On US peace plan
The broadcast is dedicated to the current developments in global politics. President Trump’s peace plan has been made public for the first time.
It was released in a semi-official manner. It has not been formalized as the official position of the United States. Nevertheless, this stance was clearly disclosed and passed on to the largest and most influential Western media outlets, specifically to present it as the position of the United States.
What exactly is President Trump proposing to stop the war in Ukraine?
First: a ceasefire is to be declared. Both sides are to immediately begin negotiations on the technical implementation following the ceasefire.
Regarding security guarantees, Ukraine would receive reliable security guarantees. A specially formed group of European countries, along with interested non-European states, would act as guarantors of security.
Ukraine would not aspire to join NATO membership.
Ukraine would aspire to join the European Union.
The territorial issues would be regulated as follows: the United States would legally recognize Russia’s control over Crimea, grant de facto recognition of Russia’s control over Luhansk region, and grant de facto recognition of control over parts of Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Kherson regions.
Ukraine would regain its territories in the Kharkiv region. Ukraine would regain control over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant through U.S.-managed administration and operation, with the distribution of electricity between Ukraine and Russia, as well as regain control over the Kakhovka Dam.
Ukraine would also be granted unrestricted navigation along the Dnipro River and regain control over the Kinburn Spit.
The United States and Ukraine would conclude an agreement on economic cooperation. Ukraine would be guaranteed full reconstruction and financial compensation.
Sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014 due to "this conflict" would be lifted.
The United States and Russia would develop economic cooperation in the energy sector and other areas.
A ceasefire and negotiations following the ceasefire — this is clear. The ceasefire would have to be implemented unilaterally.
What does Trump’s plan actually mean? Donald Trump is not planning to initiate any peace talks, as he does not want to act as a party to the war. He intends to act solely as a broker, not as a side in the conflict. That’s why the ceasefire and any technical implementation of negotiations, in his view, should be the result of unilateral decisions. One unilateral step from Ukraine, another unilateral step from Russia.
In this scenario, all questions — who stops shooting, who continues, where the positions of the sides are actually located on the front line, how to separate those positions, and whether that’s even realistically possible — remain completely unregulated. Everything is left entirely to the discretion of the Ukrainian and Russian forces. Trump has no interest in how this ceasefire would actually work in practice. "Figure it out yourselves." Naturally, this raises a host of serious concerns, as many frontline positions are extremely vulnerable due to their close proximity.
The weakness of such a plan becomes obvious from the very first point: the United States does not act as a party on the side of Ukraine.
I’ve said many times on air that ending the war is only possible through a Korean scenario — the model of how the Korean War was brought to an end in 1953. That war was stopped because there were two clearly defined sides. On one side were the UN forces: South Korea, the United States, and allied nations under the UN command — essentially most countries of the Western world, including, by the way, Colombia from South America, one of the participating states. In other words, on one side were Western countries within the sphere of Western civilization and NATO influence. On the other side was the Soviet bloc — North Korea, China, which negotiated together. There were two sides at the table. That made it obvious who was responsible for upholding or violating the terms — the parties sitting on either side of the negotiating table. Right now, in our case, the only party responsible for enforcing a ceasefire is Ukraine itself. So Ukraine, the very country that has suffered aggression, is expected to ensure that it does not incur losses during this so-called disengagement and ceasefire. We must also make sure its interests are not harmed when the Russians claim, "We are the ones occupying these positions, not you, and we demand that you withdraw, even if you’re only a hundred meters away — otherwise, we’ll open fire." In other words, right from the first point, Ukraine is expected to shoulder the most critical responsibility on its own. It is now clear that what Putin did — this so-called Easter ceasefire, unilaterally declared and implemented by Russia — was a demonstration for Trump. A signal: look, we’re ready for a scenario where each side enforces the ceasefire independently, on its own terms.
I want to remind everyone how this agreement differs from Minsk I and Minsk II. Minsk I included a ceasefire, but there was no bilateral mechanism to implement it. The ceasefire declared on September 5, 2014, led directly to Minsk II, because Minsk I lacked any mechanisms for control, coordination, or mutual agreement on positions. To make Minsk II work, under pressure from our Western partners — particularly Germany and France, who played a strong role at the time — a structure was introduced: the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC). Yes, it was largely symbolic: both Russian and Ukrainian officers were present, and while the center occasionally reviewed incidents, it often simply ignored them. But at least it represented a bilateral apparatus — a mechanism of joint agreements. Today, no such bilateral mechanism exists. Even if there is an exchange of fire or a clash somewhere on the front, no one will come to investigate. Everything will be settled solely through the use of force just like it was after Minsk I. And let me remind you: the inability to enforce the ceasefire under the first Minsk agreement is exactly what led, after five or six months, to renewed fighting — local battles across the front line, and eventually the large-scale Battle of Debaltseve. It was only after Debaltseve that Minsk II was born — and with it, the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination, which at least carried more weight thanks to the involvement of the OSCE mission and greater Western engagement.
