"There is no messiah in Ukraine": Butusov on new Commander-in-Chief, front and future of Ukrainian army
Why was Mykhailo Drapatyi’s appointment a spontaneous decision? Who orchestrated the media attack on Drapatyi? What mistakes did Oleksandr Syrskyi make? Why was Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s dismissal never explained?
Friends, welcome to Liga.net. My name is Dmytro Hliebov. Joining me virtually today is Yurii Butusov, editor-in-chief of Censor.NET and a serviceman with the 2nd Khartiia Corps. Mr Butusov, welcome.
Hello.
Yurii, I would like to begin our conversation with a subject you have already addressed in considerable detail several times. However, I still have questions that I would like answered, and I believe our viewers do as well. What are we talking about? More than a million personnel and budgets worth billions - this is what the new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Mykhailo Drapatyi, will have at his disposal. But what indicators can we use to assess his actual influence on the military and on the country’s ongoing defence processes? Let me add one caveat here: for now, I will not ask you about Drapatyi building his own system within the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
During wartime, there is one main criterion for assessing a Commander-in-Chief: whether the army can hold the front and prevent the enemy from advancing, and whether it can inflict unacceptable losses on the enemy while reducing its own losses severalfold. In effect, these are three criteria: territory, the rate of enemy losses and the rate of our own losses. These are the three main criteria by which the Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine’s Defence Forces is assessed first and foremost.
Yurii, what should we compare this against, then? The figures we once discussed in this studio when we spoke about Mykhailo Fedorov, who said that 50,000 Russians needed to be killed for us to stop the Russian military? Or the figures Oleksandr Syrskyi delivered as Commander-in-Chief?
First and foremost, once again, we need to look at territory. Are we defending our land, or is the enemy continuing to seize it? That is the first point.
Second, we need to look at whether the rate of enemy losses is sufficient to prevent it from advancing.
And third, we need to look at our own losses, which indicate whether we are capable of continuing our resistance. That is all.
Yurii, I would like to refer to something you said. If I do not quote you entirely accurately, please correct me. In a recent comment, you said that not every competent professional is capable of working with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In that context, how should we view Drapatyi’s appointment? And does it not seem that Mr Drapatyi may find himself alone with a host of problems directly at the front and, secondly, in his direct dealings with Zelenskyy, alone with the latter’s vision of both the war and politics? After all, we understand that the post of Commander-in-Chief is also a political position.
We do not know what will happen next because these things are entirely unpredictable. All our appointments are driven primarily by image and media considerations. Take Vadym Sukharevskyi. He was a successful commander of the 59th Infantry Brigade. He was respected and held in high regard, and he had his own sector of the front where he performed well. Then, suddenly, he was invited to Kyiv, made commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces, featured in countless photo shoots and videos, and used for publicity. Exactly one year later, he was told goodbye. He is now leaving the military because he was simply not allowed to do what he had been told and ordered to do. Naturally, he became disillusioned and was unable to deliver results. And this, too, was presented in a certain way. Just look back at the news coverage: there were hundreds of stories about new breakthroughs, a young Hero of Ukraine and a commander who enjoyed public trust. So much was promised in advance that for three months, they could report on combat operations using nothing but photo shoots with Sukharevskyi. Then they simply exploited him for image purposes and shoved him out of sight. No one in government even mentions where he is anymore. We must therefore understand that we have seen many different examples of people being elevated and then removed. This process is in no way driven by any practical, pragmatic or rational considerations.
Yurii, Drapatyi strikes me as someone with a very positive public image. At least, he has often been spoken of favourably. In your opinion, and here I will refer back to your previous answer about Sukharevskyi, was this appointment made for image purposes, or was it a well-considered practical decision after all?
I think the key factor was undoubtedly, first and foremost, his popularity. Another factor was that he had good relations with Mykhailo Fedorov and publicly spoke out in support of him. I believe that was decisive. What pragmatism or rationality can we talk about when Syrskyi was hastily removed within three days? The "cardboard Maidan" began, and three days later, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was suddenly dismissed without warning and a new one brought in. In other words, this was not a planned process. No one had prepared a handover, and no one had prepared for the gradual integration of the new Commander-in-Chief into the incumbent Commander-in-Chief’s staff. No criticisms or demands were put to Syrskyi, none whatsoever. I can assure you that there are neither public documents nor any internal official assessments of his performance. For example, what criticisms did we have of his performance? What, then, is the new Commander-in-Chief supposed to do? None of this is set out anywhere. The tasks assigned to the new Commander-in-Chief have been defined in entirely formal terms. There has been no in-depth development of strategic objectives or conclusions as to what he must change. He has none of that. One Commander-in-Chief has simply been replaced with another, who has been thrown straight into the system effectively, the military command-and-control system that Syrskyi spent five years building and for which he was responsible. From 2022, he commanded half of the Armed Forces: the Khortytsia Operational-Strategic Group of Troops was under his command, and later, so were the entire Armed Forces. He has his own command system, characterised by rigid micromanagement of every detail and every process. Suddenly, a completely different person arrives with a completely different management style and vision. He must now address and resolve the tasks that Syrskyi used to deal with on the fly. And the situation is extremely difficult. Heavy fighting is under way for Kostiantynivka, and the enemy has captured a large part of the city. The enemy is enveloping it from the flanks, has reached the outskirts of Druzhkivka, and has almost completely captured Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. The enemy continues to push forward and is only a few kilometres from Sloviansk. The situation is not merely difficult; it is critical in many sectors. If we look at Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, our task now is not so much to cling to positions there as to organise the defence of Dobropillia. Drapatyi must now make decisions on all of this, even though he has not had a single day to establish the work of his staff because no preparations were made. This should have been a systematic process, but we have no such system. So what was this driven by more: emotion or calculation?
