Can peace talks force Putin to halt?
The situation is difficult both for us and for the enemy. The Russians are advancing — but at the cost of heavy losses.
Can peace talks in any way compel Putin to stop?
I follow closely what politicians are saying regarding peace negotiations. To be frank, I have yet to hear a single statement, declaration, or even a plan — either from President Trump or from the leaders of the European Union — that, in my view, could compel Putin to engage in peace talks. What we are now seeing in Istanbul, I believe, will be just another round of negotiations on whether peace should be made at all — and, if so, under what terms to even sit down at the negotiating table.
I would like to remind you that the war, the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation, began with Putin's statement that he was going to carry out the "denazification of Ukraine," that is, to de-Ukrainize Ukraine, or, to put it simply, to demilitarize it, that is, to deprive Ukraine of its independence and sovereignty and to change the Ukrainian government. You must agree that under the conditions announced by Putin, it is impossible to conduct any negotiations. Moreover, after that, the Russian Federation decided to annex five regions of Ukraine—Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia—that is, practically everything. So, on what terms can we negotiate with them? All this is in the Russian Constitution, four regions have been annexed, and all this, of course, means that as long as Russia maintains this position, it is impossible to sit down at the negotiating table. Russia must take a step back. Is Russia taking a step back? We do not see this. No steps back.
I believe that in Istanbul, we’ll see yet another round of political discourse. As for any immediate impact, regardless of what Trump may say, we’re seeing that President Trump issues statements almost daily. His primary goal, above all else, is to ensure that he’s quoted every day and that his name stays in the headlines and at the top of global media coverage. So when I read yet another statement—"wait until tomorrow," "expect something next week," "there will be good news"—to be honest, our own government has been feeding us the same kind of rhetoric for the past six years. I’ve seen this before in Ukraine: the same techniques, absolutely identical political spin, nothing new. Talk of comprehensive ceasefires, peace deals, meetings with Putin—we’ve heard it all before.
Trump can only surprise his American voters; he won't surprise us anymore. We've been through all this before. What do I think about the real situation? I think that Putin will use this summer to carry out further offensive operations. He understands that Ukraine, with the support of the European Union, has a strong enough position and is not going to sit down at the negotiating table with what Putin announced earlier. That is, negotiations cannot begin with Russia saying, "We have four Ukrainian regions, let's negotiate about the rest. Recognize that we have already captured them, that it is our land, that it is ours." This cannot be. It is therefore clear that Putin will try to exploit the situation to consolidate or expand, by force, control over the territories Russia has already partially occupied — Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions. There is not much left of Luhansk, and in the Kharkiv region, their offensive is advancing and expanding. We understand that since Putin is not getting what he wants at the start of the negotiations, he will try to achieve it by force. This is the scenario of the Minsk-1 and Minsk-2 negotiations, which Ukraine already went through in 2014-2015. I would like to remind you that negotiations were also taking place at that time, alongside military operations. And when Putin needed to show in these negotiations that he could walk away from them, that you would still have to recognize that we control Donbas and Crimea, they carried out offensive operations.
Let me remind you that six months passed between the first and second Minsk agreements. That is, negotiations continued for half a year—formally under a ceasefire. A ceasefire had been agreed upon on September 5, 2014, yet active hostilities—albeit more limited—continued right up to the end of February 2015. And then again: a so-called full ceasefire, disengagement of forces, joint coordination mechanisms—yet covert fighting still went on. So when we ask whether Putin intends to end the war in Istanbul, we should at least recall our own experience.
First, Russia has not taken—and is not taking—any real steps toward peace. Talk of peace negotiations has absolutely nothing to do with reality. There is no genuine cessation of hostilities. Secondly, let’s recall that in 2014–2015, under pressure from Europe and the United States, Putin did agree to ceasefires. Yet even under the cover of these so-called ceasefire measures, he continued the war. We need to understand one thing clearly: there will be no miracle. Putin will not change his strategy. Hostilities will continue—and they will continue for a long time. And if we do have any real grounds to talk about peace, we won’t be discussing words or yet another one of Trump’s morning tweets—we’ll be discussing real steps, first and foremost from the aggressor and occupier, the Russian Federation. At the moment, we do not see them.
This is about the political component.
As for the situation on the front line: the enemy is currently continuing its offensive along almost the entire frontline. While it does not hold the tactical initiative across the full length of the front, it does on most directions, especially on the main axis in Donbas. The enemy continues offensive operations. However, its advances are extremely limited. The pace of the offensive in 2025 is exceptionally slow. Russian forces are pushing forward, but at the cost of severe overexertion of their troops.
