Fedorov and Syrskyi’s dismissals: Butusov on what personnel changes mean for defence
In a livestream, Yurii Butusov, commander of a UAV company in the 23rd Assault Regiment of the National Guard’s 2nd Khartiia Corps, analyses the dismissal of Mykhailo Fedorov and the sacking of Oleksandr Syrskyi, the possible return of the former defence minister, the appointment of new leadership, reforms in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the situation on the front line.
The livestream will focus on the extraordinary events taking place in our country: the dismissal of Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov and the dismissal of Oleksandr Syrskyi as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces.
I will share my thoughts on these events and answer your questions. Thank you to everyone who supports the Butusov Plus channel. Thanks to you, we can continue our work. And I sincerely apologise for appearing on air so rarely. That is simply how life is unfolding and the circumstances in which we have to work. This is normal. There are many fairly complex tasks that need to be addressed. I will tell you about them later.
On my channel, you can watch a video showing how we spent June. It is a very short compilation of some of the combat missions carried out by the separate unmanned systems company of the 23rd Assault Regiment, RUKH, of the 2nd Khartiia Corps.
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
How likely is Fedorov’s return?
Fedorov was dismissed entirely without warning. The reason for his dismissal was his conflict with Syrskyi. Well, Syrskyi has now been removed, yet no one is proposing that Fedorov return to his post. They do not want him back. There is no longer any conflict: there is no Syrskyi, so there is no conflict. But Fedorov is not being offered the post of defence minister; he is being offered something else. Any other position, some kind of deputy prime minister for technological affairs, for instance, or head of the entire MILITECH sector. This is clearly driven by a desire simply to take a photo of a smiling Fedorov shaking someone’s hand, showing that everything is going well in his life and that he is happy with some new position. That position can be called anything, but its real purpose is clear: anything to keep Fedorov away from the Ministry of Defence budget.
As is known, in May, following political changes in Hungary, the country lifted its veto on a €90 billion loan to Ukraine from European Union member states. That is a colossal sum. As soon as this happened, just a month and a half passed, and before the money had even reached the Ministry of Defence’s accounts, the defence minister was replaced. And they are categorically opposed to bringing him back, immediately putting forward another candidate.
Could Fedorov return? Anything is possible. At present, it is impossible. His only chance of returning may lie in some form of influence that we have yet to see. Perhaps Mykhailo Fedorov will also take to the Maidan. Perhaps Mykhailo Fedorov will find new arguments to present to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Perhaps there will be changes, and support for Fedorov on the Maidan and within society will grow. Anything is possible. At present, however, there are no grounds for such conclusions. Fedorov was simply removed swiftly and immediately, before he could begin allocating the money coming in from European partners.
In principle, one could say that the reason for his dismissal was Ukraine’s receipt of €90 billion for its defence. So the European partners provided the impetus. I think that if the money had not been available, or if the amount had been substantially smaller, Fedorov might still be in office, making public appearances and serving as the government’s face of the war.
The situation is now completely deadlocked. Mykhailo Fedorov, who consistently built his political career on complete loyalty to the president and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, has now effectively become the face of the street protests, the face of the Maidan. Strange – who could have imagined that?
In your opinion, will Drapatyi and Skybiuk have sufficient strength and resources to implement systemic changes and reforms in the Armed Forces, shifting the emphasis from outward appearances to substance?
I will devote a separate livestream to this next time. I will talk about what I know and my experience of dealing with these people. I will share what I know and think about Mykhailo Drapatyi and Skybiuk. For now, I want to briefly say that the military, in any country in the world, does not carry out reforms on its own. The army is an implementing structure; its rigid hierarchy and centralised command are designed to enable it to operate under existing conditions with the forces and resources available. The army can make proposals, but its operational strategy, planning strategy and development priorities must all be determined by the Ministry of Defence, as stipulated by Ukrainian law, and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. This was the environment in which previous commanders-in-chief operated, including Syrskyi, Zaluzhnyi and those who preceded them. They implement political decisions and the political strategy formulated by the country’s leadership, primarily the president.