What happened under Minsk II? There was a Joint Centre for Control and Coordination, and the OSCE mission was deployed after the establishment of this joint centre. The ceasefire monitoring mechanism worked as follows: both sides — Ukraine and Russia — submitted reports to the JCCC when ceasefire violations occurred. In response, representatives from both Ukrainian and Russian sides of the JCCC, along with OSCE observers, would arrive at the reported location. While OSCE personnel were not military, a special agreement between Ukraine and Russia allowed the OSCE mission to operate on both sides of the frontline and to provide reports identifying which side had violated the ceasefire. So this Joint Centre for Control and Coordination, together with the OSCE mission, ensured at least a minimal, rough enforcement of the ceasefire. Now, we see that none of this exists. There is simply a call to "cease fire." But we’ve already been through this — back in September 2014. And that is the core risk: the complete absence of any enforcement or monitoring mechanisms. The entire burden of responsibility is once again placed on Ukraine to defend itself and guarantee its own security. Meanwhile, Putin is given space as he was in 2014 to provoke attacks, redraw the front lines to his advantage, and reignite the war, causing more casualties among Ukrainians. That is the fundamental danger we are seeing from the outset.
On security guarantees for Ukraine, Ukraine is said to be receiving reliable security guarantees. The guarantors will be a specially formed group of European countries, along with interested non-European states. But what exactly are reliable security guarantees? I’d like to point out that Ukraine has already had security guarantors in the past. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe served as one. It was the collective position of all European states. We already had those guarantees. And when full-scale fighting broke out, the OSCE mission simply left — because it was made up of civilians, public servants, and nothing more. So, when we talk about reliable security guarantees, the truth is: we don’t really know what that means.
We see that a group of countries is expected to act as guarantors. But how exactly will they guarantee anything if Russia violates the security commitments? Once again, there is no clarity. At the same time, Ukraine is already being presented with obligations. Ukraine would agree not to pursue NATO membership. Now, I must say — the wording is extremely vague. And if it’s phrased like that, without any binding legal commitments, it essentially does not oblige us to anything. We are not planning to seek NATO membership in the near future — and "near future" is something that can pass. The risk is that if we agree to this language right from the start, the next step could be enshrining it in a formal agreement. But we don’t even have a peace agreement yet. This is merely what Trump has written — a list of points we’re expected to take to the negotiating table. Putin, on the other hand, might be ready to sit down for talks if we declare such things up front.
What happens next at the negotiating table? If we agree to abandon NATO aspirations right from the start, we could be pressured into formalizing this, either through a Ukrainian law or even by amending the Constitution. We’ve seen this before. Ukraine was once declared a neutral, non-nuclear state. It was written down — all of it — making it possible to destroy us at any moment. Do we need that again? We were a non-aligned state. It was enshrined in our Constitution. Everything was fine. And what did that non-alignment give us? How many hundreds of thousands of lives has it cost us? These words are completely disadvantageous to Ukraine. In the context of this war, agreeing to such a clause makes absolutely no sense — it is pure absurdity. Putin attacked Ukraine while it had a non-aligned status. And now he demands that we return to it? No. As for EU membership, Ukraine may seek to join the European Union. That’s not even a matter for peace negotiations. It’s already been decided. I’m not sure what there is to guarantee here but fine, let it be included. I have no objection to that point, obviously.
On territory: the United States recognizes Russia’s control over Crimea. That means Russia gets something right away. But the original cause of aggression against Ukraine was the seizure of Crimea. For years, Trump, Biden, and both Republicans and Democrats have insisted on not recognizing any redrawing of borders in Europe. All European security documents clearly state that borders must not be violated. And now, a country that is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a leading member of the OSCE and other international institutions, says: "No — we want to take this, and we will take it." Putin will now rebuild his army, complete rearmament, and then say: "Look — you’ve already lost Crimea as a result of this war. Maybe you’ll lose something else too." That was precisely the logic behind the start of the war in 2014. There was a real risk that Putin would go further — that he would seek to take other regions as well. That is why the war began — because Putin refused to acknowledge, in any way, that he was violating Ukraine’s sovereignty. And with such a clause, he will be able to say: "We will keep doing this — the threat remains." The United States is effectively recognizing Russia’s control over the Luhansk region. This, in practice, creates a form of legal control. Crimea, it seems, can now be considered "taken" — it’s already regarded as part of Russia. The same applies to Luhansk region and parts of Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Kherson that are currently occupied by Russia. This model essentially says: Crimea is gone — it only took 11 years. Next comes Luhansk and the rest. It’s simply a matter of time. This has been going on for a decade. So why not provoke Ukraine further? And perhaps, in a year or two or three, Trump will say: "Well, what’s the point — let’s go ahead and legally recognize it all" In effect, Putin is demonstrating that he can do whatever he wants in Ukraine — and force the entire world, including the United States and all of Ukraine’s allies who for years talked about their support for Ukraine and for democracy — to eventually say: "Russia is stronger." And through military force, Russia will — gradually, not all at once, but through continued fighting — seize more and more territory, piece by piece.
