Russia attacks data centers: What will happen to internet access and communications in Ukraine?
Strikes on three data centers in Kyiv caused temporary disruptions to internet access and sparked debate over how much connectivity will cost, what will happen to the internet, and whether Russia could "switch it off" altogether.
BusinessCensor spoke with providers affected by the strikes, telecommunications experts, and the owner of Mirahost, Ukraine’s largest hosting provider, to find out how much internet services will actually cost this winter, whether mobile connectivity can be relied on during prolonged power outages, and what pitfalls lie behind the idea of "buying one Starlink terminal for the entire homeowners’ association."
Not the first attack, but the first to make headlines: The September 23–24 strikes on data centers and their consequences
The September 23–24 strikes on data centers in Kyiv made headlines across news feeds. In fact, those we spoke with acknowledge that this was not the first attack on data centers in Ukraine. Similar strikes had already taken place over the summer, but providers had managed to redistribute network loads quickly enough that users noticed no disruption at all.
That is why the September 23–24 attack drew attention: three facilities were hit at once, leaving around 100,000 subscribers experiencing connectivity disruptions.
One of the affected centers housed UTELS equipment. Some network components were destroyed in the attack. However, restoring service took approximately two hours. Speaking to BusinessCensor, the provider’s owner, Oleksandr Poliudov, identified two factors behind the rapid recovery:
- a team that worked tirelessly until everything was restored;
- network decentralization – by the time of the attack, equipment had already been distributed across several data centers.
In the interview, Poliudov emphasized the importance of coordinated work by specialists – emergency repair crews and technical administrators – because the second factor, network decentralization, had already been implemented following the painful experience of previous attacks.
"Within two hours, thanks to the coordinated efforts of our technical specialists, we were able to restore normal internet service to most affected subscribers," Poliudov says.
The provider Pavutyna was affected at the same time as UTELS, and a notice appeared on its website that same day announcing that service had been successfully restored.
Pavutyna director Oleksandr Arutiunian also points to the decentralization of network nodes as an important factor in the successful recovery. Both interviewees agree that the attack was intended to generate media attention and sow panic. Ordinary Ukrainians were affected, and the strikes had no military purpose.
How much will internet prices actually rise this winter?
After the strike, predictions of a "significant increase" in internet prices began circulating on Telegram channels. We asked our interviewees what this would mean for people’s wallets in actual numbers.
According to the owner of UTELS, rates will rise by at least 20% from current levels, while some operators may double the prices of their entry-level plans specifically. The increases are expected by the end of the year, or January 1 at the latest.
The reason is not the destroyed equipment but ongoing costs: the price of fiber-optic cable has risen three- to fourfold over the past year as fiber prices in China have increased. Equipment has also become more expensive, and technical staff salaries have risen.
Pavutyna director Oleksandr Arutiunian attributes the forthcoming increases to these recurring operating costs rather than the one-off replacement of equipment.
"This is not about equipment that burned down in a single incident and now somehow needs to be paid for. It is about the restructuring of all business processes, both within and outside companies operating in the market, which is already happening and will continue. A provider used to have equipment at 10 locations; now it needs 50 small network nodes. Each of these nodes requires its own power supply system and separate cables. This means hiring more staff and increasing the number of emergency repair crews, expanding transport capacity and logistics. That is a substantial increase in operating costs," he says.
Arutiunian estimates that prices across the market will rise by 10–20%: competition among thousands of small providers will simply prevent sharp increases.
Oleksandr Olshanskyi, the owner of hosting provider Mirahost, expects service prices to rise by 10–15%, as the bulk of the company’s capacity was moved abroad long ago, and attacks on Ukrainian data centers do not directly affect it.
Meanwhile, providers, like other businesses in Ukraine, are left to deal with the consequences on their own. Those interviewed do not expect compensation for lost equipment. The incidents are recorded as force majeure events. As an example of useful engagement by the state, Poliudov singled out the Ministry of Digital Transformation, which remains in contact and provides targeted assistance, though not financial support.
Cell towers "cannot handle" all subscribers: how can you prepare?
Previous winters have shown that mobile internet is not always a solution during prolonged power outages: the longer the outage lasted, the worse mobile connectivity became. If fixed-line providers experience problems, the load on mobile networks will be even greater.
Poliudov explains the technical reason: mobile operators have far more base stations than fixed-line providers have network nodes, and emergency crews simply cannot replace batteries at all of them every few days, as they can at fixed-line internet nodes. Meanwhile, if fixed broadband access also goes down, the load on mobile base stations will increase to the point where subscribers simply cannot connect.