Drapatyi and Skybiuk will first and foremost do whatever is most effective. The situation on the front is extremely difficult. We will now discuss Oleksandr Syrskyi’s farewell statement and the legacy he leaves behind. But the situation is extremely difficult. Changes in command and control are certainly necessary, but reforms will depend on whether Defence Minister Yevhen Khmara and Mykhailo Drapatyi as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In my view, the commanders of the army corps, which stand to be the principal beneficiaries of any changes in the army, share a common vision. Drapatyi and Khmara must present their reform plans, if they have any, to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for consideration and approval.
In every country, reforms are a political project: they require a mandate, a framework and principles established by the political leadership, not the military. The military implements them, works out the details and sets out its requirements in line with approved plans and priorities. So we will see. This work has only just begun, and not all the relevant decrees have been issued yet.
Will Khmara go along with corrupt schemes?
I do not know what Yevhen Khmara will do. I think we will also devote a separate livestream to him, with separate questions and a discussion of his initial statements. We can do so if he is nominated for the ministerial post, which, incidentally, has still not been decided, as Mykhailo Fedorov remains on the president’s team. He has not become an opposition politician; he remains part of the team and does not criticise the president. If Yevhen Khmara is nominated as a candidate for defence minister and makes any policy statements on reforms, we will examine and comment on them.
Yevhen Khmara is an officer who built his reputation as commander of the Security Service (SSU) of Ukraine’s Special Operations Centre "A." For context, the SSU’s Special Operations Centre "A" ranks first in the Delta system in terms of electronic points awarded for striking enemy targets. Ahead of every other unit of the Defence Forces. Khmara is genuinely respected both by his personnel and by everyone who works with the Special Operations Centre "A" on the front as a truly talented combat officer and, above all, an organiser of UAV combat operations. But it remains to be seen how this career combat officer will perform in a political post, as a political figure, an administrator and the head of the country’s largest government institution in terms of both budget and personnel, the Ministry of Defence, during wartime.
This is an enormous challenge. Is Khmara ready for the post? We will see. To begin with, we need at least to hear a substantive plan and a genuine vision, which Khmara will have to present sooner or later. Only then will we be able to assess them. But in his previous post as commander of the SSU’s Special Operations Centre "A," he earned widespread recognition as a competent, professional, and principled person focused exclusively on the war and achieving combat results, rather than on raising funds. So we will see. People change once they take office. That is life.
Will assault regiment commanders Harkavyi and Shyriaiev be detained?
I think that is a matter for law enforcement agencies and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The assault regiment commanders were appointed to these posts by orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They operate by carrying out tasks set by the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief evidently considers their actions effective. Both assault regiment commanders have been awarded the title of Hero of Ukraine, and a significant number of their servicemen have also received this title. So I do not know how someone can receive awards and be imprisoned at the same time. Evidently, they are being decorated precisely for carrying out orders in the manner required of them. That, in principle, is the logic behind the awards.
Can our European partners influence Fedorov’s appointment?
I do not think so. Our European partners, like our American partners, influence the Ukrainian authorities in only one situation: when there is a suspicion that the Ukrainian authorities are embezzling European or US taxpayers’ money. In such cases, the information is passed to NABU and SAPO, and very high-profile developments follow in Ukraine. But when it comes to political appointments or influencing appointments within the Ukrainian government, putting this particular person in this particular post, I have yet to see any such precedents involving our partners. Our partners, allies, and diplomats do not work with individuals. They deal in politics; they work with offices. They communicate, maintain relationships, and form friendships with people, but issues are handled through the offices those people hold. Whoever the state appoints becomes the counterpart for agreements and communication with European and American partners. That is politics; that is diplomacy. They do not assume responsibility for reforms or democracy in Ukraine. They are responsible only for combating corruption, and only insofar as it concerns their countries’ taxpayers’ money. And that is logical.
It is highly suspicious why Yermak rushed to Syrskyi’s headquarters just before his dismissal.
What can I say? In our country, if the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine receives someone at his headquarters, it means that person is a sufficiently influential figure. Even if they have no political status. Because to gain such access, one must have a certain status, a certain authorisation. And this authorisation, as you will understand, for a meeting with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, is granted only by the person who appoints and dismisses that Commander-in-Chief by decree. Judge for yourselves who could have sent Yermak there and for what purpose.