Ukraine is regaining control over the territory in the Kharkiv region. Approximately 300 square kilometers — up to 300 — are currently occupied in the Kharkiv region. At this point, we are in a position to take them back. Russia does not control any town or settlement there, and their positions are unfavorable. They are withdrawing from the area.
Ukraine is returning control of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant under US administration and will jointly own what the plant produces, effectively helping Russia to fully restore energy supplies at the expense of the Ukrainian nuclear power plant in the occupied territories. So we agree with what we are actually doing? We are entering into contractual relations with the aggressor, through the mediation of the United States, of course, because this is only administration, the US is getting sovereign rights to this territory, it is simply administering it, civilian specialists are sitting there and administering it. And in fact, Ukraine is entering into bilateral agreements and doing business with the aggressor. The aggressor now allows us to trade electricity because they seized our nuclear power plant. Previously, during the Minsk agreements, we had arrangements for joint coal operations. Now we’ll be receiving electricity from the aggressor instead, tying ourselves to them through economic relations. We’re also being allowed to use our own Kakhovka Dam and the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant. Ukraine is granted unrestricted navigation on the Dnipro River and control over the Kinburn Spit, which is part of the Mykolaiv region. In other words, we are being allowed to use access to the Dnipro River, to regain the Kinburn Spit, parts of the Mykolaiv region, and navigation along the Dnipro while the Russian army remains stationed along the riverbanks. What can we say? These terms are clearly far harsher than those outlined in the Minsk agreements. Minsk I and Minsk II provided greater guarantees and mechanisms of control. What we’re seeing now are far more one-sided demands — and far greater losses.
The next, last section concerns economic cooperation. The United States and Ukraine are set to sign an agreement on economic partnership. This is something we’ve already discussed — and yes, that’s good. Ukraine is promised full reconstruction and financial compensation. But honestly, this part lacks detail. We already have ambiguity when it comes to security guarantees — here, we’d like to hear specific figures and commitments. What exactly does "full reconstruction" mean? What is "financial compensation"? In reality, Russian aggression has destroyed our economy. And if we sign onto this framework, we are essentially agreeing to a complete restructuring of Ukraine’s economic model. Our national economic infrastructure has been severely damaged and is already undergoing deep changes. When it comes to security, the only real guarantee, from a military perspective, is Ukraine itself and the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This means that Ukraine will not be able to allocate serious resources from its own budget solely for reconstruction, because we must maintain our Defence Forces at a high level of readiness, support a professional army, and sustain substantial force numbers. I don’t believe we need a one-million-strong force — we neither have the capacity nor the necessity for that — but we must have a professional military, supported by volunteer defence forces, reserve components within both the army and volunteer formations, and militarised units across all law enforcement agencies to allow for rapid deployment. All of this requires significant spending — we are talking about tens of billions each year just to fund Ukraine’s defence. Only with that level of security can reconstruction even take place. And that’s not even mentioning the scale of infrastructure destruction — we will need investments of enormous proportions simply to rebuild.
Sanctions against Russia imposed since the conflicts began in 2014 will be lifted. This means that Russia will immediately regain access to the levers of influence that had separated it from the civilized world — and had, in effect, served as a form of protection for Ukraine. These sanctions were extremely difficult to impose. And reintroducing them — if needed — would be just as difficult, if not more so. It is essential to understand what mechanism would govern the lifting and potential reimposition of these sanctions. Will such a mechanism be outlined? Will it be included in the broader security guarantees package? These are questions that must be answered clearly from the outset. Meanwhile, the United States and Russia are expected to develop economic cooperation across various sectors. We had little doubt this was part of the deal — that much is obvious.
What is currently being proposed is the unconditional, voluntary abandonment — by both Ukraine and its key Western ally, the United States — of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. These are significantly harsher and more severe terms compared to the Minsk agreements. Minsk was a temporary concession, one that was never formally legalized. Now, for the first time, we are talking about legal recognition. I don’t want to use dramatic language and call this an act of capitulation — but it is, without a doubt, a formal legal admission of defeat in the war and of the impossibility of reclaiming the occupied territories. First, it acknowledges defeat in the war. Second, it concedes that the territories seized by the enemy cannot be regained, effectively abandoning the fight for them. Third – it places full responsibility on Ukraine alone for the enforcement of these peace agreements, including through the use of force if necessary. Compared to the Minsk agreements, Minsk II did not require Ukraine to give anything up. Minsk II did not provide for the lifting of sanctions on the Russian Federation. Minsk II did not stipulate that Ukraine must abandon its sovereign foreign policy course. On the contrary, during that time, Ukraine’s integration with NATO only deepened. Now, however, Ukraine is expected to voluntarily agree to the incorporation of its own territory into the Russian Federation. What does it mean when our key allies recognize Russia’s occupation? It means we are expected to accept it — and sign off on it. And what follows? That once the United States formally recognizes Crimea as Russian territory, any other country in the world — and many will — can do the same. Legally. And after that, recognizing the de facto annexation of other territories will come just as easily. That would be a devastating defeat — and a set of terms far worse and less favorable than any we’ve seen before. What’s the underlying position here? Is this how we’re supposed to evaluate Trump’s approach? If Trump’s proposal had included actual security guarantees — concrete figures, firm commitments — and if the United States, following the Korean model, assumed part of the responsibility for security enforcement, then it would not be acceptable for Ukraine to abandon its NATO aspirations. In that case, NATO should actually strengthen its presence in Ukraine as part of those security guarantees. NATO doesn’t need to deploy all offensive systems or long-range weapons — those are implementation details. But NATO must deploy defense systems, in Ukraine. First and foremost: air defense systems, radar surveillance stations, and intelligence centers — the components necessary to ensure Ukraine’s security.
