Why was Sodol dismissed and what will change?
We are facing a very important and unprecedented event in the history of the Ukrainian Defense Forces, which should be given maximum attention.
For the first time, Lieutenant General Yurii Sodol, commander of the Khortytsia operational and strategic group of troops, one of the largest groups in the Defense Forces, which holds the largest frontline, the largest section of the front, and commander of the Joint Forces, was resigned from his post due to a conflict with the command of one of the combat brigades, namely the 12th Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine AZOV.
SODOL WAS DISMISSED DUE TO A CONFLICT WITH AZOV
The situation is absolutely unprecedented, when subordinates raised the issue of the incompetence of one of the highest commanders of the Ukrainian Defense Forces, and the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief considered this issue, and literally within a day, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy made a personal decision to dismiss Yurii Sodol. I think that such an event is unprecedented in the history of any country. This is really a very big event for all of us, which shows that there are actually many events that can be marked at once.
First of all, when people with combat merit, who hold on to each other, a combat team, raise the issue of the responsibility of the higher command openly, it turns out that in these situations, with public support, the situation can be resolved not only by punitive measures against these subordinates but quite the opposite can be done in favor of dismissing this higher commander. This is an event that is very important for Ukraine and our Defense Forces.
Secondly, it turns out that public opinion and authority can really change the situation and attitude towards the commander. I want to remind you that Yurii Sodol became the commander of the OSGT Khortytsia back in February 2024. And he was only the head of the OSGT until June. This is also a very important event. This public opinion, I would like to remind you, was initially created, i.e. there were several statements before the Chief of Staff of the Azov Army Bohdan Kratevych spoke, before that there were statements by several bloggers, a people's deputy of Ukraine. But public opinion worked.
The third factor. It has become obvious that the position of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Volodymyr Zelenskyy personally do have an impact on the situation and can quickly replace any of the top leaders. This is where many people and the propaganda itself, by the way, the "Servants of the People" tells Zelenskyy's supporters on the Internet that he has nothing to do with the war and has no influence or knowledge of it at all. This is not true, we have talked about this many times. In fact, according to the law of Ukraine, the Constitution, and all the powers, it is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief who decides everything, who controls the resources and all personnel appointments. This is just an important example that, in fact, when there are certain problems in the army, in fact, it is provided for by law, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief must make quick decisions.
Fourth, I would like to note that this is a great window of opportunity for our army. This is a reason for the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi, to think that times are changing and that an informal hierarchy of commanders with a reputation is being created in the country. Commanders who have the support of public opinion, who have combat teams behind them, who cannot be simply driven away on command, removed, dismissed, or tighten the screws, because it doesn't work that way anymore. There is a long war going on, a brutal war, with heavy losses, and people will not tolerate irresponsible decisions continuing at the front, at the strategic level, at the operational level. This will create conflicts, and I am sure that this is not the last conflict.
By the way, I want to say it's not the first. The first public one, I would say. So, this is a reason for the command of the Armed Forces, the Defense Forces of Ukraine, and all structures to think about it. For the first time, what we need to take care of is trust within the army's management structure. Trust between the general staff, the leadership, the highest, operational, strategic level, and those people who make war, who are responsible for their area of defense and for the people in that area. These are brigade commanders, battalion commanders, company commanders. These are the people who carry this war on their backs, which depends entirely on them. And unfortunately, we have a big gap between these levels in the army. The generals live their own lives, the OTG, the OSGT, they have their own ideas about the war, which are completely paper-based and very little connected to reality. Then there is the command level, the middle level, brigades, battalions. And then there are those people who walk on zero line. These are company commanders, platoon commanders, squad leaders. These are the soldiers who hold the positions and make these lines on the map real. They draw them with their own hands, with their own bravery, with their own shovels, with their own machine guns. That is why we have a gap in all these links. The army is not united, the defense forces are not united. There are superiors, leaders, those who are in charge of the war, responsible for the areas. There are those who are fighting in these areas, killing enemies and dying. These are Ukrainian heroes in the trenches. I would like to say that all these factors have merged into one. And this case now is just unprecedented. I think this is actually such a big step forward for Ukraine. Strengthening the influence of civil society on personnel decisions, on leadership in the defense forces is the best way to reform and quickly change the defense forces in time of war. And such changes are desperately needed.
