Great war requires great changes
It is about the principles of warfare, procedures for managing troops, the role and place of units on the battlefield, not about a wide range of Western weapons and beautiful Latin labels on office doors.
Strategic mistakes in planning cannot be compensated for at the tactical level, when the enemy has a great advantage in almost everything.
I propose to look at one of the advantages that the enemy has been using to good effect since the beginning of the full-scale invasion until now.
One of them is not in the planning and use of troops, because I do not consider the tactics of the Russian Federation to be bright in terms of operational art (with such human resources and military-industrial complex, you can fight much more effectively), it is exclusively of an organisational nature, namely the concept of formation, provision, training and management of units of operational-tactical and operational-strategic levels, which allows the command of enemy divisions and armies to prepare and subsequently manage their regular units in combat more effectively and confidently than our commanders of the OTGs, TGRs and brigades, because today it is difficult to find a brigade on the frontline that does not fight with attached units in the form of companies and battalions, which often leads to:
- significant deterioration in interaction,
- biased attitudes and misuse of units,
- loss of control,
- unjustified losses among personnel that could have been prevented,
- As a result, the combat missions were not fulfilled.
Every day, the commanders of the largest tactical unit face problems with their attached units, and instead place their regular companies/battalions under the command of other brigades, which in most cases leads to the problems mentioned above.
With a frontline of more than 1,000 kilometres, it is rather pointless and inefficient to micromanage, descending to manual control of companies and battalions. On the contrary, the enemy organises command and control at the level of divisions, corps and armies, which makes it easier for him to plan and use troops, knowing his potential and real capabilities.
Briefly about the advantages of creating divisions/army corps in a full-scale war against a strong enemy that has a significant advantage in the number of personnel, equipment, weapons and ammunition, and about the subsequent transition to strategic defence with a meagre claim to conduct counter-offensive actions (operations) at the operational and tactical level.
1. Unity of command. The division/army corps commander, which should be created on the foundations of combat-ready brigades by reducing stillborn organisms that have lost their combat capability without ever gaining it, will be able to organise combat and special training in regular units, be personally responsible for the process and quality of training, soberly assess combat capabilities and set assigned tasks for each brigade/regiment accordingly.
2. Initiative. More confidently, without losing initiative and situational awareness, to lead regular units on the line of contact, without attached forces, having everything on their own, except for aviation.
3. Simplicity. Improved command and control and defence resilience.
4. Saving efforts. Sustainable command and control of troops will allow to expand operational zones and defence strips on the front line (even in breakthrough areas)
P.S. This is the way it is done now, because who carries - on that and leave. Over the past three months, our team has had it increased three times.
5. Security. Reducing the need to plug holes and extinguish fires with attached units, which complicates interaction and almost never gives the desired result in the absence of a fundamental approach.
6 . And most importantly, the reduction of manual control at the tactical level will, in turn, allow the generals to deal with strategic planning (as this is their responsibility) and higher priority tasks, such as strategic defence, which includes a set of measures that have not yet been launched.
P.S. Because we have a long time to fight.
Quoting the basic principles of war according to the immortal Clausewitz, with hopes for the best, may we all dream of a victory plan where we begin to implement real reforms and accumulate, or at least not waste, resources for the long-awaited victory or postponement of our death.
Time is playing against us. Think about it.
Denys Prokopenko, (Redis), commander of the 12th Special Forces Brigade "Azov" of the National Guard of Ukraine, Colonel
