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Whoever wins sky wins war

Author: Andrii Seliverstov

A critical mass of people is gradually forming those who understand what needs to be done and how. I am also a co-author of the thoughts outlined below. While there is nothing secret or unknown to most people at the front in this text, we do not claim to hold the ultimate truth. There is always room for additions and criticism. But it is better to start doing something before it’s too late.

Innovation, bottom-up initiative, and effective horizontal coordination are the foundations of the Ukrainian Defence Forces’ survival in this extremely difficult and asymmetric war. The enemy, who significantly outmatches us in resources and adheres to a rigid vertical command doctrine, has consistently lagged behind — forced to catch up and adapt to change. So far, it is our innovations that have allowed us to maintain an edge in the skies, inflict disproportionate losses, disrupt logistics, and hold the line.

However, the enemy is learning, adapting, and drawing its own conclusions. Change in UAV usage strategy, and by leveraging the scientific capacity of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies through training new crews to use a wide range of tools, along with the simultaneous application of new methodologies on the front, are yielding results for the enemy. Both the end of the Kursk campaign and the subsequent enemy advance between Myrnohrad and Kostiantynivka have the same common denominator: the adversary revised its drone strategy and gained full control of the airspace. The next step is cutting Ukrainian Defence Forces logistics and the ground results quickly follow.

Given the enemy’s virtually unlimited resources, we face a very real threat of losing air superiority across the entire front in the coming months!

At this point inside the Armed Forces, bottom-up initiatives and horizontal links alone are no longer enough.

What is the enemy's systematic approach?

- Destroying antennas at the maximum possible depth. For the first time in the entire war, the antennas of the Defense Forces of Ukraine (DFU) have become the #1 priority for the enemy.

-Active hunting for the Ukrainian Defence Forces’ UAV crews.

- A clear division of zones of responsibility between units.

- Separate units have been deployed to hunt for Ukrainian Defence Forces’ copters and fixed-wing UAV crews.

- A whole range of new technical solutions for finding the launch points of Ukrainian Defence Forces’ drones.

- A significant resource is allocated to increasing the range of the enemy's unmanned vehicles ("Molniya," fiber-optic drones, various copters, ground drones, etc.).

- A complete change in the approach to the use of enemy Electronic Warfare (EW), building an echeloned system using a wide range of new and effective assets ("Silok," "Chornyi Glaz," "KOP 2/3").

- Active creation of dummy targets with clear objectives, scopes, and photo reports.

What we can counter with in this situation:

- A large array of intelligence data regarding the positions of EW, ELINT, and UAV launch points.

- For now, significant capabilities in the quantity and quality of our means of engagement.

- An understanding of the criticality of the situation.

But:

- In today’s points hunt, a unit must decide whether to spend a whole day flying several long-range UAV sorties to hunt for enemy launch sites—with a low probability of success—or to hit enemy infantry in the near zone, where results are virtually guaranteed.

-  Even with intelligence that puts a target within 30–40 metres, a hit is not assured. Sub-units are willing to launch only after someone else carries out the final recon so they can strike faster and rack up points. The choice clearly works against taking out enemy UAV operators…

- Too many different units on the same axis breeds confusion, weak coordination, no single person responsible, unhealthy competition—and the end result suffers critically.

- A lack of dummy targets (ELINT antennas, fake Starlink terminals) makes the enemy’s strikes far more effective.

The conclusion is obvious: an immediate and complete change in  Ukrainian Defence Forces’ strategy "on the fly," involving the entire chain of command for this purpose. Very little time remains.

Countering enemy UAV crews must be declared a priority mission.

1.  First echelon: each brigade (separate regiment) must create full-time or part-time units (of the best) whose sole (main) function will be to detect and hit these targets. The AUTEL 4N quadcopter has proven to be the most effective means of aerial reconnaissance, as it can detect drones such as MAVIC 3T. At the same time, such specially created units should include units of destruction means (FPV drones, heavy bombers of the "Vampire" type and, necessarily, artillery destruction means. There should be daily monitoring and reporting of detected/hit/destroyed enemy UAV crews.

2.  Second echelon — counter-FPV operations. This mission falls to specialised elements within USF corps ( Unmanned Systems Forces) and separate UAV battalions at corps (brigade) level. It demands systematic ELINT/SIGINT to identify likely launch areas, follow-up reconnaissance with fixed-wing drones, and immediate fire engagement with weapons of appropriate calibre once a target is confirmed. Reconnaissance and strike must be fused under a single command, with the same daily control and reporting regime.

3. Third echelon — counter-fixed-wing UAVs. Tasks include both destroying the aerial targets and locating and eliminating their crews. The scheme mirrors echelon 2, but with higher-level ISR and fire assets.

4 Testing new ideas/technologies in combat conditions, investing in training centers with immediate implementation of effective ideas/technologies across the entire frontline.

5. In general, it is systematic work. Everyday, painstaking work, with no expectation of overnight results. —an approach akin to counter-sniping or counter-battery warfare: detect and neutralise immediately. Even "just" destroying the crew’s equipment is a win, as it sidelines them for a time. All of this must function as a single structure with unified control of ISR and fires, free of excess bureaucracy or approvals.

Andrii Seliverstov