Deputy Minister of Justice Yevhen Pikalov: "We do not have separate cells for ministers, deputies, or judges"
By amending the legislation on the mobilization of convicts, deputies introduced restrictions for those who held positions in the civil service and were convicted of corruption offenses. However, the law still allows the mobilization of individuals accused of such crimes without awaiting a verdict.
And if, during their service, the statute of limitations for criminal prosecution expires, they will no longer be held accountable for the charges brought against them.
Such cases provoke widespread resonance, as was the case, for example, with the former head of the State Fiscal Service, Roman Nasirov.
So, in our conversation with Deputy Minister of Justice Yevhen Pikalov about reforming the penitentiary system during wartime, we also discussed former high-ranking officials accused of crimes and the conditions under which they can be mobilized. Additionally, we touched on whether they can "buy" improved detention conditions if they ultimately have to serve their sentences.
I also asked whether the "big sell-off of prisons" will continue, a new wing of the Kyiv pre-trial detention center, long criticized for overcrowding, will be built; how approaches to the resocialization of convicts, including former servicemembers, will evolve; and why some Russian prisoners of war refuse to be exchanged.
"SOME POWs REFUSE TO BE EXCHANGED"
– When the process of mobilizing convicts began, it was met with mixed reactions. There was criticism, considering Russia’s experience of recruiting prisoners into the Wagner PMC. Has this idea proven effective? How many convicts have currently submitted applications for mobilization?
– In my view, there is a fundamental difference from what Russia did. You surely remember how many volunteer fighters there were when the invasion started. These people queued at military enlistment offices.
People who are convicted are also citizens of Ukraine who may share similar aspirations. They, too, want to participate in repelling armed aggression. However, due to legislative restrictions, they previously lacked such an opportunity. The amendments to the legislation have now enabled these individuals to take part in the defense of the homeland.
I am not a career military officer to evaluate them, but judging by the number of military units reaching out to us and showing interest in recruiting this category of individuals, I can conclude that they are effective on the front lines.
As of now, more than 8,600 individuals have been mobilized or signed contracts, with over a thousand applications still under consideration. Some highly renowned and effective brigades, even certain battalions (such as the 1st Separate Assault Battalion "Da Vinci") and regiments (225th Separate Assault Regiment), are being formed specifically from individuals whose sentences have been modified. From what I hear from military personnel, these individuals have proven themselves to be highly effective.
– There were concerns that former convicts might flee from the front lines and simply arrange a life of freedom for themselves.
– Such risks exist for all individuals serving. AWOL is an inherent part of any mobilization effort.
I do not have specific data regarding former inmates to base conclusions on, but I am confident that we would not be receiving such positive feedback from the military or this level of interest if there were numerous incidents. I believe the majority have performed well.
– How many women have been mobilized?
– Over 100. This accounts for approximately 10% of the total number of convicted women.
– What crimes were they serving sentences for?
– Mostly property-related offenses. While men’s property crimes may be associated with violence or armed robbery, women’s offenses are primarily thefts. For example, cleaning someone’s home and stealing something.
– Who are courts mostly denying?
– The law establishes specific restrictions for certain categories of individuals eligible for conditional early release. The first group includes crimes against the foundations of national security. The second covers violent offenses, such as the murder of two or more persons, murder accompanied by rape, sexual crimes, and murders committed with particular cruelty. Corruption offenses are also excluded if the individual held a particularly responsible position.
– The mobilization of the former head of the State Fiscal Service Roman Nasirov and deputy prosecutor of the Zaporizhzhia Regional Prosecutor’s Office Nataliia Maksymenko sparked widespread resonance. In both cases, the accusations involve corruption crimes, but no verdicts have been issued yet. Mobilization orders have currently been canceled. What is your stance on mobilizing former officials whose cases have not yet been adjudicated?
– There are two categories of individuals: those convicted and serving sentences, and those held in pre-trial detention facilities. Those held in detention are either suspects or defendants, and their cases have not yet been resolved by a court verdict.
That is why pre-trial detention is a preventive measure, not a form of punishment. Accordingly, it is imposed by a court at the request of the investigative body and prosecutor. Article 616 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine allows the modification of preventive measures for participation in repelling armed aggression. That is, at the prosecutor’s request, the court may alter the preventive measure. The State Penitentiary Service of Ukraine (SPS) has no influence here. We simply receive the court order and execute it.