Yurii, following up on your point, I never heard an explanation at the time as to why Zaluzhnyi was dismissed or which tasks he had failed to accomplish and why we therefore appointed someone capable of accomplishing them, namely Oleksandr Syrskyi. I did a little research, looking for these explanations precisely so that we could discuss Drapatyi in greater detail. In that context, I have the following question. Drapatyi once appeared to be a kind of crisis manager for individual sectors of the front; we can recall the Kharkiv region, for example. I discussed this subject with you while I was still working at Ukrainska Pravda. You have spoken about these difficult sectors of the front. In your opinion, based on your assessment and your extensive knowledge of him, is Drapatyi capable of resolving these problems quickly when we are talking about Kostiantynivka, Dobropillia, Druzhkivka and Sloviansk?
We will find out very soon because the situation there is critical, and delays in decision-making or decisions that are not made quickly enough will simply allow this crisis to result in the loss of these cities.
And this is a key area for the Donbas, isn’t it?
Yes. We will see now. There is, for example, a critical situation in the Kozacha Lopan sector. Mykhailo Vasylovych previously commanded the Joint Forces Task Force in that sector and is also very familiar with the situation in the Kharkiv region. The situation around Kozacha Lopan is critical. Therefore, we will certainly be looking at the results now. The task assigned to Drapatyi requires more than merely a highly experienced person of strong moral character. To accomplish it now, he must possess extraordinary moral fortitude and professional capabilities, as well as exceptional organisational and administrative skills. He must also have a large team of competent, responsible people overseeing different areas, a team that clearly understands which commanders should be appointed to which sectors, who must be replaced if they fail to perform, where the system of troop subordination must be changed, and where forces must be reinforced with resources, reserves, personnel, equipment and the necessary types of ammunition.
This is an enormous challenge in a person’s life, requiring truly extraordinary abilities, a strong team and even a certain amount of luck. So, will Drapatyi be able to do it? Look, the challenge before him is to command 1.2 million personnel in the Defence Forces, with an annual budget of nearly $70 billion. You know, perhaps only a handful of people on the planet could cope with a challenge of that magnitude. We will see how Mykhailo Vasylovych handles it.
I will discuss the billions of dollars with you a little later, but first I have a question for you as an experienced media professional. In recent days, Mykhailo Drapatyi has faced his first media attack of this kind: a fake account on X circulated a statement about the launch of an audit in the military, in fact, a rather positive statement. StratCom officially denied that Drapatyi had any connection to the account. But once again, as an experienced media professional, whose handiwork does this look like? Who stands to benefit from artificially inflating expectations of the Commander-in-Chief? After all, the message that was circulated was positive.
Look, there are currently so many pieces of planted information, and it is so easy to generate an information wave around virtually anything. Such waves are being generated constantly. It is simply that they do not always involve top officials or provoke such a strong reaction. We live in a world of constant information confrontation and information warfare. Planted stories are circulated in large numbers every day. Some of them take off as this one did. They are disguised as part of a genuine context and tailored to genuine expectations. Their purpose is to promote certain messages, draw public attention to someone or something, or provoke a response so that the resulting information wave instead discredits someone who, for example, does or does not take certain specific actions. What I want to say is that this situation was engineered very cheaply. People were given the information they wanted to hear, the same messages and words that might have been expressed under different circumstances. People always want to believe in miracles and good news; they are constantly searching for them. They are looking for a context that allows them to view the future with hope. That is why planted stories claiming that the military will be audited and everything will now be scrutinised gain traction so easily: they have a credible basis and draw on real events and genuine preconditions. I do not think this is anywhere near the worst piece of planted information to have circulated and gained traction in our information space. But yes, this is possible, and it will continue. I do not know how much this particular operation cost, from a media perspective, perhaps $10,000–20,000. But look at the response and reach, and at how many media outlets fell for it and circulated it.