ARMY AND COMMUNICATION
The army has to change. It is not changing, it is not keeping up with the changes. It cannot be ahead of the enemy in many areas. It cannot lead the changes that are necessary in the defense forces. Therefore, I do not believe that interaction is a mistake of the military. They do not know how to do it. The military leadership has never been taught to do this. They don't know how to communicate, interact with civil society and use its enormous resources. That is why the army must be flexible, it must listen, it must rely, it must think about how to rely on public opinion, how to build trust, first of all, internally, to itself. We don't have this, and we need to strengthen this sector segment. Our flexibility, intelligent decisions, changes, personnel changes are our strengths. This is the strength of a democratic society, which the Russian army does not have. And we need to use our advantage. So, what happened? Let's look at it again in detail. I think many people know, but it needs to be repeated.
Let's look at that memorable post of the Chief of Staff of the 12th Brigade AZOV or the 12th Brigade of the National Guard, Bohdan Krotevych.
I wrote a letter to the State Bureau of Investigation calling for an investigation into a military general who, in my opinion, killed more Ukrainian soldiers than any Russian general. I give a damn that they judge combatants and brigadiers for the loss of an observation post. But they don't judge a general for the loss of regions and the loss of thousands of soldiers."
WHY DID BOHDAN KROTEVYCH APPLY TO THE SBI FOR SODOL?
Let's look at what really happened, what was the reason for Krotevich's harsh statement. The relationship between Azov and Sodol had already been hostile, to put it mildly. Why did this happen? At the beginning of the war, General Yurii Sodol was in charge of the sector of the OTG South, the Ukrainian defense forces that were part of the joint command of the Joint Forces Operation in Donbas.
SODOL AND MARIUPOL
It was Sodol who was responsible for organizing the defense of Mariupol and southern Donbas. That is, Mariupol, we know the situation, it was one of our main outposts, the main stronghold in Donbas, a very important strategic city, of course, its defense was paid attention to in words and on paper.
Sodol was responsible for the defense of Mariupol. What happened at the beginning of the war? We know that control was lost and the organization of defense in the south was practically failed. Already on February 24, the first day of the invasion, the Russians advanced up to 100 kilometers. They captured the bridges across the Dnipro River and moved on to Enerhodar, Tokmak, and Melitopol just as quickly. On February 25, the enemy captured Melitopol, and on February 26, they advanced on Berdiansk. It was obvious that the enemy was entering the rear of Mariupol. And at that moment, friends, because I was also in touch with the command of some of our units in the area, in particular, with the Azov Command, at that moment the Azov Command immediately asked General Sodol what to do, whether to fight there in a complete encirclement. There were two of our formations in Mariupol. There was the 12th Brigade of the National Guard, which included a separate Azov unit. And there was the 36th Marine Brigade. There were also separate rear units, small forces. That was the total, the actual number of people was about five and a half thousand.
On February 24, General Sodol was in Mariupol and held a meeting on the organization of defense, but the meeting did not define the areas of responsibility, who was doing what, what was the plan of action, who was covering the rear. Sodol, as we understand it, on the first day of the war, he set some rather general tasks and left Mariupol for his command post, which at that time was in Vuhledar. The Azov command saw what was happening day by day. On the first day of the war, Denys Prokopenko, commander of the Azov Special Forces detachment, spontaneously took over the defense functions without Sodol's order. Without authorization, he was a captain at the time. He took the initiative, and all the leaders, all the commanders agreed with him. But since it was an improvised decision that had been in place for a long time, no one had legitimized it, there were no separate orders for it, so, unfortunately, he could not make any decisions during those days that would help organize the defense of the city. Mariupol was not fortified with any perimeter engineering structures. The front was further away, the defense perimeter was open, and most importantly, it was completely open from the rear. There were no troops of ours. Neither in Bordiansk nor in Melitopol, there was just a small unit that left immediately. There was no fighting. From the very first day, the Azov command addressed General Sodol with an assessment of the situation and asked whether we should fight in Mariupol itself. Azov proposed, as did its commander Denys Prokopenko, to meet the enemy, to prevent the city from being surrounded, to meet the enemy at least at the level of Berdiansk in order to fight the enemy there. Azov was based on February 24 in the town of Urzuf near Mariupol, and it could have moved on to Berdiansk instead of Mariupol, and covered Mariupol from the rear. Unfortunately, all these requests were rejected by the Ukrainian command. General Sodol did not give permission to withdraw from Mariupol, to be able to delay the Russian offensive in Berdiansk.
