Dmytro Filatov, commander of 1st ’Da Vinci’ SAB, on 153rd Brigade: Gather 20 of worst soldiers, we will train them, and when they return, they will start fighting and become leaders
Is it possible to stop the enemy near Pokrovsk and prevent them from capturing the city and advancing further into the Dnipropetrovsk region? Why are the fortifications built in 2024 considered ’fortifications of the last war’? What should be done with AWOL soldiers and conscientious objectors?
We are talking to the commander of the 1st Separate Assault Battalion (SAB) "Da Vinci" Dmytro Filatov about the most intense area of the frontline.
Please tell us, as usual, you are now in the area of the enemy's main efforts near Pokrovsk. How intense are the enemy’s attacks, and what losses have you managed to inflict on them?
As of today, the enemy is attacking almost daily. The key question is the number of troops they deploy. When weather conditions are difficult, they send in more troops because they can use the cover of fog and rain to replenish the battlefield with infantry. And they will be sent into combat, which naturally puts more strain on all our firepower, on the infantry directly on the positions. Consequently, the drones are under greater load as well. When the weather is favorable, in good conditions, they send out smaller groups—two or three men at most. Usually, they attack from three to four directions simultaneously, sometimes from two. This has become routine for us. The enemy is trying to drive us out, but during these attempts, we destroy them and inflict heavy losses.
What losses have the 1st Da Vinci Assault Battalion inflicted over the past month, in January?
Over three hundred in the last month. On the 24th, I counted, and it was close to three hundred. Then I lost track a bit because I had to shift my focus to the direction of 153rd and, accordingly, couldn’t keep up with the statistics.
More than three hundred eliminated occupiers?
Yes.
Are these the ones that you have confirmed with photos and videos?
Yes.
This is a very high figure.
Let's just say that this is not the highest figure for our division. In the previous direction, where we were at Kurakhovo, we had up to 750 per month.
Is it possible to stop the enemy, prevent the capture of Pokrovsk, and enter the Dnipropetrovsk region?
Yes, absolutely. We have every chance to do so. We just need to analyze our mistakes and take responsibility at different levels instead of constantly trying to shift it. Too often, mistakes are pushed all the way down to the infantry. This is something I see firsthand when I arrive to assist somewhere. They shift responsibility onto the infantry, but when you start assessing the situation, you realize that these guys are smart, solid fighters—they will fight. But they have lost faith in their commanders, who are inexperienced and don’t understand what leadership entails. There are certain systemic flaws in the traditions of our Armed Forces that we need to overcome. Once we address these issues, everything will change. We are now well-equipped with weapons and gear. However, there are serious shortcomings when it comes to UAV operations—high losses and a lack of centralized coordination across all units. For us, when it happens—I often encounter it in those areas where everything is falling apart, where everything crumbles and collapses—they try to throw in as many different units as possible that have proven their effectiveness. The first thing that happens when they deploy units there—like here, at the sector of 153rd—is that they are given tasks, but no proper chain of communication, command, or coordination has been established. There is a term everyone loves to use but few know how to implement—interaction. Without interaction, without coordination, these weaknesses have to be corrected in the middle of combat. This is bad. The enemy is using this to advance, and that's it. If we approached it from the other end—starting with logistics and command and only then taking measures to build defensive lines. Defense lines are not just one thing, as we had a problem there, let's say, when there were no fortifications. There were no fortifications, we started building fortifications. We begin to consider fortifications, and it seems as if we are building fortifications for a war that is already over.
Please explain why we have such fortifications. Last year, the budget allocated 17 billion hryvnias for fortification construction, and it is crucial to hear a combat commander's opinion—why are the fortifications we are building designed for the last war?
