Full text of Mykhailo Fedorov’s high-profile briefing

Full transcript of Mykhailo Fedorov’s briefing

I would like to briefly discuss the results of my work as Defence Minister today. In fact, my work in defence began earlier, with the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022. You remember the story involving Starlink and Elon Musk, followed by the Army of Drones, and so on. My work in the President’s government began back in 2019. I am probably the last minister remaining from the first government and the last one to be dismissed today, yesterday, or the day before. And I will say honestly that for seven years, just like the representatives of the Servant of the People faction present here, we faithfully served our ideas and the President as one team. I did not pursue a political career, establish my own companies, or engage in business. I can say that among the people around the President, I am probably the person who valued him most and continues to value him most. I have never let him down in any way. Nor, for that matter, have I let you down. There have been no corruption scandals, and no schemes have been set up.

We have been building a digital state since 2019. Judging by public opinion polls, this is probably the most significant reform that Ukrainian citizens consider to have succeeded. We launched Diia and Mriia, as well as Diia City, the best tax regime in Europe, and fundamentally changed the tax system for technology companies. These companies, which later began producing weapons and became defence companies, subsequently joined this regime. We developed telecommunications infrastructure. Difficult winters came, yet we had communications. We faced a great many problems and cyberattacks, but together we built a digital state. Then, in 2022, while serving as minister of digital transformation, my entire team and I began working on the war effort. Today, I would like to discuss the results of my work not only over the past six months, but since 2022. My aim is to show what has been achieved, because these are, in essence, foundational elements that will enable us to continue striking the enemy, reclaiming our land, preventing the enemy from advancing, and protecting our cities. I want to show what must not be dismantled, what needs to be supported and, more broadly, to highlight the problems that remain.

I think the time has come to speak to Ukrainians as adults. There are certain problems that need to be resolved. They cannot be kept quiet. And I would like to discuss them today. Why is the slide titled "Our Story"? The document I am about to show you actually has a story of its own. Only two people have seen it. Well, three, if we count the designer: the President and me. One month after I began working at the Ministry of Defence, we launched an audit of the ministry to understand what was happening there and began speaking with military personnel. This was, as you know, the standard first stage of work at any institution or organisation. We identified a number of problems that clearly highlighted what needed to change for us to achieve our goal of stopping the enemy and securing a genuinely just peace. The President and I went through this document together. I showed him what the two of us had managed to achieve. Our story. It is the story of the President and me, because I could not have achieved any of what has been accomplished to date had we not been on the same team. On the other hand, it is now our shared story as Ukrainians, because today drones account for 95% of the enemy we kill, we protect our skies with drones, and we are developing many different technologies. It all began in 2022, when we took an unprecedented step that the government supported at the time: raising the permitted profit margin for drone companies and opening up the market by allowing margins of up to 25%. These are some of the best conditions for starting a business anywhere in the world. We analysed every country before introducing them.

Next, at the President’s instruction, we launched United24, a fundraising platform, and the first Army of Drones fundraiser. That was when the term "Army of Drones" first emerged, and we began raising funds. The money was used to invest in drones and make the first procurements. At the time, the Ministry of Defence was not purchasing drones, so this decision had to be made.

Next came the financing and development of naval drones. I would like to remind you once again that we began procuring the first naval drones on a more or less industrial scale thanks to fundraising campaigns. They subsequently began striking Russian ships. Today, there are already many companies operating in this field, there is a market, and there are government orders. But we started it together as a start-up, and we made it happen. Then came the procurement of the first deep-strike drones. I remember when the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine used the first deep-strike drone to hit its first target, when the drone reached its destination. At the time, we procured those first deep-strike drones through the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, and they began operating and delivering results. Today, they are our long-range sanctions, which the entire world is talking about. Today, this is a card in our hand that can no longer be concealed. Another important part of our technological history is the development of the Delta system. To be honest, we had to save it from every Commander-in-Chief I met, because there was a certain culture of always wanting to do something to Delta. Today, however, Delta is something the entire world needs. Network-centric warfare is built around the best digital warfare system, one that originated among military personnel in our country. Next came the introduction of strike drone companies into the Armed Forces, which later evolved into the Unmanned Systems Forces Command. But we also launched the first strike drone companies without funding from the state budget: we sought money from private companies and purchased pickup trucks and the first drones. In other words, this was something we believed in enormously. We understood that this was the future and, despite everything, we found the resources to continue working on it.

Next came the creation of e-points. Everyone is familiar with this digital system. It has become a game-changer for the entire world. Through the system, our frontline units can use the e-points they receive for destroying the enemy, with the results verified by video, to purchase drones through Brave1 Market — an Amazon for the war. This helps us prevail in every innovation cycle, because products are updated every two or three months. These are fast funds, fast points that help the military obtain cutting-edge technologies.

Next, a decree establishing the Unmanned Systems Forces was signed. I remember how it happened: the President and I were alone in his office. We had been discussing the creation of unmanned forces for a long time, and that was when we drafted the decree. It was signed quickly. Today, everyone knows about the achievements of Magyar, who is doing his job well, destroying Russian tankers and targets on the battlefield. We are proud that we succeeded in creating this force and building the system.

Then we launched the Drone Line, which today kills every third or fourth Russian on the battlefield, depending on the month. Using e-points data, we selected the best units because an objective monitoring system had emerged, and we began providing those units with direct funding. Those units then began to grow. Our rationale was that, when there was no time to build the entire system — although the system still had to be built — what we could do quickly was support the strongest units. So we began funding them. We began funding Pasha Lazar and Lazar’s Group. We began providing the Alpha units with billions in development funding, as well as Magyar, Achilles, Rarog, K-2 and all the other units you know. This was built on the e-points system, while e-points emerged from the drone market. Everything is interconnected, so you can see how the entire system is financed and implemented.

Next came the funding and opening of the explosives market, which was another important stage in our country’s development. Recently, incidentally, we awarded almost one billion in grants to the private sector, start-ups, and innovative manufacturing. We opened the market for UGVs and many other markets. But this case is particularly illustrative because an aggressive decision was made to open the interceptor drone market and begin testing them under combat conditions in several regions: to allow private companies to enter those regions, integrate into the air defence system, test their interceptors against Shaheds in real time and receive, if I remember correctly, between $10,000 and $20,000 as an incentive to continue developing them. It was an unconventional decision, and everyone opposed it. But at a meeting of the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the President said: "Put them into action. Let’s go." And we made that decision. Today, interceptors shoot down 70%, 80%, and even 90% of the Shaheds flying over our country. I have already spoken a little about UGVs, but the institutional resistance that has always existed is a feature of every traditional military. This is why civilian oversight, dialogue, and development are necessary. It is a normal process that must take place.