And with that, responsibility for enforcing these security arrangements would be shared. But at present, none of this exists. Trump’s proposal clearly requires further clarification. So how did Ukraine’s leadership respond?
This was also an unofficial response. Trump passed his proposal through Reuters, while Ukraine responded via The Telegraph. Thus, Kyiv’s demands indicate that Ukraine seeks to explicitly exclude any formal international recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea and other temporarily occupied territories. The first and second points focus on framing any peace agreement as grounded in international law — not as a form of capitulation.
The third point is an attempt to take back control over the negotiation process from Trump and reestablish Ukraine at the center of the peace process.
The fourth point serves as a warning to the United States and NATO: allowing Russia to keep Crimea would enable it to threaten not only Ukraine but also its Black Sea allies.
The fifth point clearly states that Russia must not be allowed to impose any restrictions on the size of Ukraine’s Armed Forces or Defence Forces. That, of course, is entirely self-evident.
Ukraine is not currently ready to sign off on Trump’s proposal despite the extremely difficult situation. Clearly, signing the agreement in its current form would amount to the current leadership admitting total failure on both the political and military fronts. There is undoubtedly a risk here. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy would have to place his trust in President Trump. Because if he doesn’t — if there’s no trust — then this agreement is meaningless. The main risk lies in the fact that Trump is presenting his plan unofficially. There is no formal peace negotiation involving all parties to the war. There is no roundtable where the U.S., Ukraine, and European partners sit on one side, and Russia on the other. Trump envisions a peace deal involving just two parties: Ukraine and Russia. That’s it. But Ukraine has a broad coalition of supporters. They are making declarations promising financial aid. Promising. They promise reconstruction but no one promises whether peace can even exist under such a threatening configuration. We are dealing with a country that, three years ago, openly declared its goal: the total destruction of Ukraine, the dismantling of its political system, the removal of its government, the complete disarmament of the country — in other words, the elimination of Ukrainian statehood and the transformation of Ukraine into just another province of the Russian Federation. We are now in the fourth year of a brutal war. And now, the United States tells us: make peace at any cost — but security guarantees are entirely your own responsibility. You're on your own. As for everything else — we’ll support you, just trust us. I would like to remind everyone: this logic also underpinned the Budapest Memorandum, signed by then-President Leonid Kravchuk. And we all know how that ended. That was also a trust-based agreement under which Ukraine gave up all of its nuclear weapons. Not only expensive and complex strategic weapons, but also tactical nuclear arms — simpler and far cheaper to maintain. Everything was handed over to Russia. Later, almost automatically, five years later, Ukraine also handed over its air-launched cruise missiles — as well as its strategic bombers — to Russia. In exchange for something. As a result, those very bombers and missiles have now been used to strike Ukraine. They continue to bomb us — nearly every week. That is the true cost of trust-based agreements. So, let me be clear: what we are seeing now in Trump’s plan is not Minsk III. It is Budapest Memorandum 2. In essence. With the same kind of consequences. And therefore, to say that this proposal is a legitimate basis for Ukraine to sit down at the negotiating table — that is completely insufficient. However, if this proposal becomes the subject of a joint agreement — a shared position among Ukraine, the European Union, and all of our key allies — and if it is presented as a unified, detailed platform, with Trump engaging not through Reuters but through official channels — at a dedicated conference or special summit — where all positions are publicly voiced, discussed, and mechanisms written down and formalized in writing — then, and only then, such a consolidated NATO-wide position might be considered viable. With some changes, this proposal could potentially serve as the basis for peace negotiations. But at this stage, it remains a set of unilateral arrangements — lacking any actual enforcement mechanism beyond Ukraine itself. In other words, the nature of the war is not being addressed in any meaningful way. On the contrary, the proposal introduces new flashpoints for future conflict — such as the distribution of energy from the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, the operation of the Kakhovka Hydropower Plant, and the regulation of navigation along the Dnipro River. These are clearly areas where friction is 100% inevitable. And that’s not even mentioning the front line. The risks are significant.
Answers to questions
- No matter how it can be framed, this is capitulation.
Well, look — this is still just a proposal. Nothing has been agreed upon. We are only beginning to discuss it. This is the first time we are seeing an unofficial draft — not from the United States government, but reportedly leaked through Reuters by sources within the Trump team.