The Russian Federation, objectively, is in a state of crisis when it comes to replenishing frontline manpower. We can clearly see how they are scraping the bottom of the barrel for personnel. The war is now starting to take a serious toll inside Russia itself as well.
Therefore, claiming that Russia’s advantage is inexhaustible—that it simply won’t run out—would be inaccurate and misleading. Russia continues to conduct combat operations, but its ability to effectively utilize its manpower is steadily deteriorating. We are seeing a clear decrease in the scale of personnel being mobilized and deployed.
In 2022, the Russian army was first expanded by 150,000 contract soldiers. Then, an additional 300,000 were mobilized. A large number of volunteer units were formed. The BARS (Combat Army Reserve - ed.note) system was established. Wagner was created as an armed forced formation. Various volunteer formations were also set up under the Redut private military company affiliated with the Ministry of Defense. In other words, to its one-million-strong army in 2022, Russia added approximately 600,000 personnel. This figure includes those mobilized from the occupied territories. So 600,000 is a conservative estimate—realistically, the number could be as high as 700,000 or even 800,000. At this point, we simply cannot calculate the exact figure.
In other words, Russia had approximately one million troops, and on top of that, it deployed the Rosgvardiya (Russian national guard - ed.note) and other military formations. This means Russia could have sent at least 1.8 million military personnel against Ukraine—most of them were deployed in 2022. In 2023, according to official data from Russia’s Ministry of Defense, 480,000 contract soldiers were brought into the armed forces. In 2024, that number dropped to 430,000. So we can clearly see that this wave of covert mobilization within the army is steadily decreasing.
We can see that the figures for 2025 are even lower. This indicates that Russia is no longer capable of sustaining the same pace of offensives as in 2023–2024—simply because it is running out of manpower on that scale, the so-called cannon fodder. This also shows that the high-tech drone warfare is draining not only for Ukraine; it is extremely exhausting for Russia as well. The Russian Federation cannot continue to sustain such costly advances indefinitely.
It’s no coincidence that Putin keeps thanking North Korea — because without North Korean troops, as officially acknowledged by the Russian Federation, they wouldn’t have been able to seize the buffer zone in the Kursk region. As of now, the situation on the front does not represent a collapse or catastrophe for Ukraine. There is no scenario unfolding where everything is falling apart and Russia is breaking through the front lines.
On the contrary, we are now in a position where we can genuinely stabilize the front — not just in words, but in real terms. To achieve this, we need a stable, layered line of defense.
And a defensive line that won’t be built based on poorly written Second World War-era manuals — unfortunately, the old Soviet engineering field manuals. Today, a proper defensive line must first and foremost protect against drone surveillance and strikes. This requires completely different approaches to planning and organizing defense—new principles for the depth of battle formations and the construction of logistical routes.
And we see that if such a line of defense is established, if the Ukrainian command and leadership finally begin to build real defensive structures, if a high-tech war is finally organized, and we have enough personnel, enough commanders, and operators across the entire front line, then the Russian offensive will simply be completely stopped. In many areas where the Russians seemed to be advancing continuously, such as in Pokrovsk, the front line across the entire southern Donbas, after the fall of Vuhledar, after the fall of Velyka Novosilka, after the fall of Novohrodivka, when the enemy had already approached the borders of the Dnipropetrovsk region, at this moment the front line there has not been stopped, because heavy counterattacks are taking place there, but the enemy is unable to advance and push our troops back to the Dnipropetrovsk region. And the frontline is holding—the configuration has remained largely unchanged since early February 2025. That means combat operations have been taking place within the same zone for four months now.
Yes, the situation remains highly threatening on many fronts. The enemy continues its offensive. In Chasiv Yar, in the area around Toretsk—they are trying to reach and seize Kostiantynivka, to crawl their way in. They are also attempting to encircle our forces on the Oskil bridgehead and to capture Kupiansk and Borova.
Without a doubt, there are serious sectors where the enemy is still advancing. However, the way the Russians are doing it—and the losses they’re sustaining—leaves no doubt: with competent and well-coordinated actions by the Ukrainian command, the enemy can be stopped even on these directions. We can significantly reduce our losses and drastically increase Russian losses.
Q&A
What are the potential risks if Russia frames the negotiations as a return to the Istanbul talks?
