11 years of war for independence
On February 18, 2014, clashes broke out on Kyiv’s Independence Square and in Kyiv’s Pechersk district and city center, in which thugs and Berkut forces loyal to President Yanukovych, the pro-Russian leader in Ukraine, opened fire on Ukrainian patriots and demonstrators defending Ukraine’s independence and freedom.
I believe that on that day, the war truly began—the Russian invasion orchestrated by Putin to completely destroy Ukraine.
On February 20, 2014, the Russian authorities declared it the day the operation to reclaim Crimea began—Russia’s seizure of the peninsula and this date is engraved on the commemorative medal. For three days in Ukraine, people had been killed simply for going to the square with Ukrainian and European flags. All of this was orchestrated by Moscow, using Russian weapons and involving Russian special services.
I think everyone remembers the morning of February 24, 2022, when the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation began. And now, we all understand that this war—these eleven years, these three years of unparalleled defense and struggle—have shaped the Ukrainian nation. Today, the Ukrainian nation is so resilient and strong that no foreign or domestic political storms can bring Ukrainians down or divide them. And in the past, people mocked the saying 'It's none of my business,' calling it the Ukrainian motto.
Eleven years of war and the most intense, large-scale fighting of the 21st century have shown that Ukrainians are one of the most cohesive and organized nations in the world. Yes, we all have our own vision of freedom. This is what makes every Ukrainian a driven individual, ready to act. And it is difficult to establish a unified way of communication among us. But when we are united by shared goals and a common struggle, we see that we are changing history. For eleven years, we have been demonstrating to the world that here, in the heart of Europe, we are a true nation and a genuinely new state that the world must acknowledge and respect. So, I want to thank those Ukrainians, those citizens who cannot watch this stream because they are defending Ukraine. It is these people who hold the front and shape Ukraine’s identity, who build its influence and authority on the global stage, and who make the world speak the name of Ukraine—all honest and decent people.
For me, what has been happening in recent years, like for everyone else, is the greatest experience and event in my life. I talk to soldiers a lot, I hear a lot of things, and for me, the greatest emotion I have seen in my life is those people who were the first to go into battle, even without experience, without understanding what was ahead.
We reminded you of a report by Iryna Storozhenko on Butusov Plus, dedicated to the memory of the first Hero of Ukraine since the full-scale invasion. Just two hours after the Russians began their massive assault on Ukraine, at 6 AM on February 24, sailor Vitalii Skakun and his comrade Oleksandr Tkach positioned a trailer filled with explosives on a bridge near Henichesk on Arabatska Strilka, as planned. This was one of the crucial bridges that the Russian army was using to advance into Ukraine. According to Ukraine’s defence plan, thirteen strategic sites—including road and railway bridges, dams, and key routes through Perekop—were designated for demolition as early as 2015 to prevent a Russian invasion from the south, which had long been regarded as Ukraine’s primary strategic threat. Preparations and drills were conducted annually, with the last exercise taking place under President Zelenskyy's leadership.
On February 12, just twelve days before the war began, a readiness check was conducted to assess Ukraine’s ability to repel an attack near Chonohar and Crimea. However, despite years of planning, none of the thirteen designated structures were successfully demolished—except for one. This was the bridge where Vitalii Skakun moved onto the bridge. I strongly recommend watching Iryna Storozhenko’s report. Skakun and Tkach reached the bridge, but after positioning the explosives, they discovered that the electric detonator had failed. The fighters did not have a spare electric detonator. At that moment, nothing was certain. The war had just begun. They had yet to see a single Russian convoy. They were under fire, hearing explosions, but had no way of knowing what lay ahead—whether Ukraine would hold, what forces the enemy would deploy, how far they would push, or what the future held. They knew nothing. But Vitalii Skakun made a decision—one that millions of Ukrainians would also make in the days to come, even without knowing all the details. He resolved to do whatever it took to stop the enemy from breaking through his position. When Vitalii Skakun, a 25-year-old sailor of the 137th Marine Battalion, realized that the electric detonator was not working, he took the only spare detonator, a mechanical one, and left his comrade, went alone to that bridge and detonated the explosive charge. Vitalii Skakun, unfortunately, died on the spot. He knowingly sacrificed himself for Ukraine’s freedom and its people. For this act of courage, he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Ukraine—a recognition he absolutely deserved. This act of bravery marked the beginning of the great war. The first strikes, the first casualties. But the heroism Vitalii Skakun displayed was not an isolated case—it was widespread across the entire frontline. Many of these acts of valor remain unknown. The details are lost, but the numbers are undeniable: thousands of Ukrainian soldiers fought to the last, even in hopeless situations—not in the dozens or hundreds, but in the thousands. And it is thanks to them that Ukraine has stood firm and will continue to stand. I do not believe anyone in the world, not even our enemies, has any doubt left: no one will succeed in breaking or destroying Ukraine. Because Ukraine has a people who are prepared to fight to the very end to defend their freedom.
