Yurii Butusov: "We lag behind Russia in terms of number of foreign fighters involved"
Ukrainian drones have significantly hampered the Russian army’s offensive operations and enabled the establishment of fire control over key enemy logistics routes. However, as Yurii Butusov, commander of the UAV platoon of the 13th Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine "Khartiia, emphasizes, tactical successes are not enough to turn the tide of the war: this requires systemic changes in troop management and a reduction in personnel losses.
This is Radio NV, my name is Oleksii Tarasov, and we’ll be spending the next two hours together. As a reminder, just last week the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence announced that it had established fire control over sections of the so-called Crimea-Donetsk corridor. Footage of attacks on Russian military vehicles and fuel tankers has been released. We have indeed been hearing for several weeks now that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have acquired new capabilities in terms of medium-range strikes, which allow them to disrupt the enemy’s logistics, to disrupt the logistics of the Russian occupiers. This concerns not only the Crimea-Donetsk route, but also, for example, the Luhansk region. I have before me a statement by Maksym Zhorin, deputy commander of the Third Corps, who said that whilst the occupiers are reporting on the alleged capture of the Luhansk region, we will continue to strike at their logistics, destroy their infrastructure and kill the enemy.
We’ll start our discussion on this topic with our next speaker – Yurii Butusov, commander of the UAV platoon of the 13th Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine "Khartiia", who is on the line with us.
- Over the past few months, there have been many reports in the Western media suggesting that we may have reached a turning point in the war and that the Ukrainian military may have gained new capabilities. Subsequently, our military commanders themselves began to speak about such matters. There is even a statement from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defence. So, regarding the new Ukrainian capabilities to disrupt our enemy’s logistics, what are your observations, and how serious is this?
- Firstly, the turning point in the war is currently taking place at the tactical level; it has not yet occurred at the operational and strategic levels. I have spoken about this on numerous occasions: the current turning point lies in the qualitative and quantitative growth of UAV units within the Ukrainian Defence Forces. UAVs have now become the backbone of the Defence Forces’ battle formations; their numbers and operational effectiveness have increased, and although still at an insufficient level overall, the scale of supply, production, the number of drones and the infrastructure for their deployment are improving.
Such a significant increase in the number of UAV positions within combat formations has meant that it has become practically impossible for the enemy to overcome such a dense drone-infantry defence, even using infiltration tactics, as any advance inflicted and continues to inflict heavy losses on the enemy. Therefore, it can be said that at the tactical level, Russian infiltration tactics can no longer be employed as they were a year ago, as they encounter sufficiently dense resistance everywhere. The enemy advances only where it manages to achieve local air superiority.
So there really is a turning point, but this turning point is exclusively at the tactical level; it is by no means across the entire front, and it has not yet become a turning point at the strategic level.
- If I understand correctly, your unit is in the Kharkiv region. Do you, or your comrades in neighbouring units, have the ability to reach Russian logistics?
- Yes. At present, without work on logistics, it is impossible to carry out one of the key tasks – isolating the combat zone. This is one of the basic principles of tactics. It existed even before the era of drones. Now this task, like many others, is being solved by drones. That is why we are focused on this.
- You have already mentioned that this tactical breakthrough is not happening across all sections of the front, and that it is specifically enabled by the quantity and quality of UAV crews in various units. But have we seen any new technological developments? Because there seems to be a lot of misunderstanding in the media regarding what is happening, for example, with the Hornet drones. It seems to me that the Russians are constantly spotting them, or at least reporting that they are spotting them in the southern sector, in the so-called land corridor between Donetsk and Crimea. On the one hand, they are supposedly manufactured by the United States of America; on the other hand, we very often come across the phrase ‘Ukrainian Hornets’. So, if we were to discuss the technological aspect of this tactical shift, what would you highlight?
- I wouldn’t reduce this story to the idea that we’ve acquired some kind of standalone asset. Yes, it is a new asset, a high-quality one: these are Hornet strike drones from an American company owned by one of the most brilliant innovators of our time, Eric Schmidt. Undoubtedly, the Hornet system he has developed is, in itself, a well-balanced strike asset in terms of its characteristics, strike capabilities, control systems, flight range, and, crucially, cost. But it is by no means the only or primary means of striking logistics. It is a high-quality weapon, but other means, other types of drones, are also being used against logistics.
The key point is that a significant number of qualified UAV crews have now been built up, and the organisation of UAV deployment has improved at both the tactical and operational levels. Furthermore, the number of drones and drone munitions is increasing. This combination of factors makes it possible not only to maintain tactical-level control, but also to deploy a significant number of units, commanders, command centres, reconnaissance assets and strike assets. This enables us to inflict damage at ever-greater depths. The development of drones in our country is proceeding in small steps, which are actually still far from allowing us to say that we have an optimal model. But development is taking place, and the fact that we have begun to take more systematic action on logistics is one of the consequences of this qualitative and quantitative growth.