It doesn’t carry any real significance at this point—this is merely a play on words, aimed at preserving political initiative and remaining in the media spotlight. The goal is to be quoted by U.S. leadership, EU officials, and Ukrainian authorities alike. There is also a media war for headlines inside Russia itself.
Unfortunately, this is just a fight for headlines. These are empty words that have no real impact on the real state of affairs.
What awaits us could resemble the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) of 2015–2016 — only on a larger scale, if a peace agreement is signed.
At this point, we need to understand that just because we hear many statements about peace, it does not mean that anyone actually intends to make peace.
We don’t know if peace will come — that’s the core issue. The main difference between 2014–2015 and now is that back then, under pressure from Europe and the United States, Russia regularly made certain moves, took certain actions that helped limit the escalation of hostilities.
Those actions allowed us to say that political pressure on Russia was having an effect. Today, the Western world no longer has such leverage.
That’s why, at this stage, there is no real basis to say that negotiations will actually happen.
Whether this turns into something like "Minsk-3" — we don’t know. The war could continue for a long time, without any pauses for peace.
What’s the situation in the Zaporizhzhia direction?
Offensive actions continue there as well. The enemy attempted — and is still trying — to break through near Orikhiv. This has led to heavy fighting and so-called meat grinder assaults.
Another wave is underway now. There have been intense battles in the area for several months. Several major assaults have recently been repelled. After suffering heavy losses, the Russians are now replenishing their forces.
I believe that after a short pause, they will once again attempt to push forward. The situation there, as on the rest of the front, is that the enemy continues to apply pressure. They receive reinforcements, redistribute them across units.
One week of preparation, five to ten days — and forward. That’s how it works for them across the entire front. Then the reinforcements run out, and they wait for the next month.
The Russian army operates on a rotation plan — they have a system for replenishments. They’ve used up the assault troops sent to them this month, and now they’re waiting for the next batch to arrive.
Who holds air superiority?
When it comes to overall air superiority, there’s no doubt that Russian aviation dominates the frontline skies. This is due to their large fleet — hundreds of aircraft — and the mass production of guided aerial bombs. Russia is also ramping up production of ballistic missiles and attack drones.
That’s why, along the front line, we talk about the big sky and the small sky. In the big sky, Russian aircraft dominate. Ukrainian pilots do carry out painful raids and strikes against enemy positions, and ambush tactics are used by air defense systems — but overall, the enemy maintains air superiority.
As for the small sky — the drone domain — unfortunately, the situation is deteriorating. In 2025, Russia began rapidly scaling up this component. And the Russian leadership, as we know, has announced plans to establish drone forces in 2025, with an increase in both the number of UAVs and the size of UAV units. Regrettably, on certain sections of the front, the enemy currently holds an advantage in the small sky — meaning in the drones.
This is a complex problem — it’s not just about the number of drones. The effectiveness of drones today depends on the integrated use of high-tech weaponry. Drones must be employed in coordination with electronic warfare systems, signals intelligence tools, air defense systems, radar stations, and in some cases even surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery systems.
When all of that is in place and properly coordinated, yes — there are significant sections of the frontline where we hold a notable advantage. Unfortunately, there are now areas where parity has been reached — in terms of drones, electronic warfare, and the command and control of those systems. And unfortunately, there are also sectors where the enemy has temporarily managed to establish air superiority. They are trying to increase their troop numbers — and that’s a serious issue.
In 2025 and beyond, the competition in the high-tech dimension of warfare will only intensify — both in terms of organization and technology. This is a serious challenge. That’s why, already back in 2022, it was obvious — and I’ve said it many times on air — that the number of soldiers with rifles is no longer the defining factor for a resilient defense.
The key battlefield today is the drone front — the front of drones and counter-drone systems. And whoever manages it better, organizes it more effectively, controls its deployment more efficiently, and develops this capability more consistently — that side gains the upper hand on the battlefield.
Under current conditions, conventional types of weaponry — infantry, tanks, artillery — cannot survive without dominance in the low-altitude airspace, without superiority in the drone and counter-drone systems. Our current advantage, our ability to eliminate significantly more Russian occupiers, stems solely from our use of drones. We have a certain local advantage in drone capabilities.
And in some areas, we are effectively employing counter-drone systems.
Why are there payments for those mobilized between the ages of 18 and 24, but not for me if I’m a lieutenant and I’m 21?
Unfortunately, this is one of the many injustices of war. What can I say? I believe that if you’re a lieutenant, you still have a significant advantage over those young men who are only now being mobilized.
