on the highway near Mariupol be able to collapse the frontline, as happened with Kherson? What is your opinion on the aerial blockade of the Donetsk highway?
I believe that a crucial factor in the war is the long-range engagement of enemy logistics using our fixed-wing strike drones equipped with Starlink. But I want to say that completely isolating a combat zone exclusively with drones is currently impossible. It requires significantly greater technical resources, and it still cannot replace combat formations on the ground. Regardless, in order to stop the Russians, it is necessary first and foremost to halt the frontline. Resilient combat formations must be established on the forward edge, which the enemy cannot simply push through with suicidal infiltration. In other words, the key issue I have been talking about for many years is reforms at the level of army corps and brigades. That is, waging war with operational formations and structuring combat formations in accordance with the demands set by the war. Combat formations built around drones, where the number of personnel and infantry on the forward edge is minimized. It is minimized through drones, signals intelligence (SIGINT), electronic warfare (EW), and combat unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). However, infantry cannot be excluded from the battlefield. And the infantryman must be exceptionally well-equipped with engineering support, with mandatory artillery support. Yes, significantly fewer of such infantrymen will be needed, and they will sustain significantly fewer casualties. And then, when we restructure our combat formations and stop the enemy, strikes on their communications will become lethal for them. They will fight, trying to push through our defense here, there, and everywhere, suffering tremendous losses on logistical routes. In this way, it can indeed become one of the factors of victory in the war. But you must understand, friends, that an absolute weapon does not exist. It never happens in war that you have a single tool that solves everything. Therefore, I say again: halt the frontline through the efforts of all branches of the military, and strike at logistics. The enemy does not stand still. We cannot assume that we will isolate a combat zone with some miraculous strikes on a few highways. The enemy is strengthening their air defense; if they are not stopped on the ground, if large numbers of their infantry are not eliminated, if their actions are not blocked, and if pressure is not applied to the enemy on the ground, they will simply enhance their air defense, shoot down more of our fixed-wing drones, reinforce the engineering protection of their logistical routes, improve the quality of their traffic management, and reduce their losses. Drones are not capable of everything when it comes to such absolute defense, either. Therefore, the key to the war, to victory, is singular: changes in the command and control organization of the troops so that all our units act cohesively. Then there will be an effect.
Why are assault brigades needed?
In my view, assault brigades are indeed necessary. What is needed are specialized troops with special training for conducting assault operations in the kill zone. In other words, these should be assault groups specifically trained for the task, capable of carrying out missions for extended periods, taking cover, staying hidden, maneuvering covertly, operating autonomously for long periods, independently and away from the main forces and sustainment, with supplies delivered solely by drones. They must know how to camouflage themselves, be able to operate effectively, be highly trained for individual combat, have endurance, and consist of healthy young people. These troops must also be trained to work with drones, because the survivability of assault groups in the kill zone can be ensured only through high-quality coordination with drones and provided that our drones have superiority in the air. Therefore, assault regiments, as a specialized tool for countering the infiltration of Russian infantry and carrying out counterattacks, are absolutely necessary. The key problem with the development of our assault troops, which I have also spoken about repeatedly, is that our assault troops exist simply as an independent tool. They carry out operational missions. In other words, we have the Air Assault Forces, which include air assault brigades that were in fact created and have a set of weapons for operations at the operational level. There are two Air Assault Forces corps. And they should not be replaced by assault regiments. In my view, assault regiments have their own specialization that is needed in this war. Assault regiments should be assigned to army corps and incorporated into them, serving as a stabilization tool and a reserve tool for the army corps commander, in order to clear all infiltrations in the corps sector and carry out counterattacks within that sector. That is when assault regiments make sense: they rely on the infrastructure of the combat formations created by the corps, namely electronic warfare, electronic intelligence, and a significant share of UAVs. In other words, there is a defensive line, a defense sector of a given brigade, for example. And assault regiments should not be thrown in there when that brigade has already been completely knocked out, is no longer holding any positions, and there are holes everywhere. The corps commander should commit an assault regiment so that when the enemy is pressing a brigade, he uses that assault regiment to reinforce it, carry out counterattacks, and