VUHLEDAR. EXECUTION OF POWS
The fall of the city of Vuhledar, a real bastion in Donbas, for which Ukrainian soldiers heroically fought for two and a half years of war.
It was just a terrible battle, a terrible battle, and at night our units completely withdrew from Vuhledar. Unfortunately, this is not the only difficult event.
The second event was that the enemy unfortunately cut off the Oskil bridgehead, for which our troops had been fighting since October 2022. They fought at the positions behind Oskil, and unfortunately, the enemy tried for 2 years to drive out our units, cut off this bridgehead behind Oskil, and reach the Oskil military line. Unfortunately, today (October 2 - ed.) the enemy managed to reach the Oskil River in one of the sections. The situation is also very difficult.
And the third event is the tragic events near Pokrovsk, in the Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk direction. On the evening of September 30, Russian infantry, a Russian assault group, captured one of the Ukrainian positions and took all the POWs out of there and shot 9 of our soldiers.
Let's start with Vuhledar. We had a lot of videos about the battles for Vuhledar. In the battles for Vuhledar, many thousands of Russian occupiers and many hundreds of pieces of military equipment were destroyed. Vuhledar was simply a well-designated tactical line at an altitude that provided very convenient radio horizons for our drones, observation platforms, and firepower. Vuhledar was above such a plain, dominating the terrain, and this gave us the opportunity to fight and defend very effectively.
First and foremost, Vuhledar was defended by the soldiers of the 72nd Mechanized Brigade, and most of the time they were the ones who fought for this town. And these cemeteries of Russian tanks, cemeteries of Russian infantry, all this was made by soldiers of the 72nd Brigade, as well as several other brigades and attached units. Unfortunately, we had to withdraw.
The withdrawal from the city was in no way unexpected. It is the result of the enemy's ability to push through the flanks from the north, to penetrate the front north of Vuhledar. It was all very gradual, the enemy nibbled for many months, six months, one planting after another, very slowly, without any deep breakthroughs, just pushing and pushing and pushing our defense. And just like that, it crawled in and surrounded Vuhledar.
The last days of the city's defence were very tragic. Let's take a look at a screenshot posted by a soldier of the 72nd Mechanised Brigade, a well-known volunteer fighter and aerial reconnaissance man Mykola Voroshnov.
"Vuhledar has fallen.
Vuhledar was doomed,
it was impossible to save it.
But the people could be saved.
But the command to withdraw was not given.
Everyone in and around the town realized that the countdown was on for days, and then for hours, but the command to withdraw was not given.
Where would we withdraw to? Who the f#ck knows. As long as the enemy has the strength to drive us back, we will back."
Unfortunately, we see that I don't know what he reads out in his evening addresses, but it is not true, and the soldiers refute the words that the high command is monitoring the situation at the front at all. Once again. Once again, irresponsible behavior on the part of Oleksandr Syrskyi, who, as I understand it, chose the position of head of the Kursk OTG, obviously, and who saw the situation perfectly, did not give the order to withdraw. Also, the Commander of the Khortytsia OSGT, General Hnatov, and the Commander of the Donetsk OTG, Colonel Lutsenko, are responsible for the absence of a timely order. It's all on their conscience that there was no order.
On September 24, the enemy approached within 1400 meters of the only supply road leading to Vuhledar. The road came under fire. On September 26, it was impossible to drive any vehicles there, because drones and artillery were completely destroying everything there. We had to leave the city immediately. On September 24-25. No, this was not done. Why not? Perhaps because someone wanted to celebrate the first of October in Kyiv in a joyful atmosphere. Unfortunately, this is the price of such decisions by Mr. Zelenskyy, his desire to boast in front of a TV camera, and we see it. This is how it is reflected later, this desire to report only good news and hide all problems. This is how it is perceived at the front. Why couldn't you have withdrawn in time? Well, apart from this festive atmosphere on October 1, there are really no other reasons. The situation was unfavorable as early as September 24, and it could have been expected that the command was preparing some kind of counterattack, to expand the corridor, to provide withdrawal. None of this happened, friends. The withdrawal was not organized, of those units that were covering until the end. And the story that happened in Avdiivka, in Soledar, in Bakhmut repeated itself, when the high command, the generals who are sitting far away in good headquarters, in bunkers, do not want to take responsibility and give the command to withdraw. They don't want to bring bad news to the Headquarters. They also learned from Zelenskyy that to sit in the chair, you only need to say good things. And so it was agreed.