You have the ability to choose certain specializations. You have the flexibility to decide when to deploy. You can request a transfer to a unit that suits you better. You have experience. That means you can find your place in this war. And to me, that’s actually the most important advantage — and the greatest opportunity — anyone can have during wartime.
When you’re able to find a team of like-minded people where you can truly realize your potential. So honestly, I don’t think it’s a matter of envy. I do think it’s unfair.
I believe that every experienced service member — those who have served on the front line for one, two, or three years — also deserve one-time payments. No less than what is currently offered when signing a contract. Because I believe experienced personnel need to be incentivized.
One experienced soldier, as I have repeatedly said on air, is worth twenty untrained ones. His experience, skills, competence, and situational awareness can determine the outcome of a battle. So yes, this is unfair and disheartening.
Unfortunately, I have to repeat it again: there is no planning in the state for the use of human resources. This is a major problem for Ukraine, because quality is not valued.
Quantity is what matters. The goal is to meet the quota for recruiting young people. Let’s run a campaign.
Effectiveness is not about forcing more young people into the military by offering one million hryvnias. So what if they are deployed ineffectively in a drone warfare, if they are poorly trained, if they are not given proper instruction — what will happen to them in this modern, high-tech war? If we had a quality-based approach, then these young people — those who see their place in the military and recognize proper organization — would join the army even without the promise of a million. There are also plenty of existing conditions and social benefits that the military provides.
But the priority should be to sustain and fund the core — the backbone — that holds the front and keeps the army combat-ready. These are experienced personnel with at least several years of war behind them. They need to be retained, so they don’t leave the military just to take a break, but instead have time to recover and the motivation to return.
And they should be able to at least address some basic personal and everyday needs. After spending years at war, they also have families, they also need to do things — whether it’s buying an apartment or making repairs at home. They need medical treatment, and they need to support their families and loved ones.
This is what should be funded.
Yurii, it turns out that none of the political processes surrounding the war have had any impact on its conclusion so far. If Russia starts looking for more cannon fodder in Africa, they could keep going like this for a long time.
And you're absolutely right. Political processes are not influencing the war at the moment. They haven't, and they haven't for quite some time.
The full-scale invasion in 2022 marked Russia’s exit from all political processes. Putin’s objective was the elimination of Ukraine. He stated that clearly.
So nothing has changed since then. Nothing. That’s why I say we shouldn’t pay attention to this information noise right now. Let’s look at real actions. Let’s not feed ourselves with narratives that have no direct connection to reality. "Russia is looking for cannon fodder in Africa." They are already doing that. All over the world. What should Ukraine do? Ukraine must recruit people abroad.
We have sufficient opportunities to engage volunteers who want to fight and sign a contract. I want to emphasize that thanks solely to contributions from subscribers of the "Butusov Plus" channel, we were able to raise funds and purchase tickets. Forty Colombian contract soldiers have already arrived in Ukraine to join the ranks of the 47th Brigade.
Now we no longer have to catch 40 Ukrainians on the street somewhere. They came just for the money, just bought tickets exclusively. No cash was handed out.
The tickets have been bought and 40 people are already undergoing basic training. And I want to say that there will be more news in the near future and I hope that we will be able to announce a much larger number of volunteer fighters. That's why we need to do it.
You see, war is a way out of all the rules. It requires all the efforts of the state. Everything.
If you are strong, if your position is strong, if you resist, if Ukraine stops the Russian offensive, then Putin will want to sit down at the negotiating table himself. There is only one condition.
Please tell us, what’s the situation in the area of Bahatyr?
Yes, I want to highlight that extremely intense fighting is ongoing around Bahatyr. This is in southern Donbas, in the area of operations of the Ukrainian tactical group "Vuhledar." The enemy is making every effort to advance on Bahatyr. It’s essentially the last remaining logistical hub before the Dnipropetrovsk region, located between Pokrovsk and Velyka Novosilka.
The enemy attacks almost daily. Small infantry units or motorcycle groups attempt to infiltrate the settlement every day. In part of the village, Russian troops are hiding in a few basements. But there are no Russian flags there — because they are being taken out daily.
These are essentially roaming groups of Russian infantry. They enter, get eliminated, and then others move in. What’s happening there is essentially continuous encounter battles.