Could you please explain how quality is taken into account when weapons are procured through specification-based tenders, if units are not allowed to request products from specific manufacturers and can only state their requirements and specifications?
I think this approach, under which only requirements and specifications are requested, is simply another remnant of our old and utterly ineffective procurement system. That system is based on absolute centralisation at every level: if you want to be supplied with anything, submit a requirement, and a requirement with certain specific specifications - and we, somewhere up there in the General Staff, know better than you, have access to more information, and will decide for ourselves what to do.
In fact, present-day realities show that the commander of a combat unit employing high-tech weapons on the battlefield must first and foremost be a startup manager. Modern military units are startups; they are essentially enterprises engaged in entrepreneurial activity. A commander must understand technological innovations and allocate funding, personnel, time, and resources to rapidly adapt the unit’s weapons. They must act and stay ahead of the enemy not only in tactical planning but also in technological development; that is, they must plan ahead. How can they do that if all they can do is submit requirements, requirements for certain specifications? No, they need to purchase finished products that industry can produce quickly: we identify an innovation, we try to introduce it, and we must get ahead. For this to happen, military unit commanders must have budgets. The Armed Forces of Ukraine currently have such budgets, incidentally, while the National Guard does not, unfortunately. It is a form of discrimination. In the Armed Forces of Ukraine, every battalion is allocated UAH 7 million per month to purchase whatever its battalion or brigade commander needs. In reality, that is a very small amount.
Brigades receive no more than UAH 80 million per month. As a rule, however, they receive around UAH 30–40 million, depending on the number of battalions on the front line. We have limited resources. I believe that, to stay ahead of the enemy, brigade and corps commanders should have monthly budgets planned for an entire year, allowing them to develop their own procurement systems around the technical specialists available to them, the missions that are priorities in their sectors, and the real problems they face and need to resolve. The enemy varies and operates differently in different sectors.
All of this must be taken into account. The commanders of these military startups must be given development budgets.
During combat operations, we cannot plan everything centrally from the top down; we will constantly fall behind. I believe this approach of saying, "Just give us the specifications," is effectively the first step towards corruption. Then the tenders begin. For example, one company has now won a Ministry of Defence tender to supply 250,000 fibre-optic cables. The tender was structured in such a way that its terms are very convenient for one company to fulfil, but not quite as convenient for the others. What concerns me most, however, is that a single company simply cannot wind that much fibre-optic cable onto that many spools. It is a fairly complex process, and awarding such volumes to a single company will lead to a decline in quality. Why do that?
High-tech weapons require development. Not monopolisation or the creation of a single largest company enjoying the best terms. On the contrary, a significant number of companies and their development must be supported simultaneously so that risks can be spread and technological oversight and quality can be ensured across different companies. Technological development requires a variety of engineering, technology, and production teams. This decentralises both the work and the orders, improves quality and technical oversight, and reduces the risks if one production site is struck. The others will still be able to maintain supplies. Unfortunately, we have a great deal of ineffective administration, which is the primary cause of corruption.
How did Zelenskyy agree to appoint the popular Drapatyi?
The principal issue at stake is the replacement of the defence minister and the €90 billion European loan. An unprecedented event took place in order to resolve the political crisis and reduce the street protests. Even the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was removed within a matter of days. This shows what is at stake and the real motivation behind this entire story.
You are fighting, if I am not mistaken. Did they not take your phone away?
How can they take someone’s phone away if they are fighting? In fact, phones are not confiscated at the front. Perhaps this happens in some units, but I have never seen it in front-line units holding their sectors. Besides, I am now a company commander, and if my phone were taken away, I think a great many people at every level would be unhappy. So yes, of course, I think you should join the army yourself. I invite you to join my unit, my company. Then you will stop frightening yourself and asking such fearful questions, and you will realise that people in the army do not actually have their phones confiscated. On the contrary, they are fed and receive military pay, and where there are good, properly functioning combat teams, you feel part of a normal military family engaged in difficult and dangerous but effective combat work. To see exactly what that work entails, take a look at the results. There is a video here on the channel showing how we spent June and the combat results achieved by the separate unmanned systems company that I have the honour of commanding in the 23rd Assault Regiment of the 2nd Khartiia Corps. You are welcome to join us if this is something you fear.
