Drapatyi instead of Syrskyi: expectations, risks, prospects
The new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s Defence Forces, Mykhailo Drapatyi. What kind of person is he, what do I know about him, what expectations are there, and what challenges might he face?
It must be noted that he is not a messiah, not someone who will solve everything. There are a great many problems, threats, and challenges that he will have to confront. The point is that serving as Commander-in-Chief during a war entails an immense level of responsibility, an enormous body of information, and responsibility for decisions that must all be concentrated in one person, someone who must adapt quickly, think on a large scale, ultimately change the course of the war, and halt the Russian advance, something that has not been achieved before. The responsibility is so great that, without exaggeration, the eyes of all Ukrainians, all of Ukraine’s friends and supporters around the world and, of course, all its enemies are now fixed on him.
So, to begin with, this is how I first learned of Mykhailo Drapatyi. It was in July 2014. At the time, I had just arrived at the headquarters of the 72nd Brigade, which was positioned right on the border with Russia. The brigade was carrying out a combat mission to seal off the border area across a very broad front spanning several dozen kilometres. Its task, together with other units, including Air Assault Forces units, was to seal off the border completely.
Our troops advanced from Sontseve and Amvrosiivka, moved along the border and were already close to Luhansk. But there was one final route they had not cut off. They had blocked all the supply routes and all the main roads along which Russia was transferring troops and weapons to the Donbas, but one route remained, the Izvaryne highway. Fierce fighting erupted over this town and control of the highway. It was there that, among other Ukrainian units, the 2nd Mechanized Battalion of the 72nd Brigade found itself. The battalion was commanded by Major Mykhailo Drapatyi, who was still unknown at the time. During the fighting, our troops were effectively cut off. The enemy completely blocked all supplies. Provisions had to be airdropped to the border from aircraft. One of our aircraft was later shot down. Ground-attack aircraft subsequently flew missions to support our troops at the border. We also suffered aircraft losses. In other words, everything possible was done to hold the position. Unfortunately, the enemy concentrated substantial forces and managed to retain control of the Izvaryne highway due to its considerable numerical superiority. They attempted to eliminate our two battalions of the 72nd Brigade and the Air Assault Forces units holding the border. They launched strikes, but our troops held their ground. They did not withdraw despite lacking everything, even water.
There was an incident in which Ukrainian patriots drove a truckload of water from one of the local shops right under the militants’ noses. Finally, in August 2014, our units received orders to break out. By then, the situation was extremely difficult. On 6–7 August, the units were ordered to break out of Izvaryne. The enemy maintained constant fire, and the roads were mined. The risks were considerable. A major and traumatic event then occurred. The commander of the 1st Battalion of the 72nd Brigade decided that a breakout without heavy casualties was impossible. He did not want to risk his troops and decided to save them at any cost. The 1st Battalion therefore destroyed its weapons, and its personnel crossed into Russian territory. What followed was the so-called internment, after which the battalion was returned to Ukraine at another point along the state border. At the time, Russia was still pretending that it was not openly waging war against Ukraine. But, as you understand, it exploited the event to the fullest extent in its propaganda: "Look, Ukrainian soldiers do not regard us as the enemy. They came to us themselves. We Russians, the Russian military, are helping them, while the Ukrainians are fighting rebel miners from the Donbas." In this situation, what I believe preserved, supported, and strengthened the morale of Ukrainian troops and the Ukrainian army, and what went down in history, was the decision by Mykhailo Drapatyi, commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 72nd Brigade, not to lay down his arms or enter Russia, but to break through. He gathered all the troops, there were several units there, rallied them around him, and led the column. Several border guards were killed by shelling during the breakout, but everyone else made it out; they even managed to bring their military vehicles and equipment through and evacuate the wounded.
It truly was an extraordinary feat. I had the honour of being the first to learn about it and the first to write about this act of heroism, to report for the first time that there was such a commander, Battalion Commander Major Drapatyi, who had done something every Ukrainian should be proud of. It is also an honour for me that, following that publication, Mykhailo Drapatyi became a constant presence in the media. He is now well known and popular in the army, but this is how it all began. Drapatyi subsequently began to advance through the ranks. He is respected in the army, was decorated for a genuine act of heroism, and later became commander of the 58th Brigade. Even before the full-scale war, he was promoted to brigadier general.
I later met him again, including during another momentous encounter in March 2022. The situation in the south had become extremely difficult. Our troops were withdrawing along several axes, heavy fighting was underway, and the enemy was pushing forward along several axes across Right-Bank Ukraine, attempting to seize as much territory as possible. One of the Russian force groupings was advancing towards Kryvyi Rih. They were attempting to advance along the Bashtanka–Kryvyi Rih and Bashtanka–Novyi Buh highways, bypass Kryvyi Rih and reach the Kirovohrad highway. The enemy had to be stopped, but only improvised formations were available there. To give you an idea, the closest Russian patrol approaching Kryvyi Rih was recorded just 12 kilometres from the city. Another deeply dramatic event occurred there. One of the commanders of a tactical group assigned to defend Zaporizhzhia arrived on the scene and assessed the situation: it was appalling, and the forces we had on that section of the front were improvised. Unfortunately, he took his own life right at the command post. Imagine the effect this had on the morale of his subordinates. General Drapatyi was sent in to salvage the situation. He arrived and spoke with almost everyone; there were very few troops. I came to his headquarters together with Hero of Ukraine Dmytro Kotsiubailo, an outstanding Ukrainian warrior. Dmytro assessed the situation and also saw that Kryvyi Rih was under threat, posing a major danger to Ukraine. When Dmytro arrived, Drapatyi had literally only one battery of old 152 mm guns from an arsenal that had not been fully restored to working order. This was the only artillery in the entire Kryvyi Rih area, the only heavy artillery. Da Vinci took two guns from that battery, the two in the best operational condition. The Kryvyi Rih Defence Council provided some artillery tractors they had managed to find. In fact, Oleksandr Vilkul found them himself and took the initiative to equip the artillery. Yes, I was surprised too. But Da Vinci’s guns began firing.