Unfortunately, not all of our fighters managed to withdraw in such conditions. There were losses, deaths because in recent days the withdrawal from Vuhledar was already a breakthrough. A breakthrough under heavy enemy fire. Unfortunately, one of our groups of fighters was taken captive in the northern part of Vuhledar, five fighters, apparently due to the destruction of repeaters and lack of communication. And, unfortunately, our reconnaissance drone of the 72nd recorded how the enemy shot these fighters. I am saying this because I was told this by sources who watched this heavy picture. These casualties are not the result of some tactical necessity or some kind of management. This is the result of irresponsibility. This is the result of the fact that the generals, Mr. Syrskyi, Mr. Zelenskyy, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, held a conference on the first of October, and they needed good news. In this conference, Volodymyr Zelenskyi said nothing about the situation in Vuhledar, objectively, and showed no interest in this topic. This is the price. And he will have to pay for it for the rest of his life. And let neither Mr. Zelenskyy nor Mr. Syrskyi think that one day someone will forget this. I say this on air on purpose so that such things are not forgotten. And Mr. Hnatov, Mr. Lutsenko, all the people for whom a chair in such a situation is more important than people's lives, they must understand that this will simply not be forgotten. I don't know about responsibility. But it is simply impossible to walk around in the clear in this situation and pretend to be war heroes with such irresponsibility. This is a great disrespect to the Ukrainian soldiers who gave their lives, because it turns out that no one prepared any counterattacks, did anything, and just sat there irresponsibly, waiting for the opportunity to promote themselves on television again. This is just a shameful situation. And this is the rake we keep stepping on. There is never any planned withdrawals. It's just absurd. How many times has this been repeated? No one draws any conclusions, no after action reviews, no analysis of the situation. They keep repeating the same mistakes. People are dying as they repeat them.
How many towns are like this, fortresses where units are forced to withdraw and breakthrough on their own, because no one above them, all cowards, are afraid to respond. We will give publicity to the situation in Vuhledar. I am asking the soldiers of the 72nd Brigade, those who were there, who have information about the last days of the defense, what was reported, to let me know, and we will give publicity to it. We must remember those heroes who stayed to the last to cover the retreat of our troops in Vuhledar. They died there because of the lack of timely decisions and orders.
Now let's look at the map of the situation in Vuhledar.
The enemy is advancing further. The enemy is advancing from Vodiane to Bohoiavlenka. They are trying to build on their success and advance to Bohoiavlenka. And now, after the capture of Vuhledar, the enemy will try to do two things.
So, the enemy is going to disassemble the front. They will now advance on Kurakhove. They are attacking Kurakhove from the north, they are advancing. They are advancing on Kurakhove from the east. And now there will be another salient. They will advance on Kurakhove from the south. So the next target will be here, the enemy will try to capture Kurakhove. And, obviously, they will be disassembling the front in the direction of Velyka Novosilka. To capture this settlement as well. The concentration of Russian troops has already begun there. They are trying to capture Novosilka. They are also trying to push through and bypass it from two flanks. Most likely, as the Russian command is already doing according to a template. In order to reach the borders with the Zaporizhzhia region. And they are already there, in principle. Unfortunately, it's not far away. Because Vuhledar was in a position that could stop the enemy. Now, without Vuhledar, it will be difficult to stop him in this direction. Because there are no more such convenient natural borders as Vuhledar was. And the enemy continues to advance.
Next, let's look at the map for Kupiansk.