Why did Azov criticize this from the first day? Because in reality, Mariupol was not prepared for defense at all. Not only was there a problem that there were no fortifications, neither along the perimeter nor inside the city. There were no stockpiles, no water, no medicines, nothing that is needed in a war. And the main thing that was not there was no ammunition stockpile. According to the documents, Azov went there with its regular D-30 howitzer division, which had less than one set of shells. Well, dear friends, this is nothing at all. According to the documents, they had no more than 80 shells per barrel. This is simply nothing. The day of the battle was not the most intense, to say the least. Of course, Azov made some illegal stockpiles of shells. It was about three more ammunition sets. Okay, it wasn't one day of fighting, they could shoot very sporadically for a week or two, maybe. A very limited number of shells. And that was it. In Mariupol itself, the Azovs found several 152-mm cannons and a small number of shells for them that belonged to another brigade, it seems, the 56th. They also took them into service. They just found them when they were patrolling the city. And from the very beginning, Azov's command said that there was no prospect of defending the city without shells. This is heroism, but it is absolutely heroism, which is doomed to defeat and heavy losses. And they repeatedly asked for this. Unfortunately, General Sodol did not give permission for Azov to leave and cover the communications to Mariupol. I don't think it was his personal opinion. I think that he, of course, coordinated with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Office and with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valerii Zaluzhnyi. But it was Sodol who saw the situation at the operational level better than anyone else. And, of course, he had to take responsibility and give the order to withdraw. We had two brigades there, I want to remind you. And if there was no ammunition, then there was a question of whether we should keep the whole two brigades, which we still have, for the most part, in captivity, unfortunately, several thousand people. Maybe we should keep them for fighting, especially since they were combat-capable brigades, the 36th Marine Brigade, the 12th National Guard, which included the Azov, more than a thousand well-trained soldiers. Unfortunately, at that time the Ukrainian leadership did not make such a decision. The direct responsibility, of course, for the criticism of Azov was associated with Sodol's actions, because he was their direct commander. But for the sake of objectivity, it must be said that the order to defend ourselves without ammunition, to defend a city of half a million people without ammunition, was given by the top leadership of Ukraine. First and foremost, it was given by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Valerii Zaluzhnyi. That is, these were coordinated decisions. We know the results. The enemy just passed rapidly. On the fifth day of the war, they surrounded Mariupol, and on March 3, the encirclement of Mariupol became complete.