I have done many interviews, talked to many people, but few things have touched me as deeply as a fragment of an interview with an infantryman, call sign Joker. He is a rifleman, a private infantry soldier of the 28th Mechanized Brigade, serving in the company of the well-known Ukrainian warrior Ivan Chupyk, who is widely recognized on the internet. In his company, there was an outstanding fighter with the call sign Joker. Ivan told me about this soldier. I went to meet him, and that night, he had just returned from his position, from a mission where he had been for several days, straight to the dugout on the zero line, where our forward positions were. I interviewed an infantryman who had spent days simply surviving—under fire, in the mud, in the cold. And I was deeply struck by the words of Vitalii, Joker:
Most of the people who came like me, as volunteer fighters, are no longer here. Those who joined in the first days—it was tough, very tough in those early days. Not that I'm saying it's easy now. You know, I was on my way to my first assault, but I never made it there. They just dropped me off from the BMP, and some Cossack turns to me and says, ‘Hey, what's your name?’ I say, ‘Vitalii.’ He says, ‘My rifle isn't firing, and we're heading into an assault.’ I ask, ‘How do you know it’s not working?’ He says, ‘I wanted to fire a shot in the air, but it didn’t go off.’ I took it off safety, clicked it—and it fired. He asks, "What did you press?’"
You see, a person goes to an assault who does not know how to use a machine gun. Back then, there were hundreds, thousands of people like that who didn't know how to hold a rifle, and they went on assaults and stopped the enemy, you know?
This is the very emotion Vitalii was talking about. It was unique, and I truly want to say that this drive, the powerful drive of Ukrainians who were not fleeing from the enemy but seeking out the enemy, is one of the greatest experiences and feelings of those first terrible days of the war. And it will never, ever be forgotten. And this is our history.
Answers to questions
Question for the 137th battalion commander. Couldn't they have checked the detonators a week before the war? Everything was already clear.
We don't know now what the course of action was, how things unfolded, the investigation is ongoing. So I don't know how it will end. I don't think it will be completed and reach the court under the current administration. There are no signs of that yet. SBI investigators are gathering information, and that's it. Who will speak out, who was supposed to check it, who did what at the command level? I have some information from certain commanders, leaders in the direction. We will gradually prepare materials about what happened. We are gradually revealing them.
You will see a new video by Iryna Starozhenko on Butusov Plus. It is a report on the first day of the war at Chonhar – the battle at Chonhar. It should be noted that despite the fact that, unfortunately, Chonhar and the bridges were not damaged at all, and Russian columns were advancing at high speed, nevertheless, several of our fighters engaged in battle. And even under these dire circumstances, when an armored column was moving straight at them, and they only had a few grenade launchers – nothing more. There were no anti-tank missile systems, no cannons firing, no rockets launched. There were no aircraft, nothing at all, and no minefields were detonated. Yet, there were people who fired some of the first shots of the war. You will see this unique video by Iryna Strazhenko, who did extensive work and found several people who were at Chonhar. Some were merely witnesses to these events, while others made the decision and risked their lives to stand their ground against the occupiers. Thus, we are gradually uncovering and preserving these fragments of history that must not be forgotten.
By the way, it should be noted that these were soldiers of the State Border Guard Service. They were the first to go into battle under such difficult conditions
Why is there no difference between Zaluzhyi and Syrskyi?