A "Finnish scenario", but what is our alternative?
Undoubtedly, what we’re seeing bears a resemblance to the so-called "Finnish scenario." But there is one crucial difference. At the time, the Soviet Union never officially declared its intent to fully occupy Finland. Finland, following the post–World War II settlements, was not placed within the Soviet Union’s exclusive sphere of influence. In fact, there were clear international arrangements — at the Tehran Conference, at the Potsdam Conference — where guarantees of Finland’s independence came not from Finland itself negotiating with Stalin, but from the leaders of the world’s major powers. It was Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt, and later Truman who took on that responsibility. They were the guarantors of the Finnish outcome. That’s what made the "Finnish scenario" possible. Or consider the Korean model — where there is no peace treaty at all. And who guarantees the Korean ceasefire? U.S. troops do — by physically being there. That is the guarantee. What we are being offered now is something else entirely. It’s not the Finnish scenario.
If the U.S. doesn't want to commit or guarantee anything — why should we listen to them?
We cannot afford not to listen to the United States. America remains one of Ukraine’s key allies, and our security depends on U.S. support to a very large extent. That is why we must continue to build our relationship with the United States. We cannot afford to provoke conflict. Instead, we must work to influence public opinion in the U.S. — including the political, military, and civil society spheres, as well as the media. This is not a task for five or six officials in the President’s Office. It is a responsibility that must be shared across the entire Ukrainian state and society. It would be to the point to define this strategy now. And I want to emphasize: we must seek compromise and right now, that begins first and foremost with Donald Trump himself.
So basically, you're suggesting we fight until the last Ukrainian?
Vitia, let me give you some advice — stop watching so much Russian television. In fact, maybe you are Russian because "fighting until the last Ukrainian" is a Russian propaganda slogan. Russia has been using that line for the past four years. What you've just said shows that you, fundamentally, hold pro-Russian views. Ukraine is fighting because it's under attack — from a country whose leader, on February 24, 2022, openly declared that his goals were to seize Ukraine, overthrow its government, 'denazify' and 'demilitarize' it. He made it clear that he wanted the whole of Ukraine. He sent troops to Kyiv, to Odesa, and set out to destroy Ukraine as a state. This is not a situation where Putin is saying, "I’m a peaceful man, please let’s stop the war." No. As of April 20, Putin has shown he could stop the bombings and missile strikes with a single order. But he hasn’t. He continues attacking civilians. Even if you stop fighting Putin, he’ll keep killing more. He kills just as he does now in the occupied territories, where people disappear, are executed without trial, are thrown into prison by the thousands simply because they are suspected of being "Ukrainian spies". Being "Ukrainian sympathizers."This is a crime in Russia. Speaking Ukrainian is treated as a crime — something you can be imprisoned for very easily in Donbas. For flag. If someone wants Ukraine to cease to exist, then sure don’t talk about the war at all. But that is not the choice of those who are defending Ukraine. What we are talking about now is defining the kind of guarantees and rules that could truly ensure Ukraine’s security and bring a real end to the war not just in words. A leak to Reuters is not a peace agreement. It’s just someone stating their position. Nothing more.
Use the ceasefire to reinforce the front line, lay mines everywhere, restore missile programs, build a proper army, fortify positions — and get this mob out of Kyiv.
Maybe that’s not a bad strategy. But how do you actually achieve peace? Right now, there’s no clear format for how that peace would come about. Let me be clear. Maybe some people missed it. What Trump is offering is a starting point for talks but it’s being presented as something we must agree to before we even sit at the table. This is not a peace deal. It’s a proposal to start a conversation. And if we accept it in the form it’s currently in, the negotiation will be extremely difficult and disadvantageous for us. We absolutely must work to influence this position. Well, how else could it be?
Trump was and still is a Russian ruscist
I don’t agree with that. I believe Trump is a populist politician but he’s also a representative of American society, and he enjoys strong support there. The Republican Party is one of the pillars of the American state, one of two. And as for accusing the U.S. president of populism — let’s be honest, we’re not exactly in a position to accuse anyone of populism. Our own society has shown a strong tendency to elect populist leaders. That’s why we need to understand how these populists think, what they respond to, and how we can influence them — and how we can engage with American civil society and the U.S. political system to steer their position in a direction that serves Ukraine’s interests.
You recently had a broadcast about the Colombian volunteer fighters for the 47th Brigade. Has there been any state support?
There’s been no support from the state. However, viewers, the Censor.NET editorial team, and friends of the 47th Brigade have so far raised 1.8 million UAH. About a week ago, we purchased plane tickets for around 30 Colombian volunteer fighters, and we’re now preparing a package to bring in more. So no, the effort hasn't been abandoned — it’s ongoing. As soon as the volunteer fighters arrive, I’ll share more detailed updates — and even visuals. This was a meaningful broadcast, and we’re already seeing real progress.
Why did Trump propose such terms in his peace plan?