So, this is the Oskil River. And the enemy made a breakthrough. We can see Tabaiivka, Pishchane and the arrow to Kolisnykivka. The enemy managed to reach Kolisnykivka. And thus, unfortunately, the enemy cut off our Oskil bridgehead in this area. At this point, they managed to reach the water. And to prevent a maneuver along the coast in the eastern part of Oskil, it is impossible for us in this area. We understand what this means. The enemy will now try to expand this foothold and disassemble the front. To disassemble the front both to the north to Kupiansk and to the south to Borova. And in order to reach the Oskil military line completely along the entire front. The situation here is very difficult. And so far we do not understand what stabilization will look like. We do not see any stabilization measures. We do not have any active actions, counterattacks to cut off these Russian troops' penetrations, effective counterattacks, not on the map, but in fact. At the same time, it should be noted that the enemy is also suffering heavy losses here. For the enemy, the war is also fought with heavy losses, which generally exceed ours. But the question is that they exceed our losses, but at the same time they capture and seize territory. And we are losing people. We are losing people, although we could have suffered much less losses with an adequate defense organization. We see that here, on the rest of the front, the enemy is being repelled.
In the area of Nevske, south of Borova, a counterattack by units of the 3rd Assault Brigade actually stopped the enemy from advancing further. And now there is fighting in the area of Nevske, but the enemy has had no chance of advancing for several days. That's why this breakthrough at Pishchane is the only one on this front, but it is a critical point. And we need to make quick decisions here. It can no longer be left to a single brigade commander, as is happening now. The brigade that forces was taken away, no longer has its own forces, it is fighting with their equipment. We need some systematic actions, not improvisations.
Next, the situation near the village of Mykolaivka, which is located near Myrnohrad.
We see that the enemy has reached Myrnohrad. From here to Myrnohrad is about 3.5 kilometers. Mykolaivka is a very important village, which is right on the route to Myrnohrad. This is a position, a massive area with very dense forests, which, of course, must be held. Otherwise, there is no other such convenient military line in front of Myrnohrad at the moment. That's why our troops are fighting fierce battles here.
What happened on the evening of September 30? We won't show you the whole video, but a small fragment. This is a video from our quadcopter. Unfortunately, Russian soldiers took our fighters prisoner and lined them up and all of them were shot, unfortunately. We are not going to watch this moment. I'm looking into this episode now, so if you have any information, please elaborate. I have already managed to find out a lot. On September 30th, it was in the evening, it was already dark, around 19-20 o'clock, all this happened. And what happened? This is one of the frontline positions near the village of Mykolaivka. There was a combined unit at the position. A group of fighters from different units. Six were from different units of the 142nd Brigade and four from different units of the 151st Brigade. They are new, newly formed in 2023, they finished their formation in 2024. And they have been fighting in this area for a long time. One of our soldiers survived. He managed to crawl out of there heavily wounded. Now he is in the hospital, doctors are fighting for his life.
I have seen the information about the report of the Prosecutor General's Office about 16 dead. At the moment, I do not have information that there were exactly 16 people at this position and that 16 people were shot in Mykolaivka. I do not have such data. What the fighters and aerial reconnaissance men tell me is that we are talking about 10 soldiers, 9 of whom were shot, and one was seriously wounded. He is now in intensive care, doctors are fighting for his life.
