ZALUZNYI’S RESIGNATION. WHAT’S NEXT?
Yurii Butusov, Editor-in-Chief of Censor.NET, shared his vision of the dismissal of the Chief Commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valerii Zaluzhnyi and analyzed President Zelenskyy’s statement on the tasks assigned to the newly appointed Oleksandr Syrskyi.
ZALUZHNYI LEFT POST
Good afternoon! The event of our stream today, I think, is in the focus of the whole world, the whole country. Today, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy dismissed General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the Commander-in-Chief who had been leading the army since the first minutes of the Russian invasion, from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Of course, this event shook everyone. There is no one who would be indifferent to this. After all, Valerii Zaluzhnyi is a man who has become a symbol of resistance not only for the army but also for society. I would like to remind you that at the time when, before the war, the political leadership of Ukraine and President Zelenskyy himself were constantly saying that there would be no war, that we would resolve everything peacefully, convincing the whole world, all of us, that we were not preparing for war, we did not need war and we would not do anything, Valerii Zaluzhny was in charge of the army at that time. And when the Russian invasion began, the army accepted the battle and the trust in the high command in Ukraine was in Zaluzhnyi, not in Zelenskyy or any other officials. And when we talk about why Zaluzhnyi's rating and trust in him are so high, it is because in these critical first weeks, Valerii Zaluzhnyi became the symbol of resistance for the army and the people. And in this status, he will remain forever in the history of Ukraine and in world history. Therefore, Zaluzhnyi as a moral figure for the army and for the Ukrainian resistance is of paramount importance. That is why there is such a resonance.
And we know from the president's statements that Zelenskyy made remarks in his media appearances that Zaluzhnyi was too involved in politics. These were actually the only comments that the president constantly made. Therefore, it is obvious that there were political reasons for this dismissal. But now we need to understand the consequences of this decision. What will happen next?
We will deal with it without politics because we are in a difficult war and need to understand the results for the defense system and our resistance. This is a very important issue of principle. I want to say that the army has a lot of problems that have not been solved. These include unsuccessful combat operations and organizational problems. Of course, Valerii Zaluzhny is largely responsible for these problems. And no official can be free from criticism. But we need to understand that Zaluzhnyi was not just a moral symbol in our military system. He was a person who organized our chaotic, disorganized, fragmented management system in a certain way, and people trusted him, expected him to make decisions, and sometimes they did. I should note that not everything in the management of the army was optimal. But there was a certain consistency, logic, and trust. It is fundamentally important when people trust their commanders. It is with institutional trust that action begins. I would also like to say that there is a lot of criticism of Zaluzhnyi's actions, for example, during the counteroffensive. But on the other hand, the actions that were taken at the beginning of the war were the only possible ones, and they were more effective, so to speak, than the actions of the Russian command.
HOW ZALUZNYI PREPARED THE ARMY FOR A FULL-SCALE INVASION
Let's recall what the command and control system was based on at the time. Thus, the army as a whole was also not quite prepared for such a large-scale invasion. The troops entered the battle from the east. Brigade deployment borders were determined up to 100 kilometers from the Russian border, and most brigades entered the battle from the east, without having time to deploy. But this was done contrary to the policy, statements, and demands of the country's political leadership. Valerii Zaluzhnyi nevertheless ordered the deployment of troops just before the war began. However, the political leadership again said that there was no threat of invasion. On February 21, Defense Minister Reznikov said that there were no Russian Federation strike groups near the border with Ukraine at all. There were no official warnings of war. Even the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense did not warn in its reports that there would be war tomorrow. The army did not receive such intelligence reports. Therefore, in these circumstances, Zaluzhnyi decided to deploy troops. They left their permanent locations. And it is important to note that at the beginning of the war, the Ukrainian command gave considerable autonomy and decision-making power to the brigade commanders. I want to say that our army acted most effectively at the beginning of the war, because brigade commanders and battalion commanders had maximum autonomy and responsibility at that time and could make decisions themselves in many cases, taking into account the situation. Zaluzhnyi communicated directly with many brigade commanders and gave them such freedom of action. It should be noted that in the initial period of the war, it was for these reasons that our army had much greater flexibility in management, which unfortunately disappeared later. But in the initial maneuverable period of the Russian invasion, the army was active, the brigade and battalion commanders had more flexibility, and this alone, I am sure, made it possible to gain an advantage in command even where the enemy had an advantage in numbers.
I will not give a lengthy answer now about the significance of the figure of Zaluzhnyi: who is responsible and what is responsible. This will be the topic of a separate program. Now we need to discuss what will happen next.
HOW WAS ZALUZHNYI DIFFERENT FROM OTHER GENERALS?