Last year, however, we managed to contract for 12,000 UGVs, despite considerable opposition. But once again, a political decision was made: we move forward and award the contracts. This year, 50,000 UGVs will be procured. That is a record number, and today everything available is being bought up. Incidentally, you can see that there is no information here about the past six months. You can find that information on social media; everything has been published there. Today, the objective is to explain the architecture of what we are doing, rather than individual projects or specific results in any particular area. The objective is to explain the architecture of everything that is happening and why it matters to our country.

Next came the launch of drone assault units. Please do not confuse them with assault units: I am referring specifically to drone assault units. Under modern conditions, it is impossible not to make technology the central element around which an organisation is built. A decision was therefore made to provide several units, including CODE 9.2 and the 1st Separate Assault Regiment, with additional funding so that they would have the resources and money to demonstrate how drones can first take out everything and infantry can then move in to recapture territory with minimal losses. CODE 9.2, together with Khartiia, recaptured Kupiansk. The funding it received enabled it to invest in developing this capability. This is an example of how a modern army should fight. Drones operate first, followed by people, and in this way we protect the lives of our troops. We have also discussed Operation AUCHAN, which focused on destroying equipment. The operation was built around Lazar’s Group and Nemesis: we simply brought together a large number of multicopter drones and, over several nights, sent thousands of them to a depth of 50 kilometres, destroying more than 700 pieces of equipment. This asymmetric operation, conducted in May last year, resulted in the enemy launching no mechanised attacks whatsoever from May through October. All of its equipment had simply been destroyed. This year, we repeated the operation as AUCHAN-2 and destroyed 250 enemy artillery systems in two nights, because we continue to lose people to Russian artillery. We have also discussed the regular decisions to fund Lazar and Alpha. Today, Alpha ranks first in eliminating Russian troops according to the e-points system. Lazar is also firmly among the top five.

In other words, this did not concern the Armed Forces alone, but the Defence Forces as a whole. These decisions also had to be defended. Another important decision made at the outset, one that was also architecturally significant, was cutting off Russian access to Starlink when we began our work at the Ministry of Defence. We had a conversation with Elon Musk after the first Starlink-equipped Shahed flew over Kyiv, then over central Kyiv and even over the Ministry of Defence building. We realised that unless we cut off Russian access to Starlink immediately, it would become a major problem for us. Operator-controlled Shaheds immune to electronic warfare would be able to alter their flight paths and destroy our entire air defence system, including Patriots, F-16s and much more. So we had that conversation. There was only a 1% chance that we would succeed, but Elon said: "Let’s just talk over video." It was our first video call; previously, we had always communicated by text. We spoke, and he said: "Okay, I’ll do it — we will introduce whitelists. The only thing is that I will have to change the rules and terms for Starlink customers across a large country." From a business perspective, changing the rules so that every Starlink now had to be registered appeared disastrous. His people could have said: "Elon, what are you doing?" But thanks to the digital state that had already been built, a large number of Starlinks were registered through administrative service centres and Diia. SpaceX itself was astonished that we could implement projects of this kind within a matter of days.

The next important stage was the creation of a small-scale air defence system. This was another architecturally important decision made after we began working at the Ministry of Defence and our team took up its duties. As you know, we proposed Pavlo Yelizarov, who today, incidentally, (on 16 July), submitted a request to be discharged from military service. I hope that changes. Our idea was to build a short-range air defence system capable of intercepting at least 95% of all Shaheds and cruise missiles through new technologies and a new organisational structure. We encountered many problems in trying to implement it fully, and we will discuss them later. But this decision is also changing how we organise our work asymmetrically to defend against the Russians. More broadly, our objective, which we have already stated publicly, contains nothing new: to halt the enemy’s advance as much as possible and force the enemy to stop. We called this doctrine Air Land Economy: to intercept as many cruise missiles, drones and ballistic missiles as possible, halt the enemy’s advance on the battlefield and make it impossible for Russia to finance the war. Every decision at the Ministry of Defence was made on the basis of this plan: does it fit within the concept or not? Working on universities is important, but building a small-scale air defence system is essential. Developing colleges is important, but so is introducing certain organisational changes on a particular section of the front. And so on. This was our philosophy, the frame of reference within which we worked. What problems did I identify after a month of working inside the Ministry of Defence, and what did we discuss? First, the war is now increasingly being fought at the operational level, while we continue to fight at the tactical level. Russia always operates to operational depth. Russia was built around this doctrine and, in practical terms, effectively created this concept. Our organisation, meanwhile, was built more around the tactical level and is only now transitioning to a corps-based system. You can see how operating at the operational level, and the introduction of mid-strikes, have changed the situation.

Second, the corps-based system has not become fully operational. We have successful corps that advance every month or at least lose no territory. And we have corps whose commanders are constantly being replaced. Some corps have already developed into schools with a philosophy of their own, while with others we do not even know how many brigades they contain or what is happening there. In reality, everything depends on organisation. Yet the corps do not distribute all resources among the brigades under their command. Why do some corps have five brigades while others have 12? This brings us to the third problem: the fragmentation of brigades and corps. Some brigades cannot even determine how many battalions they have. A battalion is pulled out of one brigade and sent to another. It is impossible to build an effective command-and-control system under such conditions. No one is responsible for anything — it is a classic problem. Those on the front line who carried out particular missions are invariably blamed and investigated; responsibility is pushed down onto someone else. This culture has developed over the years, and no one is held accountable.

Commanders are constantly replaced. A brigade commander arrives, and a month later he is removed, and someone else takes over. This is closely related to point four: no one is held accountable. With such an organisational structure, however, it is impossible to forecast or plan anything.

Supplies do not flow through the corps. The supply problem is fundamental. Over the past five months, we procured more drones than in the whole of last year, yet most units did not feel the difference because distribution is handled manually. If you are loyal, you receive supplies; if you are not, you receive nothing. As a result, units cannot plan their future. We therefore launched a project to provide brigades with a baseline allocation of drones. Getting it approved took four months of hell. This is linked to point ten — the obstruction of initiatives and bureaucratic crossfire. We spent four months approving a simple project. If we procure large numbers of drones, let us ensure that every brigade and corps receives a specific quantity of resources so that they can plan their subsequent actions on the battlefield. After four months, we signed the order and managed to launch the project. We will see how it works in the military. The next problem is the isolation and vilification of those who are making progress. Are you succeeding? Well done. Now off to the sidelines. Drapatyi — a third reprimand, goodbye. Forgive me, Drapatyi; I suspect you will receive a fourth reprimand after this. But we no longer have the option of remaining silent about it. If someone achieves results — Lazar in the Air Force, for example — then, fine, for two months some commander will not be allowed to sign off on anything for you. You will not receive allocations. Let us organise training for you so that you have to deal with bureaucracy instead of doing your job. This is a persistent problem.