War is a collective effort. No single leader is in charge; instead, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief directly influences the course of hostilities by distributing mobilised personnel, allocating weapons, finances, and all types of material resources. It approves the order of operations presented to the Headquarters by military commanders and even directly empowers both the Minister of Defence and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to intervene in numerous personnel appointments. Therefore, in Ukraine, no single person holds all the powers of command in warfare in the form of a general. Generals are subordinate, but there is one person to whom everything is subordinate – and that is Volodymyr Zelenskyy, not Zaluzhnyi or Syrskyi. Thus, the generals strive to meet the requirements set by the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief based on their understanding of the situation. They act within the scope of the authority and responsibility assigned to them. Everyone has their strengths and weaknesses, but, of course, for the soldier on the ground and for many commanders, some see these changes, while others do not.
When will it end?
Friends, I answer this question many times both on the air and on the street almost every day. Therefore, I can tell you that the war will end only when the enemy is stopped at the front, that is, is defeated, and organizational and technological superiority is established across the entire front line. The enemy will simply cease further offensives because the losses will far exceed its ability to replenish them, making further breakthroughs impossible. I respect all bold and rightful peace initiatives. They are very good and necessary. We are grateful to all countries that are making these efforts. But the fact remains that the reality is different. In reality, the Russian Federation has no obligations regarding the timing of the end of hostilities. The offensive continues, massive attacks continue, and every soldier on the frontline is crucial. Troops are needed to stop this onslaught, which persists, and the activity and intensity of hostilities are not decreasing. On the contrary, they are increasing. So, when will it end? It will happen when systemic organizational decisions are made, when technological solutions are implemented, and when resources are allocated correctly. And I hope that when the United States, after all these misunderstandings and conflicts, resumes and increases its support, both military and financial, to the level necessary to defeat Russia. At a press conference, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief stated that over the past three years, Ukraine has spent $320 billion on defense, including $120 billion of its own funds, $100 billion from the United States, and $100 billion from the European Union. This includes funding for combat operations and the cost of weapons. I would like to point out that according to official data from the Russian Federation, it spends more than 40 percent, possibly up to 50 percent of its total budget, both central and regional, on the war. According to SIPRI's estimates of the minimum expenditures of the Russian Federation, which are close to the official Russian budget figures, Russia spent an estimated $462 billion in 2024. Let me emphasize that this is a minimum estimate. So, in one year, Russia has actually spent one and a half times more than Ukraine, together with its allies, spent on the war over three years. This is despite the fact that Russia has five times the population, significantly greater natural resources, and has been preparing for war for many years, far more intensively than Ukraine. It has also amassed huge stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, surpassing the combined stockpiles of all NATO countries in certain categories.
So, when will the war end? War requires intellectual, organizational, and managerial decisions. It demands a large number of such decisions, which must be aimed at quality—at improving the quality of combat operations, the quality of employment, the quality of organization, planning, and command. As soon as we begin to surpass the enemy in these components, success will come to us. I look with great hope at the experiment and reform initiated by Oleksandr Syrskyi, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, regarding the creation of army corps. The entire frontline will be divided among these corps, each with a fixed composition of forces, a clearly defined area of responsibility—for personnel, for mission execution, and for the elimination of the enemy. I am confident that if this decision is properly implemented, it will significantly improve the situation at the front. And, of course, we must all contribute to this as much as possible. Army corps represent a qualitatively new level of military organization and the quality of combat operations. Therefore, if we make decisions of this scale and implement them, we will win the war, the Russians will be defeated, and their army will be destroyed. This is an absolutely solvable technological task, which depends on our command decisions, organizational efforts, and timely financial resources. Thus, if our allies provide financial assistance, and if we can increase funding for our modern UAV, EW, and SIGINT units three to four times, we will be able to build a drone front, a sensor front, protect our forces, and turn any Russian offensive on any section of the front into a meat grinder, preventing any advance or success. Yes, all of this is possible, and a great number of Ukrainian soldiers, professionals, and commanders are now speaking about it with confidence. That is the confidence I want to share with you. Our army does not feel like a victim of war, nor does it feel betrayed. The military demands only one thing from the authorities—adequate and swift decisions based on the operational situation. And our soldiers are doing everything to maximize enemy losses, becoming more and more proficient at it every day. Our main shortfall is the lack of resources.
Is there any chance of ending the war this year?