Weapons of destruction are not taken into account, nor is the detailed effectiveness of units analyzed. That is, in my opinion, which may be subjective, as I am looking at it from below—well, not entirely from the bottom, but from a fairly low level in the hierarchy, perhaps from above, it looks different. First and foremost, modern precision weapons are not being factored in, nor is the actual number of troops and resources required to hold these defensive positions. For example, when I pass by some of these fortifications, I can’t help but smile, I wonder where we are supposed to find enough infantry to man them, company strongpoint is built right at a crossroads, and it’s not even a proper company strongpoint for a platoon—it’s a company stronghold, to make it at least somewhat functional, you would need to station 150 soldiers there. But putting 150 servicemen into an obvious target for the enemy's attack, the enemy won't attack with infantry or drive their equipment like in previous wars. Such a number of infantry was necessary to survive intense artillery shelling and, after these barrages, be able to repel the enemy's attack, which would be mechanized, using equipment, including tanks. Now, the war is different. Now, an anti-tank ditch is the most important obstacle in the enemy's advance. By digging an anti-tank ditch and ensuring small passages for logistical support of our troops, while we stand in front of this ditch, it gives us the ability to control the situation and prevent the enemy from advancing en masse in a mechanized manner. Based on the experience from the Kurakhove direction, the enemy can do this. They don't need to invent anything super technological for it. The enemy simply takes old models of armored vehicles, reinforces them in so-called sheds, and using these sheds overcomes a strip of about 10 kilometers. They move, we use FPV operator, fire artillery, but a large amount of equipment reaches our combat formations, the enemy dismounts and conducts assault actions. First, we need to block the enemy’s ability to use equipment, and that’s where the anti-tank ditch comes in, and then we deal with their infantry. For this, we don’t need 150 infantrymen, we need just 15. And clear, centralized control. Intelligence, or rather, first, communications, intelligence, and then firepower. These are the three components, the three pillars that should be the foundation not only of defense but also of everything, the offensive as well—this is the essence of military management.
How many drones do you receive from the state?
Currently, the situation has improved significantly, but still, let’s say, not without your involvement. There was a time when we had nothing to fly with, we couldn’t provide anything. And now, the situation in terms of supply is not 100% resolved, but it is better than it was, let’s say, a couple of months ago. Regarding weapons and equipment, if we don’t count the trophies we captured ourselves, nothing has been added since Dmytro's death. No changes have occurred. Our battalion has not received a single unit of equipment or any types of weaponry, except for MKs and 82mm mortars. And of course, small arms.
That is, there was no increase in armoured vehicles, no increase in guns.
And what about the guns? Are they the same ones that Dmytro received? Have they at least been repaired—barrels and liners replaced?
We replaced two of them. They were in desperate need of replacement. The guns are already quite worn out. But they’re still functional. The guys do their best to maintain and take care of them.
How many drones does a battalion need to be fully equipped? What should be the monthly budget for drones to ensure a separate assault battalion can operate effectively?
I can’t estimate the budget offhand—that would require sitting down and making calculations. But what I do know for sure, based on current drone losses, is that the absolute minimum to sustain operations for a month is 100 drones.
Is that the minimum?
Yes, that's the bare minimum. That’s how many we lose. Losses of funds to date, due to electronic warfare, the enemy's increased use of electronic warfare, due to difficult weather conditions, fog, rain, all this affects the number of drone losses. During periods of stable weather, with less precipitation, the loss rate decreases. But for this time of year, we need 100 drones. We use Mavics, and ideally, they should be 3T models.
Nighttime, with a thermal imager
Yes, with a thermal imager. It’s not just easier to detect targets at night but also during the day, since the thermal signature remains visible, allowing us to spot enemy positions. This greatly aids reconnaissance.
How many drones did the battalion receive from the state in 2024, over the course of a year?
Very few.
More than 100 or less than 100?
Less than 100 for the entire year
So an assault battalion, which carries out critical missions in key sectors, received less than its monthly requirement over the span of a year?
Yes. That’s if we don’t count FPV drones, as they fall into a different category.
Do you receive FPV from the state?
Yes, we are receiving FPVs. Let's put it this way, there’s no problem with the availability of FPV equipment. Why? First, the state provides them, but we more often use the ones provided by volunteers—they supply a lot of them because they have better video connections, better overall communication quality. In general, the quality of those FPV drones provided by volunteers and various organizations is much better, so we use them. To say there’s a shortage of FPV equipment? No, that’s not the case.
Mainly on drones with payload drops, on reconnaissance drones.
Yes.