destroy infiltrations, while the brigade holds the defense, secures the sector, and defends it with its own forces. Then the assault regiment, for example, deploys one assault battalion, and that assault battalion destroys all enemy attempts to attack in that brigade’s sector. It has done its job, killed the enemy, fought for a month, two or three; the enemy is exhausted and beaten back, the threat of a breakthrough has been repelled, and that is it: the assault battalion pulls out and clears the neighboring sector of the adjacent brigade, for example, or another battalion from the same regiment does so. In this way, these regiments do indeed operate as autonomous battalions, but there is a certain logic to it. So what is the reason for the heavy losses in our assault regiments? As a rule, they are committed to battle when some brigade has already been completely mauled, there is a hole in the front, the enemy is advancing, and has already pushed into that breakthrough. And then there is a meeting engagement. Only then, after all the bloggers have written about it and all the media have reported it, is a reserve sent there: the assault regiments. And they are not simply carrying out counterattack missions; they are effectively restoring the front line sector altogether. In other words, they enter a sector unfamiliar to them, where they do not know the situation and where, in effect, a meeting engagement is underway with an advancing enemy. That is why there are such losses and so many soldiers missing in action: they are committed to battle, to a meeting engagement, in a place where they do not have situational awareness, and there is no one who can orient them. This is a major organizational problem, because we do not have a clear division between the separate Air Assault Forces, which are operational and operational-strategic rapid response forces, and the assault troops, the assault regiments of the Ground Forces, which by logic, and by their very name, should be support forces for the Ground Forces for specialized drone-assault operations in the kill zone. That is why I believe the creation of specialized assault regiments is the right decision and a justified one. But because they sometimes have the wrong logic behind them, the wrong logic of employment, this leads to people being forced to perform feats constantly, forced into mass heroism. Is that really an effective tactic for employing them? No. It is not an effective organizational model. Such things happen because, unfortunately, painful as it is to say, we lack a scientific, analytical approach to assessing operations at the strategic and operational levels, both in the state and in the army. We do not draw conclusions from any mistakes. As for the army corps, I have spoken about this many times already... It is shameful to say, friends, but Ukraine is the only country in the world, the only one in the past 300 years, since the beginning of the Napoleonic wars, that has deployed a million-strong army and is fighting exclusively with tactical units at brigade level, without even having fully deployed corps to this day. Let me remind you: we have one army corps out of 18 deployed at full strength. Everything else is a complete mishmash, chaos. Brigades from different corps are fighting all along the front, scattered and mixed together. We are not fighting as a corps. And as I have said, Russia, which is rigid, feudal, totalitarian, and all the rest of it, somehow has such an elementary thing as army organization: regiment, brigade, division, corps, army. It works there. And it works all over the world. It works in all armies, in major NATO militaries, in the US Army. They have dedicated field manuals and regulations for divisions, corps, and armies. All of this works, but not in Ukraine. Here, we have our own path. Here, the people in charge are apparently proud of the fact that they do not know military history, are unfamiliar with the basics of military affairs and do not know how this has worked across the world for 300 years. I cannot explain it any other way. It is deeply shameful. And one day, historians will write about Ukraine’s war and say what strange things Ukrainians did, how they simply ignored common sense on many issues.
Do you plan to take a high-level position in the General Staff?
No, friends. In fact, I tell everyone, and this is an absolutely sincere wish. In this war, I received my first officer rank, junior lieutenant, and I have only one request. I do not want other ranks; I do not need them. I did not come for ranks or positions, and I fully want to do the work I am doing in my current place, in my current rank. And the General Staff is an instrument for implementing the decisions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. For now, I perfectly understand that if the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief does not react, does not take measures to reform the army, then no matter what happens in the General Staff, the General Staff itself is an executing structure, not a self-reforming one. If politicians have no demand for reforms within the defense forces, it means they will not happen. And the system that currently exists will remain. Because generals are trained to execute orders within the active system. And it never happens that an army reforms itself. There is a political decision, political leaders have a political course; reforms take place within the framework of this course and within the framework of the resources allocated by the political leadership.
Will the Russians reach Dobropillia by the end of summer?