There can be different situations. Anything can happen in life. There can be all kinds of surprises. Frankly speaking, at this moment, I do not see any prerequisites for the war ending this year. Why? Because I really like the confident statements of President Trump, who says, I will end the war now, there will be peace now. This is very good. But we have not heard any statements from the Russian Federation—or from Putin, the one who started this war. We see that one side—the United States—is shaping the information environment for negotiations, while the other side remains silent, simply observing and continuing its offensive, intensifying strikes against Ukraine. How long can this last? A year? Two years? We do not know Putin’s intentions. We remember how Putin once assured certain presidents that if they met with him, looked him in the eye, he would end the war and everything would be settled. What did that turn out to be? Nothing but a tactic—Putin uses negotiations as a cover to expand his aggression and to expose the weakness of the side that comes to him seeking peace. This is what Putin does. Perhaps something will change. Maybe Trump will be able to pressure Putin in negotiations by threatening escalation and a sharp increase in U.S. military involvement. I cannot rule that out. Because as long as Putin outmatches us in resources by several times, then, of course, with a 1-to-5 ratio in expenditures and manpower, it is unrealistic to think that we can sustain this war indefinitely and quickly defeat the enemy. But if America were to provide not just $30 billion per year in aid but, instead, $60-70 billion—which is entirely feasible within its $760 billion military budget—then this war would, I am certain, end with us halting the enemy. I am not talking about an offensive right now, but I am saying that our defensive capabilities would be significantly strengthened. Because a multiple increase in funding for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, particularly for high-tech units and infantry, would fundamentally change the situation on the battlefield. The U.S. and Western countries have the resources to do this; for them, it is a challenging decision, but one that is entirely within their financial capacity. If we were to triple or quadruple the funding for our high-tech forces and infantry, the battlefield situation would shift dramatically—simply because of funding. This is not even about weapons. These funds would be used to preserve the lives of infantrymen and to eliminate Russian forces using drones and high-precision weaponry. This is the elementary way, leverage available to Trump. Of course, he may choose to take it—we do not know. And, of course, this could influence Putin. My view is that Putin, based on his entire history of conflict resolution, will try to maximize Russia’s military gains while negotiations are ongoing—attempting to cripple Ukraine’s frontlines and push forward as far as possible. Right now, the enemy is amassing reserves and attempting to break through our defensive lines with full force. They are continuing to recruit personnel, including assault troops—tens of thousands of "cannon fodder"—and sending them forward. They are doing everything possible to seize victory and break Ukraine. That is why I do not rule out that, in reality, all these words will remain just words—as has happened before—and the war may continue indefinitely. So far, however, there has been no rupture in relations with the United States. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has made that absolutely clear.
Everything related to foreign policy was set out by Zelenskyy in a very clear and logical manner. Therefore, it should be noted that this was a positive press conference for Ukraine in general. Ukraine is doing its best to avoid any conflict situations with both the US and President Trump. And everything is being done, as stated by the President, to avoid conflict. So I am confident that we will continue to have these close allied relations, and America will increase its assistance.
If Trump had initially decided to increase military aid to Ukraine to $100 billion a year, Putin would have negotiated much faster with this argument, and then there would have been guarantees. So far, there is only one guarantee of peace and security for Ukraine. Ukrainian soldiers at the front. There is nothing else. Just as it hasn't existed for all these 11 years.
Europe rallies with determination and provides significant support. Reaction of the United States and Russia.
I would only welcome this. If Europe sets an example now, then European countries and the European Union have the necessary resources. It is not only the United States that can provide us with $100 billion per year for the war—the European Union can provide this funding right now. I have calculated the budgets of our UAV, EW, and SIGINT units. I can say with certainty that for $5 billion, all three of these components could be fully equipped with modern technology in a relatively short timeframe—within just a few months. This would enable the mass deployment of new weaponry, fully equipping our forces with drones of almost all types, and securing a decisive technological and organizational advantage in drones over the enemy along the entire frontline. This would be a drone front that the Russian army simply would not be able to breach—because every step forward would cost them thousands of casualties. Europe has the capacity to make this happen.
Elections have taken place in Germany, bringing to power a coalition of Ukraine’s allies. We also expect that, just as Ukrainian soldiers are demonstrating leadership on the battlefield, other countries will demonstrate leadership on the global stage. That is why I hope the European Union will go beyond political declarations and provide tangible, powerful support. We are very grateful—Europe’s support has been remarkable. But if this sets an example for the United States in terms of financial aid, then yes, this could also become a turning point in the war. It would also be a clear signal to Trump—and a devastating blow to Putin.