Drapatyi directed the defence. He established coordination with the local authorities and with the volunteers joining the 60th Brigade. The soldiers of the 60th Brigade became the backbone and core of the defence. And so, with the help of these improvised formations, untrained people who were almost unarmed, carrying little more than assault rifles, with not even enough magazines for everyone, the Ukrainian troops, volunteers and all the residents of Kryvyi Rih achieved something extraordinary: the enemy was stopped. I cannot say that this was large-scale compared with other axes, but I was impressed by the precision of their actions amid the most chaotic circumstances imaginable.
Drapatyi and I later crossed paths when he commanded a force grouping during Ukraine’s unfortunately unsuccessful attempts, initiated by the High Command, to attack that ill-fated bridgehead on the right bank. The attempts were, regrettably, unsuccessful. After the liberation of Kherson, however, Drapatyi took command of the operational-strategic grouping of forces in the South. At the time, I was pleased to see that Drapatyi was the first to establish coordination with one of our outstanding organisers, a person of historic stature, in my view, Pavlo Yelizarov, founder and commander of the Lazar special unit of the National Guard. Yelizarov told Drapatyi that there was no coordination among the various units, forces and capabilities: between drones and electronic warfare, or between combined-arms units. As a result, our electronic warfare systems were jamming our own drones of every type, we could not establish flight corridors, and we had problems with target designation. Drapatyi established coordination of drone operations, probably for the first time within an operational-strategic grouping of forces. He regularly brought in Yelizarov and his representatives in the South to establish effective coordination among drones, electronic warfare, other units and intelligence, and to organise target engagement planning. It should be noted that this worked there for the first time. The results of their combat operations were very strong. It was gratifying for me to watch this unfold; it was truly an outstanding achievement.
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
Was Drapatyi the best choice for Commander-in-Chief, or were there better options?
The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is not an independent figure. He is subordinate to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. I think we all already understand the personality of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and his methods of governance. Not every professional can work with him. Therefore, the choice was not between someone professional and someone even more professional, because professional criteria are not always applied in our country. It was simply a choice among people who were well known and popular, who held senior positions, whom the state leadership knew, and who were interviewed in some fashion.
We do not know what the purpose of those interviews was. As far as I am aware, no specific issues were discussed, because replacing the Commander-in-Chief so quickly requires first defining the requirements and identifying what the previous Commander-in-Chief was unable to do. What were the problems? They should at least be written down somewhere, perhaps on a piece of paper, but they must be clearly formulated. What were Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s shortcomings as Commander-in-Chief? No one knows why he was removed. They were never announced. The criticism levelled against him was that he maintained too high a public profile. That was the only criticism voiced by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. No specific complaints were made against Zaluzhnyi about what he had done wrong, nor was the new Commander-in-Chief given any guidance on what needed to be done.
Incidentally, I disagreed with this at the time as well. I have always said that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief bears responsibility for everything that happens in the war, above all, for the problems. He is the one who must formulate the requirements for the Commander-in-Chief whom he appoints by decree. There were no such requirements for Zaluzhnyi, no specific criticisms of Zaluzhnyi, and no after-action review of his overall performance at the strategic level. Nor were any specific, comprehensible criteria set for Syrskyi. There simply were none at all. I remember that one of the directives issued to Syrskyi was to ensure the equitable distribution of weapons. Sometimes there were things like that which were simply beyond comment. It is now unclear, from a professional standpoint, why Syrskyi was removed. At present, the reason for his removal appears to be a conflict with the defence minister, who was himself dismissed. What was the underlying reason? Was his professional performance satisfactory or not? There has been no criticism and no analysis. Consequently, no requirements were formulated for the new Commander-in-Chief either. We are therefore looking to Mykhailo Drapatyi with great hope, because he will have to construct for himself the decision-making framework within which he will operate. He will have to establish a frame of reference, identify strategic priorities, determine how resources will be allocated, decide which direction the army should take in its development, manage the course of combat operations and force generation, address mobilisation insofar as it concerns the Armed Forces of Ukraine, train personnel, develop high-tech weapons and protect the airspace. It is an entire universe of problems, an immense number of them. Drapatyi therefore faces a major challenge. We will now examine all these details more closely.
What do you think about the missile strike on the shooting club?