The big problem in this area is command and control. The infantry is tired, people are overworked, there are constant contact battles, units are constantly withdrawing and entering. This is a Brownian movement of small groups of infantry, both ours and the enemy's. Unfortunately, there was a prefabricated group of people from two brigades. It was not a position, it was called "Espeshka," meaning that people were sent to a point on the map and told to dig in, because, unfortunately, there are no defense lines on the approach to Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk. And this Mykolaivka and important positions behind Novohrodivka are not covered by anything. So people were simply sent to a point in the planting area, and they dug something for themselves in a very short time with shovels, because since there is fire there, you can't just sit down and dig in. Something is constantly happening there, shelling, drone strikes, and they have to disguise themselves because the position is not equipped. They were actually thrown into an encounter battle. Since there are people from two units there, that is, two brigades, they have been assigned to the third brigade in the area, which is responsible for this situation. And because of the significant losses, there are mixed units there, that is, these are not units working in a coordinated manner, where everyone knows each other, but mixed units and in one point there are two espeshkas, espeshkas of two brigades. What is an espeshka? It is an observation post. According to all the statutes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, an observation post is not a stronghold, it is not intended for long-term defense. But people were driven there in the expectation that an enemy group would be moving there, and they would destroy it. And this is basically what is happening. A large number of small groups of Russian infantry knock them out, destroy them when they approach. But unfortunately, since this is an unequipped position, if an enemy drone spots ours, unfortunately, the enemy will shell such positions. They are very vulnerable because there are no reliable shelters there. They are very open, you just have to hide there. And because of this, of course, the position was not stable. And unfortunately, such a tragic story happened. We are now establishing the details. But the enemy, who is also fighting hard there, realizes that we have the same chaos in the area as they have. They introduced themselves as fighters of another unit. Obviously, they entered the position and there was already communication from the position. So it was not a loss of communication. The people who were taken prisoner were not cowards who just raised their hands, you have to understand. Among them were several experienced fighters who were definitely not going to surrender. According to the data I have from the 142nd Brigade, which I am checking now, there was even a report that some allegedly their own fighters had entered our position. The units are so mixed up with each other, there is such a poor interaction that the command of the Donetsk OTG is not able to organize, that of course such a mix, such chaos, unfortunately, created the preconditions for the enemy to do this. Unfortunately, there was no round-the-clock drone surveillance organized at this position, no drone carousel, and even this video you saw was recorded by an aerial reconnaissance man from another unit who was flying here on a different mission. He just happened to be watching what was happening at the position with his camera. And only after the aerial reconnaissance man of another unit paid attention to this stream, the situation was seen in the brigades from which these fighters are from, and in the brigade responsible for the line. There are obvious problems there, and this is why the units are mixed up.
What is happening? First of all, when units are mixed up, interaction, cohesion, and communication are lost, because how do you report whose unit came up? If it was a lane of one brigade, it would be easy to check. But what about here? It's impossible to get through to everyone, to shout, it's just unrealistic. And there is no responsibility. In such conditions, military leaders lose responsibility. They are not responsible, everything is mixed up. One, two, three units, all are bouncing off the walls, all are on observation posts, no organized positions. What is an observation post? People are sent to a point on the map, they are told to lie down and watch. But if the enemy comes at you, you have to take the fight. And how do you take the fight? You will be immediately noticed in this open position and you will also be hit. This is a vulnerable position. That's why people come to this observation post, they are shelled, maybe there are losses, maybe there are no losses, people are just scared, maybe there is no control. They withdraw. Because this observation post is not a position, it's just a point in the bushes. And next to it is another observation post, where people, for example, are sitting from another unit, they don't even know what's here. They don't know if there is anyone there or not. Will someone be our neighbor to the right or left or not? Because of this chaos, unfortunately, such tragedies happen very often at the front. Here it is noticed, we saw it on video. Do we draw any conclusions? No. The headquarters of one brigade cannot manage several others. There are simply no people there to manage it. There are no intelligence means for such a number. The only way is logical, simple, and followed by all the armies of the world, the US Army, the French Army, the Polish Army, even the Russian Army. All the armies of all the countries of the world. In order to improve the responsibility of the management organization, regular divisions and corps are deployed to the front. Not some temporary OTGs, OSGTs that are not responsible for their troops. They are only responsible for the lines, the arrows on the map, how the desk clerks work. Why did you retreat? Restore the position by 8:00. Go go. We are being commanded by generals - desk clerks at the front. Unfortunately, this is what happens. Because there is no responsibility. And this video is a demonstration of what irresponsibility looks like in war. Vuhledar, Pishchane, and the shooting of these people, which became known only because it happened on the map, I emphasize, of another unit, an allied one, which is nearby. But this is not the unit that