MARIUPOL INVESTIGATION
Then there were losses and a breakthrough was no longer possible. I would now put aside my sentiments, perhaps sometimes in war it is necessary to give the order to stand to the death. But this order must be justified. When two brigades were left surrounded without ammunition, that is, without even the possibility of inflicting maximum losses on the enemy, what can I say, this is a completely inadequate decision. And someone must certainly be held accountable for this decision. I would like to say that the episode "Why Mariupol was not covered from the rear" is still not being investigated as part of the proceedings on the events in the south and the surrender of southern Ukraine. And for some reason, no one has asked the Azov command. And no one asks the leaders. Why did you leave two brigades without ammunition and lose them so quickly? Two brigades, just imagine what a powerful force this is and what they could do to stabilize the frontline if they continued to be able to conduct effective combat operations. But unfortunately, Azov and the 36th Marine Brigade were not given this opportunity. That's why Denys Prokopenko criticized Sodol's actions in managing the battles for Mariupol many times back then, where there were constant problems with the lack of coordination of coordinated actions between the various units that were there. Formally, we can say that Prokopenko took the initiative, but there were military units, and they often acted uncoordinated because they had their own chain of command. And there was also criticism of Sodol in this regard. And at the end of March, after a very long criticism from the Azov command and personally from Redis, Sodol was removed from the command of the Joint Forces Operation South in Donbas. This was done at the insistence of the Azov command. At that time, there was already a crisis and a failure of defense in the Volnovakha area, and there were very negative consequences, and someone really had to be responsible for this. And some personnel decisions had to be made, so Sodol was dismissed. But after Azov came under the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy, laid down their arms, after the ammunition was completely out, even the ammunition for the assault rifles was out, and Azov laid down their arms in May, those soldiers who still remained, and after that Sodol was restored to his position. In other words, Prokopenko was in a Russian prison, and then Sodol was again appointed commander of the Donetsk OTG. That is, at that time no one saw any problems in the events in Mariupol. Time passed, General Sodol was in command of the Donetsk OTG, and some of the operations caused a lot of criticism in the military environment, especially these continuous frontal attacks in the area of Pavlivka near Vuhledar, where I have already told you who was used. Later, Sodol was appointed commander of the marines. He also carried out combat operations in the area near Donetsk, in the area of Opytne, and counterattacks were carried out. Unfortunately, there were a lot of issues with the planning of these actions. Then the Marines took part in the offensive in the South, in June, in September of 2023, as part of a separate command, and attacked there. There were also heavy battles, some small successes, but we could not fulfill the overall plan because the enemy was not inferior in strength. And there were very heavy battles there, and there was also a big question whether we should constantly carry out these frontal attacks on an unsuppressed, undefeated defense. But, in principle, the same mistakes, and even more gross mistakes, were made by other Ukrainian commanders in this area. This was the plan of the Ukrainian High Military Command and the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, which failed to implement this plan. And then there was the story of the Marines launching a separate operation near the village of Krynky, which was aimed at creating a bridgehead on the left bank. There was a certain logic in these battles while active fighting continued in the South. It could be said that forces were being diverted from one direction, the enemy's forces were being dispersed, but in fact, after the enemy began its offensive, that is, somewhere in November-December of 2023, it became obvious that Krynky was a story of heroism, but it was impossible to turn this bridgehead into an operational success. It is only for the distraction of the enemy forces, and it is necessary to consider, at what cost, who has the advantage in means of destruction in this area. That's why there was a lot of criticism of these actions, of the fact that marines have to constantly cross the river by boat in very uncomfortable conditions, behind the Dnipro. This problem is a very serious issue for the military command, which also caused a lot of criticism in the army. But this did not hinder Sodol's career, and Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and the new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi, after the change of army command, after Valerii Zaluzhnyi was dismissed, Syrskyi was appointed, Sodol actually had good support in the army. He took the next career step. From the commander of the marines, he was appointed commander of the joint forces and at the same time the commander of the Khortytsia operational and strategic group. This group controls and is responsible for most of the frontline, and most of our troops are fighting in it. Before Sodol, this position was held by Oleksandr Syrskyi. Sodol was appointed, of course, by Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself. In other words, everything was going well for Sodol. And what brought him down? He failed because our commanders of the operational and strategic grouping and Sodol himself, after his appointment as commander, did not change their approaches. What worked, perhaps, in Sodol's manual control mode at the brigade commander level, what worked very poorly but sometimes worked when he intervened manually, gave orders to platoons, companies, battalions, who should go where, how to hold on, at the level of the OTG, at the level of the OSGT, was simply a failure. It just had bad consequences. In other words, manual control of the Khortytsia OSGT troops at Sodol.