Valerii Zaluzhnyi was a respected person in the army for a reason. He was a very atypical type of Ukrainian general. Not like his predecessors, Viktor Muzhenko, for example, or Ruslan Khomchak. Zaluzhnyi was not petty. This is a very big difference. He didn't try to play micromanagement, which is what most of our generals suffer from. Because most of the Ukrainian generals are, you know, good people, in fact, they are outgrown company commanders in terms of their professional command style of management. Good company commanders who rose through the ranks very quickly. And very often, unfortunately, many generals want to command platoons, companies, adjust the fire of individual guns, command tanks, now, especially because of the streams. It's a big disease and a big problem that our commanders, instead of managing structural units, try to work directly as company or platoon commanders. So, this was not the case in Zaluzhnyi's style. Yes, there were problems there, in my opinion, big ones. Valerii Fedorovych does not want to quarrel with anyone. He is a very gentle person. He is not a person who is conflicted in his army environment. On the one hand, there are many drawbacks to this position. But for our chaotic system, there are still more advantages. What are the advantages? The fact that our hierarchical system is built on the idea that someone has to prove to someone else that he/she has a higher rank, higher shoulder straps, which means I am smarter, I can make decisions. It means that I am the one who has to finally tell everyone who runs where. This is also a big disease - this manual style of management. Unfortunately, it is not Soviet. It is used by many people who received military education after the Soviet Union. And so. This desire to destroy someone, to take revenge on someone, Zaluzhnyi has practically no such desire. The army knows this. They know the shortcomings, they know that there are many contradictions. They know that Zaluzhnyi also made many bad personnel decisions. There are generals whose appointment raises questions, for example, General Zubanych - to what extent can this person be in his place, whether he corresponds to this position. Or General Silchenko. There are many people. General Lytvynov. The appointment of these people to high positions in the army causes people to have very reserved feelings. Because the results of their combat work are not obvious, to put it mildly, and cause a lot of criticism. But Zaluzhnyi was not trying to destroy anyone. And this is a precedent for our army system, for power systems in general. People understood that this was because Zaluzhnyi did not want to finish people off. He can give people a chance to work within the system. In general, I would like to say that in our chaotic system, where everyone is always with some kind of political connections, this is a positive trait for a leader. What I see is objective. Now that we have seen this change, the question arises: what will happen next? The army had an inefficient management system in many elements. But it was based not on the fact that the country's leadership had created some kind of logic, but because there was Zaluzhnyi, who built this logic around his name. And what will happen this time?
WHY DID ZALUZHNYI NOT HAVE FULL POWER IN HIS POSITION?
Now let's look at what powers the country's leadership gave Zaluzhnyi - and what he could actually do?
We have a situation where our war management system is completely fragmented. We have Zaluzhnyi, the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, but at the same time, he was not actually in charge of the ground forces. The vertical of the army and in fact half of the army of the Khortytsia OSGT was and is under the leadership of Oleksandr Syrskyi. Syrskyi also had a direct connection with the President's Office and his own tasks. And Commander-in-Chief Zelenskyy, after the first fear after the Russian invasion had passed, began to intervene more actively in the management of the army together with the President's Office. In order to interfere, they actually fragmented the entire command. The Syrskyi vertical emerged. Budanov's army of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine emerged, and the Special Operations Forces had their own vertical of command. I would like to remind you that President Zelenskyy, without even Zaluzhnyi's knowledge, dismissed and appointed the heads of the Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. A vertical of communication with the airborne assault troops, the air force, and the logistics forces have emerged. And everywhere, the President's Office, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Andrii Yermak called directly, demanded something, and made decisions. And all of this without Zaluzhnyi's approval. Therefore, I cannot say that he bears full responsibility for the army. Because the state has not created such a full vertical of responsibility for the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Therefore, in previous broadcasts, I have always said: it is impossible for us to do it this way, that Supreme Commander-in-Chief Zelenskyy, who is responsible for the defense of Ukraine under the Constitution, does not trust and constantly criticizes his Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, this is an abnormal situation. There is only one way to resolve the situation and destroy this fragmentation and chaos in the command and control system: when Volodymyr Zelenskyy entrusts one person with the leadership of all defense forces. The leadership of at least the Armed Forces alone, in one hand. And when Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Andrii Yermak stop interfering in the management of individual branches of the armed forces, individual operational and strategic departments. Because these decisions only worsen the situation at the front. They create conflicts within. They create contradictions between different decisions. These are conflicts that the government itself creates in the army leadership. This reduces our effectiveness. It does not allow us to be responsible - this is the key issue - for the assigned work.
So, that's why I said that dismissing Zaluzhnyi or giving him all the powers is not an alternative. Of course, the president made a more convenient political decision to remove an inconvenient person. Frankly speaking, I think that Zelenskyy's decision is wrong and unjustified by the situation. Because in fact, the president himself, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, is responsible for most of the things that Zaluzhnyi is now being blamed for. And all of this can be seen by simply reading the legislation and the scope of his powers. That's why I thought that a more effective way was to create a vertical management structure that the president would trust. That is, strengthening Zaluzhnyi, perhaps with some deputies, new changes in the command of the military services, especially important changes in the operational and tactical departments along the entire front. But there must be one vertical. The president should say: that's it, I will appoint everyone now, please, I trust you. But the president decided that he did not trust Zaluzhnyi. This is his authority.