If we were to receive $100 billion in military funding—above and beyond current commitments—then this war could be brought to a swift conclusion, perhaps by the end of this year or the beginning of next year. With these resources, Ukraine could dramatically accelerate the development of high-tech weapons systems, leading to a radical shift on the battlefield. That would be the price of peace. What is the most cost-effective solution for the entire world right now? I believe it is far better to quickly allocate the necessary funding, strengthen the Ukrainian army, reduce losses, eliminate the occupiers—and end this war. That is the most effective path forward.
How can we, as Ukrainians, influence the government to implement reforms in the army?
Obviously, we have only one instrument of influence—public opinion. And, in principle, it works. Thanks to widespread publicity and public support, including for my broadcasts and publications, many changes have already been implemented. There are now centralized planning and control mechanisms for the deployment of drones, which are overseen by state leadership. The corps system is being established and deployed. The rapid development of UAVs is underway. The formation of new brigades has been prohibited, which allows personnel to be assigned to existing units where at least some command structure is already in place—ensuring better unit cohesion, preserving personnel, and maintaining operational effectiveness. In other words, public opinion in Ukraine is working. The problem, however, is that it takes a long time to shape and mobilize public opinion. You keep writing, speaking out—but the impact takes time to materialize. That said, public opinion remains an effective instrument, one that the Russian Federation lacks entirely. This makes them more organized and centralized, but also less flexible. If our government truly believed in the people—recognized that society itself is a constant driving force, far more dynamic than bureaucrats sitting in offices—then the government would strengthen its feedback mechanisms. Because we are all in the same boat, and we must move forward together. Organizational and managerial reforms in the military are our collective responsibility. If this shift in mindset were to happen—believe me, we would surpass Russia very quickly, even despite their numerical and financial advantages.
Is there any result after Drapatyi's appointment? Or have the ruscists run out of steam?
By ruscists, do you mean whether this appointment has affected the situation at the front? In fact, Mykhailo Drapatyi’s authority is not entirely clear at the moment. Due to the ongoing corps reform and the policy of appointing commanders of Operational-Tactical Groups (OTG) and Tactical Groupings (TG), the position of the commander of the Operational and Strategic Group of Troops (OSGT) currently has an undefined status. However, I am confident that Mykhailo Drapatyi, as a talented officer, will establish a clear operational framework for his actions in this situation. That said, the supposed halt of the Russian offensive is highly relative. The Russians expended significant resources in December and January. Now, during the winter months, they are enlisting fewer personnel under contract. I believe no one in their ranks is eager to participate in frontal assaults in the freezing January cold. Fewer troops are being sent to storm positions, and those who are deployed are being eliminated rapidly. That is why their advance has slowed. However, I want to emphasize that the enemy has already built up certain reserves and is now deploying fresh forces in the Pokrovsk, Siversk, Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, and Kupiansk sectors. The situation remains extremely difficult. The frontline is shifting, and unfortunately, the enemy continues to push westward, advancing on certain positions. Thus, even if we do not suffer major territorial losses over a given period, and only a few settlements are lost, it does not mean that the ruscists are exhausted. Unfortunately, I must emphasize once again—the enemy remains on the offensive and retains tactical initiative along nearly the entire frontline, with only a few localized exceptions.
Is there any information on the cases of Chervinskyi and the arrested generals?
At the moment, there is no new information. Today, there was another court hearing on the Kharkiv case. Regarding Colonel Riumshyn’s case, I can now state that it is completely fabricated, a falsified accusation by the investigation. In reality, a criminal case should be opened against those who brought these charges. From the case materials I reviewed, the alleged crime itself was entirely fabricated on paper. As for Roman Chervinskyi’s case, they have effectively abandoned it—Roman remains under house arrest. The charges are completely fabricated. What is there to discuss? Right now, our primary fight is ensuring that Roman is not imprisoned on completely baseless charges. This situation is absurd—there is no crime, and the accusations have been thoroughly debunked in every detail. Yet, the man remains under house arrest, while law enforcement agencies continue to stage a charade of investigative actions.
General Staffs and military educational institutions are being cut by 30-40%. Is this the right decision?