Ukrainian soldiers have been fighting for Bahatyr for an extended period. A large number of armored assaults have already been repelled in this area. Recently, armored columns are no longer advancing — only motorcycle groups attempt to break through, and they are being taken out. According to the data I had as of this morning, around 20 Russian infantry troops may have entered the northern outskirts of Bahatyr.
The elimination of these forces continued throughout the day. It’s an ongoing process that has been uninterrupted for several months. In Bahatyr and on its approaches, Ukrainian artillery and drones are operating like a combine harvester, and the enemy is suffering heavy losses.
As of now, Bahatyr has not been captured by the enemy. Ukrainian units remain in the village, as do enemy units — active combat is taking place between them. This situation has persisted for several months.
I believe that the situation unfolding there, in the Vuhledar sector, clearly shows that this direction must receive combat-ready reserves and be resupplied with ammunition. This is the responsibility of the senior military leadership — and of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s Staff — because our soldiers in this area are doing absolutely everything possible, and even beyond that, to inflict maximum losses on the enemy.
You can spend the whole day listening to the national telethon telling you that everything is fine — and still not shake the anxiety or the sense of pressure. Or you can listen to an interview with people like Corps Commander Biletskyi — and finally breathe a little easier, with a sense of confidence.
Thank you. Yes, we’ve just published an interview on the channel with the commander of the 3rd Army Corps, Andrii Biletskyi. I highly recommend watching it — there’s a lot in there that has never been made public before, not about Biletskyi’s combat experience, nor about the operations of the 3rd Assault Brigade. Many of these things are probably being revealed for the first time.
As a battalion commander who failed, who lost control of his personnel, failed to take care of his soldiers, and was removed from his position the same day — with the help of a "stool" and some very persuasive kicks from that stool. About how Biletskyi filed a report on the actions of his superior officer, General Bohomolov, and what that led to. About how Biletskyi submitted a request to be relieved of his duties as commander of the 3rd Assault Brigade.
And of course, I would call this interview the "Biletskyi`s Doctrine," because it essentially lays out the core principles of a corps commander: what leadership means, what it means to be a commander, what a commander’s responsibility is, the nature of modern combat — this drone warfare, the war of high-tech UAV systems, artillery, intelligence, electronic warfare — and what it all costs within a corps-level operational zone, within the zone of the 3rd Assault Brigade. It also explains how losses can be inflicted at a ratio of 1 to 10, 1 to 12, and under what conditions this is possible. That’s why I strongly recommend watching this interview.
Is a breakthrough into the Dnipropetrovsk region possible this summer? Could the enemy advance into the region?
The shortest distance between the village of Kotliarivka and the Dnipropetrovsk region is currently 1.8 kilometers from the nearest enemy positions.
Two kilometers. Is there a possibility the enemy could advance two kilometers? Is it possible that in other areas — for example, near Pokrovsk, where they are five kilometers away — the enemy could inch forward over the summer, over several months, even with heavy losses, across 2–5 kilometers, or 7 kilometers? Yes, of course. That threat exists. Is there a possibility that the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in their current condition, can stop the enemy and prevent them from entering central Ukraine? Yes, that possibility also exists. But it requires basic organizational and systemic actions.
We need commanders on this front who are given authority, responsibility, resources, and clearly defined objectives and tasks. And we do have such commanders. We also have the necessary resources. We have the people. Will this actually be implemented? I can’t say. I’ve seen how the fortifications are being built there.
The people building these fortifications are incompetent. What they’re doing doesn’t meet even the standards of the late First World War. The strongpoints being constructed there are outdated. I can say with certainty: fortifications like these haven’t been built in global wars since around 1916. This is an outdated and unprofessional approach.
And yet we’re still building this — for billions. If all we get is window dressing, imitation, and money being siphoned off straight into contractors’ pockets, then there will be no real defense. And people are not eternal. To survive, people need reliable defensive structures. They need covered transportation routes — logistical corridors protected from drones, from surveillance, from strikes.
So yes, it is possible to stop the enemy, it is possible to deploy personnel. But this requires action. Will the Ukrainian authorities do everything necessary? I don’t know.
But the threat is serious, and the possibility is real. And that is precisely why the enemy is not entering into genuine negotiations — because they still aim to fully capture Donbas, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. They also want to hold positions in Kharkiv region in order to threaten Ukraine. And they will pursue that.
Is there any information about the enemy using new explosive ammunition for small arms?
I don’t have any such information, but I don’t believe it’s a serious issue. The production of explosive rounds is likely to be extremely limited.
There are certain restrictions on both production and use. The primary means of delivering strikes in this war is the drone, not small arms. Personally, I see no logic in investing in such modifications.