Now we need to understand what will happen next with our war and the Defense Forces. So, let's take a look at what President Zelenskyy wants to do with his decision. Today (broadcast on 8.02.2024 - ed.), having dismissed Zaluzhnyi, President Zelenskyy appointed a new head of the Armed Forces. He appointed Oleksandr Syrskyi, who is currently the commander of the Army and the commander of the Khortytsia OSGT, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. But today (broadcast on 8.02.2024 - ed.), the president made a statement that we must analyze. The statement about Zaluzhnyi's dismissal gives a lot of facts. We will be able to check it to see how true it is, and then the promises that the president made here. And this is important for our understanding of what will happen next.
ZELENSKY'S STATEMENT ON THE APPOINTMENT OF SYRYSKYI
I quote President Zelenskyy's statement. "Starting today, a new management team takes over the leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. I want our soldiers in Robotyne or Avdiivka, as well as the General Staff and the General Staff to have the same vision of the war. Everyone whose experience will serve to renew the Armed Forces is being carefully selected. Today I spoke to Brigadier Generals Andrii Hnatov, Mykhailo Drapatyi, Ihor Skybiuk and Colonels Pavlo Palisa and Vadym Sukharevskyi. All of them are being considered for leadership positions in the army and will serve under the leadership of the most experienced commander, Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi. He has successful experience in defense - he led the Kyiv defense operation. He also has a successful experience of offensive - the Kharkiv liberation operation. I have appointed Colonel General Syrskyi as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Today I spoke with Generals Moisiuk and Zabrodskyi. Their experience is in the service of the state. I expect such changes in the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the near future. I expect the following changes in the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the near future. First. A realistic, detailed action plan for the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2024 should be put on the table. Taking into account the real situation on the battlefield now and the prospects. Secondly. Each combat brigade on the first line should receive effective Western weapons - there should be a fair redistribution of such weapons in favor of the first line of the front. Logistical problems must be resolved. Avdiivka should not wait for the generals to find out where their drones are stuck in their warehouses. Fourth. Every general must know the front. If a general does not know the front, he is not serving Ukraine. Fifth. Excessive and unjustified staffing levels should be corrected. Sixth. An effective system of rotations must be built in the army. The experience of certain combat brigades of the Armed Forces and units of the State Border Guard Service, where such a system exists, can be used as a basis. Rotations are a must. There is a clear need to improve the quality of training for soldiers - only trained soldiers on the front line." Yes, and one, two, three, four, five, six, seven and eight. "A new branch of the Armed Forces is being created in the structure of the Armed Forces - the Unmanned Systems Forces. The first commander must be appointed. Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi will present the team of the restart of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the coming days. The year 2024 can be successful for Ukraine only if we make effective changes in the basis of our defense, which is the Armed Forces of Ukraine."
ABOUT THE NEW TEAM OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
Now we will analyze the president's statement. Because we know that Volodymyr Oleksandrovych very often voices the text written by speechwriters and the meaning of which he is not entirely aware. Sometimes they write things that are lies. And he voices it all, apparently, without being able to correct himself. That is why it is very important to conduct a professional examination of what Zelenskyy said.
What did I notice? The names of the people with whom the president met today. These names - Andrii Hnatov, Mykhailo Drapatyi, Ihor Skybiuk, Pavlo Palisa, Vadym Sukharevskyi - these names seem very encouraging. For all my critical attitude toward the government, I generally liked this list. Andrii Hnatov is a man known in the marines as a Marine Brigade Commander.
GENERAL DRAPATYI
Mykhailo Drapatyi is a very well-respected person in the army, who is the commander of the operational and strategic group. In my opinion, he is currently the most competent Ukrainian commander in his position, and he is doing a really professional job. Communication with Mykhailo Drapatyi evokes a great deal of respect. The army knows Drapatyi very well. He is a person who is very far from publicity and politics, but who has great authority.
Ihor Skybiuk. At the beginning of the war, Ihor Skybiuk commanded the 10th Air Assault Brigade. Now he is the Chief of Staff of the Air Assault Troops. He is also an honorable person in the Air Assault Forces, competent and respected. The 80th Brigade, I think, is one of those units that has been to literally all parts of the frontline, like a fire brigade, and performed strategic tasks. It is a unique and effective unit. Skybiuk is also a respected and competent person.
COLONEL PAVLO PALISA
Colonel Pavlo Palisa, commander of the 93rd Mechanized Brigade. He is also a man who studied in the United States, has a Western education, critical thinking and is generally respected in the troops. He is a truly competent commander.
COLONEL VADYM SUKHAREVSKYI
Vadym Sukharevskyi. I think the whole country knows this man. It was Senior Lieutenant Vadym Sukharevskyi who opened the war. It was he who on April 14, 2014, became the first Ukrainian commander, the first military man who ordered to open fire on the Russian occupiers, on the saboteurs of Girkin's unit near Sloviansk, the FSB unit of the Russian Federation, and until recently Vadym Sukharevskyi was the commander of the 59th Motorized Infantry Brigade. It is also one of the best units. He literally created it from scratch, because the brigade was defeated and suffered heavy losses in the early part of the war. However, Vadym Sukharevskyi restored the unit's combat capability and the brigade is performing very important tasks south of Avdiivka.