I have heard that significant reductions are taking place across various rear administrative structures. However, in wartime, such decisions fall under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Everything depends on the objectives and how these measures are implemented. If downsizing is carried out rationally, with the goal of training personnel, reinforcing combat units, and ensuring proper preparation—rather than throwing soldiers into battle unprepared—then I support it. Because if the General Staff is being reduced, this implies that all structures should undergo cuts proportionally. However, I would like to see how this is actually being implemented. Right now, with the formation of army corps, we hear talk about reducing bureaucratic structures, but in practice, they are expanding. Personnel are being pulled from existing brigades to staff the new corps, while operational commands—which were supposed to be downsized under this reform—remain untouched. The same applies to the command structures of military branches. According to proper military administrative logic, creating army corps should mean shifting a significant portion of responsibilities away from operational commands and the commands of military branches. That is where reductions should take place—not by pulling personnel from brigades that are already understaffed. Right now, units that are actively engaged in combat are being constantly stripped of personnel, which is nonsensical. This is the issue—we have many good ideas on paper, but the real problem lies in execution and implementation. And that is what continually leads to scandals and protests.
What do you know about the defence of Volnovakha in late February and early March of 2022?
Unfortunately, not much is publicly known. I am aware of certain details—some heroic, some tragic. We were unable to hold Volnovakha, but our soldiers fought there with incredible determination, suffering significant losses. At that time, the enemy was operating at full strength, launching attacks with overwhelming amounts of ammunition, infantry, and armored equipment. The battles there were extremely intense. I have spoken to those who participated.
Steve Witkoff said that the Istanbul Agreement could serve as a basis for negotiations. This is a surrender, isn't it?
Right now, I am not paying much attention to the rhetoric and messaging coming from the new U.S. administration. I understand that they are trying to send signals to Putin—to create an information climate that would lure him to the negotiating table. That is the primary goal. However, it seems to me that at least half of the statements and proposals currently voiced by U.S. leadership cannot serve as a foundation for any agreement between Ukraine and Russia. That said, I want to wait and see. They are announcing initiatives, raising expectations. Here we are, we will meet, we will sign quickly. That's it, that's the peace deal, that's it.
For instance, the U.S. did not support the resolution prepared by Ukraine for the third anniversary of the full-scale invasion, a resolution that explicitly condemned Russia’s actions. Meanwhile, every message that could be perceived as a positive signal by Russian propaganda in the Kremlin is being delivered by the U.S. administration. Now, I want to see what actually happens when they finally sit down at the negotiation table. Because I remember what happened in Ukraine in 2019-2020—all the rhetoric about a comprehensive ceasefire, looking Putin in the eye, steps toward peace, reducing losses. We were told again and again that peace was coming, that progress was being made. But in reality, for three years, we were fed empty promises, while Putin coldly used that time to expand his military, increase his stockpiles, and prepare for full-scale war. And now, the same pattern is unfolding—premature gestures, expectations, hopes. I want President Trump to show what kind of agreement he is actually proposing. I don’t care about the rhetoric—I want to see what they will actually put on the table. Because without Ukraine, this agreement will not work. Without Europe, this agreement will not work. We will not be left alone. I want to see what the U.S. administration actually brings forward as a "peace plan"—and whether they bring anything at all. Because it is entirely possible that negotiations will take place behind closed doors, only for it to turn out that nothing substantial was achieved. So let’s wait and see. Meanwhile, all these information waves have little to do with Ukraine’s real, urgent problems—which are not in conference rooms, but in the trenches, on the frontlines. And those are the issues that should take priority.
Will there be an investigation into the surrender of Mariupol?
Well, there was no surrender of Mariupol—it was a heroic defense. What should be investigated, however, is the surrender of southern Ukraine. Because during the fall of the south, Mariupol was effectively encircled by the enemy on the fourth day of the war. By the eighth day, the blockade was fully in place. This is a consequence of the fact that Russian columns were practically unimpeded in their movement to Mariupol from the rear to the rear of the defenders. The primary assault came from this direction, where no defensive positions had been planned.
In the event of negotiations about us but without us, is there really a plan B that we don’t want to discuss?