I am deeply saddened that this happened. I am saddened that the Russians killed so many Ukrainians. Many people were injured and wounded. Our defence industry sector suffered serious losses. In terms of security measures, there were undoubtedly serious failings in the security arrangements. Someone must certainly be held accountable for this. It was the Russians who carried out the killing, of course, but anyone who assumes responsibility for the lives and health of others during wartime must be held accountable and understand that they must be prepared to bear that responsibility. The enemy may strike, but you must be certain that you have done everything necessary to protect people, that a comprehensive set of security measures is in place. If a strike is carried out against a location that was not visible from the highway, was situated in a forest and had not previously hosted such events, then there must have been other failings. During the war, I have participated and continue to participate in large gatherings on many occasions, and strict procedures are followed everywhere.
Locations and routes are always designated, and the route is then adjusted once people are on the ground. Information about the precise venue is not shared and is never communicated by phone. People are given an assembly point, and once there, they are told where to go. They proceed on foot, sometimes over a considerable distance. Everyone does this. A location and time are then selected with due regard for the air situation in the area and whether the enemy is conducting aerial reconnaissance there. In other words, there is a comprehensive set of measures that is self-evident to many people in our country. The investigation will now have to determine why those measures failed in this case and what was done incorrectly. I believe there must undoubtedly be an investigation. I am not prepared to say that the people who assumed responsibility for this event are 100% at fault, but their actions must certainly be investigated and their degree of responsibility determined. If the enemy somehow managed to plant an agent there, infiltrate the event or steal the information, that is one thing. In that case, there would be no grounds for holding the organisers responsible. But if the information was circulated through group chats and the location pin was shared immediately, then responsibility lies with those who failed to ensure security. I do not know what happened there, and I do not want to draw hasty conclusions or condemn anyone. This is war, and we cannot dispense with events at which industry representatives and military units are introduced to weapons systems that can be demonstrated immediately at a training ground. But you must understand how many people you are bringing together, because the more people from different organisations are involved, the greater the likelihood of a leak, the disclosure of information or a security breach. I have repeatedly said on air that the enemy compromises the phones of ordinary people through phishing schemes because they are far too eager to click links sent to them by both known and unknown numbers. This is OSINT. The enemy conducts this kind of OSINT, and so do we. We have also carried out many successful strikes after compromising enemy phones.
Can I transfer to your unit from the Air Assault Forces after going AWOL?
Yes, if your case has been entered into the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations. Please send me a private message. Transfers are currently possible, including in your case following an unauthorised absence. There is a specific procedure that must be completed, and I must warn you from the outset that it is not quick. There is currently a lot of talk about easy and rapid transfers following an unauthorised absence, but procedurally, none of this is working yet. If you are prepared to work in a good team, then there is certainly no one we would refuse to accept after an unauthorised absence, provided that they are a competent worker, a capable soldier and perform their duties well. I want to emphasise again that most of my company consists of soldiers who returned after going AWOL. Most of it. In fact, they are the unit’s primary source of personnel. So we are certainly waiting for everyone. Please write to me.
Will Colonel Riumshyn be reinstated?
I sincerely hope that Mykhailo Drapatyi will rectify the injustice that the previous Commander-in-Chief, Oleksandr Syrskyi, regrettably committed against Colonel Riumshyn. As commander of the 155th Brigade, Colonel Riumshyn proved himself to be an entirely worthy commander who commanded great respect among his subordinates and members of adjacent units. He is a genuinely distinguished officer, and I have absolutely no doubts about the results of his work and combat performance. He performed exceptionally well in the 47th Mechanized Brigade. I hope that what happened afterwards, when he was made a scapegoat over the 155th Brigade for purely political reasons, will be rectified. Why was he blamed in the case involving 50 service members who went AWOL in France? He was not responsible for that, as I have repeatedly said. The military leadership simply shifted the responsibility onto him to avoid admitting that the generals of Operational Command West were at fault, that the Land Forces Command was at fault, or that the General Staff personnel who issued bogus combat-readiness assessments were at fault. They therefore decided to sacrifice the colonel. It was a genuinely sordid political intrigue and an act of complete irresponsibility. I hope that Mykhailo Drapatyi will actually rectify this despicable act against Ryumshyn, and that Ryumshyn will return to the military; he is needed. He is needed. Let us compare what was happening there in the military under him, in those brigades he commanded, and now. There is much to compare.
What is your assessment of assault regiments, and should the practice of employing them continue, with a more personnel-centred approach, of course?
Incidentally, this is one of the key issues facing Mykhailo Drapatyi. Friends, I believe that assault regiments are necessary—absolutely necessary, for the Defence Forces of Ukraine. But in what capacity? In a different capacity, not as they are used now. Categorically not as they are used now. I have spoken about assault regiments before, but their employment now presents a challenge, and there is only one reasonable and appropriate model. They should serve as specialised assault units within army corps. Alternatively, they could be separate units directly subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief but assigned a clearly defined area of responsibility within the sector of one army corps, or two at most. Ideally, it should be one corps and one regiment. So many of these regiments have already been created that there is now effectively one for every corps. Why is this important? Within a given sector, the enemy may conduct active operations, infiltrate positions, attempt attacks and assaults, and concentrate reserves. An assault regiment under the command of a corps commander would serve as a means of reinforcing troops on a specific section where the intensity and tempo of combat operations need to be increased. In other words, it should not operate independently but within the corps’ sector. A brigade may be holding a particular defensive sector. The enemy may be attacking that brigade, or the brigade itself may be advancing. An assault regiment would enter its sector as reinforcement, operating with the brigade’s reconnaissance UAVs, support assets, artillery, intelligence, and logistics. The regiment would commit one assault battalion, or two at most, while the others underwent reconstitution and prepared for subsequent operations. For a limited period—one or two months, or up to three, they would operate intensively in that sector, change the situation, reinforce the brigade, and improve its position. They would then be withdrawn for rotation again. This is not a force intended to hold the front line permanently; it is a force intended to accomplish specific missions, specific assault missions for which fresh, physically fit personnel must receive specialised training in modern warfare. I am currently fighting in the 23rd Assault Regiment as part of the 2nd Khartiia Corps. All our infantry here consists of foreign assault troops, while the Ukrainians serve in command-and-control, UAV and support roles, and we conduct drone-assisted assault operations to improve our position, counter the enemy and carry out counterattacks. I believe this model represents the proper employment of assault regiments.