Each of these five people is a true authority. The fact that the president talked to them inspires respect for this act of Volodymyr Zelenskyy. I hope that this is not just PR. These meetings will be followed by decisions. And these people will not just get a position or a title, but they will get the most important thing - the authority, the ability to choose their team, the ability to spread the good management practices they have. Will they be able to do it? We will see. I don't know yet, because where Volodymyr Zelenskyy says something or is written to, it can sometimes be "two times two is five". But this application is interesting. We will follow these decisions. These people are truly worthy of higher, senior positions.
"Today I spoke with Generals Moisiuk and Zabrodskyi. Their experience is in the service of the state."
Well, I understand that Zabrodskyi and Moisiuk are deputy chiefs of the General Staff. This is Zaluzhnyi's team. They will also be dismissed. Zaluzhnyi's team is leaving. It doesn't say anything about Chief of the General Staff Shaptala. However, it is obvious that this position will be vacated for someone from Syrskyi's team. We will talk about Oleksandr Syrskyi later. Regarding other statements by the president: What tasks does the Supreme Commander-in-Chief now set for Syrskyi?
"THIS WILL NOT BE SOLVED BY SYRSKYI!"
"A realistic, detailed action plan for the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2024 should be on the table. Taking into account the real situation on the battlefield now and the prospects."
This first point is an absolute manipulation and, unfortunately, none of this will be fulfilled. How can there be a realistic action plan for the Armed Forces when the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the government of the "servants of the people" have not yet passed a law on mobilization? They have not yet determined how many people they will mobilize into the Armed Forces in a year. So far, I want to tell you that at this point, 38 days have passed since the beginning of 2024, not a single contract for the production of an army of drones - the million drones that Volodymyr Zelenskyy spoke about in December - has been paid for. They have just begun to be signed. Ammunition. There is no production of shells. We produce mines in small quantities, unfortunately. We do not have our own production of gunpowder, fuzes - we still do not do this. The state and the Cabinet of Ministers have not allocated equipment, have not engaged state construction organizations to build strategic defense lines.
All this will not be solved by Syrskyi. And not only Syrskyi. Napoleon. Dwight Eisenhower. No commander-in-chief will do this. Because this is the task of Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself. It is he who must calculate what forces and resources he will give the army for the third year of the war. And when the president has such calculations, Syrskyi will be able to write a plan. But now Zelenskyy is once again continuing his political games, and he is shifting the responsibility for the lack of strategy and lack of planned actions from himself to Syrskyi. He wants Syrskyi to immediately become a whipping boy. And here, the context is set as if Zaluzhnyi did not give such a plan for 2024. Is this true again? Where are the resources? You didn't give the army resources, you didn't define them - this is your responsibility, Supreme Commander-in-Chief. And the demands are made of the military leadership. In the third year, hearing this is a kind of spaciousness and isolation. I would like to see the headquarters of the Supreme Command and Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself not only say something to the military with whom he communicates but try to understand a little bit what decisions are expected of him. Decisions, not photo shoots in the work near Avdiivka. Decisions are required from the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Syrskyi was given the same task as Zaluzhnyi was dismissed for. I can say that Syrskyi will not make any realistic plan without determining how many people will be mobilized, how much equipment we will receive from the allies, how much ammunition Ukraine will produce and how much we will receive from the allies. That is, you can write a piece of paper and call it "Realistic Detailed Plan of the Armed Forces for 2024." It will be just a blank paper with some banal generalities.
Next. The second point of the president's instructions to Syrskyi. "Each combat brigade on the first line should receive effective Western weapons - there should be a fair redistribution of such weapons in favor of the first line of the front."
To be honest, this is some kind of kindergarten - to redistribute weapons. This is what the Supreme Commander-in-Chief says. To redistribute weapons to the first line. The level of planning, as if a child was told how to do well in the army, tell me? Let's redistribute the weapons. Excuse me, do we have enough weapons? Do we have brigades somewhere in the rear with a lot of weapons that are not sent to the front line? Unfortunately, no. For example, we have some armored vehicles used in various law enforcement agencies. They will not give them to the infantry anyway. And the number of weapons is not enough - what is there to redistribute? To be honest, the main problem is the organization of the use of the Armed Forces. The proper use of available weapons at the front. And most of the Western weapons already work. Writing such ridiculous things in the action plan for the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces is just the level of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. This is a kindergarten. Unfortunately, we see that here Volodymyr Zelenskyy is a PR campaign aimed at very uneducated people who have no idea what the army is. I am disappointed with these statements, to be honest. The second point.
Third point. "We need to solve the problems with logistics. Avdiivka should not wait for the generals to find out where their drones are stuck in their warehouses."