Do you know why the Logistics Forces Command is cutting its department responsible for analysing experience in the use of electronic warfare systems while retaining an entire CBRN directorate whose personnel do nothing?
Our bureaucratic system has long been a world unto itself. Whenever a directorate or department is cut, created or closed, it is actually part of a continuous process.
How can someone be removed from a post in our army? They can either be promoted, or their post can be abolished along with their unit, only for a new one to be created the following month specifically for the people who need it.
What can the new command do about our bridgehead beyond the Oskil River?
I hope there will be serious changes in the command and organisation of troops in the Kharkiv region, Donbas and other regions, but primarily in the Kharkiv and Sumy regions, because these were the areas of responsibility of Mykhailo Drapatyi as commander of the Joint Forces Task Force. He visited regularly and made decisions on a regular basis. He has a good grasp of the situation in the Kharkiv region, particularly on our sector of the front along the Oskil.
It must be understood that the Oskil sector encompasses Kupiansk, Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi and Borova, that is, vast areas where extremely heavy fighting is taking place. I hope that command and organisational decisions will be taken. I will also devote a separate livestream specifically to Mykhailo Drapatyi, discussing who he is, his achievements and what can be expected of him.
How are things going under the new rules with the return of those who left their units without authorisation, those who went AWOL?
I have not yet experienced the effects of the new rules myself. At present, 20 servicemen who are classed as AWOL live and work in my unit. They perform support duties every day, while we work through their cases in the courts. Gradually, step by step, month by month, we are managing to bring these people back and restore their lawful rights and military status, now in my company. So if anyone is interested in returning after going AWOL, you are welcome to join us. Most of my company consists of people who have returned after going AWOL over the past year or less. Those among them who are serving are simply wonderful people. Wonderful people with excellent combat motivation, professionalism and skills, who are given a good team and treated with care. I am personally in contact with every one of my soldiers, and you certainly understand that I try to approach this with the utmost responsibility.
So I invite you to join us. Anyone who wants to return after going AWOL can message me privately on a messaging app or Instagram.
On mobilisation: when will the negative burden be shifted away by transferring responsibility for locating and notifying people and dealing with draft evaders to the police?
Friends, I do not think mobilisation is something negative that needs to be shifted elsewhere. To be honest, I disagreed with the Ministry of Defence and Fedorov’s team on this aspect of mobilisation. I do not believe this function should be transferred to the police. I believe mobilisation is not something negative but an essential, key function of the state that must be shared equally by the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the police. Why must they do this together? Because the central issue in mobilisation is responsibility. When a person is stopped in the street, has their documents checked and is taken to a Territorial Centre of Recruitment and Social Support (TCR and SS), the first thing they should see, hear and understand there is that they are being met by competent, conscientious, intelligent and distinguished combat veterans from specific, well-known combat units. These veterans should immediately meet and accompany the person, or come to them, take part in stopping them in the street, and hand them a call-up notice. They should tell them: "Friend, we are going to do this together. We are fighting for the Ukrainian state, and we need you. We take responsibility for you from your very first step, from the moment we first meet. We are responsible for your training, your health, and ensuring that you are assigned appropriately in line with your physical, psychological and professional abilities. We, the specific brigade and corps commanders who sent us here and whom the entire country knows—are responsible for you." That is how mobilisation will work on the basis of trust.
It is impossible to turn mobilisation into a positive project. It is impossible to absolve ourselves of responsibility. In every country, mobilisation is a responsibility of the state, with the police performing their function by helping to locate people or detain offenders who fail to comply with lawful orders. But nowhere is mobilisation itself a police function. Look at any NATO country. There is not a single country, not one, where mobilisation is conducted solely by the police. Only in Ukraine could such an absurd idea be discussed. So instead of describing mobilisation as something negative, even in a question, let us understand that mobilisation is a necessity, a difficult and unpleasant necessity for everyone in society, but a necessity nonetheless. And let us ensure that everyone in society knows that a person who is mobilised is placed in responsible, reliable hands, is not abandoned to their fate, is not treated as cannon fodder and immediately becomes part of a well-run combat team. Then we will have a different attitude towards mobilisation and a different approach, which we currently lack.