We do not have many of the capabilities available to brigades. The regiment is sufficiently mobile: it can manoeuvre and concentrate rapidly, and it operates within the sectors of other units. This is sound and appropriate tactics, enabling combat operations in a particular sector to be properly organised and controlled, reducing casualties and ensuring effective employment. The problem with assault regiments is that they are very often assigned independent sectors of responsibility. A section of the front may have been deteriorating for a long time: the corps holding it and the corps’ brigades received neither support nor timely reinforcement. The front kept giving way until it finally collapsed. Only then do posts begin appearing on Facebook and in the media, soldiers upload videos, and their relatives speak of a catastrophe. It is only when this generates a public outcry that the order is given: "Forward, forward, send everyone there to plug the gap." The assault regiments are then thrown straight into that gap, without preparation or proper deployment. They enter battle directly from the line of march while the enemy is advancing, is strong, and has dense combat formations. The enemy has breached the defences and is moving forward, and the assault regiments are sent directly against it in a head-on engagement. In other words, we strike the enemy not where it is weak or where it can be stopped at existing positions and made to suffer maximum losses, but where it is strong, where it has already broken through the front and is continuing to advance. When assault regiments are employed in this manner, they suffer heavy casualties while moving into position, conducting additional reconnaissance, deploying their UAV positions, infantry and logistics, entering the area, moving through it, and advancing. This is also why the number of personnel listed as missing in action is so high. This is primarily the result of poorly formulated missions at the operational and strategic levels. Had assault regiments been permanently assigned to corps sectors, they could have cleared these infiltrations and contained breakthroughs before they led to the collapse of our front, as happened in the Zaporizhzhia region, at Ocheretyne and on the Kostiantynivka–Toretsk axis. Command and control would have been better, casualties would have been lower, and fewer personnel would have gone missing. There would have been an established procedure for their employment, and the front would not have been breached. Most losses in war result from mistakes in planning, command and the organisation of forces. A soldier carries out a mission as it has been assigned. The commander who assigns and plans that mission does so based on the time, personnel, fire-support assets, intelligence capabilities and information about the enemy provided to him. There are no miracles in war. War, especially today’s drone war, is primarily a technological war. In effect, large enterprises and start-ups are fighting one another, with commanders managing money, resources, equipment, personnel, ammunition and logistics, many different components that they must keep track of. You gain an advantage only when your entire system functions as a whole, when you can set the tempo across all these components, analyse better, complete Boyd’s OODA loop faster in your mind and keep your decisions ahead of the enemy’s over a sustained period. Numbers alone do not decide anything in the kill zone. Drones now outnumber personnel many times over, not twofold, threefold or tenfold, but a hundredfold or two hundredfold. A hundred drones may be sent against a single soldier. Hypothetically, a hundred can be allocated if the target has not been eliminated. Therefore, preserving personnel in modern warfare requires time, planning, organisation and training. Manpower alone is not enough, nor are weapons alone. It is the system of employment that does the fighting.
Is it possible to transfer to your unit without going AWOL?
It is possible under certain circumstances. We have had isolated cases in which people managed to transfer without going AWOL due to a favourable combination of circumstances. This happened a couple of times when unit commanders did not try to retain personnel and approved the transfers themselves. With the consent of the unit commander, the process can then be completed fairly quickly. Unfortunately, that is generally not the case. If you are serving in the National Guard, however, there is some chance of transferring from there. That, too, can be described as a matter of agreement between commanders.
Did you support Klymenko’s appointment to the Ministry of Defence? What do you think of your new superior, Vyhivskyi?
You know, I am so detached from high-level political processes that I only learned that the defence minister was being replaced by the interior minister at around nine in the evening, after the story had already appeared across the news. I completely missed it. In fact, I have no particular emotional response to it because, again, the defence minister is subordinate to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the President of Ukraine. It is the president who nominates the defence minister. I simply saw the reasons for the dismissal; I discussed them during my previous broadcast and understood how the appointment was being made. I heard the president say that he would not remain defence minister and that someone else would take the post. Incidentally, Klymenko was never officially named at all. As far as I remember, the entire Klymenko story lasted only one evening, literally a few hours. Fedorov was then removed, and the following morning, I believe, the entire government resigned, and everyone was replaced. Frankly, I did not follow this political crisis or all these events online because I was extremely busy. We had certain active operations underway.
What do you think about voluntary formations of territorial communities (VFTCs)? Are they needed, and what will happen to them?