should have actually organized the observation. Unfortunately, this is what is happening. That is, there is no front line, no proper organization of troops. And these are obvious things, I'm saying now. All armies in the world have this. It's just strange. For political reasons, because of the unwillingness to increase or unite brigades, we have such chaos at the front. There is one observation post in a line of three brigades. Just imagine. Three brigade commanders are responsible for 10 soldiers at an observation post at a point in the plantation. This is the result we see. The OTG is also responsible, of course. Because OTG is responsible for the organization of interaction between the large units according to our statutes. The Donetsk OTG. Of course, the Khortytsia OSGT is also responsible. The Khortytsia OSGT is also directly involved in tactical decisions through the entire vertical, in general, the management. And, of course, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Office, answers. Friends, isn't that how it is there? Just so we understand, this Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad- Selydove-Novohrodivka agglomeration - that's more than 150,000 people by 2022. This is a huge industrial area. This is the only place where we produce coking coal for our entire steel industry. What can I say? We also see lithium here. This is a strategically important area, an important communication hub. And we saw how the fighting is organized there in this video. This is such a responsibility, this is the organization of hostilities. And who will be responsible for this? I can tell you right away. Who will be made guilty? Well, of course, the soldiers themselves. Because soldiers have to foresee this, to navigate the chaos of war. It's all on them. Then some kind of reprimand will be given to the commanders to say that we told someone. Will any of the leaders who are responsible for interactions, the use of troops, and the organization of troops be held accountable according to the Armed Forces' statutes? In the other words, everything that is there in the OTG and above. Up to Syrskyi, up to Zelenskyy. Of course not. Zero. It was the same in dozens of other cases. So will lessons be learned, friends? No, not at the command level. The maximum level of responsibility is for brigade and battalion commanders. That's it. Then the responsibility ends for people and weapons, and for the front line, for the destruction of the enemy. Then there is only politics, PR, severe reprimands, criminal investigations, internal investigations, the State Bureau of Investigation, "hold on" orders, and absolutely nothing else, paperwork, PR, newsletters, and that's it. This is the kind of management we have at the top. And you can see how this irresponsibility and incompetence is happening at the bottom in this video. And then, at the observation post, 10 soldiers at night, who have no aerial reconnaissance data, who are not told whether the enemy has approached or not, who have no situational awareness of their neighbors, their allies, who are not equipped with modern thermal imaging sights, who cannot verify this information. Then they have to make their own decisions. Unfortunately, they did not want to make a mistake, and unfortunately, they did. Because the enemy sees this chaos in our country perfectly and takes advantage of it. It uses it, realizes that we are in chaos, a mess, and irresponsible. And this case is very instructive. The Russians have realized what is happening there, they are also seizing our radio stations, they are also seizing prisoners, seizing documents. They know what a mess it is in this area. And they just took advantage of it this time.
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
Will any of our generals be responsible for the murder of our soldiers? In my opinion, they could not have surrendered 16 in the field. Most likely, it was the lack of ammunition load and the failure to withdraw the fighters.
I was just talking about this.
In your opinion, what is the impact of Bezuhla's posts on the fall of Vuhledar?
Dear friends, I do not think that the statements of People's Deputy Bezuhla, a servant of the people, have any impact on the situation in Vuhledar. This is just a manifestation of political intrigue in the leadership of the "servants of the people" and the President's Office. There are no practical actions. Ms. Bezuhla does not make any statements to the State Bureau of Investigation, does not initiate criminal cases, does not threaten Zelenskyy's political stability in any way, on the contrary, she uses all means to defend him and says that somewhere in Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, and Selydove, military administrations appointed by the president have finally begun to dig fortifications. I haven't seen these fortifications yet, and neither have the soldiers in the video, but Bezuhla writes about them. That's why I don't take this person seriously. This is a spammer in the government who creates information noise in order to absolve the servants of the people and Zelenskyy for the war and to lie to people, saying that Zelenskyy does not know how bad the generals are. As if he is not involved, someone is deceiving him. He trusts them over and over again, and they keep deceiving him. And he has been in charge for six years and still doesn't realize that he is being deceived. This is the kind of person he is, and I don't know if this is some kind of admission that justifies the president in saying that he simply does not understand war management at all. But for many people, maybe some people like it.
What is the probability of a nuclear strike on Ukraine?
I don't see such a possibility of a nuclear strike right now. Why would Putin want to do that if he is basically advancing with these small infantry groups anyway? I don't see it at all. They are already carrying out their operations without any other means of warfare, continuing to seize Ukrainian land and advance. I don't see any reason why they would need to use nuclear weapons, increase the level of escalation and create risks of using nuclear weapons in some other places. Because nuclear materials are radioactive, and if someone starts using them, they could be used against Russia. Of course, we are at war with completely inadequate, crazy people, but as long as they are advancing on the front, on a wide front, almost on the entire front, I do not see any prerequisites for them to use nuclear weapons.