There are indeed problems with logistics in the army. And Volodymyr Zelenskyy did raise this issue at the headquarters meeting. The 26 thousand drones he mentioned were distributed very slowly. And this is the responsibility of the army command. On the other hand, I would like to say that the logistics forces also have a command in direct communication with the President's Office, and have their own autonomy from the Armed Forces. Here, again, we have to go for a conflict. We hope that Syrskyi will go for a conflict with the Office, resolve this problem and change the command of the logistics forces. Perhaps he will be allowed to do so. The main problem we have with drones is to have something to distribute. The brigade that defends Avdiivka received 250 fpvs for the whole of Avdiivka on January 2024. That's enough for about 4 days if you use light mode. So the main problem is the lack of drones. And drones, I mean, none of these million drones are being manufactured so far. The manufacturers have not received funding. Therefore, Volodymyr Zelenskyy must first of all assign this task to himself.
Fourth point. "Every general must know the front. If a general does not know the front, he does not serve Ukraine."
Well, these are general wishes. Generals, be good, don't be bad. Be good generals. This is completely unspecific. A general does not know the front, does not serve Ukraine. It's just... empty words.
"The excessive and unjustified number of staffs should be corrected."
This is again populism. In fact, the number of staff in the headquarters is regulated by operational management guidelines. I don't think it is possible to reduce the number of headquarters. Moreover. We all have a shortage of officers or competent operators everywhere - from battalion, brigade and above. So I would say that we have an unjustified, too-large number of headquarters. We have a complicated management structure. For example, at the front, we have a duplicated management system. There are operational and tactical departments that manage brigades, and above them there are operational and strategic departments that also manage the same brigades. We have these OSGTs (operational-strategic group of troops - ed. note), operational and strategic departments - I don't know if there is any need for them at all in the conditions of a stable front and the presence of OTGs (operational-tactical groups - ed. note). Because the key link in the management of brigades is still the OTGs. Let's reduce OTGs. The military commands were created because the president himself decided to divide the army into the Syrskyi OSGT and Tarnavskyi-Zaluzhnyi OSGTs . Whose decision is this and who is to be instructed? We have also created a large number of military units. They are not provided with personnel. We have a shortage of soldiers. But there is an excessive number of headquarters. That is, we need to reduce the administrative structure, and the number of headquarters themselves - we just need to identify competent commanders and give them authority, I would say. They will staff their headquarters themselves. Otherwise, we have a lot of understaffed troops. That's why the number of commanders is much higher. It is harder to find soldiers than staff officers. That is, the very logic of the question is incorrect.
Next, the sixth point of Zelenskyy's demands. "We need to build an effective rotation system in the army. The experience of certain combat brigades of the Armed Forces and units of the State Border Guard Service, where such a system exists, can be used as a basis. Rotations are a must."
Yes, it would be great. If there were rotations and if there were replacements. To do this, we don't really need to learn from the experience of individual brigades, we just need to change the practice of using the Armed Forces. The practice of use is different. The State Border Guard Service units are subordinated to attached units, they have their own procedure for use. The rotations there are much better than in the Armed Forces. In some brigades of the Armed Forces, they also think about rotations, changing people. But in reality, there is no normal rotation anywhere. There is no optimal rotation in any brigade of the Armed Forces. And the reason is that all our troops are built up, they are being deployed into a thin line when they are used. They always lack a second echelon and cannot conduct internal rotations. It is impossible. Another question is why we do not have enough people and troops to build a two-line front? Because we do not have mass mobilization and we do not compensate for the lack of people in any way. There is no rotation. We rely on the people who stay until the end. Then they get exhausted, tired, die, get wounded, and the frontline collapses. But, excuse me, who is responsible for mobilization? Volodymyr Oleksandrovych, you should have written down this point for yourself. Not Syrskyi. Syrskyi would have done a rotation, and Zaluzhnyi would have done a rotation - there would have been people to do it. Mobilization is needed. On the one hand, this problem depends on mobilization, and on the other hand, it depends on application. We need rotation, we need deployment, and we need strategic defense lines to protect people. Are they being built anywhere in Ukraine? There are no strategic fortifications on the frontline, nothing like what Russia is doing. They have not been built and are not being built now. That is, people and human resources are not being saved. We suffer great losses because of this. Because we have a defense line - we sent people with shovels to dig trenches for ourselves. This is the defense line. No concrete, no equipment. It is simply not used. This is a particular initiative of certain units in certain places.
Next. Seventh point. "There is a need for an obvious improvement in the quality of training of soldiers - only trained soldiers on the first line."
This is great. A good wish for the commander of the ground forces, Syrskyi. To be honest, I would like not just a wish, but to finally say, in the third year of the war, what kind of training should be conducted. Because these are empty words. A child in the street can say that: "Soldiers need to be trained. What do we have to do? We need to make a decision. It can be an order from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief at the headquarters that soldiers are not allowed to go to the front without a training course with clearly defined exams and skills. That training takes place not only in training centers, but first of all, time should be allocated for training in the combat brigades themselves, and that they should be checked for knowledge of tactical medicine, what exams they conduct, the speed of tourniquet application, and the use of all other means of tactical assistance. Then there is shooting, as it should be. Orientation, communication, camouflage. Everything that a soldier needs should be put into a training program and the results should be checked, and without passing the exams under this program, the soldier should not be allowed to go to the front. Soldiers must be trained. I have been hearing this for 20 years. And what is the result? Today, for example, my friends from the Special Operations Forces also write to me: a group is being formed, all volunteers, but not trained, help us, what to do? I say: write a report, how can you throw untrained people into battle? Give them at least three weeks of training. And they will be motivated and prepared. You will be able to use them. What is training? In our country, training means that a person can spend a month at the training ground, live in a tent, shoot two horns once, and he or she is told: you are trained, you have been in the training center for a month. No one really checks what the training consists of.