Even under Syrskyi, he had a problem with manual control, that they interfered wherever they could, controlled points on the map. And here, it's just a disease that has become extremely acute. And I will say, it's hard to find. There are some, maybe. There are brigade commanders who can say something neutral or favorable about some of Sodol's actions. Not without that. But for a lot of brigade commanders, the name Sodol began to cause a very critical reaction. Because Sodol, when he rose to such a high position, the problems that existed only got worse. Constant orders, constant internal investigations. This management of internal investigations is simply a disease of the Armed Forces, a disease of the Defense Forces in general. And these threats to the brigades, where you retreated to, from which observation post, from which stronghold, despite the enemy's forces, to be defeated. All of this is just a desire to hold on, without any knowledge of the tactical situation or the enemy's forces. It's just such thoughtless orders to stand to the death, although there is no tactical expediency or logic in it at all. This created a lot of such critical mass, such a strong critical mass. And this critical mass was not among ordinary fighters, but at the level of brigade commanders, battalion commanders, with whom Sodol had, as they say, a large number of people who did not accept him. And what happened to Azov? Sodol returned in the same way, he actually became the commander of Khortytsia, and Khortytsia includes the 12th Brigade of the Azov National Guard and the same Azov headquarters that was in Mariupol. And he hasn't forgotten anything.
Azov is now on the Lyman direction, in the Serebrianskyi forest. And Azov started some further actions, which caused Sodol's reaction. He thought that he had risen to a high level, one of the highest in the country, he had Zelenskyy's support, Syrskyi's support. And he began to train all the brigades in this way, to educate and train them, I would say, with such harsh orders. And there were orders with internal investigations. An internal investigation that could later become the basis for opening a criminal case against commanders. In fact, Sodol opened such internal investigations, and apparently he opened them against all brigade commanders. A significant number of brigade commanders are now in the same Kupiansk direction, and one brigade commander was recently dismissed, completely undeservedly, because the OSGT Khortytsia gave him a completely inadequate task to hold the remains of a village in the lowlands, I mentioned it, the village of Ivanivka. And at any cost, with absolutely no regard for the situation. There are many such examples. And the same story happened with Azov. As far as I know, General Sodol opened two proceedings against Azov commander Denys Prokopenko. These are internal investigations that may become the basis for a criminal case. This is not a record. There are commanders for whom more are opened. Sodol opened two against Prokopenko. One was why the situation in the area of a certain observation post was not restored. It was actually restored, but just not in the timeframe that was set by the Khortytsia OSGT.
OSGT KHORTYTSIA
The reason is that it's a war. And you can't do that, the enemy doesn't want to retreat, you have to knock them out. It is not possible to restore an observation post on the instructions of the OSGT. Or even a position, a platoon strongpoint. This is absurd. But the OSGT "Khortytsia" is absolutely not interested in this. Unfortunately, this is a big problem for our army bureaucracy and the general's paper army that is running the war. When these reports and arrows on the map are all that matters. It's an absolutely absurd situation. Then a second investigation arose. When again, some position, some directive, was not fulfilled within the timeframe set. And again, a situation was created where the brigade commander was again reprimanded, investigated, and threatened with criminal charges. This is really the most terrible thing, friends, that this is how the High Command is running our country in all areas of the front.
SODOL AND CONFLICTS WITH THE BRIGADES
Instead of jointly deciding how best to organize combat operations, we have these castes at the front. There are brigadiers and combatants. They are responsible for the frontline, for the people, for weapons, and for the destruction of the enemy. And there is a caste of generals. OTG, OSGT. And these operational-tactical, operational-strategic departments are not responsible for the destruction of the enemy, or for people, or for the tactical situation, but for constantly beating brigadiers and combatants on the head. Giving them orders, writing assignments, restoring the situation by 6:00 a.m., and by 8:00 a.m., if they didn't do it, it's a criminal case. In other words, they completely ignore reality, the enemy's superiority and this imaginary world is completely illusory. Why do they think this way? Because, unfortunately, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy, when he holds a meeting, no one is interested in what is happening at the front. There is only one question. Points on the map. Where did you retreat? 