Incidentally, if Mykhailo Drapatyi eventually turns his attention to the organisational structure of the Defence Forces, I believe that voluntary formations of territorial communities, or VFTC units, are an important and essential element of the country’s defence system. A VFTC should bring together not simply those who join the army, but those who perform certain local duties in the regions. It is not quite the same as the Territorial Defence Forces. A VFTC is fundamentally an association of civic-minded, intelligent, patriotic and capable local residents. A VFTC consists of your neighbours, and not only men but women as well. It means sharing information and providing mutual assistance during emergencies, threats, incidents or attacks. It may even respond when someone breaches public order or threatens people’s lives and safety. That, too, falls within the role of a VFTC. In other words, I believe that most members of society, if they regard themselves as patriots and citizens, should be involved in certain self-organisation structures, coordinate with their neighbours and work together to ensure security where they live. Personal safety and defence, as well as mutual assistance in one’s local community, this is what a VFTC represents. They are undoubtedly essential.
Videos of drone strikes on Russia create the impression that the balance in the war is evening out. But what is happening at the front?
There has been no balancing of the war. The enemy had an advantage in strike systems and firepower, and it retains that advantage today. We have caught up in terms of our ability to strike Russian infrastructure. Russia has used that capability since the first day of the war. Russia has destroyed and continues to destroy our infrastructure, unfortunately on a far greater scale than we do. Previously, we had no ability to retaliate at all. Now we do. But this does not mean that our strikes, although highly spectacular and impressive, are in themselves evidence of a turning point. They show that we can inflict greater losses on the enemy and force it to expend more resources, but the enemy still has resources. If we compare which side has more of them, I must unfortunately say, friends, that the enemy continues to advance on many sections of the front. It is seizing our land and moving forward. A significant part of Kostiantynivka has been captured and is under enemy control. Fighting is taking place in the city centre, as we can see from reports by OSINT analysts. The enemy is attempting to envelop the city from the flanks and continues to advance. Heavy fighting is underway in the Zaporizhzhia region. We are advancing in some areas, while the enemy is advancing in others. The enemy has an advantage in UAVs on many sections of the front, not merely numerical, but also organisational and, in some areas, qualitative. The enemy has more drones and more operating positions, as well as effective command and control. It is also developing its Unmanned Systems Forces and the unmanned component of its military. Unfortunately, war is not a one-sided process. We are also suffering heavy losses. Yes, the casualty ratio favours us, but unfortunately not by a wide margin. The current casualty ratio is therefore unacceptable for us. That is why the enemy is advancing. We need change.
We cannot afford to fight like this, matching numbers against numbers. The enemy is advancing, and we must stop it. Only stabilising the front can lead to a peaceful resolution of the war. This requires strategic decisions across many areas. I hope that Mykhailo Drapatyi understands this and has an objective grasp of the situation. He commanded the Joint Forces Task Force that defended the Kharkiv and Sumy regions. He therefore visited Khartiia frequently and is well informed about the situation in our sector, in the sectors of neighbouring corps and in Andrii Biletskyi’s corps. I am therefore confident that his assessment is highly realistic. I am confident that he understands the challenges well. His main task now is to devise the necessary solutions. Drapatyi has assumed office and must urgently assemble a team. That team must be qualitatively different from the leadership team under the previous Commander-in-Chief because we need qualitative change. We must retain many people who possess experience and expertise, replace a significant number to accelerate change, and bring in others. In my view, particular attention must be paid to the system governing the operation of army corps. They must be strengthened immediately: their headquarters staffs, organisation, and complement of capable officers and commanders at every level must all be reinforced. Such personnel are available. This must now be put into practice.
Why, then, did Syrskyi say that he was handing over an advancing army?
Friends, that is a subject for a separate broadcast. Oleksandr Syrskyi’s statements alone need to be analysed, objectively acknowledging the positive things he accomplished as well as the shortcomings in his work. Again, that is a separate subject. I want to say that this phrase should not be taken literally. I believe it should be understood as follows: an army capable of conducting offensive operations. Our army is capable of advancing and seizing the initiative on certain sections of the front. On other sections, unfortunately, it lacks that capability and instead needs to be able to organise an effective defence. This is a problem and a challenge. We must be realistic. The enemy holds the initiative on most sections of the front, at both the operational and tactical levels. It is advancing, seizing our land and capturing our cities. Donbas is currently under serious threat. The enemy has advanced very close to Kramatorsk and is literally only a few kilometres from Sloviansk. It has captured a large part of Kostiantynivka and continues to advance. The enemy is advancing on Druzhkivka and has already reached its outskirts. It is advancing on Dobropillia and continues to move forward. The enemy has captured almost all of Pokrovsk; Myrnohrad has also been captured, and the enemy continues its advance. Let us not deceive ourselves with videos of drone strikes. They are impressive and spectacular, and they inflict major losses. They increase the cost of the war for Russia many times over. But they cannot stop Russia. They cannot. They mean that the enemy will have significantly fewer resources and personnel available to assault our positions at the front. But despite our campaign of aerial strikes, the enemy will continue to advance. That campaign must continue. It is an essential means of exerting pressure on the enemy. But stabilising the front requires more than drone strikes. It requires comprehensive action. First and foremost, this means protecting our infantry, establishing resilient combat formations and properly organising UAV operations to intercept the enemy and gain dominance of the low-altitude airspace, the drone domain. Only then will the enemy be stopped. Combat engineering support, which is exceptionally weak on our side, is another issue. There is much that needs to be discussed.