I was pleased to see reputable publications such as Ukrainska Pravda report that the story had been retracted. That was the right thing to do from a media perspective and showed respect for their readers. These things happen, and it is important to acknowledge one’s own mistakes as well.
Yurii, I have an important question. I found your point about clannishness in the military, which you discussed on your own YouTube channel, both compelling and alarming. Clearly, appointing one’s own people to key positions is one way of ensuring that assigned tasks will be accomplished. It is easier to work with these people; you understand them better, and they are unlikely to resist you. But will Drapatyi now face resistance within the military when he begins appointing his own people to key positions, given that these appointments also entail control over financial flows?
Any hierarchical system, such as the military, has its own power groups made up of people who spend their entire careers in the service, and there is always competition between these groups. So there is nothing unusual about that. I believe the main issue we need to discuss now is whether Mykhailo Drapatyi will be able, literally within the next couple of weeks, to formulate his own rationale and concept for commanding the forces, as well as his vision of what changes must be introduced to alter the situation, and how quickly he will begin implementing them. We will see this from the steps he takes. The fact that there will be some resistance is normal for any system, especially during a war. Our Defence Forces number 1.2 million personnel across every formation we have. All of them are now subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Of course, there may be some resistance. But that is actually a secondary issue. Compared with whether there will be... The key issue is the Commander-in-Chief’s own concept and vision for his work: how realistic it will be and how closely it will be aligned, organisationally and administratively, with the people currently serving in the command structure, the existing circumstances, the conditions of the war and the resources available for it. We will see this very quickly. The sooner this alignment takes place, the sooner we will have an answer to your question.
All right, Yurii. I think that for those taking to the square outside the Ivan Franko Theatre and to the central squares of their cities, Mykhailo Fedorov’s return to the Ministry of Defence is far from a secondary issue. I am sceptical and do not believe it will happen, but I nevertheless have to ask you this question. In your opinion, what factors or levers could still bring Fedorov back to the Ministry of Defence? It seems to me that all the positions reportedly offered to Mykhailo Fedorov were more about securing good photographs of him with someone. Overall, this is what we call a figurehead role, nothing more.
The only factor that could lead to Fedorov’s return now would be if our Western European allies, who allocated a €90 billion loan to Ukraine, at least €4 billion of which is supposed to go towards the defence budget - were to say: "Friends, Ukrainian friends, we will provide this money only if Fedorov is Defence Minister."
And is responsible for managing it.
The fact that he is supported by people in the streets is, in principle, another lever. But at present, money is the only decisive factor, because he was removed over this money, and only this money can bring him back. That is all.
Yurii, all right, let us turn to specific individuals. In our country, things revolve around personalities more often than around the system. For example, in an interview with Roman Kravets, when discussing potential candidates for the post of Commander-in-Chief, Taras Chmut said: "The problem is that we are talking about four or five names, including corps commanders, from Khartiia, the 3rd Assault Corps, Drapatyi and several others." When it comes to the Defence Minister, however, we really have only two options: Fedorov, who was dismissed and whom people are demanding be reinstated, and Mr Khmara, whom the President effectively appointed. We therefore find ourselves in a crisis where it is not merely that we have no principled and capable person to appoint, but that making such an appointment is simply impossible because the list of candidates has narrowed even further, to one or two names.
To be honest, I strongly disagree with the claim that we lack qualified personnel and have no one to appoint.
All right, make your case.
That bears absolutely no relation to reality.
Look, we have no candidates who simultaneously carry media weight, enjoy the confidence of the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, are professionals and administrators, are outstanding organisers, and have their own teams. These are now the requirements: someone must come in and command such authority that the leadership immediately says, "Yes, only him. Who else could it be?" Ukraine has no such messiahs. And the primary reason is that commanding an army during a war does not actually require messiahs. This notion of five or six effective managers, which the authorities are promoting, merely demonstrates the incompetence of those shaping state policy and their failure to understand how public administration actually works. It is an entirely misguided notion in the military as well. We have no messiahs. What we do have is a considerable number of professionals capable of filling positions in which the limits of their authority, responsibilities, and duties are clearly defined. So there is no single person who can do everything, but we do have approximately 20 or 30 people who could take up senior positions and implement systemic changes, provided that clear criteria, areas of responsibility and tasks are established for them. Ukraine’s problem now is precisely that no one at the top wants to do this. That is why everyone is looking for a messiah who will come along and single-handedly lead us to victory despite the utter incompetence of those appointing him. These are the extraordinary demands we place on the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: despite the complete paralysis and impotence of the rest of the state machinery, he is expected to build a brilliant, flawless and exceptionally professional command structure for the Armed Forces. These are, of course, fantastical conditions and fantastical expectations. That simply does not happen in real life.