-In many of our broadcasts, you have said that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have the capability to stop the enemy. And this will be possible with qualitative changes in the organisation of processes. Commander of the Third Army Corps Andrii Biletskyi told Reuters in an interview: "Ukraine has a six-month window during which it can seize the initiative on the battlefield and strengthen its negotiating position… The Russian army is exhausted and incapable of making major breakthroughs. If the Ukrainian military manages to build up and maintain momentum over the next few months, they will be able to seize the initiative on the front line and force Russia to abandon its plans to capture the last part of the Donetsk region.
What do you think of this forecast? What needs to happen first?
- In fact, since 2022, as I have spoken about at length, Ukraine has had many opportunities to stop the enemy, to prevent the Russians from advancing further, to prevent them from breaking through or seizing territory. All this required significant organisational changes. So far, this has not happened. Whether it will happen in 6, 9, 12 or 15 months is also a big question. The only thing we can say with certainty right now is that a turning point has indeed occurred at the tactical level. Which is what we were discussing.
As for any specific timelines – we could have stopped the enemy earlier, but we have not managed to do so yet. To achieve a turning point at the strategic level, strategic decisions are needed. Do we have the capacity for this? Yes. Will they be implemented? We’ll see; I don’t know. It depends on many factors. At the strategic level, changes are happening much more slowly and the pace is insufficient.
- Mr Yurii, you have certainly spoken about this many times, but could you elaborate on what strategic changes, in your opinion, we are talking about?
- All our successes are linked to innovation, the development of UAV units and innovation within the UAV industry. Unfortunately, we are not seeing qualitative changes in the organisation of troop deployment. Changes are happening, but they are very slow and everything is progressing very slowly, with major problems, and in some areas, nothing is happening at all. The front line is held by the infantry. We are proud that we are managing to inflict heavy losses using our UAV units. But a key issue is being raised in our media: the enemy is also inflicting major losses on us using UAVs. And the enemy is also breaching our sections of the front line primarily with the help of UAVs. Drones are now the main means of breaching our battle formations.
There is a lot of talk about the need to kill; this is the right approach – we need to kill 30, 40, 50 thousand Russians a month. But achieving this goal is only possible if we reduce our losses from drones. Unfortunately, this is hardly discussed at the highest levels, and almost nothing is being done systematically to reduce the losses of our troops. There are also a great many mistakes in the deployment of infantry and assault units in the grey zone.
Furthermore, there are still no systematic state efforts to bring in foreign infantry. We lag behind Russia, for example, in the number of foreign nationals brought in to take part in combat operations. And by a significant margin.
We are very fond of reporting on victories and talking about victories, which is certainly necessary. But every problem has several layers. We are still having to retreat on many sections of the front. The enemy continues to seize our land. This is happening because the enemy is inflicting serious losses primarily on our infantry and our infantry support units. And until we resolve this key issue of the proper organisation of troop deployment, with drones alone or with drone pilots alone, we will not be able to halt the advance and defeat the Russian army. Because this is a complex issue.
In drone warfare, it is not enough merely to effectively destroy the enemy with drones or to carry out all combat tasks at the front using drones; one must also effectively echelon one’s combat formations, enhance the effectiveness of ground forces, and drastically reduce casualties across all branches of the armed forces. And this is the task we have failed to address.
- Regarding drastically reducing the losses of our troops from enemy drones: are we talking about electronic warfare systems, or reconnaissance, or nets – what exactly are we talking about?
- These are simply tools; there are many tools. I am talking about the organisation of troop deployment as a whole: how troops are commanded, how they are organised, how their combat performance is assessed, and how effective commanders are evaluated and promoted within the army. These are all complex issues, which primarily boil down to who is responsible for which sector, how tasks are carried out, how reinforcements are received, how commanders protect their men and carry out tasks, and how the actions of a particular commander are assessed. All of these are complex matters. In other words, for these matters, in order to conduct combat operations effectively, there are hundreds of different tools.
Unfortunately, at the strategic level, there is no such approach to planning modern combat operations, to planning the deployment of our personnel, to rotations, to reducing casualties, to reinforcing troops, to deciding where to carry out rotations, and where and how to form—or not to form—new units. We have a million questions. None of these issues are being systematically resolved. It is precisely for this reason that we are suffering losses that are unnecessary in such a war, and we are short of personnel, and the enemy is still managing to break through our positions in certain areas.