– You’re explaining how this is procedurally outlined in criminal procedural legislation. I was asking about something else, your personal stance as someone who has worked in the Prosecutor General’s Office and the National Police.
– Ms. Tetiana, I am the Deputy Minister of Justice. I act within the framework and manner prescribed by the law. In other words, we operate according to what the legislature has established. I would prefer not to give any personal assessments.
– Overall, how many people who decided to sign contracts with the Armed Forces of Ukraine have had their preventive measures changed during the pre-trial investigation phase?
– There are not many such individuals. According to our information, preventive measures have been modified for about 100 people in this way. These concern various crimes investigated by all pre-trial investigative bodies, and prosecutors from all regions have submitted the relevant motions.
– Are there any among them accused of corruption offenses?
– We do not have such a dataset.
– When it comes to law enforcement agencies, there are often accusations that few of their personnel are fighting. How many employees of SPS are fighting? Are there volunteers among them?
– The penitentiary system is not only penal institutions. It also includes probation, healthcare, and other services. Currently, about a thousand people who worked in the system before the full-scale invasion are fighting. They volunteered.
Unfortunately, 46 people have died. We are now trying to maintain contact with the families of the deceased. We have several initiatives in place to support them.
– You have not been in the position for long. Have you analyzed how the war has impacted the penitentiary system?
– Absolutely. I encountered the full-scale war while serving in the National Police as head of the Internal Security Department. I witnessed firsthand how various bodies—law enforcement agencies, government authorities—responded. When I later joined the Ministry of Justice, it was important for me to understand how the penitentiary system reacted. I can now unequivocally say: it demonstrated resilience.
Before the war, no one was 100% prepared—not because they didn’t prepare, but because you simply cannot be ready for such a scenario and scale of events. This does not happen every day in the modern world. There is no manual that dictates what to do. Inevitably, there will be miscalculations and crisis situations requiring immediate, on-the-fly decisions.
SPS met the war with considerable dignity. Some facilities fell under occupation, but overall, the system held firm and adapted quite rapidly to martial law conditions.
– How exactly?
– From the first days of the war, prisoners of war began arriving. It was decided that the penitentiary system would be responsible for their care. This required rapidly adapting facilities, establishing POW camps, organizing the work, standardizing all processes, and issuing new orders and instructions that previously did not exist. All of this has been accomplished and is functioning—quite effectively, in fact. I was recently in Geneva for the review of the national report on torture at a session of the UN Committee Against Torture. Committee members also recognize that, unlike Russia, Ukraine strictly adheres to all international conventions and obligations. I consider this a credit to the SPS.
By the way, some prisoners refuse to participate in exchanges—especially non-citizens of the Russian Federation who came here to fight and were captured.
– Why?
– There have been cases where, with permission from the Coordinating Headquarters on Prisoner of War Affairs, journalists interviewed such individuals. They reported having three meals a day, paid work, and medical support here—things they lacked at home.
They do not want to return because the only path forward is back to the trenches.
– How are traitors, collaborators, and Russian-recruited sabotage operatives held? In general, population cells or separately? How do other convicts treat them?
– They are held together with others; no special conditions are applied. Other inmates treat them very negatively. From the perspective of a Ukrainian citizen, such individuals appear utterly despicable.
Regarding arson attacks on military vehicles or relay cabinets, the motives are usually not anti-state but property-related. These acts are driven by a desire for financial gain rather than genuine loyalty to Russia. Moreover, most of these individuals do not want to be exchanged. This is also an important factor to consider.
– Why do they need them there? Men can still be sent to the front, but what about women?
– I don’t know. When I worked in the police, my colleagues and I also participated in documenting such crimes. The motives of those who committed them vary. For example, Russia exchanged one woman for several of our officers. She managed a network of agents in Sumy and directed missiles at National Guard and Armed Forces targets. Together with colleagues from the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU), we documented her activities. The Russians later insisted on her exchange. In this case, the motives were clear and understandable. She is a traitor who was recruited and consciously worked for the enemy.