No systemic project can be implemented. You constantly encounter the same objections: why is this needed, how will it work, why should we push it through? There are many projects that I discussed during my address to Parliament. We can do this. We need to move logistics underground, and that will change the situation on the battlefield. A second front is now emerging in the air. But continuing this work requires organisational capacity.

Human capital is being depleted without proper analysis. In fact, we did a great deal of work and, for the first time, built a system that provides real-time analysis of the battlefield and casualties. We began receiving daily casualty reports. Yet decisions on whom to support and whom not to support, whom to reinforce and whom not to reinforce, are not based on data. They are based on loyalty, and no system can be developed on that basis.

The obstruction of initiatives and bureaucratic crossfire. During our six months at the Ministry of Defence, we were unable to establish centres of excellence or change the organisational structure because the General Staff would not approve it. The name was supposedly wrong, or something else was wrong. In other words, there was no need, in their view, to bring in new people capable of generating ideas. We always found ways around this through unconventional solutions, and we continue to do so, but overall this approach does not work when we are talking about a serious system. During our entire time at the Ministry of Defence, we were unable to transfer more than, I do not know, three to five people. Just imagine: a country at war that generates solutions cannot transfer people to the Ministry of Defence because of deliberate obstruction. And then there are the constant lies, including claims about me: that I commissioned the investigation into Skelia; that it was not someone else who created Skelia or any other unit and allowed these things to happen, but that I launched a media campaign, that I did this, that someone else did something else. This is a culture that has developed throughout the system, and it simply must be eradicated. Otherwise, we will not be able to defeat an enemy whose system is afflicted by the same problems.

What solutions were proposed at the time? Radical personnel decisions, including replacing both the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the General Staff. I promised today that we needed to speak as adults. In reality, we have no other choice if we want to defeat the enemy asymmetrically and with minimal losses, in a system where strong commanders and leaders are allowed to develop rather than being suppressed, written off, sent away, reprimanded and held back. A modern organisation built around technology requires leadership in management. It involves numerous sensors, working with IT specialists and intelligent people, and attracting talent despite limited resources and the absence of high salaries. It requires an entirely different model of management.

Strong corps commanders must be appointed. We have several corps that everyone knows: the Triika (Third Corps), Khartiia, and the 8th Air Assault Corps. Many corps are delivering results. But there are also many corps with as many as 13 brigades that are unable to establish effective command and control. We do not know who is responsible for what, who was appointed to which position, or who bears responsibility for anything at all.

Third, drone assault forces. This represents a change in the way we employ infantry. A decree establishing the Operational Response Forces has now been signed. I hope they will form the basis of the drone assault units, based on the principle that technology does the fighting and we lose drones rather than people, after which the infantry moves in. We must fight for every individual. We simply cannot mobilise people on the same scale as the Russians. We need an asymmetric approach. Everything we have succeeded in doing has been based on technology and asymmetry.

Another measure is straightening the front line and implementing the doctrine. I will not go into extensive detail here. The point is that we must not lose people where those losses can be avoided. We must proceed from the terrain and the situation, minimise our personnel losses and, at the same time, establish defensive lines that allow us to attrit the enemy as much as possible.

All resources must be distributed through the corps. We have discussed this. That includes personnel, drones, artillery, training, and so on. At present, corps hold a section of the front but are not responsible for allocating these resources. Who is responsible for a section of the front? A brigade? But that brigade operates within a corps, and the corps must operate to operational depth to reduce the pressure on the front line. Yet the brigade does not receive mid-strike capabilities for this purpose; the corps does. The result is a situation in which no one is ultimately responsible for the front line. The purpose of this baseline provision is precisely to ensure that brigades and corps have the assets they need to carry out their missions and make plans. There is also a broader issue that is not directly related to today’s meeting: we need to establish an Academy of Modern Warfare and a leadership school, and the President needs to create this academy. We need a school that teaches people how to fight. We need programmes similar to the Captain Training programme — schools where we present modern doctrine, explain what we are doing, what is working on the frontlines, and how we apply this experience, so that we can develop new leaders capable of advancing professionally and commanding headquarters and units.

Another measure is a consortium for ballistic and counter-ballistic systems. There is good news here: the consortium agreement was signed on Monday, and everything is moving forward.

Securing the skies. Today, we discussed the organisational problems in this area.

Winning the economic war. Work in this area is also progressing fairly well at present.

I will not discuss the tenth point. It is already, shall we say, somewhat classified.

What else? The transformation of the Defence Forces themselves; opening controlled exports, which we have discussed; and stamping out corruption in procurement. I expect you will have questions about procurement, and we will answer them. But in reality, we managed to accomplish a great deal. Controlled exports have been authorised and will begin operating soon, while we have also taken the first steps towards stamping out corruption in procurement. This is an important slide showing what the asymmetry and courage of Ukrainian troops can achieve. It shows territorial losses and liberated territory from October through June. Red indicates what we lost; yellow indicates what we managed to recapture. You can see a positive trend. In January and February, Starlink became a complete game changer. The Russians were unable to replace Starlink with anything. They continue to lose personnel and infantry. Their assaults are no longer conducted by groups or even small groups, but by individual soldiers, and this is causing them major problems. This shows Russian losses by month and hмow the situation is developing. Thanks to the e-points system, we continue to kill between 27,000 and 35,000 Russians.

The next slide shows statistics on UAV strikes at ranges of more than 20 kilometres. Look at the trend: compare how many targets we destroyed at ranges of more than 20 kilometres in January with how many we are destroying in June. This is the result of the procurement system we created and the sound procurement decisions made in February, when we brought the funding forward, despite the resistance we constantly have to overcome to achieve this. These slides show strikes at ranges of more than 50 kilometres.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

Politico: Yesterday, we spoke with your critics, and they said that, in effect, we had all become victims of a clash between two egos — yours and Syrskyi’s. Why were you unable to work with Syrskyi? You share the same goal: winning the war. But you have described what the General Staff did with your initiatives. Have we become victims of a clash of egos?

When the President said that he did not intend to replace Syrskyi, that was his decision as Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

I fully accepted that decision and said: "Then I will learn to work with him, because ultimately our client is the Ukrainian people." But we found that every initiative we proposed began to be obstructed, while Syrskyi was not prepared to discuss the problems openly, face-to-face. He was prepared to attend meetings, weave intrigues and assume that someone had commissioned a media campaign, rather than recognise that the problem lay in the actions being taken. In effect, he issued an ultimatum. Instead of figuring out how to defeat Russia asymmetrically, which is the Commander-in-Chief’s job, he figured out how to divide the country in which we all live. And that is a major problem. By nature, I do not go around complaining about problems. I came with the analysis and said: if we want to win, this is what we need to do. But I did not impose a condition that it was either Syrskyi or me. I said: "Then we will defeat Russia with this Commander-in-Chief." Because Syrskyi did, in fact, help save our country in 2022. He led the Kyiv operation, conducted the Kharkiv operation, and took part in the Kherson operation, as well as many other operations.