Is there a chance that transfers currently being blocked by brigade commanders will begin functioning after Drapatyi’s appointment? In your view, how should transfers within the Armed Forces of Ukraine work?
First of all, I do not think anything can be changed quickly regarding transfers at present. There are capable people in brigades who want to leave units where, for example, they are dissatisfied with many things. Some are unhappy with their commanders, while others are dissatisfied with military service in general: they do not want to serve in combat roles and would prefer quieter positions in the rear. Some have friends in another unit and do not want to serve where they are; they want to serve alongside their friends. There are countless reasons for requesting transfers. Countless. A great many. But the proposal currently being made, simply allowing anyone who wants to leave any brigade to transfer elsewhere, is impossible to implement. This could have been done during the period of mass mobilisation, for example in March, April or June 2022. People were arriving in a constant stream, and transfers were handled accordingly. If someone did not want to remain, they were released because ten volunteers would arrive the following day. No one tried to retain them then. But there are no volunteers now. Every capable person who is not a drug addict or an alcoholic, who does not have chronic illnesses that prevent them from walking and thinking, and who has two arms and two legs is someone whom every commander naturally wants to retain. Transfers are not where we should begin. Unfortunately, attempting to solve the problem simply through transfers is populism. Such measures should have been introduced only after order had been restored within the forces. The primary problem is not the transfer of soldiers. The primary problem in brigades and corps is their brigade and corps commanders. This command echelon is the key problem within the military. If a brigade commander has organised combat operations in such a way that the brigade is dysfunctional and combat-ineffective, personnel will flee from that commander. Should those personnel be transferred, or should the brigade commander be replaced? The brigade commander should be replaced first, and the new commander should be tasked with restoring combat capability and provided with the necessary resources and time. If that does not work, transfers can then be considered but not indiscriminately for everyone. Individual personnel should be transferred in accordance with an overall staffing plan so that brigades are not left without personnel altogether. There must be some logic to the process. This logic should be overseen first by the army corps and then by the service branch commands, that is, by the commanders to whom the corps ultimately report. Only then will there be some order. At present, there is none. Let me cite one brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Incidentally, one of the sound but largely unnoticed reforms introduced by Mykhailo Fedorov, the former defence minister who was dismissed, was a system for tracking the combat effectiveness of brigades and corps and assessing their combat performance against numerous criteria. It was a kind of mission-control system for military units and formations. According to this data, one brigade was simply... Every performance indicator for military units was recorded. I was shocked to discover that, in one brigade, 25% of the personnel had submitted transfer requests through Army+. Just imagine that. No one wants to serve there. And those are only the people who submitted requests. How many others did not? In other words, this brigade is combat-ineffective. Other brigades have the same problem, albeit at lower percentages. Then there are brigades that hold the record for personnel going AWOL. They retain no one. Someone does not want to fight? "Fine, leave. Do not fight. We are letting you go. But you must leave on your own so that you are the offender." These include brigades that are also assigned assault missions, not assault regiments. In assault regiments, it is precisely the opposite: commanders focus on ensuring that everyone goes into battle. But we have brigades where personnel are essentially told: "The main thing is, do not create a scandal for us. Do you want to leave? Then leave. That is your transfer." They retain no one. We therefore have record-holders for AWOL cases, transfer requests, and reports requesting transfers. Some of our brigades are particularly severe cases. There are brigades that do not kill a single enemy soldier in an entire month. Imagine that. Two or three brigades did not kill a single Russian soldier, a single Russian occupier. What does that tell us? It does not necessarily mean that the commander is poor. The commanders there may, incidentally, be fairly competent. The brigade may simply have been broken up and dispersed, company by company and battalion by battalion, across a vast sector. It has no weapons and no personnel. Its troops are demoralised and exhausted. Who is going to kill the enemy? No one. We suffer casualties, while the enemy has no losses recorded and confirmed in DELTA. So before discussing transfers, mobilisation, manning and how to prevent people from worrying about or fearing the army, let us begin by ensuring, for once, that the army is not afraid of itself. This is our primary challenge. The primary challenge is to ensure that those motivated to serve do so only in properly organised military units with competent commanders who at least occasionally listen to their subordinates instead of merely issuing order after order and attempting to solve every problem that way. We have many cases in which colonels in military formations personally issue orders allocating batteries for Mavic drones.