– Even before the full-scale war, law enforcement officials, when commenting to journalists on matters related to "thieves-in-law," noted that most cooperated with the FSB. After sanctions and due to the war, the number of criminal world leaders in Ukraine has decreased. Does Russian influence over the criminal underworld still persist? Is it felt in penal institutions?
– This question is better addressed to the Security Service of Ukraine and the National Police, as the key units combating organized crime. Our role is primarily administrative and custodial. However, in my opinion, such influence still exists, albeit significantly diminished.
Some of the special contingent may consider themselves cosmopolitan, saying: "We have no flag, we are the streets, we have our own laws." But another—and I believe much larger—portion leans toward the belief that this is our land, our parents are here, and we must rule here, not someone else.
– The reform of the penitentiary system was stalled for many years due to a lack of funding. Therefore, the previous leadership of the Ministry of Justice launched a project for the "large-scale sale of prisons" that were no longer operational. For example, the Lviv Correctional Colony was sold at auction. It was planned that part of the proceeds would go to the state budget, and another part would be allocated for rebuilding prison infrastructure. For instance, the aim was to relieve overcrowding at the Kyiv pre-trial detention center. What is the status of this project now?
– All sound initiatives are supported, and project implementation continues. Several penitentiary infrastructure facilities are being prepared for privatization by the State Property Fund. However, considering that these initiatives were mostly developed before the full-scale war, we are currently reviewing all proposed sale objects to prepare for the post-war period. Crime rates may surge, and the special contingent as well as probation clients may increase once the war ends. If we sell off the entire infrastructure now, where will we accommodate offenders?
Regarding the construction of the new wing of the Kyiv pre-trial detention center: the project was developed and approved in 2021. However, we understand that by 2025, the dollar exchange rate has changed, as have the prices for construction materials. Building codes have also been updated, including requirements for shelters. Therefore, the project and cost estimates must be revised. Objectively, this will increase the cost.
This year, we have already conducted a tender and procured these services. The original designer from 2021 is revising the project, which is now in its final stages. These changes are currently undergoing the necessary expert review.
Additionally, we are optimizing the facility on which this reconstruction will be based, including redistributing the special contingent currently housed there.
We plan to begin construction of the new wing of the Kyiv pre-trial detention center in the summer. Budget funding for this year is secured, and we are allocating funds for the next year as well.
– Are you continuing the repairs funded by the revenue generated from paid detention cells?
– Improving detention conditions is enshrined in our operational documents, and we require this from the heads of institutions within the penitentiary system.
This is one of the priorities of the penitentiary reform strategy through 2026, which has been approved by the government. It is also reflected in our operational plan, which is expected to be approved soon for this year and the next.
– Please explain where the funding comes from.
– From a special fund replenished both by fees from these paid cells and other activities, such as organizing work for inmates and operating workshops.
We only have paid cells in some pre-trial detention centers as an experimental project. They do not exist in colonies. And repairs are needed not only in pre-trial detention centers.
– Will you be raising the prices for paid cells?
– It’s about time (smiles - ed.), but not for now.
– Is there demand?
– As of today, paid cells with improved conditions for detainees in the pre-trial detention centers of the State Criminal-Executive Service of Ukraine have a 93% occupancy rate.
Overall, as of May, there are 83 paid cells with 201 bed spaces operating in the pre-trial detention centers of the State Criminal-Executive Service of Ukraine.
In 2024, there were 81 paid cells with 192 bed spaces.
The opening of paid cells is planned in the pre-trial detention centers of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Odesa, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, and Kryvyi Rih.
– What amount was received for such services in 2024–2025?
– In 2024, revenue from paid services for places in paid cells amounted to UAH 16,374.1 thousand. The Kyiv pre-trial detention center earned the most—UAH 7,779.9 thousand, followed by the Odesa pre-trial detention center with UAH 1,680.7 thousand, and the Lviv Correctional Facility (No. 19) with UAH 1,050.0 thousand.
From January to April 2025, revenue from paid services for places in paid cells totaled UAH 6,223.4 thousand, with the highest earnings at the Kyiv pre-trial detention center—UAH 2,673.0 thousand—and the Odesa pre-trial detention center—UAH 770.0 thousand.
– The NABU and SAPO regularly report arrests of top-level corruption figures, and courts are handling numerous cases where the accused are former heads of state bodies or judges. Is it possible, by analogy with paid cells, to "buy" relatively improved conditions in a colony?