We cannot underestimate a commander like that. But the war has changed completely. A drone’s architecture changes, or new features are introduced, at least four times a year. Certain aspects of technology change 20 to 30 times a year. The command-and-control system has changed, and we must change as well. We cannot continue relying on what worked back then. We must understand what worked well at that time and what we need to do now to defeat Russia, because the Ukrainian people remain our client in this work. So I do not think this is a problem of egos. I think there are other reasons behind it. At the time, however, I was prepared to work with him. But, as I have said, many documents were never signed. I spoke openly about this and said: "If we are going to play bureaucratic games, we know how to do that. Let us proceed." I was told not to touch the issue. So I endured it and was prepared to continue working calmly until the Commander-in-Chief issued an ultimatum.

Reuters, Max Hunder: What are your plans now, and what was the outcome of your conversation with the President? Did he offer you another role? Whether he did or not, what do you plan to do next?

I had a normal conversation with the President yesterday. He offered me a position as an adviser or suggested finding some other way for me to remain on the team. I declined the advisory position. I never had the ambition to become a minister, remain a minister, seek positions for myself, and so on. In essence, today’s meeting with you is an example of how I act: according to my values. I believe the truth needs to be told. You cannot become hostage to certain obligations. Over the past seven years, no one can accuse me or criticise me for engaging in political activity, corruption, building schemes or pursuing some other agenda. For seven years, I worked alongside the President to implement reforms and went wherever I was sent to the most challenging areas of the country’s transformation. But today, this is not about me. It is about all of us. Either we close our eyes and say: "Fine, let everything remain as it was," or we say: "Stop. The Ukrainian people know how to fight." In 2022, Ukrainians rose up and showed the Russians that they had underestimated them. Ukrainians now have every tool needed to stop the enemy, and we must not become like the Russians. We must change our approaches, and we must tell the truth. So the conversation was normal. But, shall we say, the choice has probably been made or will be made; I do not know. My task today is to show what we accomplished and warn of the risks that lie ahead for all of us. I have been working on this around the clock for four years. I do not want to look my children in the eyes later, knowing that I failed to speak out about what was really happening.

Incidentally, I have been saying most of what I told you today all along. You can look at my interviews. I have not come out with some sensational revelation containing anything new or shocking. I have simply organised the information and shown the problems we are facing and what needs to be done.

Forbes Ukraine: We have read and seen that one of the criticisms levelled against you is that you failed to resolve the mobilisation problem. At the same time, Russia is expected to conduct another mobilisation campaign in the autumn. What is your response to this criticism and to the prospect of Russian mobilisation? What was your plan for countering it?

Look, for six months I did not respond at all to the criticism over mobilisation. I did not want to contribute to the situation we have today — one to which, in effect, the Commander-in-Chief and the General Staff have brought us, although I do not know who exactly designed this system. I did not want to say, "This is not my responsibility," or evade whatever responsibility I might bear. But whom do the Territorial Centres of Recruitment and Social Support (TCR and SS) report to? The Ground Forces. Whom do the Ground Forces report to? The Commander-in-Chief. And the General Staff handles and oversees these matters. The policies have been established. There is a policy requiring recruitment centre personnel to wear masks. But let us speak frankly, since we agreed to speak as adults today. They wear masks because no one is held accountable for attacks on TCR and SS. There are other problems that require different answers. This is not a black-and-white issue. But the mobilisation problem cannot, in reality, be resolved unless we address the issues I have shown you. Do you know what young people are discussing now? They are not discussing the new two-year and 14-month contracts we introduced, and so on. They are discussing the former commander of the 155th Brigade, who caused perhaps the greatest harm anyone could have caused during the full-scale war. They are discussing assault units or, rather, specific incidents that occurred within them, because we should not generalise about all assault units either. The mobilisation problem therefore cannot be resolved without a new social contract and genuine change within the military.

Why is the Third Assault Corps the largest corps anywhere along the front line? Because it has established processes; because someone is accountable for the line; because it has a clearly defined area of responsibility; because all its brigades are assembled within the Third Corps; because it has a clear chain of command, a doctrine, adequate supplies and leadership; and because the people responsible for recruitment have such strong HR skills that everyone you meet there is capable and understands every issue. The same applies to Khartiia and other units that deliver results. They do not have the same mobilisation problem. There is a waiting list for Khartiia, including at least 2,000 foreigners who want to join it now. At least 2,000. The root of the problem is actually our product: what are we selling? Are we selling lies, chaos, and irresponsibility, "Go ahead, it is not mined there," or what exactly are we selling? We therefore need to change our product radically. Ukrainians have earned that through their work and service. There are many people in the military who could accomplish far more if they were given freedom and their leadership was supported. They would not flee the battlefield. And all these claims that Syrskyi can hold the front because he is some kind of dictatorial, authoritarian figure are false. Ukrainians stopped the Russians because they made the decision to do so. They went out and stopped them. Ukrainians know how to assume responsibility. They do not need someone above them wielding a club and pushing them onto the front line for 10 or 15 days under drones.

Ukrainians make their own decisions, step forward, take risks, and understand for themselves why they are sitting in a trench: they are doing it for their families, not because they are afraid of going AWOL or anything else, but because they accept responsibility. These men are holding together the current geopolitical situation in the world. They need respect, proper contracts, defined terms of service, and the ability to transfer between units. They need capable leaders who listen to them. They need proper social support.

And they need many other measures that we must introduce through systemic solutions.

Ukrinform: You have developed fairly close relations with international partners. Have any of your counterparts called you? If you cannot name them, could you at least say how many countries have asked why you are facing dismissal?

And my second question: is it true that you proposed two candidates for Commander-in-Chief whom the President did not support?

Whom did I propose? In fact, I told the President that he had to make that choice himself. He had to hold dozens of meetings and determine who was genuinely capable of performing these tasks.