Because Trump, just like some NATO leaders back in 2014? believes in the idea of trading a small concession to stop a bigger war. At that time, Western leaders — including those from the U.S., Germany, France, and others — also suggested that Ukraine, under President Poroshenko, give up Crimea to build a framework where Russia would receive a "small sacrifice," and the war would stop. This has happened before and we’ve seen the consequences. And the fact that Ukraine refused to cede Crimea then, in retrospect, was absolutely the right and rational decision. Because ceding Crimea would have legitimized further Russian aggression. Instead, the fact that Russia seized Crimea forced Western nations to respond to any future escalation. Had Ukraine given in at that point, Putin would have had 8–10 years to regroup, build up his forces, and restart the war from scratch, under a new pretext. So what pretexts did Russia use this time? "Denazification," "demilitarization." But even if they already had Crimea, they could’ve declared the same thing. Nothing changes. Russia will always find a pretext for aggression. We’re dealing with a state built on lies, crimes, and madness — a nation and government obsessed with conquest, attacks, violence, and humiliation. That’s the very logic of their statehood — of their imperial policy. So why did Trump propose such terms? Nothing surprising there. He’s simply trying to negotiate the war away, just like his predecessors tried to do. Right now, Trump has more leverage because Ukraine has been severely weakened by the war, and he is exploiting the possibility of halting support altogether. That gives him more tools to pressure Ukraine, that’s clear. He’s trying to "negotiate away" the war and claim political credit as the one who ended it. Secondly, he wants to say: "Look, I’ve made a brilliant geopolitical move. I’ve freed up America’s hands so we can focus on defending Taiwan or addressing other global issues." But in reality, this is just a way to avoid taking responsibility for standing up to Russia — to give the U.S. a freer hand globally and score domestic political points. For that to happen, Trump needs Ukraine to accept his plan and publicly thank him —"If it weren’t for Trump, nothing would’ve worked out." So that’s how it is.
So the message to Trump is this: he has his own interests — interests that reflect the views of his voters. We have to respect that. It’s another state, another country, with its own agenda and its own sphere of influence. We have to acknowledge that and build our own influence accordingly.
Is it time to leave the Dnipropetrovsk region? What should civilians do?
I don’t think that’s the issue right now. Our soldiers, our army, are doing everything possible to defend the Dnipropetrovsk region. Yes, fighting continues along the border. Yes, the enemy is striking the region with increasing intensity each day. But our troops are doing everything in their power to prevent the enemy from advancing into central Ukraine. Right now, there are heavy encounter battles but everything that needs to be done is being done. I believe there are still opportunities. I also regularly visit the area and will soon be back in Donbas — in just five days, I’ll be in that region again to see what’s really happening. I’ll assess the situation firsthand and keep you informed. And it’s not just about going and filming —some local commanders listen to advice, and we act on some of those recommendations together. That’s why I can speak with confidence: I have a clear picture of the situation across nearly every brigade in that sector.
If they keep arming us, then the plan sounds great and Crimea will come back someday.
Sure, if this plan were officially presented as a joint position of Ukraine’s allies, if it included concrete figures on support, if it offered real security guarantees, weapons, sustained funding for Ukraine’s army and defense industry, then yes, we could talk about a constructive element. But right now, that constructive element is just an outline — a vague sketch. There is no substance behind it. No details, no commitments, no guarantees. And if the U.S., if Trump, truly wanted this to be credible and trustworthy, then there should be far more clarity, at the very least shared with European allies. But judging by the reactions and statements of our European partners, they don’t see those guarantees either. What they do see is risk. We have to stay realistic. Any agreement must be grounded in reality. Ukraine has already signed the Budapest Memorandum with security guarantees and commitments to territorial integrity. We've been through this before. We’ve also lived through two Minsk agreements. All of this has already been discussed and tested. It’s time to draw conclusions. We can’t keep doing the same thing over and over again and expect different results.
These negotiations are just another game by Russia, the goal of which is to end U.S. support for Ukraine. That is, without question, Russia’s objective. Russia is behaving in a way designed to fracture the united NATO front and to reduce or fully cut off U.S. assistance to Ukraine. This has nothing to do with peace —it is a deliberate tactic in Putin’s playbook.
The Deal should be signed in Istanbul.
Signed what? Did you read some Russian Telegram channel quoting Putin, claiming there were negotiations in Istanbul? What was actually discussed? What were the terms? What were the enforcement guarantees? What kind of framework did these so-called agreements have? We haven’t seen any of that. All we hear are empty words from Russian propaganda: "We offered peace — why didn’t they take it?" Well then, how exactly did you propose peace? That was March 30, during an active phase of Russian offensive operations. The fighting was ongoing — nothing had stopped on the front lines. So why trust that narrative? This kind of comment is a product of Russian propaganda’s influence.
Who’s going to rebuild the Kakhovka Dam? We’re talking billions of dollars.