– We do not have separate cells for ministers, deputies, or judges. I can assume that some corruption exists, but internal security units are specifically established to detect and combat such phenomena.
– You recently stated that the reform is ongoing and that the law-enforcement component will be strengthened. Could you explain in detail what that means?
–The State Penitentiary Service is an entity empowered to carry out operational-search activities. These powers are exercised through specialised operational units that we intend to expand. We plan to update the inter-agency regulatory framework governing cooperation with the National Police and the Security Service of Ukraine; we have already updated it with the State Bureau of Investigation. This is necessary to make the work more effective. We likewise aim to develop our own capacity to conduct operational-search activities. Another area we wish to strengthen is safeguarding our personnel. SPS staff work in rather demanding conditions: they are in constant direct contact with the special contingent and may be exposed to criminal influence and threats from the criminal community. Therefore, we want to establish an adequate mechanism to protect them from unlawful encroachments by the criminal environment. Similar units exist in every law-enforcement body and even in private organisations.
– Have such units already been established?
– Yes. These units have been created both in the regions and at the central level. The regional units form part of the Department for the Execution of Criminal Sentences, meaning they do not report to the heads of the interregional territorial directorates.
Their mandate covers two core functions: safeguarding staff members and their families, and documenting unlawful activity by representatives of the penitentiary system.
– Are there already any results from these units’ work?
– We are building them from scratch. The internal security units—more than 200 operational officers—are currently staffed at 35 percent. The command cadre has been appointed, and we are recruiting operational officers both from within the SPS system and from other law-enforcement bodies, because this line of work has its own specifics. One must understand what a criminal proceeding is, how it is registered, the role of an investigating judge, what covert investigative search actions are, and so on.
Therefore, it is still too early to talk about any concrete results. Currently, preparatory work is underway, and departmental instructions and orders are being developed. Once these are approved, we will be able to begin operating within the legal framework. Any results from the work of an operational unit must comply with procedural criminal law, ensuring that all obtained evidence is later recognized as admissible. This is, in fact, a complex procedure.
I believe that you will be able to see the first results of these units’ work by the end of summer.
– You mentioned that some penal institutions ended up in temporarily occupied territories.
– Since the beginning of 2014, a total of 34 institutions. The eastern region had quite a few penal facilities and pre-trial detention centers.
At the start of the full-scale invasion, 11 institutions were immediately seized. As part of de-occupation efforts, control over four of them has been restored.
– What happened to the convicts and personnel who were there? Were they released?
– It varied. In some cases, those held in pre-trial detention centers were released, while individuals serving sentences were taken by the occupiers to facilities in the Russian Federation. Russian courts re-sentenced them there.
– Meaning?
– Russian courts translated the verdicts of Ukrainian courts into Russian and reimposed sentences in accordance with the Russian Criminal Code for equivalent offenses.
– Why would they do that?
– We don’t have that information, as we have no communication with the other side. Presumably, it was to give themselves a legal basis to continue holding them. At the same time, some of those individuals were sent to the front.
– And what about the staff? Were they also transferred to Russia?
– Most of them managed to evacuate from the temporarily occupied territories. But there were also cases where our employees—like other law enforcement officers—made their way to Ukrainian-controlled territory by any means necessary, both legal and otherwise.
"NOW COUNTRIES ARE MORE WILLING TO EXTRADITE OFFENDERS"
– This spring, the State Bureau of Investigations submitted a case to court concerning torture and killings at Bozhkivska Correctional Colony No. 16. According to the SBI’s statement, from the moment of arrival, each convict underwent a harsh intake procedure, during which newly arrived inmates were forced to clean the floor while being filmed. Those who refused were subjected to torture. What steps are you taking to ensure such incidents do not happen again?
– Our response to such incidents operates on several levels. First, we introduced the institution of human rights inspectors whose task is to be physically present in correctional facilities or pre-trial detention centers and monitor such situations. We have already hired 50 individuals for these positions. We initially intended for them not to report to the heads of penal institutions or even the interregional directorates. However, we cannot place them on the staff of the central apparatus, as there are no vacancies and we have reached the maximum authorized personnel limit. We are legally prohibited from increasing the department’s headcount by that number of positions.
