Why is quality of decision-making in army generally deteriorating, not improving, every month?
Why is our leadership not correcting mistakes and scaling up the successful experiences needed to win the war? This is because in order to give the right answers, our leaders need to formulate the right questions.
What are the main things that brigade commanders ask battalion commanders?
1. Why did the positions lose?
2. What is being done to restore positions?
3. How many people are left in the unit and why have they not been sent yet?
What is the main thing that generals ask brigade commanders?
1. Why did the positions lose?
2. What is being done to restore positions?
3. Who will report for the loss to the SBI investigator?
What are the main questions the Supreme Commander-in-Chief asks generals?
1. Why did the positions lose?
2. 2. What is being done to restore positions?
3. Who was fired?
This formulation of the issues in the context of the enemy's overall superiority in terms of the number of people and weapons gives the following results:
1. Politicisation of troop management and information hiding about the real situation at all levels.
2. Intimidation of commanders and soldiers by tens of thousands of criminal cases and internal investigations, which are not aimed at strengthening discipline but actually serve to shift responsibility for objective problems in the conduct of hostilities, making it impossible to correct them.
3. Mass dismissal of competent commanders who take responsibility for the effective destruction of the enemy, a constant personnel reshuffling.
4. Mass appointment to command positions of commanders who substitute responsibility for results with responsibility for reports and statements, and therefore are not capable of being leaders in combat teams.
5. Rapid bureaucratization of the army, uncontrolled growth of paperwork, reporting, and commissions by 2-3 times every year, which seriously complicates the management of troops.
6. Destruction of the initiative of commanders, refusal to tactical maneuvers, unjustified losses of personnel in the struggle for unfavorable positions and for the restoration of unfavorable positions.
7. The inability to compensate for the enemy's superiority in the number of personnel and weapons with the quality of our troops' use, and the loss of defense lines.
8. The loss of a large number of people, which is unjustified by the situation and could have been avoided, i.e. a critical reduction in the state's defense capability.
Why are changes in the management, organization, training and use of troops so crucial?
In a war, we can never outnumber our enemy in terms of soldiers, shells, missiles, bombs, drones - we can only outnumber the enemy in terms of the quality of our use, the quality of our destruction of the enemy, and the quality of our lives.
What questions should we ask in order to start systemic changes and start winning the war?
What are the main things that brigade commanders should ask battalion commanders?
1. How many casualties did we inflict on the enemy over the last day, as recorded on video?
2. What are our irreplaceable losses losses per day?
3. How can I help you to increase the number of enemy losses and reduce your losses tomorrow?
What are the main things that generals should ask brigade commanders?
1. How many casualties did we inflict on the enemy over the last day, as recorded on video?
2. What are our irreplaceable losses losses per day?
3. How can I help you to increase the number of enemy losses and reduce your losses tomorrow?
What are the main questions the Supreme Commander-in-Chief should ask the generals?
1. How many casualties did we inflict on the enemy over the day, as recorded on video?
2. What are our total irreplaceable and sanitary losses per day, and are these losses reasonable at each position where they occurred?
3. How can I help you so that you can increase the number of enemy casualties and reduce your own losses tomorrow?
Yes, these are the most basic issues. There are many others, but the defense strategy should be based on these three priorities.
Video recording is the only objective system for assessing the effectiveness of our resistance. In modern warfare, not all enemy losses are captured on video, but only the losses that are recorded on video can be objective data for analysis. If there is a video, it means that the commander has high-quality intelligence, adjustment, and control of his troops. If not, it means either a weak commander, or he has a combat ineffective unit that needs to be withdrawn for rehabilitation, or there is no provision of technical intelligence and destruction means, and this needs to be immediately replenished by the higher command. If a unit is better at killing, it should receive more forces and means. If a commander is successful, his success is measured by a video report that proves everything to everyone.
We need to count our losses in order to rationally use the limited forces available, we need to understand the purposefulness of fighting for certain areas and positions, and the increase in losses should force all commanders of all levels to answer the question every day whether these losses are reasonable. Because people are the main resource, and the first condition for military victory is to inflict losses on the enemy 5-6 times greater than ours.
Asking for help in a war is much more important than looking for reasons to dismiss, because all leaders must feel jointly responsible for the results of the war, and before punishing someone for failures and incompetence, you must give a person all the resources possible to perform a combat mission in a specific place at a specific time in a specific situation. And this responsibility concerns everyone. Only those who have given a subordinate everything possible have the right to punish him. Only when the entire army is united by trust and awareness of the common cause can any punishment in it lead to changes for the better.
No army in the world has ever won by the number of criminal cases and action registers - this is the path to defeat. And armies always win, where all positions are promoted by real leaders who gain experience, take responsibility and are trusted by the people who go into battle.
Ukraine has a sufficient number of experienced combat leaders at all levels who are capable of winning the war. But for them to do so, changes in governance are needed first and foremost.
So Ukraine's leadership must immediately decide where these reports and questions are leading our army - to defeat or to victory?
Yurii Butusov, Censor. NET