What is happening at the front? Is the frontline really collapsing? What's next?
Well, unfortunately, the front is collapsing, it's a fact. This has been happening not for the first month because basic organizational management decisions are not being made. There is no recognition of the problems at all. We understand that the heroism of soldiers and motivation alone can win a battle, but it is impossible to win a whole network of battles at once when the enemy has an advantage in drones, in aviation, in the number of shells, mortar shells. Well, a miracle cannot happen. No matter how heroic a soldier is, if we allow the enemy to use high-precision weapons, artillery, on unequipped observation posts, when we do not give people normal training, when we have infantrymen who go into battle after a month of training, it is simply a crime in the third year of the war. And if we don't scale up the right organizational management decisions, which are obvious, which we are constantly talking about here on the air, well, a miracle will not happen, the enemy will advance further. This is not the responsibility of people. I want to tell you that we are not withdrawing because we do not have enough people. Not because we have fewer shells. It is not because we have fewer GABs. We are withdrawing because of our inability to take advantage of the advantages we have, because of our inability and unwillingness to draw conclusions from our mistakes and realize our strengths - to promote competent commanders who are able to manage this chaos. And we still have commanders promoted to most positions who simply, silently, loyally observe and do not panic. That is, they calmly watch people go into battle and fail to fulfill their tasks. Then we run out of people, we lose Vuhledar, we lose Avdiivka, Krasnohorivka, Novohrodivka - this year. And the collapse continues. When will this be corrected? When will Volodymyr Zelenskyy finally start drawing some conclusions? When will he stop demanding that Syrskyi stop the front instead of PR? Friends, are we able to stop the Russian offensive and stabilize the defense? I talk to a lot of our commanders. I see how our soldiers are working. I have no doubt in my mind that we can stop the Russian offensive completely, inflict absolutely unacceptable losses on the enemy, and simply defeat the Russian army. This is possible, but it requires adequate war experience and managerial organizational decisions.
How many of our soldiers survived the withdrawal? Because there are many publications by the enemy about many killed, both in the city and during the withdrawal.
Since the only road to Vuhledar was taken under fire control on September 24, it has been almost impossible to take the dead there since then, it has been very problematic. So, of course, there are losses there, I don't think they are as big as the enemy claims, but there are losses, and they are significant, of course. I will announce the number of losses in the near future, we will collect this information, check it, and I will definitely make it public because it is absolutely impossible to keep it quiet. We have to understand the price of holding Vuhledar in hopeless conditions to the last, the price of refusing to give a timely order to withdraw, when in order to inform, not to make any orders that will have some not entirely successful effect on the rating of the "servants of the people", Volodymyr Zelenskyy deliberately slows down the correct, necessary tactical decisions in the war, and people are dying because of this irresponsibility of Zelenskyy. This is how people died, unfortunately, when leaving Vuhledar. It's just this stubbornness, this ambition that doesn't make any rational sense at all, and it costs people a lot in war. We will not forget this.
Are there cases when our forces actually withdraw to prepared positions, or do they always dig in from scratch?