All kinds of strange situations arise in which people begin doing work that is not theirs instead of performing their direct duties and exercising command at the level of their competence and responsibility. These are the details that determine the professionalism of an army. Every corps commander should be a person of impeccable reputation with strong leadership qualities. When all of them are like that, when they have headquarters that they can staff with competent personnel, when they have brigade commanders whom they trust, who will also have organized headquarters, then the army will develop what it currently lacks. A chain of accountability across the entire front. Not only in individual corps. Not only in some brigades. It must exist throughout all the forces holding these 1,200 kilometres. Once this common standard is applied everywhere, the number of transfer requests will cease to be such a catastrophic problem. Going AWOL will also cease to be a catastrophic problem, because at present, going AWOL is being used as a method of transferring to another unit. What is actually happening through AWOL cases? It is impossible for us to distinguish between them. Someone who goes AWOL may be a genuine service evader and an offender who absconds because they committed an offence in the army. They may have stolen something. There are many such cases. Or someone may have become a drug addict or already been one and continued using drugs or become an alcoholic. Or they may simply not want to fight and invent reasons to get away and go home without facing any consequences. There are many such people. We must understand that not everyone who goes AWOL is simply someone who wants to fight but dislikes their commander. Situations vary. Our current problem is that these people cannot be distinguished from genuinely conscientious personnel who have been caught in the machinery of the system, placed in poor service conditions or assigned to poor commanders, and forced to buy drones, antennas and similar equipment with their own money. They go AWOL because they can no longer tolerate the people unfit to command them. They are either disillusioned or looking for another unit. Such conscientious personnel require particular attention. If there is high-quality organizational management in the army, or at least in combat units, then we should eliminate this phenomenon, or reduce it. This phenomenon must be eliminated. It will then be clearer and easier to determine what should be done with the other category, those who go AWOL in bad faith. That becomes a different matter. Transfers also become a different matter. So what does the army lack? Accountability. Accountability among commanders. To achieve this, commanders must no longer be replaced like gloves, for any reason or for no reason at all. Riumshyn was even put on trial without cause: they simply invented and falsified a criminal case against him. As for battalion commanders, I know one, a friend of mine, who, during the war, has already commanded eight battalions within a relatively short period. Just imagine that. Someone did not like something, and he was moved back and forth. On one occasion, he was removed by mistake. He had been appointed battalion commander on the Sumy axis after the previous battalion commander had been dismissed for certain instances of negligence. A new commander of the force grouping arrived and said: "My predecessor told me that this battalion has a very poor commander. Remove him immediately." His subordinates were simply too afraid to tell him that the battalion commander had only just been replaced and should be left in place. He was removed anyway. Battalion commanders are replaced so frequently and so quickly that no one even treats it as a significant event. After all, what is one battalion commander responsible for 500 people? Let us replace him today, again tomorrow, and once more the day after. There is no personnel logic in many decisions. This is something Drapatyi must address. Many commanders have left the army. Why? Because of dysfunctional organisational conditions for command and poor organisation. We have lost outstanding commanders such as Kashchenko, Holishevskyi and Zinevych. Vadym Sukharevskyi, a Hero of Ukraine, is trying to leave the army because he could not serve under these conditions. He is a capable infantry brigade commander. The army’s key problems - personnel going AWOL, ineffective mobilisation and transfers - are all consequences, not root causes. They result from poor organisation at the command and administrative level. Mykhailo Drapatyi must solve this problem if he wants to operate at a qualitatively different level from Oleksandr Syrskyi and genuinely halt the Russian advance. Genuinely, not in press releases, but on the map, with the result confirmed on every section of the front by what OSINT analysts and DeepState report.
If I contact Khartiia’s recruitment centre, would it be possible to join your unit?
Why go through recruitment? It would be better to contact me directly. I will personally oversee the process. Please send me a private message. You can message me on Facebook Messenger or Instagram, whichever you prefer. I will make sure to read it and call you myself. I speak personally with everyone who comes to me after going AWOL, contacts me directly, or transfers from another unit. I always speak to them myself and remain in contact. Every soldier in the company has my phone number or can obtain it. There are no communication problems whatsoever, either with the Colombians or the Ukrainians. We have also recently been joined by two Poles, two Polish volunteers and really great guys. That is also very encouraging. My thanks to Nazar, a Ukrainian volunteer, who helped us find such excellent soldiers and recommended them. So please message me, and I will call you after the broadcast. Incidentally, this applies to anyone interested in finding a way to transfer; there are options. I can speak personally with each of you after the broadcast. Please message me.
In your opinion, will the system allow Drapatyi to implement his position?
And this, friends, is the main challenge. To change something, Mykhailo Drapatyi must build his own system. Or he will drift with the current. And this is a new challenge. He was a general, he was a commander, a commander of an Operational-Strategic Group of Forces, a commander of the Ground Forces, and of several tactical groups. But this is the main challenge. The position of Commander-in-Chief of the AFU during such a large war, just imagine, one million two hundred thousand subordinates in total. Budgets of nearly 60-70 billion euros a year. All of this is in his hands; he manages it. He operates this massive machine. Just imagine the scale of the managerial, administrative, and command skills required. It truly has to be a person with super outstanding abilities. And these abilities must be directed at ensuring that this person creates a competent, effective team, so that he has independent, competent, knowledgeable people taking responsibility for every direction and every sector. Exactly the same kind who think, who feel him, understand him, and whom he understands and feels. And not just, "Yes, sir, exactly so, we will fight for the tree line down to the last soldier." We hold on to the last; we will not change; we will not manage flexibly. Only forward-forward to the end. In order to change the system, so that our war strategy shifts from fighting over tree lines to controlling and defending lines, defense areas, and corps sectors, all this requires major changes, a large team. And we will quickly see from Drapatyi's appointments who he appoints where. Which corps commanders, which commanders, chiefs of branches, forces, and services. We will see this very quickly and will, of course, monitor it. I treat Mykhailo Vasylovych with respect. And he is not the kind of person who will call and point fingers, saying, "Why did that person say that about me, that is bad," sitting on Facebook, reading through everything, asking who said what about me. I think he is someone with a broader perspective. I believe in this. And I hope that he will act differently. We will see by the results. The challenge is great. Can a person handle it? I want to tell you, it is a great test. If a person cannot handle something, they should not be immediately condemned. We must try to correct it, help, and adjust.
