Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters has appointed commanders of army corps, their structure has been determined
By the decision of Supreme Commander-in-Chief V. Zelenskyy, Armed Forces Commander O. Syrskyi, and NGU (National Guard of Ukraine) Commander O. Pivnenko, 18 corps commanders have been appointed, who will take responsibility for their sector of the front and be assigned a permanent complement of troops. The process will be completed within a month.
These are important and positive changes that, if properly implemented, can significantly improve the combat capability of troops and the responsibility of commanders for personnel and missions.
Most of the ground force brigades that operate as infantry at the front are now reorganized into 18 corps. There are also a significant number of units directly subordinate to the commander-in-chief. The potential creation of two more corps within the TDF (Territorial Defence Forces) is questionable, and I hope this will not happen, as the TDF should not be deployed at the front as units and formations.
Most corps will be composed of 5 brigades, with one corps comprising 7 brigades. Thirteen corps are being established within the Ground Forces, two Airborne Assault Corps, one Marine Corps, and two National Guard corps. Several corps consist not of actual brigades, but only of the names of newly designated, yet non-existent brigades with no troops. I hope that, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters to ban the formation of new brigades, troops will not be assigned to these empty structures.
Unfortunately, there are also strong grounds for criticism of this generally positive reform, and in my opinion, there are issues that require immediate correction.
Firstly, I wrote that the creation of divisions and corps should be based on the troops already operating within a specific sector to streamline management and organization within the existing combat structure quickly. This would eliminate the need for any troop regrouping, as most forces would remain in place, as movement requires time, resources, and all this under potential enemy attacks. At present, many corps have troops deployed across different operational areas, undermining the intended logic of improving the organization and utilization of forces within a unified sector. While this structure may be convenient for peacetime administration, it does not align with the logic of war or the realities on the front.
Secondly, there is a shortage of personnel to staff so many corps headquarters. As a result, they are gathering anyone available, even stripping personnel from TDF brigade headquarters, which also have operational tasks to perform. This reform requires a reduction in personnel within the troop arms commands, operational commands, and the General Staff, as the creation of corps removes the main administrative workload from these commands. However, the opposite is happening—the command staffs are being retained, while personnel are being taken from brigades to staff the corps - this is a harmful approach for the troops, causing resentment and an increase in bureaucracy.
On commanders. Judging by the fact that the current commanders of Operational-Tactical Groups (OTGs) and Tactical Groups (TGs)—O. Tarnavskyi, S. Perets, O. Bakulin—are being assigned to the corps, the improvised command structure through OTGs and TGs is finally being abolished.
On the other hand, some newly appointed corps commanders have gained authority through their leadership at the brigade level. For example, the corps will be headed by Ruslan Shevchuk, Roman Darmohrai, Vasyl Matiiv, Dmytro Voloshyn, Andrii Biletskyi, Denys Prokopenko, and Ihor Obolienskyi.
Among the commanders, many names are pleasing to see, but there are also some that are surprising, because of the significant number of questions about their competence in previous positions. For example, Sirchenko, the former brigade commander of the 56th Brigade, has been appointed as a corps commander. Some army appointments have been, and continue to be, based not on actual merit and leadership qualities, but solely on personal connections with higher command.
Commanding a corps requires exceptional leadership, management, and organizational capabilities, we will see who can rise to the challenge, as their subordinates will be the judges. Much will also depend on who is appointed to the headquarters of these corps.
I have been writing about the need to conduct warfare using larger units since 2014. I have written and spoken about this dozens of times since the beginning of the war, and a significant number of others have raised this issue wherever possible, now, public pressure is yielding results. In the eleventh year of the war, in the fourth year of full-scale hostilities, Ukraine is, for the first time in its history, deploying permanent formations with an established command structure. This demonstrates how slow and difficult even fundamental changes are in our country—and how quickly things can actually be done when there is political will. The decision to establish the corps was announced a month ago, with another month allocated for its implementation.
I hope that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces will address the objective challenges of corps formation, adjust the composition of the brigades assigned to each operational direction, and forbid the dismantling of brigade headquarters.
Yurii Butusov, Censor. NET