I think this depends entirely on what Trump brings to the table. We have only one plan—Ukraine’s resistance. Our defense against the invasion. There cannot be any alternative plans. If someone proposes a peace agreement, we must examine it. And based on the framework outlined by the President, this is a reasonable approach, and I agree with it—from the standpoint of foreign policy. So let’s wait and listen to what our government will say—they will have full knowledge of the details and will make an announcement accordingly. Of course, no agreement can be made without the approval of the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian Parliament. I am grateful to our friends and partners in the European Union. I am grateful to all Ukrainians who are holding rallies in Germany and across the world in support of Ukraine. This is our guarantee—this public pressure and international solidarity. All of these demonstrations, public opinion movements, and global efforts by Ukrainians and Ukraine’s allies—this is what ensures that no government will be able to make decisions without Ukraine. And this is a serious, very serious influence.
I want to address all Ukrainians who have participated in rallies in support of Ukraine. If you have photos or videos from these demonstrations in different countries, please send them to me. You can send them via Facebook, to our editorial contacts, or through our YouTube channel. We will be posting all of this in our news feed. For us, such large-scale, consolidated support is critically important. And in today’s world, it has a real impact.
What would you say about the strategic concentration of the offensive on Kostiantynivka, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk? How will Ukraine respond to this challenge?
Yes, of course, the enemy is trying to capture this largest agglomeration. Ukraine has two major agglomerations left in Donbas: Sloviansk-Kramatorsk and Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad. Of course, it is strategically important for the enemy to capture both of these hubs. The Slaviansko-Kramatorsk hub is actually the gateway to Slobozhanshchyna (Sloboda Ukraine), to central Ukraine, and the gateway to Donbas. The key. The one who controls this key area is the one who dominates the Western Donbas. Therefore, of course, the defence of these areas is of strategic importance for Ukraine, and this is the most important story.
What can you say about the surrender of Melitopol? Was there a professional command, or was Russia outnumbered?
No defensive positions were established in the Melitopol area. Right before the invasion, a severely understrength 9th Battalion of the 59th Brigade, numbering only up to 300 personnel, was deployed there. Additionally, a tank company from the separate 12th Tank Battalion was sent to the area but arrived without sufficient time to establish defensive positions. As a result, there was no organized defense of Melitopol. There were a few scattered engagements, but by the second day of the war, the enemy had already captured the city. This was, without a doubt, a complete failure. It's unbelievable—for eight years, it was widely acknowledged that Russia was preparing to establish a land corridor to Crimea. The importance of defending Crimea, its exits, and strategic approaches was repeatedly emphasized. And yet, the key cities that were crucial for controlling and blocking Russia’s strategic advance—Melitopol, Tokmak, Enerhodar—were simply handed over to the enemy. Even Nova Kakhovka was lost on the very first day, along with Oleshky and the Kherson bridges. Those responsible for this disastrous failure—which led to massive losses, devastating destruction, and a severe strategic setback for Ukraine—must be held accountable. And this responsibility lies at the highest levels. I believe that such an investigation, if it ever takes place, will certainly not happen under the current government—but rather under a future administration. Only then will we be able to learn the full truth.
Where is the Joker now?
He is recovering on rehabilitation leave in Italy. In an interview with him, which was truly remarkable, he said: "I have a dream—for my leg to be blown off. I can no longer fight as an infantryman because I am completely overworked and exhausted. But I can fight as a grenade launcher operator, a machine gunner, a drone operator, fight alongside my comrades, hold the front, and destroy the enemy. However, I am just too tired of being in the infantry for so long without rest. I wish my leg would be blown off." Imagine—a man has been at war for two years. We record this interview, and a week later, Vitaliy comes under mortar fire. A mine explodes next to him, and shrapnel riddles his legs, both of them. And then, a miracle happens. His legs are pierced by shrapnel, several bones are broken, yet no amputation was necessary. His legs are still there, though they require long rehabilitation, and Vitalii will be able to run again. So, things turned out much better than he had wished for. He is alive and recovering from a serious injury.
How was the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant seized?