I have said many times during my livestreams that military units seeking reinforcements must become involved in mobilisation planning and provide representatives from among combat veterans, wounded personnel and servicemen who need a break from combat operations. They should be transferred laterally for a time to help the TCR and SS conduct mobilisation. They could then work with these people, possibly at training centres, before meeting them again in combat units. That would be a responsible approach, and people would understand: we were not simply thrown somewhere by someone; we have been looked after from the very first moment. That would produce a different attitude towards mobilisation, and such questions would no longer arise.
Regarding Oleksandr Syrskyi’s statement
I have something to say about the approach itself and the replacement of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. I want to recall 2023–2024. When Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi was removed from office, I spoke out against that step during my livestreams. But I did not say that Zaluzhnyi was the only person capable of waging the war and serving as Commander-in-Chief. I said that Zaluzhnyi was part of the team of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Minister of Defence. They must work together. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief bears political responsibility before voters and citizens. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine carries out his decisions. That is why I opposed removing the Commander-in-Chief without any explanation or stated reasons.
Replacing such a key figure in the management of the war while hostilities are under way is possible when: a) a replacement has been prepared and responsibilities are handed over in a planned manner; b) the tasks and criteria that the outgoing Commander-in-Chief failed to meet are identified, along with the mistakes made, the problems encountered and the successes achieved; and c) this programme and report then become the new Commander-in-Chief’s programme of action, with the new commander bringing greater expertise in certain areas. Then there is logic behind such changes. The Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief is ultimately responsible for all of this. None of it was done in 2024. Zaluzhnyi was replaced by Syrskyi, and for the next two months we were told that everything was going well and that the front had been stabilised. Then the front collapsed, and over the summer the enemy advanced 40 kilometres from Avdiivka all the way to Pokrovsk. We are now in the same situation. Unfortunately, no lessons have been learned.
Suddenly, almost instantaneously, Syrskyi is removed. Just days after Mykhailo Fedorov’s press conference. Why was he removed? How was he removed? On what grounds? What shortcomings were there in his work? What is his successor supposed to do? What is the programme of action? As you understand, no one addressed any of this during those few days. The interests at play were entirely different. I believe this approach is ill-considered. Syrskyi has his own understanding of the war, and he should have passed it on. His actions should have been analysed professionally, not necessarily publicly. It should also have been clearly established what his successor must do. Had that been done, finding a successor would have been easy. But that is not the point. Everything here comes down to messianism: let us simply replace one person with another. There will be no miracle. He will still be carrying out the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. If nothing changes at that level, it is difficult to change anything in the other components. We need a programme of action in the defence sector to make our personnel decisions work, to ensure that the people appointed can work effectively and understand which tasks require their attention and which problems they must resolve. We need specifics. Unfortunately, we have no such planning at the strategic level, and that deeply concerns me.
As for Oleksandr Syrskyi himself, I should say that he is probably also a figure worthy of a separate livestream. I believe that, in terms of what Oleksandr Syrskyi did as a commander at the operational-tactical level, he truly was the best general in this war on either side of the front. But all the problems under Syrskyi concerned strategic planning, force generation, mobilisation, personnel replacements, troop replenishment, and the planning and conduct of strategic-level defensive operations. Those were the areas where problems arose and where the greatest number of mistakes and shortcomings occurred. I deeply regret that there was no professional analysis that would have genuinely helped his successor and Syrskyi himself. This is not customary in our system. After Action Reviews are not conducted at any level of military command. Unfortunately, above all, there are no After Action Reviews, no post-action analysis, where they are needed most: at the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, within the command, and at the General Staff. I am referring simply to a procedure that should be followed. Then there would be no questions about what is happening. In reality, we have no professional analysis. Nor do we currently have professional, measured assessments of Syrskyi’s performance.
I promise that in the near future I will devote a livestream both to the successful operations he commanded and, unfortunately, to the unsuccessful ones. We will discuss them. There is a statement by Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi that says a great deal about his achievements. Much was left unsaid, however, and there is nothing at all about his shortcomings. It contains only positive points. Having read it, one would think ours is an army on the offensive: a successful offensive in the Zaporizhzhia region and a successful offensive in Donbas. There is quite a disconnect from reality. We are supposedly advancing successfully everywhere, yet for some reason the enemy has captured 90% of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. For some reason, enemy forces are being detected in the centre of Kostiantynivka. How can that be if we are succeeding everywhere? Unfortunately, as I have said many times, the art of briefing is far more important in our system than the art of war. That is regrettable. And it is not because we do not understand the war or because the people here are not intelligent enough. Ukrainian military personnel are among the best in the world, and that is now obvious to everyone.