Taras Chmut said that brigades on the front line are understaffed, while many servicemen, both soldiers and officers, remain in the rear instead of serving at the front. How should this be understood, and what is your view on it?
This needs to be examined. The problem does exist. I would not say it is quite so widespread, however, because our main problem is the failure to organise the forces properly. Unfortunately, our army is marked by feudal fragmentation. Every branch and service is expanding and growing chaotically, spinning off new entities and developing whatever it wants for itself, while new units and subunits are constantly being created. Every organisation and structure has an enormous administrative apparatus and a vast number of military units: rear units; combat units that do not perform combat missions; and combat units that do perform them but with low effectiveness because they are understaffed and are not deployed in combat formations. We have created a vast number of military units that we do not need, although each has been assigned its own designated role. Furthermore, I want to point out that many of our command bodies are fundamentally unneeded in such a composition and with such an extensive organizational structure. We have created an enormous number of entirely unnecessary, redundant military structures that do little more than administer themselves. The army’s missions must be clearly defined; this unwieldy mass of units must be reduced, and the staffing and supply of the remaining units must be improved accordingly. Personnel should be given tasks that require intensive work, but they must also be provided with the necessary resources and manpower. Instead, brigades are maintained merely for the sake of retaining the name, while new brigades continue to be created. Let me remind you that new brigades are still being formed even this year, although infantry staffing in most existing brigades averages around 20%. And that is an optimistic estimate. In some brigades, the figure is even lower. In other words, brigades exist without infantry. There is an enormous administrative apparatus and a vast number of personnel who are unfit or fit only for limited service, all circulating within this unwieldy machine while producing virtually no useful output. This is the result of incompetent organisation and incompetent planning of Ukraine’s defence. No one is addressing it because everything has become politicised. If there is a particular service or branch and we have a vast number of them, it has its own access to decision-makers. Some brigades and the commanders of certain regiments and battalions have access to the upper levels, to various offices where decisions are made, to the General Staff and to various individual decision-makers. They all lobby for expanded staffing tables, new responsibilities, additional subunits and additional units. And the entire system keeps growing. There is no single accountant asking: "Gentlemen, how are you going to pay for all this? Why have you created so many positions and units when there are neither weapons, personnel nor supplies for them? Why are you squandering resources that are already in short supply merely so that certain individuals can secure positions and ranks and parade them around without even understanding what they are doing?" No one counts the money, and there is no accountability. Consequently, those same people who are entrusted with the lives of service members are not held accountable for them either.
Army is currently in acute need of such accountability. The absence of accountability and of a proper, functional command structure composed of accountable commanders capable of acting independently has resulted in a host of problems, including this one: a multitude of redundant, unnecessary, and inadequately supplied units.
Do you think Telegram channels linked to the Presidential Administration will launch a smear campaign against Drapatyi in order to have him dismissed in three or four months and replaced with someone loyal to the president?
That is an interesting question. What makes you think Drapatyi is not loyal to the president? General Drapatyi swore an oath to the people of Ukraine. He acts within the chain of command: he is appointed by presidential decree by the president, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and he carries out his orders. This is why I constantly say that the role of the Commander-in-Chief should not be overestimated: he does not decide absolutely everything concerning the war. Decisions are made by the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The allocation of money, resources and personnel, as well as mobilisation, under the law on mobilisation, my friends—all fall under the authority of the president of Ukraine. These are his personal powers. By decree, the president also appoints the commanders of the services, branches and forces. It is the president who makes these appointments. The same applies to the General Staff. In our system, the president appoints practically everyone by decree and assumes responsibility for all of it. And everywhere, as you understand, certain people find back channels or acquaintances and friends, and say: "This person is very good; he needs our support. This one should not be dismissed." Such cases even involve regimental commanders: "He is a good man, could he remain in his post?" This also illustrates how difficult it was for Syrskyi to exercise command amid political pressure. The same was true of Zaluzhnyi and, before him, Khomchak.
What requirements do you have for people with disabilities who have been removed from the military register? Do you need people in this category?
Of course, my friend. We need anyone capable of performing even a limited range of combat duties. If a person is motivated and has a disability but remains capable of working and is responsible, we will find a position for them. We need to speak with you to determine what would be suitable. Again, you can message me, and I will get in touch. Facebook Messenger or Instagram would be preferable, or you can obtain my phone number. It is not really a secret. Every soldier in my company knows it, as do personnel throughout the regiment.
Friends, thank you. We have been on air long enough. We have discussed the challenges and problems facing the army. Of course, it is impossible to cover all of this in such a short time. We will continue to closely monitor what is happening in the army and the changes on which the fate of every one of us, every service member, every citizen of Ukraine, and the future of Ukraine as a whole depend. So I will continue going live. I know that Mykhailo Drapatyi listens carefully to criticism and to other points of view. We will try to convey the key issues on which changes in the course of the war now depend. The situation is extremely difficult. And this winter, my friends, it will be more difficult than ever. We will therefore be watching developments very closely. Whenever I have time, while Mykhailo Drapatyi is familiarising himself with his new role and the people around him and developing his strategy, I will try to come on air and discuss the most pressing issues in the hope that I may be of some assistance and contribute to this work. I believe in change in Ukraine, and today I believe in our victory more than ever. Thank you. Glory to Ukraine!