100 meters here, 200 meters there. What is it? A settlement. And no one cares that it's gone. It's just completely destroyed land, burnt soil. The map shows why we withdrew. The country's top political leadership asks generals such questions. They are constantly being scared for this, constantly being shouted at. And our generals are scared, they are very afraid of politicians. This is a disease. They are very afraid because of their military career. They think that to make a military career at the highest level means to obey everything, that no one will shout in the highest offices. And this charade of personnel, when anyone can be kicked out of their chair at any time, and inadequate demands are made, leads to the fact that the war is bureaucratized. No one is responsible for the result, for the destruction of the enemy, for the safety of their people. They ask for those dots on the map. And that's why Sodol thought he was doing what he was told. And he constantly has reports on where we are, on what points we are sitting, what is being done to hold these points. And how are these hostilities being conducted? At what cost? What is the tactical expediency? This is not his problem at all. But it is a problem for the 12th Azov Brigade. Because the brigade commander is responsible not only for the points on the map, he is responsible for his men, for the destruction of the enemy, he better analyzes the tactical situation, where the enemy is advancing, in what forces, what he should do. So the situation is completely different. A different vision. And so the conflict arose. After Sodol began to educate the brigade commander with these papers, the Brigade Chief of Staff Bohdan Krotevych wrote a very resonant post. For the first time in the history of the defense forces, an officer, the chief of staff of a brigade, openly and publicly addressed and filed a complaint with the State Bureau of Investigation against General Sodol's actions. And not only did he file a complaint, but he also published a post on Facebook. And in order to spread this information as much as possible. Well, friends, we can see the result. As soon as Krotevych made such an accusation, the country's leadership had to do something about it. Either remove the Brigadier and his Chief of Staff, or remove the General. And then we saw that the President's Office took a break to study public opinion. And suddenly it turned out that a large number of people support the AZOV brigade and its command. Public opinion, public opinion supports them. No one supports General Sodol. I know that there are military men in the army who speak favorably of Sodol. They do exist. They are a minority now, but they are there. Because he was both a commander and a brigadier. And many people remember that he did some useful and right things for them. But a person grows and does not remain adequate in every position. Because each new position means a new scale, a new horizon of decisions, planning, and new challenges. And not all people understand correctly what to do in a new position. That is why no one, most of General Sodol's subordinates, who command most of the active army, stood up for the commanders. Because criticism, this criticism, is known in the army. Sodol is unpopular in the army not because there were few posts about him on Facebook, that there are no bloggers who did not write something good about him. Sodol is unpopular because in the middle of the army, the leadership, the middle management of the army, does not understand him and does not support his management decisions. This is the main lesson of this story. I want to say that this is a wake-up call for Oleksandr Syrskyi, who appointed Sodol instead of himself. What if systemic changes are not immediately adopted in our army to strengthen good, effective management practices, to promote... good, strong leaders who have proven their effectiveness. If the criteria for evaluating the success of combat operations are not changed, and these arrows and dots on the map continue instead of video reports of the destruction of the enemy and instead of doing everything possible to save their people, there will be some post or even no post, and Syrskyi will be dismissed as easily as Zelenskyy signed a decree to dismiss Sodol.
I would like to say that for the Armed Forces as a whole if we look at it this way, friends, this is a great positive because public opinion has changed the general. But on the other hand, friends, the reason why he was removed has not been eliminated. Now General Hnatov will replace Sodol, and if he is again pointed at with arrows on the map, he will be in the same situation as Sodol. What will change? We need to change the very approaches, evaluation criteria, what combat operations are, what their effectiveness is. We need to promote commanders, real combat leaders, not formalists. Because we have Sodols at all levels, and we have brigadiers like Sodol. Look at the commander of the current 59th Brigade, for example. He's a little Sodol, just a brigadier, aged 30-something. A young man, he thinks the same way. And unfortunately, we have a lot of such people in the army. Because this is how they are promoted. Those responsible for the arrows, for the dots, for cartography. Cartographers, not commanders. And this is a serious problem that we need to solve, unfortunately, and it cannot be solved by the Facebook posts of one brigade chief of staff. We need systemic changes. We need effective brigade commanders who know how to fight to strengthen their brigades, and not to create new brigades that exist only on paper and are given equipment by people who do not exist. No command staff, no non-commissioned officers, no officers. Nothing is understaffed. They have to learn this at the front. At the same time, combat brigades, where there is such a cadre, are simply falling apart, because they do not receive replenishment, do not receive reinforcement. In general, we need to talk about this.