Further. "A new branch of the Armed Forces is being created in the structure of the Armed Forces - the Unmanned Systems Forces. The first commander must be appointed."
I hope that a commander will be appointed. Let's see now. It looks very optimistic. But any of us who are helping has a certain understanding of this. The unmanned systems forces are the right direction, this is to be welcomed. But all of this will be effective and work only if the state begins to systematically provide these forces. This means equipment and technical specialists. We will see. We hope so. However, the war is going on right now, today, and not a single drone under the 2024 program has been paid for. Not a single one! Not a single one of the million promised by the president. That is why I support this eighth point of the President's statement, it is a long overdue decision. I, like many other people, have been talking and writing about it. This is the right decision of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, which I fully share.
ABOUT OLEKSANDR SYRSKYI
Now let's talk about the personality of Oleksandr Syrskyi. Oleksandr Syrskyi is a person who is very well-known in the army. And most of the military, to be honest, are very critical of him. Will he replace Zaluzhnyi? No, he won't. This is out of the question. He will not be able to replace Zaluzhnyi. Zaluzhnyi has created his own system of relations in the army, his own idea of the command system, and he will not be able to replace him. Syrsky is not a sociable person. He is a person with a completely different vision of the command system. Let's see, in my opinion, what are the main challenges facing Oleksandr Syrskyi and why is he disliked?
I want to say that the biggest criticism we have in any state system always comes not from journalists, but from the head of the state. It always comes from his subordinates. So, Oleksandr Syrskyi's main critics are always his subordinates. And especially the commanders of the brigades and battalions that report to him. Because Oleksandr Syrskyi has one big problem. He likes to command separate platoons and companies. This micromanagement has very destructive consequences for any unit. In my opinion, the main challenge and the main criticism of Syrskyi is related to this. I expect that Oleksandr Syrskyi will still manage the existing institutions of the army, the existing organisms, without replacing them, without jumping from top to bottom. This is the main challenge. If he does not do this, it will be complete chaos. I can't say that there is no micromanagement in Tarnavskyi's operational group, which is actually competing with Syrskyi in reports at the headquarters. Unfortunately, he is there too. Generals also intervene and give instructions. But they do not lead individual platoons. There are no such orders. This is a significant difference. That is, there are a lot of incompetent decisions, but there is no such interference. This micromanagement is the scourge of the army, it is not needed at all. I hope that when Oleksandr Syrskyi takes over the top position and assumes maximum responsibility, he will pay attention and organize the management system differently. I hope that Oleksandr Syrskyi will have all the powers to do so. Valerii Zaluzhnyi did not have all the powers and responsibilities. So I will not say now that Syrskyi's appointment is a disaster. We are still fighting. The main burden in the army, why Ukraine held on, why the Ukrainian miracle of 2022 happened, is that Ukraine was held on, the front was held on, and the enemy was defeated. It was defeated because it was a Ukrainian soldier who withstood it. A Ukrainian soldier. First and foremost, the infantry soldier, those who went to zero point, held the front and went forward. These are the main people. Now we have a great responsibility to these people to ensure that we have a decent command in such difficult conditions. I want to tell you that Oleksandr Syrskyk will not win any laurels in this position. The situation at the front is very difficult. It now depends not only on the head of the Armed Forces. It depends on the systemic efforts of the entire state. And systemic changes are impossible without the position of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. First of all, Volodymyr Zelenskyy should give Syrskyi responsibility for the entire army and stop the practice of interfering in the management through the head of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. If this happens, Oleksandr Syrskyi will have the opportunity to replace many of the people who were not possible, for example, under Valerii Zaluzhnyi. I think it is absolutely clear that we need to replace all the commanders of operational and tactical departments with brigade commanders who have experience in modern warfare and have shown high combat capability. It is the level of operational and tactical departments that is key to command and control in war. Changes are also needed at the command level in many brigades. There must be competent commanders who have gained leadership in the war and who are respected. Syrskyi needs to increase his personal popularity, I'm not saying his personal popularity. This is absolutely impossible. He is a different kind of person. His only chance to be effective is to increase institutional trust within the army in his high command. To do this, he must command and make decisions at the strategic level. He has to get political carte blanche and trust from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Zelenskyy. These are two difficult tasks. If this is a wish that I am finally at the top, I will now organize a Moshchun at every site, not a step back - to stand to the death against the Russian army, which outnumbers us in terms of shells, mines, planes, bombs, and is not inferior in terms of drones, standing to the death is the first step to defeat. We need them to stand to the death, while we survive. This is the main challenge in this war. Who will be the first to organize the army so that it suffers losses several times lower than the enemy. This requires strategic decisions on a national scale. Large-scale modernization of communication and control means. Large-scale introduction of drone technology. Large-scale production of ammunition. Large-scale production of artillery and mortars. All this must be done comprehensively and we must be ahead of the enemy in these system solutions. Because we are now catching up with Russia. And we must be ahead. By months. This requires intellectual leadership and political authority. And it is up to Syrskyi to stop interfering in the management of the army and the war and preventing the army from fighting, to stop Zelenskyy from giving some small instructions that actually hinder the army and create conflicts. Will Yermak stop interfering in government contracts with his people? Much depends on this. It is up to Syrskyi to decide. It is his responsibility. And of course, the army is also expecting strategic decisions, decisions that would show institutional trust, not a desire to interfere somewhere, to close a hole with a platoon.