It had to be his decision, not mine. We have an analytical system, data on how the front is moving, and information on who is responsible for each section of it. Everything has been digitised within the system. How many square kilometres has each commander lost? Conclusions can be drawn from that data, followed by discussions and the selection of both the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the General Staff. Surely our country has not run out of commanders who have demonstrated through their leadership that they value people, do not weave intrigues, and fight to achieve results. So that is not quite how it happened. As for the second question, about foreign partners: of course, many of them have called. But I am not some government in exile, as they say, so I have not spoken to anyone. I have been reading their messages. What could I possibly tell them? This is our internal matter, something happening here in our country. We are speaking among ourselves, to Ukrainians. I replied to Boris, whose message I happened to open, because he is the person who has helped us most. I value him greatly. He is an extraordinary Defence Minister — a new European Churchill, if you like — whose leadership turned the situation around in Germany so that it would support Ukraine. He made the war a top priority. Many defence ministers called me. Even major technology leaders called and offered me jobs. But I said: "Yes, yes, yes — stop, stop, stop. I am very flattered." Alex Karp called, for example. He is the owner of Palantir. You can now... But that would be... Let us discuss that later. I believe this is our internal matter. There should be no international pressure. This is an internal issue that we must resolve within the country: reach a new understanding, establish a new social contract and stop the Russians in the air and on the ground. We have shown that we can do this. We must then force them to make peace on our terms. There is no other scenario.

TSN: Mr Fedorov, we can see that MPs have already postponed the vote on a new minister. People have taken to the streets to support you. Could the scenario now change so that you remain in office? If so, would you stay? And if you do remain, how do you envisage working with the Commander-in-Chief, who, unfortunately, is staying?

Let us not get ahead of ourselves: the wise Ukrainian people have not yet decided whether he will remain or not. Let us wait. That is the first point. Second, the defence minister is appointed under the President’s quota. Today, we saw Ukrainians take to the streets. But they did not come out for one particular minister named Fedorov. Ukrainians came out for themselves. They are asking why, after hope emerged and we seized the initiative on the battlefield and in the skies, that trajectory is now being broken, and we are turning away from it. That risk exists. And that is why Ukrainians took to the streets. Ukrainians appreciate it when things are working, and they sense when something is happening that is inconsistent with the values nurtured here. That is the reason for this reaction. Whether I remain or not is not what this is about at all. The President and I will certainly have to discuss this issue again. We also spoke by phone today. But the central issue is not me. Today, the central issue is the root cause of the problem that we must address. If we address that root cause, our country has enough people capable of holding various positions.

Would that be on the condition that Syrskyi is no longer Commander-in-Chief?

I have never imposed conditions. But I cannot imagine how it would work. I do not need the position of Defence Minister merely to be Defence Minister. I need that position to win the war. In the current configuration, I personally do not know how the war can be won.

Hromadske: Hello. I would like to return to the issue of mobilisation. How effective was the first stage of the mobilisation reform, and what will happen to it now? Is it true that the reform also faced resistance within the General Staff? Military personnel have told us that service members are still receiving no information whatsoever.

Look, I do not want our press conference to turn into me complaining about the General Staff. I would rather focus on architectural issues. You already know whether particular people helped or did not help, and so on. There are units that have steel... well, you understand. They actively sign these contracts and promote them internally. Take CODE 9.2 — forgive me for mentioning CODE 9.2 again, but I know that Flint is there. He is someone who recently carried out missions in the south and whose unit participated in the liberation of Kupiansk. He was transferred to Zaporizhzhia, where he began striking bridges linking Crimea, using drones to conduct isolation operations and taking out equipment. He is an extraordinary professional — the kind of person for whom I am standing here today. For Flint. And then he was transferred to the Kharkiv region, or somewhere else, on the grounds that he was needed there... There is, of course, a particular problem there, and he was sent to resolve it. But he was also transferred to remove him from Zaporizhzhia, where he was successful and associated with me. That is a major problem. Flint, for example, has, I believe, between 3,000 and 4,000 personnel, and 1,000 of them signed contracts. So the results actually depend on the unit. But how is the information disseminated? I cannot implement a contract reform from the Ministry of Defence alone. The General Staff must be involved in that reform. But I will give you a spoiler. I hope the Chief of the General Staff will not take offence. This is not his private information, but Hnatov signed one of our contracts.

There has already been extensive discussion of your interaction with the Commander-in-Chief, but we have not yet addressed corruption. In your view, which corrupt officials or companies linked to corrupt officials were also involved in your dismissal? And what did you do in office to cut off corrupt financial flows?

From our first day in office, we began introducing a new data-driven procurement system. Previously, the General Staff drew up a list of companies from which particular products had to be purchased. We changed that system. We issued a new order requiring procurement from the highest-ranked companies: the top 10 according to e-points, DOT-Chain, and orders placed through Brave1 Market. The top 10 companies are selected in each category, and 80% of drones are procured from among those leaders to improve the quality of drones reaching the front. So much junk is currently being supplied to the front that we had to address quality. The remaining 20% is procured through tenders. That was the first step, and it changed the quality of procurement.

The second step was launching open tenders. We began with the procurement of long-range 155 mm ammunition. There were, I believe, five successful bidders. One well-known company, which was recently searched by law enforcement, publicly claimed that we were destroying the artillery sector — all those false claims about artillery. In reality, we had simply stopped buying short-range ammunition and begun procuring long-range rounds. The company thought it might be able to reach some arrangement, change the terms or cause the tender to fail. But it eventually realised that the tender was proceeding normally, joined as the sixth bidder and cut the price of every shell by $1,000.

We then launched the Crimea Strike tender for 160,000 drones. Fifty-nine companies submitted bids — that is our competitive advantage. Prices will fall by 20% to 30%. We saved more than $100 million through the artillery tender. We also halted a large number of contracts that had been signed directly with foreign companies without my knowledge. I learned about them only after taking office. I would arrive in another country and say: "Dear Minister, we are not buying these 155 mm rounds. Do not allocate 200 million for Leopard repairs. Do not fund this, that or the other." Then I would return to Ukraine, and my phone would be ringing nonstop: "You have derailed our framework contracts. Let them pay us."

As a state, we behave badly when we undermine companies’ business strategies. But if we have a surplus of short-range 155 mm ammunition at the front, how can we allow a company to sell the state even more of it? We therefore decided to procure only long-range ammunition. The contracts were halted, and only long-range rounds were purchased.

Prices will continue to fall. Tenders for deep-strike and FPV drones will be launched shortly. This will generate major savings and give companies an opportunity to compete in the market.

There is a great deal of corruption. Some department heads had effectively been installed by private companies. These department heads would simply arrive at meetings accompanied by officers from particular law enforcement agencies. They would not attend Ministry of Defence meetings without representatives of those agencies. When I discovered this, I was astonished. Why was a department head inviting a law enforcement officer to a meeting about ammunition or, for example, the relocation of a defence plant? We began dismissing these people one after another. There was one meeting that I did not attend; it was chaired by the First Deputy Minister. This was during our first days, or perhaps the first few weeks, in office. A direct contract was being discussed, and a letter had been drafted naming a specific company. There was also a letter from the Bureau of Economic Security. It was widely known within our circle that this company had a profit margin of 200% to 300% and belonged to a well-known individual who does not live in Ukraine. Following discussions with the General Staff, the company was properly removed from consideration, so there were no further questions. But the entire market soon knew who had said what at that meeting. We conducted an internal investigation. I called Hnatov, and he said: "No problem. This is bullshit; it cannot be allowed to happen. Let us fix it." We identified the person responsible and conducted polygraph examinations. I did not have time to sign the orders demoting and suspending those involved because the investigation was still underway, but I think those people understood everything.