I'll be making a broadcast in the near future, where I'll talk about what changes, in my opinion, Oleksandr Syrskyi needs to make so that he does not end up being dismissed like that on one day. That's easy. And this is an absolutely possible scenario. I mean, this is a problem, if we don't solve the problem of organizing an adequate approach to war management, the problem will not even be that we will change generals. Okay, the generals will become more flexible and learn everything else, but, friends, we don't have time to teach them, the generals. This is the third year of the war, and every day of such training means hundreds of lives of Ukrainian citizens. So why couldn't the country's leadership, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, investigate this situation without waiting for scandals or criminal cases, without Bohdan Krotevych's Facebook posts? Aren't these obvious things? We had to raise this issue at the state level. Because, dear friends, we are not going to change all the generals and brigadiers on Facebook. This is not the right format. You can change one or two. In order to promote commanders, we need systematic organizational and personnel work. It starts with setting clear evaluation criteria and clearly articulating and emphasizing the goal. Only the best should lead. The best who give the best results. Not the best reports and the best licking their bosses and obeying them in everything. And they say, sir, yes sir, they do, even when it's a complete failure.
Unfortunately, there are a lot of commanders like that now. Commanders who have no opinion. Who send people to death with their eyes closed. Those who are not able to organize battle management in their unit or formation. And it is because of them, because this structure and approach exists, that the defense is failing and we are suffering heavy losses. Unfortunately, this change of one Sodol, friends, will not be solved. This is the first step. If General Syrskyi understands it, realizes it, changes are possible. If he does not, then some other general, not Syrskyi, will make the changes. We have a lot of generals. We have no problems with this. This is the only area where we have no deficit. Our main problem is responsibility. These are the leaders who really lead to victory. That's the problem.
Question.
Was Sodol supposed to do all this about the defense of Mariupol?
Yes, as I said, there was not only Sodol, but he was the immediate commander, the commander in that area. He was in charge of the situation. The troops in Mariupol were subordinate to him.
Is it true that our American partners are not happy with Syrskyi, or are these rumours being spread by the President's Office?
Well, most of it is, in fact, the position of our government. As I said, they are trying to blame the generals, the President's Office is shifting all the responsibility, that everything that is bad is only the generals at war, and the government and the servants of the people, they generally look at it like fans from the outside. They are not responsible for anything. I don't see that the Americans are dissatisfied with Syrskyi. I have not heard this from anyone from the environment that communicates with Americans.
Ukrainian journalists are victims of the "Points on the Map" format. Take a look at the DeepState channel. And your broadcasts usually start with maps with dots. Don't you produce the perception of war through dots on the map?
Good question, thank you. The points on the map, if we discuss them on the air, we are talking about the current situation. And the points on the map in the headquarters are the points beyond which the commander if he does not send people there, will receive a criminal case and go to jail. Well, maybe go to jail. Do you understand the difference? I mean, it's one thing when you look at a map to properly assess the situation and set tasks, and it's another thing when you say, 'I don't care what's on the map, there's a point, you have to go there. This is a different situation. Absolutely different. This is criminal in nature. And everyone needs to look at the map. You need to know where the enemy is, where they are advancing. We must not lie about where our forces are. And one of our main problems at the front is lying in reports. Because this desire to control the points on the map does not mean that any of the generals or colonels or their subordinates are going around the points that are there. We all know that you will face a criminal case not for whether there are people at that point, but for what your report is. If the report says there are supposedly people there, then there are no claims against you. And we have this falsification of positions, it is very common in many areas. When information about reports is simply falsified so that you don't get reprimanded, so that you don't get proceedings opened against you. This is complete madness. So, of course, we need to see the situation. The problem is not that someone is looking at the maps. The problem is that a point on the map then becomes the basis for the country's leadership, for Zelenskyy, for Syrskyi, for Sodol, to assess what is happening on the frontline. And this is not the case, as we all know. Look, the enemy is going somewhere, to some point, for example, to some village. The village is usually located in the lowlands. To control this village, you do not need to enter it. You just need to take control of the firepower or go to the heights around the village. Then the village will not be a problem, you can enter it without fighting. And very often there are such battles on the heights. When it is necessary to enter this village, and when the enemy is firing at us from the heights, and we are firing at them from the heights. There is an exchange of manpower. But all this is done for the sake of reporting that we are in the village. Why? We are not Russians. We need to act smarter.