That threat certainly exists. But I believe that if adequate organizational and command decisions are made in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad direction, if our troops are withdrawn to tactically advantageous lines for the defense of Dobropillia rather than kept fighting meeting engagements under conditions of Russian drone superiority near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, if we pull out of the Russian kill zone and force the enemy to advance into our kill zone, I am confident they will not reach Dobropillia. I have said this before, and I am saying it now: even now, if the Ukrainian army acts with at least basic common sense and at least scales up its own successful examples of combat operations, as some army corps on the front are demonstrating, if we simply scale up the experience we already have, we will stop the enemy before autumn. Three or four months, and the enemy will be stopped. The Russians are not showing anything extraordinary. Their actions are formulaic, and they are now advancing and breaking through our front not even with their infiltrating infantry. The enemy is breaking through the front thanks to drones. The enemy brings in a large number of UAVs; they are not taken out, and where they are not taken out, they expand the kill zone into our rear. Then they strike our positions. If we force the enemy to operate on our terms, we can build a drone front right now that the enemy will not be able to overcome. "Greenery" allows maneuver. Yes, it is harder to detect infantry and harder to strike it, but it is not infantry that is breaking through the front. We know where the enemy is attacking. We can cut down tree lines, mine the areas where the enemy is advancing, and create positions that are convenient for us and for our pilots. And that will be a tactical advantage the enemy will not overcome. To do this, we need to think technologically. So far, we have such examples only in individual regiments, individual brigades, and individual corps, no more than that. There is no large-scale system. To stop Russia’s continuous offensive, it must be stopped everywhere. Only then will the enemy smash its head against our defenses, break itself, and be forced into peace.
How much time is needed for technological development to expand the kill zone to 300 kilometers? Will it be safe to live in cities in that case?
A 300-kilometer kill zone is not a prospect for this war in the near future. Right now, I want to tell you, the actual kill zone, where there is a high probability of being struck, is approximately up to 10 kilometers from the frontline. This is the zone reachable by the most dangerous reconnaissance assets, small reconnaissance copters like the Mavic. In this zone, the enemy conducts dense surveillance, we conduct dense surveillance, and this zone can experience concentrated strikes. Further out, the zone expands, and generally, up to 15, 20, or in some sectors up to 25 kilometers, there is also high UAV activity, but maneuvering is significantly better, and you can advance. Greenery allows many units to maneuver within the kill zone. The positions of UAVs, for instance, Mavic-class or FPVs, are practically all within the kill zone, and they survive. All of this can be done; it is possible to work with this, but not at 300 kilometers. At 300 kilometers, strikes will increase, but we also do not have constant, continuous fire control over a highway at a distance of over 30 kilometers. This requires concentration, a high density of reconnaissance and strike assets that deliver strikes quickly, with a short reaction time. Technologically, this is not yet possible. On the Ukrainian side, we have a major advantage—Starlink. And this truly creates great capabilities. High-speed Starlinks allow us to mass-deploy drones deep into enemy territory with high-quality control. This is our advantage, which we absolutely must expand, thereby increasing enemy losses on the approaches.
Does Kostiantynivka have a chance?
The situation with Kostiantynivka is complex. Theoretically, there are always chances, but the enemy has already entered the urban area, and to conduct successful combat operations there, primarily, to talk about success in Kostiantynivka, it is necessary to protect the highway to Kostiantynivka, the logistical routes that the enemy, thanks to their tactical position, is currently trying to take under full control, significantly complicating our logistics. If there are systematic steps to counter enemy UAVs and to destroy not only the drones in the air but also the positions from which the enemy constantly launches hundreds of drones every day to blockade Kostiantynivka, yes, then we will see chances. The chances lie in the air.
How is your military career going? What is your rank?
I can say again, I am a junior lieutenant, currently a UAV platoon commander. But I am actively recruiting people, more and more, so perhaps there will be something larger than a platoon, but in the near future, we will look at changes in the organizational structure. However, I will remain a junior lieutenant; this rank suits me perfectly. This rank provides no protection, so if there is an order, you do the work that a regular soldier must do.
How do you view Mindich’s influence over Firepoint? These are our deep strikes. What should be done in this situation?
There is a fairly logical saying in the army, and not only in the army, but also in life and in the state: if you do not know how to do something, do it according to the law, or according to the regulations and the rules. We certainly need deep strikes, and I want to say that Firepoint FP2 drones have a high and well-deserved combat reputation at the front. I have not worked with them myself, but I have seen units that have used them, and the feedback is quite strong. I recognize that these products are quality weapons and, in principle, at a fairly competitive price. But, of course, the allegations concerning Firepoint, whatever they involve, must be investigated: some kind of financing, some preferences in financing. This must be given a legal assessment. And the two things should simply be separated. There are people who make weapons very well, and they must be able to keep making weapons. But there must be equal competitive conditions in the market for UAVs and heavy strike drones. It should not be the case that only one company can scale up on a large scale. Other strike drones should also receive similar opportunities, commensurate with their technological capacity and experience. For example, we have excellent Zozulia strike drones in the same class as the Firepoint 2. These are mid-strike drones that are badly needed at the front. In other words, this is a matter of state planning. But we must proceed from the understanding that if we do not want to turn into Russia, then feudalism and the creation of preferences for one player, while other manufacturers are squeezed out in the process, is a defeat for us. Because it would mean that we ourselves are reducing competition among different manufacturers. And in a modern high-tech war, we at the front are interested in competition among manufacturers, so that they fight for quality and new technical solutions, and constantly ask the military for feedback. And I am pleased to note that many manufacturers come to Khartiia, and representatives of Beshket, excellent fiber-optic drones, even came specifically to my unit to analyze and collect combat experience. This matters to them. These excellent HORNET strike UAVs and Bumblebee drones, made by the American company owned by Eric Schmidt, which are now causing havoc on the roads, are being tested, including in our unit, where there are Bumblebee and HORNET testers who are in direct contact with our colleagues and provide feedback.