You see, Dmytro used to be able to resolve such issues, and I hope that the state leadership will recognize that support should not be limited to anniversaries of heroes' births and deaths. Their life's work must continue. And for that to happen, it must first and foremost be properly resourced. That is a true recognition and proper remembrance. True memory. Has the battalion been able to recruit new personnel?
At the moment, we are not receiving any reinforcements at all. That is, we are not included in the official distribution and manning process. We do not receive personnel through standard allocation. Yes, we are replenishing our ranks, doing our best to utilize recruiters, trying to open recruitment centers—but this is entirely our own initiative. We are making efforts to engage civilians in the military, explaining things to them, trying to spark their interest in service. We manage to attract a certain number of contract soldiers, though some are unwilling to sign contracts, while others prefer to be drafted through mobilization. The mechanisms for this are in place and functioning. We also recruit through direct mobilization. But all these efforts are undertaken by the battalion itself.
Please tell us about the mission. I was just speaking with soldiers from the 153rd Mechanized Brigade, and it turned out that this brigade, which only arrived at the front at the end of December, is newly formed and fresh. Six battalions, more than six thousand personnel. I was surprised when the soldiers told me that the Da Vinci Assault Battalion is the one saving their situation. I had assumed that a brigade coming in would be reinforcing everyone in the direction.
No, it’s a bit different. It’s not the Da Vinci Assault Battalion that’s saving them. We are operating within our assigned sector. Our team consists of just six infantrymen, five officers, and four sergeants. And yet, it’s these six infantrymen, five officers, and four sergeants who are stabilizing the situation. Now, I’ve also reinforced UAV posts, regrouped them, and slightly redistributed tasks to improve reconnaissance operations. I’ve also reorganized artillerymen to better support mortar operations. Essentially, we are building a structured battalion-level firepower system. In just two days, the commander of the mortar battery and his two gunners managed to reduce the time from receiving a fire command to actually firing a round—from 20 minutes on a 120mm mortar down to just 4 minutes. And if before, in similar situations lasting 20 minutes, someone might see a hit and everyone would deny it, now the mortar crews of the 2nd Mechanized Battalion of the 153rd Brigade hit their target when an enemy infantryman was out in the open, landing a mine right at his feet. So yes, they can fight. These guys are strong fighters. They just need to rely on some experience and proper leadership. When we arrived, we were told that the 2nd Battalion here was refusing to fight, that they were сonscientious objectors. I don’t know. Sure, there are some people who are scared, who have lost faith. However, the real issue is that their commanders not only don’t know how to handle such personnel, but they also haven’t yet gained real combat experience. As we started assessing the situation, we found that there are career officers, there are officers who have been in the Armed Forces for six years—but they come from rear units. Now they’ve been put into command positions, but they don’t fully understand what an infantry engagement looks like. They don’t know how to manage a battle. Therefore, their initial experience was unfortunate, but now the brigade is gaining confidence, starting with the level of the second battalion, the battalion we are assisting. The guys are now standing their ground, holding their positions. They are engaging the enemy, such fiercely. You can see it yourself. They are even capturing POWs. And, interestingly, the guys who recently captured a prisoner—when we arrived, they were at a reassignment center. What does that mean? It means they had been written off as conscientious objectors who didn’t want to fight. The sergeants have spoken with them, my officers have spoken with them.
Your sergeants and officers?
Yes, yes.
And did they return to their tasks?