There are many such cases. We began changing the underlying architecture, and those changes will save our national budget so that we can continue fighting and spend money on what we actually need.

Ukrainska Pravda: Good afternoon, and thank you for being here and for everything you have done. I have two questions. First, since we are speaking candidly, which commanders of operational commands, corps, and brigades do you believe should be removed immediately for ineffectiveness and obstructing important initiatives? Second, again speaking candidly, why do you think the President ultimately sided with Syrskyi and Hnatov when choosing between you on one side and them on the other?

As for the various commanders, our task is to speak as adults without undermining Ukraine’s defence capability. I do not want this to look as though I have come out and started publicly dismissing particular people by name or branding them in some way. The Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the General Staff must conduct their own audit, work with the Ministry of Defence and make decisions based on data and the additional information available only to the General Staff, including combat orders. We often see certain casualty statistics without knowing that, under those orders, additional brigades or battalions may have been placed under the operational control of those regiments. This therefore requires proper analysis. I am not currently prepared to discuss every sector individually. It would be inappropriate for me to do so.

As for why the President sided with Syrskyi: first, I have known the President for seven years, and I do not believe he has yet sided with Syrskyi. I spoke with him today. I told him: "You know, I am acting according to my conscience. We have travelled this path together." In seven years, he has never let me down as a member of his team, just as I have never let him down. We are now in a situation where both he and I are acting according to our own perspectives on the world. That is normal. I spoke publicly — we have probably never had anything like this before. He made a decision and spoke well of me at yesterday’s faction meeting. And today, as you can see, I am speaking about him with respect. But when 90% of the people who encountered problems because of our work at the Ministry of Defence come to him, it is probably difficult for him, both as a person and a manager, to analyse everything and make the correct decision. But, you know, I cannot remember who said that we always make the right decision after we have made every wrong one. I am confident that the President hears the Ukrainian people, knows what to do and will certainly rectify the situation.

I also understand that representatives of the parliamentary factions have questions.

There are no questions. We support Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov.

Verbyany, Bloomberg: Thank you very much for the opportunity to ask a question. When you spoke with President Zelenskyy, how exactly did he express his dissatisfaction with your work? What specifically was he dissatisfied with? Or was it perhaps you who said that you could not continue working under the current conditions, given that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces remains in office? One more question: we know that Western partners are dissatisfied that young Ukrainians are permitted to leave the country and therefore cannot be recruited into the Armed Forces. There were reports that you were one of the few government officials who opposed this initiative. Could you now confirm or deny that? Thank you.

Thank you for your question. Regarding my conversation with the President, I cannot disclose every detail, but there was essentially no choice to be made. The decision had been made earlier. No specific arguments were given as to what exactly was wrong. There was dissatisfaction... The military leadership said that I was obstructing rather than helping them, although they never said anything to my face. I never wove intrigues or commissioned articles. There is nothing new I can tell you here.

As for that decision, it was made, and I was part of the team, so that means I supported it.

Mykola Kniazhytskyi, European Solidarity: Mr Fedorov, we voted for you. I would like to thank you for the meetings you held with MPs from every faction. Everything you said was clear, and we supported it. Parliament is now facing a certain crisis. Poturaiev has submitted a statement announcing that he will quit his seat, while others do not know how to vote. You were more of a manager than a politician. But now you are in politics: people across the country have taken to the streets to support you. What do you expect? What political steps do you expect from Parliament? From your perspective, what should we, among others, do to support what you started? Thank you.

Thank you for your question. We can see many parliamentarians here today. I cannot tell you exactly how many MPs from different parties and factions have come, at the very least, to listen to what we are discussing and hear my report. I did not deliver such a report in Parliament, which was probably not entirely appropriate given the work I had done. I believe everyone should do what I have done: act according to their conscience. They should not fear that they may later face problems with law enforcement, come under pressure, be excluded from someone’s hookah gathering, or face some other consequence. Everyone should simply act according to their conscience. I build teams around shared values. If you look at our entire team, they are all alike. I always say that they resemble one another: they are energetic and proactive, propose ideas, and have a mission and objectives. I do not need to tell them what to do. They do it themselves.

They have values and faith in what they believe. People unite around shared values. People simply need to begin working in accordance with their inner voice.

As for what is happening to me today, I feel as though I have killed my former self and been born again. For seven years, I served the Ukrainian people as part of the President’s team and did many different things. Sometimes I did not even say what I thought, but I continued working because I understood that I was part of a team. Today, this is not a personal issue between the President and me. We are managers. The people elected him, and he selected us. But given what I feel and everything I have seen from the inside over the past four years while launching so many different reforms, I understand that this is how we must act. I could be completely wrong. But does anyone have another vision? Propose it. Does anyone have other ideas? Propose them. I am acting according to my conscience, and I will not be ashamed. So my message to MPs is this: are you comfortable with so many institutions lacking independence? Are you? Act according to your conscience. Do you want to make them independent? Say so, step forward and do it. Are you dissatisfied with the lack of civilian oversight of the military? Offer constructive proposals instead of merely standing at the rostrum and repeating: "TCR and SS, TCR and SS, TCR and SS."

Where are your balls when it comes to identifying the real problem? Speak about the units, the assaults, the inability to transfer, and the distribution of funds. Say who is effective and who is ineffective. Speak substantively and according to your conscience.

People are dying for freedom, while we sit here on Bankova and Hrushevskoho Streets unable to say what we genuinely believe. Or perhaps we do not believe it, and that is fine. But if we do believe it, we should say so. I have crossed that line for myself. That does not mean I will now tour public squares or universities giving open lectures and telling people what to do. It means that I have stated my position. I am confident that changes will now begin and will ultimately produce what the Ukrainian people deserve.

Oleksandr Fedienko: With respect, my question is now addressed to you as a manager, although there is no new minister yet and the situation surrounding your dismissal remains unclear. My question concerns those who go AWOL and those who evade mobilisation. Did the Ministry of Defence provide the General Staff with any analysis of this issue? We mobilise large numbers of people, and then the arithmetic begins: a certain number go AWOL, while another portion goes into hiding. There is now an unpopular proposal to withdraw mobilisation exemptions from half of those who currently have them. Our economy could then collapse, but no one can guarantee that those who lose their exemptions will not go AWOL or simply hide. I would like to know your position on this issue. I am asking as a member of the parliamentary defence committee: did you communicate this position to the General Staff?