- Mr Yurii, I’d like to focus briefly on isolating one of the issues: the deployment of foreign infantry. On the Ukrainian front, on Ukraine’s side, there are Colombian soldiers, and the ‘Khartiia’ Corps is also cooperating with them. What is the problem: is it a question of money, or of agreements at the intergovernmental level? Because I recall a statement, I believe, by the President of Colombia, who said that he was against Colombian citizens fighting in Ukraine. What is the main issue here?
- At the moment, it is simply a lack of funding and the state’s lack of interest in a significant increase in the number of people being brought in. Yes, efforts are being made, funding is being allocated, but in fact, by the start of the sixth month – over the five full months of 2026 – around 350 foreign fighters have been brought into Ukraine through official channels. That is a paltry figure and simply absurd; it’s astonishing, given the daily scandals: someone’s been caught at the TCR, someone’s being caught at the TCR, someone’s refusing, someone’s causing a scene.
Yet there are people – tens of thousands of them – who are ready to take part in combat operations. To achieve this, they need to be brought in from various countries around the world where there are people with combat experience and a desire to fight. We are not making any systematic efforts to do this. Instead, we are making great systematic efforts to catch taxpayers and send them to places where, after 5–1 years of war, they are no longer at all motivated to go – to the assault, to the front line. This, in my view, is an example of the lack of a systematic approach to war planning at the strategic level of the state.
- Recently, there have been reports that the new Minister of Defence – Mykhailo Fedorov – will propose reforms regarding mobilisation in Ukraine by early July. What are your expectations? What, from what you have heard, might work? The main focus is on increasing the pay of military personnel.
- Increasing pay is important. But in life, as in war, things only work systematically and as part of a comprehensive approach. We need not only higher pay for infantrymen, but also mission control for infantrymen. Just as Defence Minister Fedorov introduced mission control for drones – that is, monitoring the sorties of all UAVs deployed at the front – the same applies to mission control for infantrymen. Monitoring the actions of every individual. This is even more important.
Because if there is no accountability for the effective, high-quality deployment of personnel, if unit commanders are not held accountable for record figures, for those who deserted their units, if there is no accountability for heavy losses, those missing in action, the dead and the wounded, and no one is monitoring this process, well, then no conclusions will be drawn. And so, ineffective and unsuccessful examples of combat operations will be repeated endlessly. That is the main problem.
Because you can pay an assault trooper a salary; at the moment, there’s a 170,000-hryvnia bonus for spending a whole month fighting on the front line. You could pay 270,000 or 370,000. But do people really take on a role like that—the role of an assault trooper—solely for the money? I don’t see it that way. In other words, in order to recruit people, to get someone to go on an assault, for it to be effective, you need planning, you need the right organisation, you need commanders capable of fighting with minimal losses and maximum results. Then there will be effectiveness. You can’t fix the situation at the front with money alone. And, to be honest, I’d like to see that money first.
- But it is clear that alongside all the changes that are taking place, albeit slowly, in the Ukrainian army, there are plans and changes within our enemy’s forces. What do you see on that side? In your sector. You mentioned that, currently, infiltration – which was one of the main methods used by the Russian occupiers to advance – is not really feasible at the moment. So, what is our enemy doing now? If we’re talking about the Kharkiv region, the sector where your unit is operating.
- Infiltration is possible. Infantry infiltration has generally been the main form of combat operations since the First World War. Manoeuvrable combat operations, small infantry groups. I would say that, given the current situation where the number and capabilities of UAVs have increased dramatically, this tactic is too costly. And the enemy cannot afford it, because even infiltration can be detected by drones, which can inflict significant losses, making it impossible to sustain such operations over the long term.
There is very heavy fighting in our sector in the Kharkiv region. The enemy has concentrated a large number of its unmanned systems units in the Kupiansk area. And in the area of Lyman-Pershyi, this is the 68th Russian Division’s unmanned systems regiment of the 6th Army, as well as additional enemy units concentrated there; they are attempting, first and foremost, to use drones to isolate the combat zone and inflict heavy losses on us. This is combined with intense artillery fire. Their aim is to breach our front line and recapture Kupiansk, as happened in 2025. That is why heavy fighting is taking place; the enemy is fighting for a foothold on the right bank of the Oskil, trying to hold it, trying to build up their numbers there, and constantly attempting, at the slightest opportunity, as soon as the weather permits and limits drone activity, to bring reinforcements into Kupiansk. So there is very heavy fighting in this sector; the enemy infantry has excellent cover here, and the enemy has allocated a large number of forces to counter our drones.
Nevertheless, we are managing to repel the enemy quite effectively and hold our battle lines. Just in the news, we’ve just had reports on Kupiansk, on the Russian occupiers’ constant attempts to advance there.
- Mr Yurii, thank you very much for your analysis. To recap, Yurii Butusov, commander of the UAV platoon of the 13th Brigade of the Ukrainian National Guard, ‘Khartiia’, was speaking to us.