Therefore, de facto, they will currently report to the leadership of the interregional directorates. They will be directly responsible for reporting any violations of human rights or improper treatment of this category of individuals.
In addition, at the end of last year, a new law was adopted establishing commissions for reviewing complaints about violations of prisoners’ rights. A commission is created under each interregional directorate, and it includes representatives of civil society and experts. This work is unpaid and carried out on a voluntary basis.
We have already approved the regulations governing the work of these commissions, and the process of forming them is ongoing. This is yet another mechanism through which a convict can file a complaint regarding detention conditions, treatment, or lack of access to medical care.
And we have introduced another channel for complaints. On the SPS website we created a section where anyone can anonymously report an issue in a correctional facility. Convicts generally have internet access, via tablets in designated rooms...so they can lodge complaints anonymously. A dedicated unit has been established to handle these submissions. Each quarter we will analyze where the complaints originate most frequently, check the situation, and assess it, because complaints can also be manipulated. If a facility warden strictly enforces the regime, inmates might dislike it and file grievances against him.
– Can relatives of convicts file complaints?
– Yes.
– Won’t the facility heads then try to track down these anonymous complainants?
– We have no intention of finding complainants and "dealing" with them. We won’t immediately launch inspections for every complaint. That’s precisely why we’re creating internal security units that, even without such complaints, should understand what’s happening in each facility, which ones are more problematic, and where there’s a risk of abuse of power. I say this based on my previous experience. It’s similar in law enforcement—when you work in a certain territory, you know which unit has good discipline and performance, and which doesn’t.
Facilities are constantly monitored by interregional directorates, the central department, the Verkhovna Rada Commissioner for Human Rights, People`s Deputies, human rights activists, and the Public Council under the Ministry of Justice. We have no interest in exposing, compromising, or pressuring those who file complaints with us.
From my previous experience, I can say there was a similar dynamic. If a police officer decided to become a whistleblower and report misconduct within their unit, our task was to protect that person. We know how to do this.
That’s precisely why we created internal security units—to work preventively rather than wait for incidents to occur.
– While the internal security units are still being formed, if a complaint about torture incidents, like the one in Poltava region, arrives, will you respond immediately or wait another two to three months?
– Our response will be proportional, believe me. Additionally, as I mentioned earlier, the Ministry of Justice is about to issue an order establishing a commission in the form of a working group. We will conduct hearings with the leadership of all facilities, including medical units and regional probation branches.
– Have there been any cases of mass riots or escape attempts related to the war?
– Despite the martial law regime in Ukraine, there have been no escapes, escape attempts, or mass riots among convicts and detainees connected to the war.
However, objectively, between 2022 and 2024, due to inadequate staff performance, there were nine escapes from custody: four in 2022, four in 2023, and one last year.
All individuals who committed criminal offenses were apprehended and returned to facilities to continue serving their sentences.
– Unfortunately, Russian forces are actively advancing in the Sumy region and attempting to enter the Dnipropetrovsk region. Are you evacuating the facilities located there? And is evacuation generally possible?
– Yes, evacuation is possible. During the war, 12 facilities have been evacuated, involving around 4,000 inmates serving sentences for committed crimes. These decisions are made jointly with the military.
If there is a threat to the life and health of inmates or staff, we will respond accordingly by making coordinated decisions with the military.
– The full-scale war has affected the extradition of individuals who fled abroad to avoid liability for committed crimes. Extradition requests to the Ukrainian side have mostly been denied, citing the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the potential danger those under investigation face due to the military actions. In an investigation on high-profile corruption cases, Ukrainian Pravda journalist Mykhailo Tkach reported that designated detention facilities for extradited individuals have now been identified, located away from combat zones, with renovated premises, and he showed what they look like. In my opinion, these premises appear much better than others. What is the current situation regarding extradition?
– Two central authorities are currently handling extradition matters: the Office of the Prosecutor General and the Ministry of Justice. The Office of the Prosecutor General oversees extradition during the pre-trial investigation stage, while the Ministry of Justice is responsible at the stage of court proceedings and sentence enforcement. Conditions of detention are one of the key issues considered by the competent authorities of the requested state when deciding on extradition. This is stipulated in the relevant conventions. It is not something we invented or a matter of wanting better conditions for them; these are our international obligations as a party to the Council of Europe conventions regarding the surrender of offenders.