But is the Kakhovka Dam the only place where billions are needed? We’re talking about hundreds of billions just to cover the damage caused by Russia — not even counting the construction of anything new. None of this has been properly calculated yet. There’s no Marshall Plan in place. The Marshall Plan — the post-war recovery of Europe — had a specific budget, tailored to each country. And that plan was implemented consistently by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. That was real aid. Where is it now? Nowhere — because, unlike the U.S. role in World War II, America is not a party to this conflict. Ukraine alone is expected to negotiate both the terms of any reconstruction support with Europe and the U.S., and the terms of disengagement and "security guarantees" with Russia.What we need is actual security — backed by force — not just security "on paper," political declarations, or promises of sanctions that, in this plan, are actually meant to be lifted. So what kind of help can the West offer if Russia violates the agreement again? What — reimpose the sanctions that were just removed? We don’t see anything real in that.
How do you respond to Trump’s claim that Crimea was taken "without a single shot"? Considering the losses and destruction, can we really say Crimea was just handed over?
Yes, Crimea was handed over. We all saw it. The majority of military personnel, law enforcement officers, and members of Ukraine’s security forces not only failed to return to Ukrainian-controlled territory, but actively switched sides and joined the Russian Federation. For example, the commander of the 36th Coastal Defense Brigade, which was tasked with defending the entrance to Crimea, Colonel Starozhenko at the time, is now a general in the Russian army. He’s currently commanding troops on the front line against Ukraine. So we’re talking about a traitor — someone who was officially responsible for defending Crimea’s access points, like Perekop and Chonhar. And he’s now made a career in the Russian military. The majority of service members, police officers, and SSU (Security Service of Ukraine) personnel who were stationed in Crimea stayed behind and sided with the occupiers. Yes, Crimea was indeed handed over. But the claim that it happened "without a single shot" — that’s simply false. There were shots and as a result of those shots, and despite widespread betrayal by Ukrainian officials and troops, at least ten Ukrainian citizens were killed. Some were tortured to death. During that spring, amid protests and resistance, no fewer than ten Ukrainians lost their lives. One of them was a serviceman, Warrant Officer Serhii Kokurin, who was killed on March 18 in Simferopol. He was the first Ukrainian soldier to die, shot during an assault by Russian special forces from the FSB unit under Igor Girkin. That’s the truth — not Russian propaganda narratives. So why is Trump repeating this falsehood? Americans know there were gunshots. But Trump wants to appeal to Putin. He’s trying to "negotiate away" Crimea — to send Ukraine a message: "You’re not getting Crimea back. It’s off the table. They want you to abandon it completely. That’s it — forever.
Can we — the European countries — continue the war without the United States?
It’s difficult, but in theory, yes — it’s possible. However, that’s exactly the point — it’s theoretical. So far, European countries have not provided the financial guarantees or funding needed to offset the potential loss of U.S. military aid. We have no such figures to rely on. If European countries want to prove they’re ready — they need to show it with money. Unfortunately, in response to the U.S. stance, Europe isn’t showing the level of determination we need. We hear it in their statements — but we’re not seeing it in action. And right now, Ukraine urgently needs funding.
Do you think that if Ukraine refuses to accept the terms proposed by the United States, the next round of conditions might be even harsher?
Friends, we simply don’t know. This is real life. You only get one take. This is not a movie. The real question right now is this: Does Ukraine have a strategy? Does the Ukrainian government — the one conducting these negotiations — have a strategy for how to influence the leadership of the Republican Party, the U.S. government, or the Trump team? Does it have the channels to reach Trump directly? Does it have the ability to influence public opinion in the U.S. through the media and civil society — to get its message across? Is there a strategy? Are there tools? Is anything actually being done — beyond standard diplomatic talks between the Office of the President and Trump’s team? I don’t see it. Maybe it exists — but I don’t see it. And I don’t see it in many areas. That’s why, for now, this so-called "informal proposal" remains open to influence — and we must shape it, we can shape it. But so far, I don’t see that influence at work — and we need it, because far too much here is unclear.
Against the backdrop of the conflict between Pakistan and India, won't it happen that we will simply be forgotten?
Look — every month something happens in the world. Every year brings new crises, new tensions, new threats. And yes, I know this fear — that "Ukraine will be forgotten," that "no one cares anymore." I’ve been reading that same line since 2014 — thousands of times. Let’s not scare ourselves. Ukraine holds a strategically important position in Europe. And this is the key situation right now, which threatens Europe's security. This isn't just a problem for our country. And Europe is one of the key regions of the planet. No less important than India and Pakistan. No less significant than Taiwan and China. Or the Middle East — Israel, Syria. So naturally, whether it’s the Middle East, Israel, or Syria — none of the world’s other conflicts can overshadow the fact that there is an ongoing war in Europe. Ukraine has its own strategic track, its own story, and it will continue. No one will get tired or talk about fatigue. Fatigue from what? Is Putin tired? No, he isn’t. So why should Europe be tired? Why should our allies be tired? This is about their own security. Just look at how dramatically defense budgets are rising across Europe. Why is Poland launching an unprecedented rearmament program? It’s one of the largest in the world. Right now, Poland is purchasing more weapons than Pakistan or India, I believe. According to contracts signed over the past three years, Poland has allocated more funds for military modernization — for cutting-edge weapon systems — than either Pakistan or India. In terms of modern tanks and multiple rocket launch systems, Poland’s army now surpasses both Pakistan and India. So let’s stay focused on reality: Europe is on fire. There’s a war. For many countries, this is a political crisis — a war right on their borders.No one is going to forget that. So let’s stop repeating these tired narratives — they simply misrepresent the situation.