Managing the Armed Forces during a war, like any area of public administration in a crisis, requires proper planning, clearly defined objectives and tasks, and the selection of people capable of accomplishing those specific objectives and tasks and taking responsibility. If such an approach were adopted, believe me, we could consider not merely 20 or 30 people, but 100 or 200 for specific assignments and command roles. There truly is no messiah in Ukraine. And that is perfectly normal; there is nothing unusual about it. There are no messiahs anywhere. Let me recall international experience. The United States is the world’s greatest superpower. During the Second World War, when it needed to appoint a new command for its Armed Forces to wage a kind of war it had never fought before, a large-scale war involving mechanised armies and air power, President Roosevelt held consultations and organised army manoeuvres. Those manoeuvres identified the future Commander-in-Chief of the active forces in Europe. Lieutenant Colonel Eisenhower, who was indeed only a lieutenant colonel, was put forward for senior positions, and within three years he had become a full general and Commander-in-Chief of forces numbering seven million personnel. That is how it is done in the civilised world. There was no special commission, and no one in the United States was looking for a brilliant messiah who would build everything from scratch. They took a lieutenant colonel, properly organised staffs at every level, and appointed competent, independent people to various positions. It was this collective effort that made America invincible — not messiahs. Messiahs do not work. This is a Ukrainian myth stemming, unfortunately, primarily from the extremely low level of education among those in government.
Yurii, briefly adding to your point, perhaps football offers a more relatable analogy for some people: in football, teams win, not individual players. We could mention Argentina’s Messi here. Mr Butusov, one final question, I promise. There has been much discussion about a Russian mobilisation campaign this autumn, with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy even citing a figure of half a million people, evidently based on intelligence reports. In your opinion, does this not mean that Ukraine, for its part, should expect intensified mobilisation because there will be more Russians? And secondly, how can it be conducted properly, given that over the past five years we have only accumulated problems and now have just a few months to resolve them? It is a rather strange situation.
That is actually our usual state of affairs. We live in a permanent crisis and in the hope of a miracle. Unfortunately, this is the kind of social mindset that incompetent state leaders create and impose on us with all their might. They promise that we need only hold out for two or three weeks or two or three months, and then there will be elections and peace. People have been fed this line for five years, kept in a constant state of waiting for peace and elections. In reality, nothing is being done to introduce systemic, structural changes in how the war is managed. Our system of public administration has not improved in any way since 2022. There was chaos, reactions to planted stories and every information wave, and a pursuit of popularity where basic management was required, and that continues today. If we cannot... Why do I like seeing people take to the streets? Because it is the only lever we have. This "cardboard Maidan" is at least some way of calling the authorities to account and showing them that society is critical of their performance and expects them to make professional decisions. I do not know what must happen, what else we must lose or how many places must be lost before the authorities finally say, perhaps under pressure from public opinion and more cardboard placards, "All right, we have played around here long enough. Let us try organising the military professionally, without a messiah, so that we can stop the Russians, retain at least what little remains of the Donbas for Ukraine, and hold Zaporizhzhia and the Kharkiv region." I hope attitudes in society will change and that people will demand systemic reforms instead of merely demanding a particular name. A single person cannot change the situation. War is a struggle between systems of command, organisation and administration. I did not invent this; this is how it works throughout the world. Monographs have been written about it, and entire libraries are devoted to the lessons of the First and Second World Wars. Unfortunately, the people making decisions in Ukraine have never read those books and are not even aware that they exist. That is Ukraine’s fundamental tragedy: the extremely low intellectual level and lack of even a basic education among those holding key government positions, combined with a complete unwillingness to learn and a desire instead to chase publicity, exploit information waves, present people with yet another good person and say, "He will sort everything out for you now." Unfortunately, that is not going to happen.
Yurii, allow me to return to the substance of my question. Is the additional mobilisation of 500,000 Russians this autumn a realistic prospect, in your opinion?
I do not think they are capable of mobilising 500,000 people, but even a smaller number would pose a serious challenge. I do not believe that this number of Russians could break through the front, but the enemy will undoubtedly receive additional reinforcements, improve its use of UAVs and strengthen its defences against drones.
They are finding ways to counter our mid-range strikes. When this campaign of mid-range strikes began, there was talk of a window of opportunity lasting only a few months. It seems to me that those few months have now passed.
That is correct. Mid-range strikes are no panacea in this war. They are simply the scaling-up of an established capability to a strong, high-quality technological level. One of the means of striking the enemy has been scaled up. It had been used before, and the enemy had used it even more extensively than we had, but now the increased scale has simply produced a major impact.
With the help of our American and European partners, we scaled up this technology and managed to achieve remarkable results. But, of course, like any technological advance in warfare, it cannot remain a decisive factor indefinitely. After some time, the enemy strengthens its countermeasures while also developing and expanding its own mid-range strike capabilities. In a couple of months, this advantage will be neutralised.
Yurii, thank you for your time and your answers.
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