Such decisions can really strengthen the army. Because the army is not just Syrskyi. And it is not just Zaluzhnyi. It is not just Zelenskyy or anyone else. The army is the Ukrainian people, and the army needs systemic solutions. Volodymyr Zelenskyy received his authority from the people of Ukraine. Now he has taken sole responsibility for very big changes, which he has determined, sometimes successfully, sometimes unsuccessfully, and sometimes ineptly for the army. Which he determined for Syrskyi. And now Volodymyr Zelenskyy has taken responsibility for many, many other issues. Our task is still to help these changes.
"I WAS ALSO ASKED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COUNTRY'S LEADERSHIP ABOUT PERSONNEL CHANGES AT THE MIDDLE LEVEL"
I would like to tell you that I was also asked by representatives of the country's leadership about my opinion on possible personnel changes at the mid-level, and I named some commanders, brigade commanders and generals whom I consider to be quite competent and whose management practices should be disseminated. I hope that this will be done and that I was interviewed not only for the sake of PR, to praise something in the president's actions, but that it was done to really introduce systemic changes. We will continue to monitor this.
I will now take questions. I am sorry that it took so long. But it is a big topic.
What do the military themselves say about General Zaluzhnyi's resignation?
Most of the army perceives it very negatively. I want to tell you that for the Armed Forces, the state leader who leads to victory, who consolidates the army, is Valerii Zaluzhnyi, not Volodymyr Zelenskyi. The government in the army, as well as in our society, is perceived quite critically by the majority of the military. An infantryman who sits alone and holds the line in the absence of ammunition, support, drones, and everything else, and raises money from volunteers for everything, does not need to be shown a telethon. These people have a very clear perception of our government and are critical of its effectiveness. But they trusted Valerii Zaluzhny. Now people do not know what will happen next. I hope that Oleksandr Syrskyi will appoint competent commanders - not people like Bohomolov, whom he appointed to Soledar, but those who have real authority and trust in the army and are not micromanagers or clerical workers. If these are changes that come from the personnel brigades, changes that are trusted by the soldiers, it will be positively perceived. Then Syrskyi will not be loved, that's for sure. But at least he will be respected and the army leadership will be respected. And this is the most important thing. In the army, there is no need to love a general very much. You need to see the logic and respect the system. This is very important for now because our country is in a state of crisis.
I read on Censor that the Washington Post wrote that the Ukrainian front is collapsing and close to disaster. Do you share this assessment?
Yes, the Washington Post wrote that. It is true. The problems at the front are very big. I have been talking about this for months and years. The situation is critical. It has been critical from the first day, even when we conducted our offensive operations, they were conducted in conditions of the numerical superiority of Russian troops. The enemy outnumbered us in all types of munitions and in the number of infantry personnel. Therefore, of course, the situation at the front is very difficult, as mobilization is not carried out systematically. No one sends the trained replenishment that the president is talking about. Weapons production has not been launched in Ukraine. That's why there are problems at the front. How can there not be? The frontline is collapsing, and we see that our troops have already had to withdraw. I'm not saying it's a disaster. But the enemy now has a great tactical advantage along the entire front line and is advancing in all areas. Therefore, the situation is critical and requires systemic strategic decisions. Unfortunately, much more than what the president wrote. There are 8 points here. The president's statement is completely untrue. The president is flying in the clouds. When Volodymyr Zelenskyy comes to the front and takes photos, he arrives for 30 minutes, shakes hands, hands over a couple of orders, takes photos and videos, and quickly runs back. This does not mean that a person understands anything about what is happening at the front when he or she is guarded, escorted, flies somewhere with the electronic warfare and quickly disappears. That's why we need systemic solutions. I think we need... you can write me advice, your vision of what Oleksandr Syrskyi really expects from the new command of the Armed Forces. What the soldiers expect. Soldiers, volunteers who help the front. I think that such a program should be written. Perhaps, it should be made public so that some kind of communication could be on a professional level because it is simply strange to discuss this kindergarten, which was announced by the president today in some points. I hope that these worthy people will be appointed, with whom the president has communicated, and they will bring their vision. And the personnel decisions will allow us to make some more adequate agenda of changes in the army. Because what is written here is kindergarten. It is impossible to implement it in this form.