A good question to wrap up with: who should we thank for Moskalik?
Friends, I just want to say that I am truly impressed — this is an event that cannot go unnoticed. In Moscow, a Russian Lieutenant General was eliminated — one of Russia’s top military officials, Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. The Main Operational Directorate is the body responsible for planning all Russian military operations on a strategic level. Lieutenant General, one of the key figures involved in shaping and approving those decisions, was eliminated by unknown patriots, right in Moscow, outside his apartment building. That’s something worth acknowledging. In this case, you know, I always rely either on official information or on intelligence leaks from trusted sources. They tend to work reliably and report quickly when there's a need to do so. This time, there hasn’t been such a need. In this case, there hasn’t been any need for a public statement yet, so we’ll wait and see. Meanwhile, Russian media are accusing a Ukrainian national of killing Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik. I believe this is the first time that a military commander of such high rank was eliminated not only because of his position but, perhaps to some extent, because of his surname. You can’t help but recall the old joke about Moskalik. Well, this Moskalik is gone. (The general’s surname, Moskalik, unintentionally echoes the Ukrainian term "Moskal" (Muscovite), a historic (and often derogatory) nickname for Russians, making this incident particularly ironic to many Ukrainians.- ed.note). And not just any Moskalik — a very significant one. So, as for who deserves thanks, once there’s reliable information, we’ll give credit where it’s due. For now, according to Russian officials, we’re supposed to thank a Russian citizen of Ukrainian origin — Ihnat Kuzin, a native of Sumy Oblast. According to Russian intelligence, Ihnat Kuzin — and this may just be a coincidence, I’m not making any definitive claims here — moved to the Russian Federation in 2015 after the start of Russian aggression, registered as a resident and lived there for years. And in January 2025, by coincidence, Ihnat Kuzin rented an apartment in the same entrance of the same building in Balashikha where Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik lived. Kuzin reportedly stayed there for about a month. That same January, he purchased a Volkswagen Golf. On April 16, according to Russian claims, he parked the Golf near the entrance. The car allegedly contained a video camera and an explosive device. On the morning of April 25, as Moskalik exited the building and approached the car, it exploded. The blast was highly precise — almost surgical. No one else was harmed. Only one person was killed: a Russian war criminal, a so-called "ATO participant" against Ukraine. A high-ranking lieutenant general is as senior as it gets. Let me remind you: last year, Ukraine’s Security Service eliminated the head of Russia’s Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Forces — in Moscow. And now, another high-ranking Russian war criminal has been taken out. These are good developments. According to Russian sources, they don’t know where Ihnat Kuzin is currently located. Reportedly, on April 19, he left Russia for Turkey, and after that, his trail went cold. His current whereabouts remain unknown. I hope this individual is safe — because if it really was him, this act qualifies as a heroic deed worthy of Ukraine’s highest state honors. It was a skilled operation and a display of true patriotism. But let’s wait for either official or informal confirmation from Ukraine’s intelligence services.
The war continues. All this talk of peace — for now — remains just that: talk. The proposals recently reported by Reuters are not a formal peace plan at this stage. They do not reduce the current horrible tension at the front, nor do they affect the course of combat operations. Russian forces, according to Ukrainian intelligence — corroborated by multiple sources, including our international partners — are concentrating additional troops. There is a major threat building in both Donbas and Kharkiv regions. The enemy is making every effort to seize what remains of the buffer zone still held by Ukrainian forces — these areas are small, but they still exist. Fighting is also ongoing in the Sumy region, where enemy forces have crossed the border. So: the war is ongoing, peace has not been established, and the timeline for peace remains unknown. And perhaps we remember Minsk I and Minsk II — this precarious situation may continue for a long time. We must be prepared for that. In order for Ukraine’s leadership to even have a chance — whether they are capable or not — to secure terms that are favorable for us at the start of peace talks, and for those talks to lead to real peace, now, based on the content of the document unofficially disclosed by the Trump team, only the Ukrainian military, only Ukrainian soldiers, are the real guarantors of Ukraine’s security. This shield — the Ukrainian shield — must be supported and strengthened by the entire country. Because everything depends on it — the success of the negotiations, the possibility of successful negotiations, and the possibility of peace. We will monitor the situation, track every development, and comment on all the details. I will do my best to keep writing and appearing on air in the near future. This is an important step — the first time we’ve seen Trump’s plan. There are serious concerns about it, and we’ll watch how the negotiation process unfolds. These talks are necessary for Ukraine from every perspective — but they must benefit Ukraine. They must not become yet another burden, another noose thrown around our neck to finish us off. That is the essence of the moment we are in right now.
Glory to Ukraine!