Yes, we built a combat-effectiveness assessment system. It even took them four months to devise a name for it; we also debated its name for a long time, but we ultimately introduced it. We have a dashboard showing, for every brigade and corps, how much territory it has recaptured and lost, how many personnel it has lost and how many have been wounded. A special coefficient is calculated using a complex formula, which we showed you at the committee. We understand the AWOL rate and all the other indicators. But this product must have a client.

Who uses all this information? Who makes the decisions? Who decides to create 10 new brigades instead of analysing why 45% of the personnel in certain brigades have gone AWOL or why 60% have submitted transfer requests? Someone must examine what is happening with the commander and why this situation has arisen. They must determine who the corps commander is, whether he appointed the brigade commander, what supplies the unit received, what combat orders were issued and by whom, what the operational concept was, what effect it produced, and so on. The central question is therefore who commissions and uses all this analysis. But we digitised almost everything that could be digitised within the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces.

That is true. Let me clarify my question. If this policy continues, could the unpopular measures I have just described completely shut down our country’s economy, cause its total degradation and perhaps lead to irreversible consequences?

Look, this brings us back to the fundamental questions: what is our strategy, what is our vision and what is our plan for ending the war? What are we doing? How much funding and human capital do we need? What actions should we take? How do we determine whether our actions are effective or ineffective? Everything begins with the objective. Everything else is a matter of breaking that objective down into individual tasks. What is the objective? Once that is established, it must be broken down further. We need to understand whether we require X number of people or perhaps Y. Perhaps we need to spend more money on drones rather than personnel and pay those already serving more. Perhaps we need to increase mobilisation, perhaps reduce it, or perhaps do something else. The fundamental question is: what is the objective? What is our overall national strategy in this war? How do we stop the enemy? What does winning the war mean? What does ending the war mean? The issue is much deeper. The Commander-in-Chief’s task is to propose a vision for ending the war and securing a just peace.

MP Yuliia Yatsyk: Mykhailo, first, I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for helping the 110th Brigade. It was there, on the Zaporizhzhia front in 2022, that the first so-called Baba Yaha drones were tested, and the orcs remembered them for a long time. Second, this is already the third temporary investigative commission on which I have served. We received a great many complaints — more than 3,500 appeals from military personnel — concerning corruption within brigades and, in some cases, personal conflicts. Requests for Military Medical Commission examinations and leave were ignored, while money was demanded for transfers. Transfers were an entirely separate issue: they could only be arranged through payments, while the General Staff obstructed them. There were countless problems about which we informed the previous two defence ministers. These included internal investigations used to destroy unwanted brigade commanders over matters such as a road accident involving an ordinary soldier. Conversely, favoured commanders responsible for equipment losses or negligence received only warnings or reminders of their military duties. There were also numerous abuses involving the registers used by recruitment centres, including Oberih, Army+ and other systems.

I would like to ask what your ministry did specifically with these systems: Army+, transfers through that network and Oberih, where there were numerous abuses and people who were not legally entitled to deferment were nevertheless listed as eligible for deferment or exemption from mobilisation. What technological solutions did you propose? Were they implemented, and if not, what solutions remain on the table?

We accomplished the most important thing. We began this work at the Ministry of Digital Transformation and then continued it at the Ministry of Defence. For the first time, we created a register of military personnel. Ukraine now has such a register. It is currently 95% complete. It is built on SAP technology and the Impulse system, which collects information directly from units in the field. This system — the register of military personnel — will make it possible to understand everything that is happening. It covers the entire journey of an individual: from the moment they receive a call-up notice to where they are currently serving, where they served previously, where and for how long they trained, how many combat missions they have completed and how much additional pay they have received. It allows you to understand a person’s entire service lifecycle and analyse that information. We had probably not yet had time to announce it, but an electronic military ID based on this register was due to be launched for all service members within the next few days. Just as Diia provides an electronic passport, every service member would have an electronic document containing their data from the register. The next step was to correct and expand the information held in the system.

MP Serhii Shtepa: Mykhailo Albertovych, first of all, I would like to express my support for you. I am confident that this is not only my position, but also that of many MPs, both those present here and those currently in the Verkhovna Rada chamber. Judging by recent media coverage, including Telegram channels, mobilisation has been the main focus of criticism directed at you. Could you explain in greater detail what was planned as part of this reform, its timeframe and what exactly you intended to do to stop the openly disgraceful practice of forced street mobilisation known as "busification" (a colloquial Ukrainian term describing individuals transported to recruitment facilities by van - ed.), which unfortunately continues? That is my first question. Second, when will there be an actual increase — not indexation, but a genuinely substantial increase — in the pay of military personnel who are not serving on the front line and therefore receive the minimum remuneration? Do you see any possibility of increasing it in the near future? Thank you.

Thank you. I am not standing as a candidate for Defence Minister, so I will not discuss future plans. If these problems are fixed, everything else will follow as a consequence. It will be fine.

But your point about Telegram channels and the attention they attract is valid. I have a question: who bought Trukha? Why, after Trukha was purchased for billions of hryvnias, did it begin working exclusively against me? Why did Trukha begin writing against the TCR and SS and against me, deliberately tying me to every case involving recruitment centres? Why did the TCR and SS begin announcing certain investigations that many law enforcement officers circulate among themselves?

I have seen these cases involving members of my team, and we will discuss them separately. I will never remain silent if, God forbid, anything happens to a member of my team. Who bought Trukha? Who writes Hetmantsev’s talking points? Who is fighting for the gambling business? Hetmantsev spent a year targeting me. Someone invested in this for an entire year. The e-Excise system was supposedly wrong, even though the Ministry of Digital Transformation, rather than the Ministry of Finance, developed it without funding and without using the state budget last year. PlayCity was supposedly the wrong institution, even though it stopped taking bribes and introduced electronic licences for everything. Who is orchestrating all of this? I have questions.

I turned a blind eye to all these media attacks. Let them continue; I understand how this functions within our society. There were many attacks on the NABU, and we saw what happened last year. This is another issue that must be addressed through a new social contract. Should one individual or group of individuals be allowed to buy the largest media outlet? Today, Telegram is the most popular platform for obtaining news. Should someone be able to acquire the largest channel on the most popular news platform and begin attacking the Defence Minister during a full-scale war? It does not matter whether that minister is Umerov, Shmyhal, Fedorov, Klymenko or anyone else. Should this be possible during a full-scale war? These are among the issues that are not discussed publicly. But we need to seek answers. Who is behind it?