50 National Guardsmen were told that no reinforcements would come against 500 orcs with tanks. Naturally, there was no organized defense at Enerhodar—there was simply no time to set it up. The enemy advanced rapidly, and unfortunately, this turned into a tragic episode. The largest nuclear power plant in Europe, located in one of the most strategically important cities—just like Tokmak and Melitopol. Enerhodar, Tokmak, and Melitopol are key to controlling southern Ukraine. This was the defensive line that should have prevented the enemy from seizing the nuclear power plant. However, no significant military presence or fortifications were in place. Some of our units fought desperately, but the enemy had an overwhelming advantage. I want to emphasize that the most important story we have is that, unfortunately, in the southern direction, the situation unfolded as follows. According to data from our General Staff, which I have received—and which I will soon discuss in my upcoming research, where I will provide a brief analysis of the lessons learned from three years of drone-infantry warfare in Ukraine—I will be referencing this information. On February 24, the enemy launched its offensive, having concentrated 22 battalion tactical groups for the attack in this direction. What forces did we have to oppose them? Just one battalion of marines—250 personnel, including young soldiers with no heavy weaponry—tasked with securing a vast area, including 13 bridges and dams, which were meant to be destroyed to slow the advance. This was, at best, a token defensive force. Additionally, three battalions from the 59th Brigade were deployed to the region, but artillery units were still at training grounds and only arrived a few days after the invasion began. The anti-tank unit was stationed elsewhere, and the UAV unit was in Donbas. The brigade itself had not yet been fully deployed and remained in its base configuration. There was no defense. Our forces, these three battalions, were effectively shattered. Two battalions remained in Oleshky, but they were unable to fully deploy for battle. They encountered enemy tanks near the training ground before they could even take up defensive positions. Meanwhile, one battalion was sent to Melitopol, but it also failed to deploy in time.
That is, in reality, all three battalions of the 59th Brigade were at less than 50% strength. In effect, we had four understrength infantry units—essentially half-battalions—spread across a 150-kilometer frontline. Meanwhile, the enemy had 22 fully manned and equipped battalion tactical groups (BTGs). You can imagine the disparity. If we consolidate all our forces, then, at best, we could round them up to the equivalent of two BTGs to compare with the Russians. But even these units were not fully deployed. The Russians operated compactly, in a fully deployed and coordinated manner—while our forces were not. They were either stationed in base camps or assigned to guard isolated positions with minimal personnel. There was no defense. And against this nonexistent defense, the Russian army advanced with a 12- to 15-fold numerical superiority, enjoying absolute superiority in equipment, airpower, and artillery. How could anything possibly be held when no one was blowing up bridges, except for a single Ukrainian hero, Vitalii Skakun? Of course, it was impossible. Miracles do not happen in war. With a 1-to-15 ratio in manpower and a 1-to-30 ratio in military equipment and artillery, combined with the enemy's total air superiority, what kind of defense could there have been if it was never even properly deployed? What counterattacks could have been conducted? The so-called defense was a fiction, and this was known from the very beginning. There are official records confirming this. The data on force calculations that I have just presented is not classified—even investigators have it. Therefore, this is subject to investigation. I will be writing about this soon, citing specific sources—sources that anyone with the appropriate access will be able to verify or obtain through formal requests.
I want to say, friends, that the story of February 24 is not primarily a story of betrayal. It is, first and foremost, a testament to the heroism of the Ukrainian people. Because in those critical moments, the Ukrainian people self-mobilized for war. When civilians took it upon themselves to storm military commissariats and bases, demanding weapons to be the first to enter the fight—without proper equipment, without uniforms, without intelligence support, without anything. This was a moment of unprecedented, mass-scale heroism, a feat unmatched in modern history. It was unique. And I will never forget these days—February 18 and February 20, 2014. These are the days that changed the course of history, that forged the Ukrainian nation, that united us in a common struggle for our shared future. And I have no doubt that Ukraine will prevail in this difficult and bloody battle. But we must win—we must rebuild. And the most important task before us now is to ensure that we do not pass this war on to our children, that we do not make our children refugees. This is our generation’s responsibility. And once again, I want to express my deepest respect and gratitude to each and every person who, on that day, seeing that a brutal war had begun, began to think about their place in the ranks, about what they could do for victory—and took action. I have never seen such self-organization, such a surge of unity in my life. And I will never forget it. This is something that will be preserved in the memory of generations to come. Eternal glory and remembrance to the Ukrainian heroes who repelled the invasion and crushed the enemy army, despite its vast numerical and technological superiority. Eternal memory and honor to those who have fought for Ukraine all these years, to those who have given their lives and their health. And honor to those who continue this fight today.
Glory to Ukraine!