And if our detention conditions do not meet the standards of the Council of Europe, namely their penitentiary rules, a country may refuse extradition. As a rule, refusals occurred frequently in the past. I personally encountered this while working at the Prosecutor General’s Office.
Currently, such cases are significantly fewer because a systematic approach has been established to create facilities for extradited individuals that comply with international requirements. Now, this loophole for offenders no longer exists.
– Are countries paying less attention to the war?
– The situation is gradually changing; states are now extraditing more offenders. Just a few figures for comparison: in 2022, 17 individuals were extradited to Ukraine for criminal prosecution and to serve court sentences, most of them from Poland; in 2023, 22 individuals, again mainly from Poland; in 2024, already 73 individuals, primarily from Poland and Germany; and in the first months of 2025 alone, 49 individuals—with a wider range of source countries: Bulgaria, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, and Slovakia – one person each; Spain – two persons; Poland – 15 persons; and Germany – 24 persons.
– Are there plans to change the approaches to prisoners’ resocialization?
– This is one of the cross-cutting priorities of our work. We would like the penitentiary system’s aim to be not merely the execution of punishment but the rehabilitation of individuals and their return to normal life, as is done in developed countries. We are now drafting a new penitentiary-system bill and intend to emphasize and develop this direction throughout. One component we envisage is the development of a so-called penitentiary probation service.
That is, probation covers penalties not involving deprivation of liberty (suspended sentences, fines, community service). In Europe, the imposition of community service is generally seen as the most effective sanction, the best alternative to imprisonment, and an efficient mechanism of social reintegration.
Community service, as a form of punishment or administrative sanction, entails unpaid socially beneficial work performed during a person’s free time outside their primary employment or studies. Such an approach allows an offender to remain in their customary environment, keep working or studying, and simultaneously recognise responsibility for their act. On the one hand, this is a step towards more humane justice; on the other, it relieves pressure on the penitentiary system.
We have an idea to put this practice into effect. In reality, it is not very easy to implement, because many individuals are serving sentences not for the first time. Therefore, at the initial stage, the focus will mainly be on those serving a sentence for the first time, so that they do not embark on a criminal path in future. Hence, we are talking about finding employment, acquiring new skills, and minimising the influence of prison subculture on the individual.
The present day poses new challenges to the system. Because hostilities continue in Ukraine, relatively new categories of clients have entered the probation register, and they require fresh approaches for effective supervision. Since the outset of the full-scale invasion, the number of probation clients with combat experience (veterans) and those who have committed offences against the foundations of Ukraine’s national security (collaborators) has increased markedly.
Nearly 2,000 individuals who committed crimes encroaching on Ukraine’s national security are now on the books of authorised probation bodies. These cases may involve collaboration, aiding the enemy, disseminating pro-Russian propaganda, and similar acts. The probation service has analysed the behavioural profiles of such clients, and taking into account not only criminal conduct but also value orientations, psychologists have developed methodological guidelines for working with probation subjects convicted of collaboration.
Combatants who have committed crimes (veterans) form another, no less challenging, category whose numbers, unfortunately, show a steady upward trend. As of today, about 1.3 thousand such persons are on the probation register. Many of them suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, adjustment disorders, aggression issues, or addiction. Effective work with this group requires a comprehensive approach, close cooperation with medical and psychological services, and careful consideration of the client’s social status and combat history.
The experience Ukraine is now gaining in working with veterans is unique and differs from that of other countries such as Israel, the United States, or the United Kingdom. While it is important to study this experience, the tools and approaches used abroad must be adapted to the Ukrainian context.
In cooperation with international partners and relevant national stakeholders, work has already begun on studying the key challenges encountered in dealing with war veterans and, subsequently, on developing methodologies for effective engagement with such probation subjects. A special working group on veteran rehabilitation will be established within the Expert Advisory Council under the SPS.
The challenges facing the authorised probation bodies cannot be resolved without close, ongoing cooperation with other state institutions and civil society organisations. Consequently, we remain flexible, open to change, and capable of adapting to new realities. Only thus will penitentiary activity remain an effective instrument of justice even in the most difficult times.
Tetiana Bodnia, Censor.NET