We need different technologies, and we must stay ahead of the enemy in adaptability. In modern technological warfare, adaptability is a weapon; it is an advantage. So I see no contradiction here. There are questions for Firepoint. Firepoint must report to the parliamentary commission, and I saw that the company’s owner was there and gave testimony. There must be oversight by anti-corruption bodies, including NABU and SAPO, which are trusted by our Western partners. There must be openness and transparency on the part of our military planning bodies, namely the Ministry of Defense, which places orders for drones. And it is very important that the Ministry of Defense act as a fair arbiter, providing funding to all companies that demonstrate quality and show they are ready to produce high-quality weapons. Everyone must be given the opportunity to grow proportionally. This is important. And I very much expect that the state, as it has promised, will still receive a European loan this year and that the money will go to the army corps. And the corps will place the orders. So there is no contradiction. We need weapons. I see interesting and important technological solutions at Firepoint that deserve to be scaled up. But, of course, other manufacturers that are working effectively for the front must receive the same support as Firepoint, in the same proportional amounts. And rules must be created. In our country, rules are created only as a result of conflict, because the authorities never establish the rules of the game; they simply look down from above and wait to see how it all sorts itself out on its own.
There are drone batteries, 4-amp ones—are these needed?
Any power sources are actually needed. Various multi-tasking solutions are required, and there are specific drones for each application. Therefore, it would actually be interesting to test and demonstrate this. If you have any interesting products of your own, I would very much like you to write to us. We will gladly use them and provide feedback.
Why did the authorities ditch Yermak? The man will spend the weekend in a pretrial detention center. Would you like to contribute some hryvnias?
I think that everyone who supported Andriy Yermak has, in principle, made their contributions, but I, of course, do not plan to. I think this case illustrates very eloquently who is worth what in this country and who actually has what kind of support. It is very telling when a person who, until recently, decided the fate of the entire country and managed every process imaginable, is now a subject of discussion regarding who will post bail for them, and we see that there is no queue. This is highly eloquent; every politician must understand that no matter how long they sit in their chair, Ukraine is a democratic country, and their tenure there is not eternal. Whatever they might think of themselves, even if they consider themselves the most powerful in the world, it will all end someday. Therefore, one must behave like a decent person so that there will not be a situation where there is no one, or a very narrow circle of people, ready to intervene, stand up, and support such a politician. This is a very instructive story, and it reflects both the attitude of people toward a specific politician and a broader lesson for Ukrainian democracy, for what we all live for: to work for the country and society, not for one's own pocket. Because when difficult times eventually arrive, a person who has no issues with material resources ends up spending the night alone in some nameless cell. It is a very instructive story. Therefore, friends, today anyone can prove themselves; to do this, one needs to make an effort either in our defense industry, at infrastructure facilities, or on the frontline. Everything that currently sustains the state is a priority. And I am confident that Ukraine will remain a democracy, and our democracy? the fact that we have no untouchables, no idols, is a huge advantage for Ukraine in this war. And this adaptability in drones is actually a reflection of a different mindset. Our difference from Russia now, due to the different paths of development of our societies and the different understanding of freedom in our states, our adaptability, is precisely what gives us an advantage in the war. Monopolization is impossible here at any stage. Competition always breaks through. A person who is genuinely popular in the army can become an authority figure. Their opinion will hold influence. And this adaptability and advantage in technology and drones is also one of the merits of Ukrainian freedom and Ukrainian democracy. Therefore, when we fight for the state, we fight for our freedom and democracy. And that is exactly why I am confident that we will win this war.
Today, more than ever, I am confident in our victory. Glory to Ukraine!