I know situations where our troops occupied prepared positions. There have been such cases. Unfortunately, they are very few. Why is this happening? Unfortunately, we have another problem. Since we are still building fortifications, it is being done in the same way as the big road construction before the invasion. And the problem is that the government transfers all the money to people under its control and companies under its control, so that its people can use it all. The money goes to the civil-military administrations, and the civil-military administrations hire contractors, and they build something according to some plan. I want to say that sometimes I have seen high-quality structures on the frontline, protective structures, some elements. But I want to tell you, dear friends, I have never seen or heard of a position being built at the front that meets the requirements of the military. I have recently inspected our new strongholds in Sumy region. The wood is gorgeous, even the concrete bunkers are good, everything is good. But the troops will not occupy them. This is the problem we have along the entire frontline. And near Bakhmut, most of the defenses were built, and the troops are not occupying them. Because they are being built by the CMA according to their own plan, which does not correspond to the logic, the use of troops in general, the tactics of the troops. The same thing happened near Kharkiv. They dug not in front of the heights of the fortifications, but behind the heights. In other words, the troops could not take the positions in which they had invested billions of hryvnias. They are built for the number of people that no one uses in war. We are still digging platoon strongholds. What is a platoon stronghold? A point that should be defended by 30 soldiers. Who is putting 30 soldiers on one position at the front now? This is a big target. A GAB will definitely fly there, and not just one. Positions need to be built for the real number of people, for a squad. It's up to 10. It should be camouflaged, not these big concrete caps that are very high above the terrain, everyone can see them, it is very convenient to adjust fire, fly in FPVs, whatever. Of course, this is not convenient for anyone who wants to be a target. The positions should be disguised, inconspicuous, for fewer people. There should be camouflaged approaches to them. The trenches should not be as wide as ours. I also want to tell you that I have never seen this trench completely blocked from drops. This is a big problem. Because when you go to a position for a platoon of 30 people, some tired 10 infantrymen, they don't even have time to deploy, equip something, find construction materials somewhere else, or cover this position. There is no time at the front. So, unfortunately, yes, we have cases when some strongholds are occupied, but for the most part, I want to tell you, these strongholds are abandoned. And even cases when the positions of the CMA are dug out, then our units, when they enter this line with bulldozers, even some positions are filled in. Because an improperly dug stronghold that is not occupied by our troops will be gladly occupied by some enemy assault group to quickly jump in before making a breakthrough. Why do we need this? This is the result of the fact that, unfortunately, we do not have a perception of adequate war experience. No one studies that everything in war changes, but simply looks at who to give money to, billions, 23 billion hryvnias allocated for fortifications this year. Who sees them at the front? I don't know, I haven't heard yet. People withdraw for many reasons. But the main problem is that these fortifications are very unstable. And they are still weakened by the fact that our troops never receive orders to withdraw to these fortifications in time, even if they have dug them. If fresh units or combat-ready units were to withdraw in time, enter these fortifications dug by the CMA, they could probably equip them, finish them, and they would be comfortable positions. But this is not happening. There are a lot of problems here.
How could one soldier survive? Maybe he testified, so the prosecutor's office says 16 people?
No, let's not speculate. The man is wounded, he cannot speak, and he is now in intensive care.
Can drones be used instead of observation posts?
Of course, drones should be used instead of the observation post. Because observation post, something to watch. Infantry in modern warfare, drones have completely removed the functions of observation from the infantry. Infantry should not be observing. The infantry either has to conduct raids, assault operations, offensive actions, or take a defensive position, i.e. equip a stronghold. It takes some time to do this, to have at least one dugout, to have some positions for shooting, to have people hiding, to have equipment. There must be a position where the number of people who entered can effectively fight, store ammunition, water, food for some time, and the equipment and weapons they need. That is, it is normal to maintain combat capability at this position. Not just go to the point, take a shovel, dig something for yourself. This is the kind of war we have, a war of observation posts. Why is the frontline there not stable and collapsing? In fact, the enemy is sending these endless assault groups in all directions, and our small infantry groups are also sending their small groups to these directions, to plantings, to encounter battles. Only they are told that you are at the observation post, you don't have to attack, but you have to stay on this point. Well, this is absurd. This is actually Brownian motion. Of course, drones need to be used for surveillance. Well, in order to conduct surveillance with drones, the commander who makes this decision must understand what drones are, how drones are organized, the interaction of all-arms forces and means of drones, interaction with electronic warfare, with electronic surveillance, how to build interaction with destruction means, infantry, to build these combat orders based on drones. Well, do you think anyone in the General Staff, in the OGT, the OSGT, is learning from us how to use drones and high-tech weapons? Unfortunately, no. We don't have a single regulatory document that would define the tactics of combat with the use of drones. There is none at all. No orders, no verbal or written instructions. Nothing has been done. Generals simply do not even train these drones. They live with the observation posts. Because our generals, Syrskyi and Hnatov, were all brought up in the ATO era. Or even before the ATO. There is a full-scale war going on with the use of the entire arsenal of precision weapons. And they are still drawing observation posts on the map. And they do not draw any conclusions. I am not the only one telling you the truth. Many people in the army are saying this. Hundreds of commanders. Thousands of soldiers.