I am appealing to journalists here: if law enforcement agencies have been unable to respond, please find out who is behind it.

Anton Shvachko, Sumy region: As you know, our frontline cities are, unfortunately, constantly suffering from KAB strikes and long-range artillery fire. I know that you visited our region last week and had already initiated certain measures. I would like to hear your personal assessment. What concrete measures did you manage to implement, what did you not have time to complete, and what processes were launched to address the problems facing frontline cities? Unfortunately, many cities are currently being wiped off the face of the earth by enemy aircraft. Thank you.

I saw numerous appeals from MPs and many posts on social media saying that "the Sumy region has been abandoned" and urging me to visit it. Flash also spoke to me about it. We travelled to the Sumy region and found what was essentially a typical situation: no one is responsible for air defence in the region. There is the North Grouping of Forces, the Sumy Tactical Group, the Sumy Air Defence Tactical Group and either another tactical grouping or the Kursk Tactical Group. But no one is responsible for protecting the city and the entire region in a way that would allow one person to say: "I am responsible, and everything is under my operational control." It was deeply painful when we arrived together at the building struck by a KAB and met a father who had buried his wife and daughter the previous day. He said: "I was moving into position. My family messaged me, and I was speaking with them. I looked at Virazh and said: ‘There is a KAB heading towards you.’ The first one missed, and then the next one hit this building." I had never been in a situation like that in my life. Honestly, I did not know what to say. I simply looked at him. I did not know what to do, so I said: "I am sorry." I do not know what anyone can say in such circumstances. But even in that state, he said: "I saw that you signed the Gripen agreement. Gripens will shoot down the aircraft carrying KABs. Push it through. Destroy those who killed my family."

Our task is therefore to change the organisational structure so that we can finish off those who killed his family.

My name is Dmytro Kostiuk. A year ago, I left the Servant of the People faction after an attempt was made to eliminate the independence of the NABU and the SAPO. Since then, of course, I have continued speaking with Servant of the People MPs and observing the situation inside the faction. Several months ago, I realised that senior figures within the Servant of the People faction were preparing to take Mykhailo Fedorov down. Since we are speaking so openly here, do you sense how they feel about you? What is your relationship with the head of the Servant of the People faction?

We had a good conversation with the head of the Servant of the People party. He said: "My position towards you is neutral."

RBC: What is known about the changes at the Ministry of Digital Transformation? Were you offered the opportunity to return there? And who might be appointed if they intend to replace Borniakov?

No one has spoken to me about the Ministry of Digital Transformation. First, Boiev, who had been my deputy, left for Ukroboronprom.

Then another of my deputies was put forward for the Ministry of Digital Transformation. No one discussed that with me. I understand that they spoke to her only after the faction meeting and her meeting with the President. I may be mistaken. But it is important to preserve the Ministry of Digital Transformation because it includes Brave1, which oversees military technology, as the Ministry of Defence was not working on technology at the time. It is extremely important to monitor what happens next to the Ministry of Digital Transformation, Brave1 and the grant programmes so that we do not lose the technological advantages we have and the ministry continues to function properly. The Ministry of Digital Transformation is something of which we can be proud internationally. Ukraine is a global leader in digitalisation. Every country is watching us. We continue to rise in all the rankings and are introducing artificial intelligence.

Volodymyr Ariev, European Solidarity: First, I would like to thank Mr Fedorov for his effective cooperation with our parliamentary faction.

Honestly, I am beginning to look like a Poroshenko bot. That is very dangerous. It is not true.

We understand that we are in the same boat, because our faction is probably the one that receives the most attention from anonymous Telegram channels. You have now experienced this personally. This raises the issue of the anonymity of Telegram channels. Clearly, we will need to join forces to ensure that they either cease to be anonymous or face restrictions on their information and psychological operations.

However, my question concerns emerging technologies and the use of artificial intelligence to control drones, which are currently at the cutting edge of innovation. Will Brave1 Market continue to operate just as effectively? Thank you.

We will see. I am confident that it will. I cannot imagine anyone reversing the way Brave1 Market operates or impeding the development of technology. This morning, we saw what can happen to someone who tries to stop the innovations that have been introduced. I am therefore more confident about Brave1’s future than my own.

Inna Sovsun, Holos faction: Mykhailo, on the one hand, I am very grateful for what you have done, for what you managed to accomplish and for the initiatives you launched. On the other hand, I had reservations about some of your initiatives, primarily those concerning mobilisation. I consider the proposal that all service members who have already served for four, five or seven years should sign another two-year contract unfair. I believe most service members feel the same way; you saw the reaction.

My question is broader. When the President speaks of mobilisation reform, what does he mean? Does he understand that providing defined terms of service for some requires mobilising others? Why am I asking this? Because service members have been told for three years that something is about to be done regarding terms of service. Yet nothing happens. My main question is this: clearly, the problem lies somewhere at the top. Somewhere at the top, there is no understanding that defined terms of service cannot be provided without another mobilisation campaign. When you were assigned the task of reforming mobilisation, and when the new Defence Minister is assigned that task, how exactly does the President understand it?

I would like to address the mistake we made when launching the first stage of the military’s transformation. We made a mistake that must never be made when implementing major transformations affecting large numbers of people. I believed that we were already experienced members of the government, that we had launched many reforms and so on, but we made a serious mistake. When designing the first stage of the military’s transformation and proposing the contracts, we did not consult the Ukrainian people — through their elected representatives, directly with the public, with expert groups or with military personnel. One thing is clear to me: whoever the minister is when the next stage of the mobilisation proposals is developed, the first step must be to speak openly with society, publish the vision, bring different groups together, speak with MPs from every region, hold a separate meeting with every head of a Territorial Centre of Recruitment and Social Support, consult the police and speak with everyone involved to establish a new social contract concerning reform of the TCR and SS. Because, once again, I want to emphasise that this is not really about the TCR and SS. It is about where we are going, how we intend to get there, and what resources we will take with us. Once that is clear, the answer will emerge. But we must not repeat the mistake we made. We need to speak with the Ukrainian people about the issues that concern them most.

I would like to thank everyone, especially those who took to the streets in different cities today (15 July — ed.). We must remember that a full-scale war is underway. You must take care of your safety, and we must take care of your safety. But I love the Ukrainian people because Ukrainians understand, feel, and know. So please stay safe. We must understand that we do not need to destabilise the country. We need to ensure that the right management decisions are made, after which we can come together, move forward and continue working towards our victory. You are wise, so you know what to do. But please be careful, because Russia will do everything it can to exploit any weakness within our country for its own benefit. So please stay safe. Thank you all very much for your attention. We will continue working towards our mission. There is more to come. Thank you.