The quality of a state is determined by how it is organised. The way it is organised and the demands placed on officers, commanders and generals determine how they fight and how they report. If the main purpose of a report is not to ensure the effective conduct of combat operations and the elimination of the enemy, but to report that everything is fine, there have been no breakthroughs, we are only advancing, we are successful, and everything is stable and under control, if the purpose is to present everything in rosy colours and conceal the real problems—then we get what we currently have at the front. The enemy continues to advance amid bravura, triumphalist posts, including from the Commander-in-Chief himself, saying that we are advancing successfully. It is rather strange, to be honest.
I had expected that, perhaps, it would come later; perhaps this was only one speech, that Oleksandr Syrskyi would soon also provide an objective assessment of the situation at the front, backed up by Delta and the facts. In reality, he has a fairly good grasp of the situation. I had the opportunity to brief him on the situation several times, and I can say that Oleksandr Syrskyi generally understands it well. But this art of briefing sometimes leads to conclusions different from those dictated by the tactical situation. This is a serious gap, a disconnect between reality and reports, which exists in every army, not only Ukraine’s, but which must be overcome. The military must overcome it, and politicians must overcome it as well. This is one of the serious challenges and problems now being quietly passed on and dumped onto Mykhailo Drapatyi’s shoulders.
Questions
Do you know anything about the additional UAH 10,000 payment, or have we been deceived again, since it was not included in our pay?
First, you have your basic military pay, your so-called salary. As for the UAH 10,000, I understand you mean the UAH 10,000 additional payment for rear-area service, because there is also UAH 10,000 per day for holding the line at the zero line, incidentally. These are bonuses. As you know, bonuses are paid at the end of the month. The relevant information must be submitted this month and entered in the combat log, and the payment is then made at the end of the following month, around the 25th. So we should see the payments a little later. I think we should receive them in a week or two.
What is your opinion on which axis will see the most difficult situation in the event of Russian mobilization? Is a new axis from Belarus possible?
I do not think there will be a new axis there in the event of enemy mobilization. With a frontline of almost 1,200 kilometers, the enemy will reinforce this existing line. Undoubtedly, during mobilization, the enemy will attempt to stretch and disperse our forces along the front and launch another relentless offensive, just like the one they conducted in 2023, 2024, and 2025. A permanent offensive where they pressed forward across all axes continuously. Right now, due to natural reasons, they have run out of the kind of fools they drive into drone strikes, and mobilization is their only chance to resume a permanent offensive. Because right now, in fact, our soldiers are in active defense in certain sectors and are conducting successful counterattacks.
Yurii, currently no one is saying anything regarding Zaluzhnyi. Do you see a place for Zaluzhnyi in Drapatyi's team?
I cannot answer that. War is 99% organization, and yet 1%, at least 1%, is art. There is personal feeling, intuition, and based on this intuition, on his feelings, Mykhailo Drapatyi is forming his team himself. Everything depends on his feelings. There is nothing more to say here; it is a personal matter.
Is it possible to hold our cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk?
I believe it is possible. Sloviansk and Kramatorsk form an exceptionally advantageous line of defense that is very convenient to defend. It is maximally advantageous. One of them is a natural fortress due to its terrain. And let us recall how many times fierce battles were fought in that area during the Second World War. Even now, we have all the capabilities, all the resources, and the personnel to stop and defeat the enemy at this natural fortress. However, on one condition: adequate managerial decisions must be made. Personally, I believe that since the Third Corps, the Third Army Corps, flanks the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk grouping, and the Third Army Corps has completely stabilized the situation within its operational sector, which spans almost 130 kilometers, and is even conducting successful counterattacks against the enemy. I believe right now that the main thing lacking in our army is capable military commanders at all levels. And I believe that the operational sectors of those army corps that are successfully conducting defensive operations should be expanded; other corps experiencing managerial and organizational problems should be subordinated to them. This is simply how successful practices should be scaled. I believe that Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, where the 11th Corps is stationed, should be transferred under management, perhaps within the framework of a tactical grouping or tactical group, to the Third Corps under the command of Andriy Biletskyi. The same stabilization will occur there as well. I have no doubts about it whatsoever.