They returned to performing their tasks. They were told, "Guys, talk to them—there are infantrymen, just like you, who came with us." They sat down, had a conversation, and then went with our guys. That was it. They took up their positions. When they arrived, the enemy had already entered the settlement using mechanized units. They had relatively stable communication and were under command. They understood what was happening and could hear the commander's voice over the radio. Not their own commander, but the one who was leading the operation—our officer. Still, he gave clear instructions, knew the situation, and knew how to act. The enemy landed in the house across from them. That was it. They were told, "Guys, take cover, maintain close observation, keep your heads down—we'll handle it with artillery." We blocked the enemy’s advance with artillery fire, during this time, we prepared drones with payloads, FPV drones, and the Vampire system, we inflicted damage, and ultimately, most of the enemy was eliminated by the Vampire strike, as it destroyed the building. Three of them made it out—one was later captured, and two were taken out by payload drone drops. That was it. The unit fought, engaging in a coordinated, conventional battle. They didn’t charge at the enemy—they fired from cover, in a designated direction. Three days later, when we spoke with them, they said, "Damn, in three days, we’ve learned more about war than during our entire training." They learned what a compass is from us. And honestly, I find it bizarre when an infantryman doesn’t know what a compass is. That’s it. I don’t need any further explanation. An infantryman without a compass cannot be properly led by a commander because you cannot orient your troops without one. It’s impossible. For 12 hours, their landmarks might be a tree, a pole, or something else—but on the battlefield, there are dozens of poles, hundreds of trees. Everyone perceives them differently depending on their position. If a commander knows exactly where his position is, where his soldiers are, the only reliable way to orient them to the cardinal directions is with a compass. That’s it. When you can relay an azimuth to one position, then another, then a third—that's what’s called concentrated fire.
How do you assess the quality of the mobilized soldiers of the 153rd Mechanised Brigade?
At a high level. I would have taken everyone.
Is this no joke?
Yes, no jokes. Each one on the list. Let them hand them over. We are currently taking measures to, let’s say, stabilize the situation. We are taking personnel from here—this was agreed upon with the Pokrovsk tactical group. We are now being assigned the most, let’s say, problematic servicemen—the ones their own command cannot manage. I said, "Alright, go ahead and gather the 20 you consider the absolute worst." We will take them, teach them what war really is, and show them how it’s done. They will be integrated into the personnel currently holding the defensive line. First, we will put them through intensive five-day training. They have already undergone basic military training for several months, so they know their weapons, but they lack the finer details. We'll teach them the finer details, get them into positions, and in a couple of weeks, they'll return to their units and I'm confident they won't just start fighting—they'll become leaders, guiding others. If this personnel had been deployed alongside strong, experienced units within its combat formations, I am confident that the situation would have been different. I am sure that this brigade would have gained the capability to fight effectively. Because all levels here are operating in the same way. As I said, the artillery and mortar crews couldn’t fire accurately, there was no established communication system, no structured observation system, no proper command and control system. And this applies at both the battalion and brigade levels. All the training and coordination that takes place on training grounds doesn’t fully match the realities of modern warfare. That’s why these issues arise, leading to… In my opinion, a significant number of AWOL soldiers from the 153rd Brigade wouldn’t have fled if we had provided timely support. And the measures being taken here are also, to some extent, an initiative of the higher command. So I wouldn’t say that the leadership was completely unaware of the situation.
It should be noted, and I truly want to express my respect to the generals, that the Operational-Tactical Group (OTG) Donetsk and the Operational Command (OC) North did not leave this situation to chance. Instead, they actively sought solutions rather than simply turning a blind eye and blaming the soldiers for being mobilized. They are making an effort to stabilize the situation. What’s crucial is that this is done in a timely manner—during the preparation phase, at the stage of deployment and integration into combat—not later, when it has already escalated into a full-blown crisis that needs urgent resolution.
No, actually, the reason I speak so confidently about this sector is because I can see the people involved in stabilization efforts and problem-solving. I see who is leading the tactical group, and it’s a seasoned commander with real combat experience—someone who is trusted by other experienced commanders. That’s Colonel Bakulin. Likewise, General Krasylnykov is personally engaged in the stabilization of the 153rd.
Yes, and the commander of OC North, along with the commander of OTG Donetsk, General Tarnavskyi, has taken direct responsibility for this. This is his decision, and he is actively addressing the situation. So, what we see here is real teamwork, and it is beginning to yield results. Dmytro, thank you very much for this insightful conversation about the ongoing situation in Donbas. And we see that, without euphoria but with confidence, the conversation is assured, and there is certainty that with the right managerial and organizational measures, we have the capability to reliably stop and defeat the enemy.
Yes, one hundred percent.
Thank you, thank you to the commander, and thank you to the First Separate Assault Battalion 'Da Vinci.' Thank you for your service and for defending Ukraine.