I want to sign a contract under the 18–25 program. Is it possible to become a UAV operator? Which brigade would you recommend?
You need to weigh everything carefully. As far as I know, all positions offered under the 18–24 program are infantry roles. Infantry is the primary and most resource-intensive specialty in this war — the one that requires the most preparation. So, to the best of my knowledge, everyone entering under the 18–24 program is assigned to the infantry.
There are currently a significant number of units. I would recommend several of them under this program. You can write to me privately — let me know where you live, and I’ll suggest a good unit near you, one that provides proper training, proper preparation, and where you'll feel confident on the battlefield. As for UAV operators — I don’t see any UAV operator positions included under the 18–24 contract. Becoming a UAV operator is possible, but it’s a separate track not currently linked to this particular contract.
So when choosing a unit, don’t count on any additional payments. The 18–24 program means infantry — at least for now. That may change later.
Without a strong position, it’s not a ceasefire — it’s a capitulation for us. Previously, the Kursk region was seen as a trump card, but now we don’t have a strong position.
Look, that only existed in the information space.
Kursk was never a real bargaining chip in the negotiations. It was a strong political position in the sense that we were able to conduct combat operations on enemy territory and then gradually pull back — because it wasn’t our land. In other words, we could trade territory for enemy losses.
If we had managed to do that over a long period — fine. But in reality, from the very beginning, the Kursk region was a rather small foothold. Holding such a foothold — one that extends into Russian territory with highly vulnerable flanks — was an extremely risky task from the outset.
And that I can say with certainty: no matter what was done there — even if more forces had been deployed — we would not have been able to hold that foothold, because its configuration was extremely disadvantageous from a military standpoint. It should have been planned from the outset as a raid, a short-term operation.
But as always, our authorities inflate anything into some kind of media narrative, and then people get inspired by it and start thinking it’s actually a some kind of special advantage.
Are you facing any pressure from the authorities, considering that you highlight issues others try to conceal?
Let me say this — I’ve been in journalism for quite a long time, and what is "pressure," really? For me, it’s just part of the job.
I don’t stress about it. And honestly, what can the authorities even do to me? I don’t depend on them in any way. I’m a citizen of Ukraine fulfilling my duties — doing so as honestly as I can.
If the government had anything to accuse me of, if they could open a criminal case, take something away from me, restrict me in some way — they would’ve done it already. What protects me is civil society and your support. Thank you — because it’s thanks to your support that we’re able to keep working, that I can go on air at all, and that our team can keep doing its job.
We simply cannot replace the kind of funding we receive from our sponsors and subscribers. I’m very grateful to you for that. So — what else can the government do to me? Nothing.
You can’t shut off the internet. I have the funding I need. Thank you — to you and to all the sponsors of the Butusov+ channel.
Is Pavlohrad under threat?
Pavlohrad is currently under threat of shelling, because the front line has moved closer, and the enemy understands the city’s strategic importance.
That importance grows with each passing month. But if you’re referring to a ground offensive — I believe that’s not a realistic option for the Russians at this point. Our soldiers are holding the enemy at a considerable distance and are doing everything possible, and beyond that, to stop the Russian advance and prevent the enemy from entering the Dnipropetrovsk region.
I think we all understand that if the enemy were to advance into central Ukraine through the Dnipropetrovsk region, it would be a very serious political and informational blow. It is the government’s responsibility not to sleep through this moment, but to act — because the criticism will be harsh.
Instead of reinforcing our troops, the General Staff — I have to say — is doing absurd things. Right now, the General Staff has sent a commission to the area near the village of Bahatyr to investigate why four observation posts were lost, why the enemy is roaming around the outskirts, and why they are riding in on motorcycles. Instead of planning defensive operations — instead of planning active defense — our higher command structures are still engaged in bureaucratic theatrics and simulating activity.
People in uniform, during wartime, are acting like clowns — pretending to be busy. It’s completely unnecessary. On the Donbas front, what’s truly needed is reinforcement with actual troops, not commissions from headquarters. If that happens — if proper support is provided — the enemy will be stopped, and Pavlohrad won’t be under threat. We’re all hoping for that. Many of us are doing everything we can to help make it happen.
Friends, thank you all very much for watching. I’m truly grateful for your support. I’ll do my best to go live again soon — we’ll keep talking. Please send in your questions, and thank you for being with us.
Thank you for the stream and Glory to Ukraine!