You say that Syrskyi may be replaced by someone else. Who do you think he might be replaced with?
I don't know, I don't see any logic in the actions of the Ukrainian leadership. You see, Sodol was appointed, Sodol was sent to the Verkhovna Rada, he presented us with a draft law on mobilization, and then, bam, he was resigned in one day after a post on Facebook. And the fact that the brigade's Chief of Staff filed a criminal case against him with the State Bureau of Investigation. It can happen instantly. That's what I'm saying, I'm not worried about generals being resigned. They need to be resigned, leaders need to be resigned in principle. But it is beneficial when changes occur afterwards. In other words, the general is resigned because, not because someone said so, but because there are complaints, first, second, third, fifth, tenth. They are clearly stated. And his successor, who takes office, reads it carefully and does everything he can to ensure that he himself is not dismissed for the same reasons, but only very quickly. This is the logic of HR policy. When each appointment, selection of people, is aimed at achieving qualitative changes. When the next manager is better than the previous one. This is the logic. But with us, it's just some kind of PR. He has this kind of PR, that kind of PR. The President's Office is engaged in PR. What are the requirements for managers? There are none. There are no requirements.
What do you know about General Hnatov?
He was also a brigade commander in the Marines. In principle, there was no particular irritation or criticism of the military in his positions before him. But the situations are different. For example, in recent months he was the commander of the Bakhmut defense headquarters. There was already a complicated, very confusing situation with management there. He was put there. It was not an effective story, unfortunately. But part of this chaos, a significant part of the chaos in the management of the defense of Bakhmut was created by the OSGT Khortytsia. At that time, by the way, it was commanded by Oleksandr Syrskyi. And, I mean, in terms of managing brigades and battalions that were in Bakhmut until the last. It was not an effectively organized story. And Hnatov was in command. On the other hand, he did not create it himself. He is in this position, a high position, where he is now. He is an energetic, adequate person who will be able to sort things out and not repeat the mistakes of his predecessor. First of all, I hope that, in principle, everyone knows Hnatov as an adequate person who can build communication with commanders. We will see very quickly. After his appointment, when he really takes office and starts acting, we will see, he will have to go around to the brigade commanders, set them tasks on a daily basis. And we will get feedback very quickly.
Is Hnatov really learning and trying to be suitable for his position? Let's see, I don't know. This is a very high-level position, a strategic level. Of course, no one else has such experience on the scale of Hnatov. This is a unique experience during such a massive war. We'll see, but in principle, many people in the army also speak positively about Hnatov. Therefore, I would like to believe that he will be able to master this chaos in management and build his own practice that will be effective and efficient at the front. We will be sympathetic to this and believe in it.
So, dear friends, today, as I conclude the broadcast, I want to say that for our situation, for the fact that there is a war going on, new practices of war, changes in military leadership through a post and a criminal case from the brigade chief of staff are a step forward. With other ways, from above, there would be no reforms, no changes. And changes from below, pushed through by authoritative commanders in the defense forces, are the only possible way to improve management at the operational strategic level. Unfortunately, it is the only way. That's why it is actually optimistic. I believe that the changes are actually beneficial. Every general, including General Syrskyi himself and all his subordinates, will think that they can be removed in the same way later. The criminal case will follow them for the rest of their lives. So this is a positive step. And, dear friends, we have enough commanders at the front who can take all the positions that the army has now, both at the operational and strategic level. We have no problems with quality commanders. There are problems with the appointment of quality commanders to the relevant positions. And this is a political issue, and we have seen one such example of dismissal. So, dear friends, today more than ever, I am convinced that the changes that are taking place in our democratic society are steps towards victory. We have the people and the weapons to stop the Russians. And this requires the appointment of high-quality commanders, the right criteria for assessing the situation, and the right setting of tasks. And that is why I believe it is possible. And that is why I believe in our victory today more than ever. Thank you for the broadcast and Glory to Ukraine!
Yurii Butusov, Censor. NET