Do you have any regrets about joining the ranks of the National Guard?
I chose a path, not a lucrative place of employment. And I am actually satisfied, because in war, if you really go to the front, you are not looking for an advantageous position, but for a place where you can realize your potential. Where there are motivated people who want to change the course of the war, who are fully committed to the cause, and who value professional decisions. I found such people in the Khartiia Corps.
There are many differences in the National Guard. In fact, material supply in many components is significantly worse than in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. For example, imagine this: in the Armed Forces, every front-line battalion receives 7 million UAH per month for necessary procurement. There are brigades with 4, 5, or 6 battalions, and they receive 7 million UAH for each battalion. In the National Guard, there is no such thing. Imagine what significant funds these actually are for purchasing equipment and weaponry. Take food supplies, for example. Considerably larger sums are allocated for rations in the AFU budget than in the National Guard. On the other hand, in terms of management and control, perhaps because the National Guard is a more compact structure, there are army corps here, there are interesting people, as well as interesting and exemplary units. For war, this seems very effective to me. Therefore, I have no regrets whatsoever, and on the contrary, I invite everyone who wants to make a choice, who wants to find a combat unit where they can also realize their potential, to join our team.
We are a detached unmanned systems company dedicated to countering enemy drone launch positions. I am the commander of this company; we have outstanding people here, and it will be a great experience for you to serve in such a company, within this combat unit.
Were weapons procurements really conducted transparently, and "junk", to use Fedorov's word, was not purchased?
I think it is indeed worth noting that Mykhailo Fedorov involved a rather wide circle of people in the planning of certain competitions and procedures, and some types of procurements were conducted, in my opinion, more transparently. Regarding some procurements, I personally had questions, and I asked them. Therefore, I can say that regarding what Fedorov did over 6 months, we did not see the results, because many projects were launched in those 6 months, a large number of plans were announced, but they were not financed, and not even a year had passed to see whether they would proceed or not. Therefore, it is actually a rather strange situation when a person is allowed to carry out strategic changes and reforms, and then they are told, no, you will not be the minister because you have a conflict with the Commander-in-Chief, which, in principle, already existed at the time the minister was appointed. The absurdity of the situation is that Fedorov's conflict with Syrskyi was established exactly when Fedorov was appointed. Suddenly they say, oh, so you have a conflict, well that is it, then we will dismiss both of you. But why both, if you remove one person, the other can stay? But no, well, here are people with cardboard signs, let everything be quiet and calm. Well, what can I say, to put it as mildly as possible, it looks strange. Maximally strange and illogical.
It is illogical from the standpoint of relationships, war strategy, and the structuring of organizational work, and it is logical in only one case: when money has come in, and it needs to be allocated according to some other logic. We do not know; perhaps transparency will increase.
I hope that our partners, NABU, and journalists will scrutinize the planning of all procurements and all plans of the Ministry of Defense under a magnifying glass, hopefully with the help of Fedorov's team. This is if Fedorov is not appointed, or when he is appointed.
Thank you. I want to say that, in general, I support any changes in Ukraine during the war, because change is what compels society to move forward, people to act, speak the truth, and think about the future. For Ukraine, which has very weak or rather, virtually non-existent state institutions that exist only nominally, it is extremely important to have a civil society where people carrying cardboard placards can force out even the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in just three days, and it is frightening to imagine whom else they might force out. In our country, where the Maidan is a genuine institution of civilian oversight over the state and a truly effective, functioning one, it is extremely important that changes take place with society’s involvement.
And the defense of the country is the first of the tasks facing society. Therefore, I support these changes, and I will contribute in my place, at my post, in my rank of Junior Lieutenant, a modest rank, I will continue this work. And I will continue to work for victory. And thank you for the great support for the Yurii Butusov Fund, for the Butusov+ channel; only thanks to you can we work, attract such wonderful people for work as Iryna Romaliiska, and help my unit kill the enemy and the occupiers. Thank you, with faith in victory, Glory to Ukraine!