Are there any positive results from the Kursk operation? At some point, will the military have to be withdrawn? Or does the leadership think that it will be possible to exchange all the territories?
I want to say that the Kursk operation itself is, in my opinion, the right decision. By itself, if we take it from this point of view. It means that we are striking the enemy in a direction where he does not expect it. We are inflicting losses on him. And the enemy has diverted significant forces to this direction. So at this stage, the operation is adequate. But unfortunately, we are implementing it in a way that has weakened the situation on the entire front. If we are advancing somewhere and the enemy has an overall superiority in forces, then where we are advancing, okay, we are advancing, but on the other front, Oleksandr Syrskyi should have organized a strategic defense. Just like everyone else is doing now. There should be convenient positions for drone operators, radio horizons for drones. That is, a drone-centric and network-centric war is taking place in Ukraine right now. This is not an infantry war. Ukraine will lose in an infantry war. There is no chance, the Russians simply have more infantry. Ukraine can only win if it wages a drone war. A drone-centric and network-centric war. These are our only chances. The only opportunities. Because there are more drones than Russians in general. Drones can kill them. That's why we need to plan the use of drones. There must be kilzones, observation zones, prepared, cleared plantings, forest belts, proper mining, and proper positions equipped. First of all, for drone operators, for surveillance cameras. A proper, high-tech war must be waged. It requires a certain organization of control tactics. Oleksandr Syrskyi failed to do all this. He simply withdrew his troops from Donbas and threw them at Kursk. You can now withdraw another brigade and send it to Bryansk, relatively speaking. You can also break through the border. Why not? And then what? A significant number of our forces have been tied up in combat, and a lot of ammunition and armored vehicles are being used there. And here in Donbas, who will be responsible? We launched an offensive on Kursk, during which time we surrendered Krasnohorivka, Vuhledar was simply left to its fate. Novohrodivka. Three cities. Just complete irresponsibility. The enemy is already on the outskirts of Selydove. The enemy is three and a half kilometers from Myrnohrad. Seven and a half to Pokrovsk. Dear friends, the situation is very difficult. And we need to talk about it honestly. And we cannot tolerate politicians' lies, when the president lies to people just for the sake of his rating, does not report the situation accurately, and does not make strategic decisions. Well, I understand when a person is silent but does something. But they don't. They are busy with Kursk. Everything is very good, it is interesting and pleasant for them. In Kursk, we have taken control of a district center with a population of five thousand people. Instead, we are losing several towns where tens of thousands of Ukrainians lived, and we have lost several dozen villages where many thousands of Ukrainians also lived. These are large territories. In August-September of this year, we lost more than 300 square kilometers of Ukrainian land in the Pokrovske direction alone. And the enemy's offensive continues. Therefore, it is obvious that Kursk, as a tactical operation, is a successful step. But, unfortunately, for some reason, Zelenskyy and Syrskyi decided that Kursk – a strategy. The strategy of the war, the fate of the war, is not decided in Kursk. It is decided in the Donbas and Kharkiv regions. If we stop the Russians there, they will be forced to negotiate peace. And Kursk itself is a fashionable topic; it can be negotiated very well only when the enemy goes to negotiations. And he will negotiate when he is stopped. And why does Putin need negotiations if he is constantly advancing and capturing a settlement every day? And every month a city? Why? There will be no negotiations. It's just delusions, fantasies. The fantasies of these dreamers at the Headquarters have nothing to do with reality. Therefore, unfortunately, the successful tactical operation in Kursk serves as an excuse for the failed strategic decisions made by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. And they must quickly return to the ground and start looking at reality, correcting their gross mistakes in the deployment of troops and defense planning. Because this is people's lives every day. We have just seen an example of how our soldiers were shot. This is the price of irresponsible decisions at the highest level.
We have enough soldiers on the frontline who can end this chaos and mess and can stop the Russian offensive. I believe in the Ukrainian victory. And this is sincere because I know how people fight every day. They are fighting and doing everything possible to destroy these hordes of Russian occupiers and turn them completely into black soil. Glory to Ukraine!