Syrskyi is a better military leader than Zaluzhnyi
I had a whole broadcast: Syrskyi or Zaluzhnyi. I honestly don't see any differences between Syrskyi and Zaluzhnyi as military leaders. But it is difficult to compare them. They worked at different levels. Zaluzhnyi's level of responsibility was the whole country. With whom can we compare him? No one. In 2022, we held on in an absolutely hopeless situation when the country's leadership refused to deploy the army and prepare for war. They refused to buy ammunition. And the army held out. And the people supported the army. This is a miracle. Therefore, there is no one to compare Zaluzhnyi with. Syrskyi really led the troops. He led, for example, during the Kharkiv offensive. But it should be noted that the Kharkiv offensive was successful because at that moment the main forces of the Russian troops were simultaneously confined to the Kherson bridgehead, where another group of our troops was conducting an offensive operation. It was not successful. But it was a hard battle with heavy losses on both sides. But all the main reserves of the Russian troops, all the main forces at that time were working on the Kherson direction. And I want to say that Syrskyi led two successful operations in the Kharkiv region. One was near Kharkiv in May 2022. And the second in the Kharkiv region, the Izium-Balakliia operation. This is already in September. But this operation became possible because Zaluzhnyi's decisions kept the enemy confined to the Kherson direction. So how can we compare them? I believe that Oleksandr Syrskyi can be effective in his new position, but for this, he needs to take a critical look at himself and rethink his position - what he does in the war and how he leads. He can be effective. But for this, he needs to believe that he is capable of change. There will be personnel changes. If some generals who have absolutely no authority in the troops, but who are close to Syrskyi, are promoted and given full responsibility, then we will conclude that Syrskyi cannot change. If there are a large number of competent appointments and these people are empowered, then we can say that Syrskyi is doing the right thing. So far, the army has a very, very critical and cautious attitude towards Syrskyi's appointment. This is a fact.
Is the liberation of the Kyiv and Kharkiv regions really Syrskyi's achievement?
This is primitive propaganda from the President's Office when they want to remove Zaluzhnyi, but they do it with such shameful methods. Just to humiliate a person, to exalt someone. Syrskyi did not do anything on his own, neither in Kyiv nor in the Kharkiv region. He was integrated into the system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which were led by Zaluzhnyi. This definition of who is better and who is not is artificial. It should be noted objectively that in September 2022, when the Kharkiv operation was carried out, Oleksandr Syrskyi did a lot to put together a strike force for a breakthrough. He insisted on his opinion and made a number of right decisions. Absolutely. He led this operation. I will say this objectively. But to say that this is the merit of one person, to be honest, would be a completely biased approach. It's just the President's Office, and the "servants of the people" are constantly working to split the military leadership. All these theses are being thrown in by the President's Office, so please do not fall for this propaganda. The army is a single organism and should be an organism. And the fact that there is no vertical and Syrskyi is opposed to Zaluzhnyi is only because Volodymyr Zelenskyi himself fragmented and created chaos in military management during the war. This needs to be changed.
I'm listening to you, so it turns out that in general, the replacement of the chief executive is for the better, isn`t it?
I don't think it's impossible to change people's positions, because Zaluzhnyi was not a senior executive. He was subordinate to Zelenskyy. Zelenskyy had the authority to do so. To say that the change has been for the better, we need to look at at least some of the decisions and actions of the new commander-in-chief, Syrskyi. Whom he has appointed, first of all, what changes will be made. I can only estimate that if we compare the authority and trust in the troops to Zaluzhnyi and Syryskyi, these are incomparable things at all. We know that the trust in Zaluzhnyi is, in principle, higher than in anyone else in the state, and even the president is definitely less trusted than Zaluzhnyi.
I watched the last interview with Shaitan. Thank you very much.
The interview was released today (8.02.2024 - ed.). I advise everyone to watch it. An interview with a captured Russian commander. This is the only Russian battalion commander who was captured by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 2023. And the commander of the first battalion Alga of the 72nd motorized rifle brigade of the Russian Armed Forces in the village of Andriivka was captured by the soldiers of the Third Assault Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, commanded by Colonel Andriy Biletsky. Ukrainian heroes completely defeated the 72nd Brigade. The first battalion, commanded by Major Timur Abdurakhmanov, was completely destroyed in the village of Andriivka along with two other battalions of the brigade. Major Abdurakhmanov was taken prisoner by wounded soldiers of the third assault brigade. I highly recommend this interview. There are many interesting moments in it. Honor and glory to the third assault brigade.
I think we'll finish up for today. I am very grateful to everyone who watches and thankful to our sponsors. 1907 sponsors of the Butusov+ channel make it possible for us to broadcast on a regular basis. We will be watching the changes. In the near future, I will be back on air to comment on this unprecedented event - the change in the leadership of the Armed Forces. We will also talk about other domestic political issues. About the scandal with illegal surveillance of Bihus.info.
Today, more than ever, I am focused, I believe that we need to go to Victory and be together. We need to have a common vision, we need intellectual leadership, and this intellectual leadership in Ukraine is not created by the government, but by us, civil society. That is why today I am more confident than ever in our Victory. Thank you for the broadcast and glory to Ukraine!