Arutiunian, Poliudov and Olshanskyi all recommend having a second fixed-line provider connected to your home — and making sure it is not a sub-brand of the same provider. A SIM card with a data plan is useful only as an additional backup for brief, localized disruptions, not for blackouts.
To save money, Arutiunian recommends choosing a cheaper plan for the second provider from the outset. For example, if your primary provider offers internet speeds of 1 GB/s, you could choose the second provider’s cheapest package at 50 MB/s.
Olshanskyi puts having a second internet connection on a par with other basic wartime necessities, such as keeping copies of documents and a supply of drinking water at home.
Starlink as a backup: useful and not-so-useful applications
Volodymyr Fursevych, CTO of Adaptis, a company that develops communications systems for challenging conditions, explains why satellite connectivity is generally more resilient. Starlink does not depend on a single ground station: satellites can relay traffic between themselves and route it through other gateway stations.
One example of the advantages of satellite connectivity was the 2025 blackout in Spain and Portugal, when traffic was rerouted through stations in Italy. Adaptis checked more than 1,500 terminals it monitors during the night of September 23–24 and recorded no disruptions. Fursevych clarifies, however, that the company has no visibility into Starlink’s internal routing and cannot confirm whether the network switched routes or how quickly it did so.
A risk remains: if several ground stations go down simultaneously and those still operating cannot handle the load, disruptions are possible. But even a functioning Starlink network does not guarantee connectivity for an individual user: the terminal, router and local network also need power. Several conditions must be met to obtain internet access through Starlink, including a power supply and a clear view of the sky.
Fursevych therefore advises critical infrastructure operators and businesses to identify in advance which services must remain operational under any circumstances, maintain at least two connections using different physical infrastructure — for example, fixed-line and satellite — and make sure to test the backup under load, rather than simply having a second SIM card or dish "just in case." He says demand for backup connectivity is already growing: since the latest strikes, the workload of Adaptis’s hotline staff and sales managers has increased substantially.
Poliudov, meanwhile, is skeptical of the advice circulating online to "buy one Starlink terminal for an entire apartment building." He agrees that a dish can meet the needs of one apartment, or at most two neighboring apartments if the connection is shared through a router. Beyond that, however, complications arise. An entire apartment building or residential complex would require a separate local network — bringing additional costs and maintenance requirements, so Starlink would not work as a solution for the whole building.
Why data centers are vulnerable, but the cloud is not
"This is a troubling and very clear signal. Data centers are part of the country’s economic and defense resilience. Communications, government and banking services, warning systems, logistics, and computing capacity for AI and other critical technologies all depend on them," says Ilona Khmelova, secretary of the Economic Security Council of Ukraine and a cybersecurity expert.
Ukraine’s digital infrastructure, Khmelova explains, was not designed for missile and drone warfare and is therefore physically vulnerable. No conventional above-ground data center can withstand a direct hit. Resilience can only be achieved through a distributed architecture, backups beyond the reach of strikes, and specially protected facilities.
Strikes on civilian data centers in cities, she adds, are also attacks on people, because this infrastructure is embedded in residential areas and provides critical services to civilians. In her view, such attacks must be documented and classified as war crimes.
Khmelova describes the decision to move government and business data to cloud infrastructure in allied countries at the start of the full-scale invasion as one of the best decisions made — effectively "air defense for data," protecting it from missiles and, to a large extent, cyberattacks. That is why strikes on Kyiv cannot completely destroy Ukraine’s digital infrastructure: they can cause damage and disruptions and complicate operations for some providers, but they cannot send the country back to the "Stone Age."
"The response must be twofold: technological — international cloud infrastructure and backups — and legal: documenting attacks on civilian digital infrastructure as war crimes and ensuring systematic accountability at the international level," Khmelova stresses.
Russia is sowing panic: what impact does the enemy actually expect from the attacks?
None of those interviewed can give a definitive answer as to why the Russians chose to target data centers specifically, or why now. Poliudov even questions the official rationale for the strike: if the aim was to disable operators connected to military services, it failed. "Essentially, they achieved no military objective at all," he says. Ordinary subscribers suffered instead.
Arutiunian likewise sees no practical purpose behind the strike — only hype, terror and the sowing of panic. In his view, bloggers with Telegram channels also play a part by spreading rumors about price increases or network collapse, effectively finishing the enemy’s work for it.
Olshanskyi offers a similar assessment: destroying equipment and injuring employees is an attempt to exert psychological pressure on society.
All three agree on one thing, however: no one can control when or where the next strike will hit, but taking steps to prepare is an option.
"If you run a business, buy a Starlink terminal — it is not as expensive as you think. If you have a small shop, connect to two providers. You need to prepare. Do everything possible, everything within your control," Olshanskyi concludes.
