Gas lobby’s influence: why did Italy approve extradition of suspect over Nord Stream blasts?
The Nord Stream sabotage case is gaining momentum again. Today, two Ukrainian nationals are in the spotlight, with German investigators leading the probe suspecting them of involvement in the high-profile incident, which occurred in the early hours of September 26, 2022.
At the time, explosions occurred on the "Nord Stream" and "Nord Stream 2" gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea. As a result, key gas-supply "arteries" carrying Russian gas to Germany were severely damaged, and Germany began to investigate what had happened. Denmark and Sweden also conducted their own investigations, as portions of the route run through their territorial waters, but they soon discontinued them. The investigation is now being coordinated by the German authorities. According to the German Federal Prosecutor’s Office, a group of individuals may have planted the explosives using a rented yacht, reportedly including divers. Two Ukrainian nationals suspected at Germany’s request were detained under European arrest warrants — Volodymyr Zhuravlov in Poland and Serhii Kuznietsov in Italy. Extradition proceedings to Germany were initiated in both cases. The Polish court refused to extradite Zhuravlov, whereas the Italian court, in Kuznetsov’s case, reached the opposite conclusion and approved his extradition to German investigators. It reached that decision twice, as the first ruling was appealed to the Court of Cassation. On October 27, the Bologna Court of Appeal again confirmed that his extradition may proceed. We discussed this case with Mykola Katerynchuk, an attorney and partner at the law firm Katerynchuk, Moor & Partners, who is also involved in the defense of Ukrainian citizens.
- Mykola Dmytrovych, I know you intend to appeal this latest decision by the Italian court. What are the prospects?
- Frankly, the chances are slim. We have already held out for quite some time by relying on inaccuracies stated in the warrant for extradition to Germany, as well as on features of Italy’s procedural law. As a result, we had the previous decision quashed in cassation, and the case has now returned to the appellate instance.
However, as you can see, the appellate ruling essentially reiterated the previous one, while correcting the procedural errors made last time. Look, as soon as Serhii was arrested, he was brought before a court, literally within 48 hours. He did not even have his own defence counsel, and the interpreter was unqualified. Moreover, he was not brought into the courtroom, because the stated offence classification allowed the hearing to be held without the detainee’s physical presence. So they conducted it by videoconference. This was a gross procedural violation, as noted in the Court of Cassation’s ruling. That was corrected, and Serhii then appeared in court with defence counsel and a qualified interpreter.
Serhii Kuznietsov. Getty Images/Massimiliano Donati
I will put it this way: this Italian court’s decision reads as transparently cobbled together under the influence of Italy’s gas lobby. For example, the Polish court noted that Germany suffered no harm from the non-receipt of Russian gas. Moreover, when these pipelines were being built, Merkel assured that even if Russia resorted to blackmail and the flows were shut off, it would not harm the economies of Germany or the European Union. There was even an expert opinion to that effect. Yet in this decision, the Italian court dwells on the damages that, in its view, Germany incurred. And what seems downright absurd is the court’s point about the yacht allegedly used: they note it sailed under the German flag, which, they claim, makes it German territory. But the yacht was not damaged! No asset on German territory was harmed, neither in its territorial waters nor on the mainland. In other words, it suffered no damage.
At the same time, the Italian court ignored counsel’s submission that Denmark had closed its criminal case and Sweden had not even opened one for lack of the elements of a criminal offence. Thus, in my view, the Italian court was guided exclusively by pressure exerted by Italy’s gas lobby. Let me remind you that Italy is the European Union’s second-largest consumer of Russian gas after Germany. Which is why this is all so complicated.
Mykola Katerynchuk
- What does this case mean to you today?
- Above all, it’s about legal uncertainty: did we actually do this? Has the Ukrainian side confirmed that its citizens were behind it, or not? We proceed from the official position that we were not involved. Both Zhuravlov and Kuznietsov state that they have nothing to do with it. We cannot change that position or say otherwise. But Germany has been conducting its investigation for over a year now. And we know for certain that German investigators have communicated with senior Ukrainian officials and tried to obtain information. According to my data and that of Zhuravlov, Germany already has all the information about who carried it out and how. I do not know how well it is formalised as admissible evidence, because the German prosecutor’s office has presented our lawyers with only two expert analyses. The first one consists of photographs, which, frankly, say nothing. For instance, among the materials there is a copy of Kuznetsov’s genuine passport, and then a separate photograph taken from some other document, annotated as if it were from the passport he allegedly used to cross the border. But there is no copy of that document itself! Only the number they listed and that photograph. So any forensic examination is impossible. Anyone who has ever dealt with such matters knows that when crossing the European Union border, no photocopies of passports are made, it has long been a fully digital process. We are trying to draw the Italian court’s attention to this: look, this is an inadmissible piece of evidence that proves nothing. We pointed out that Serhii was in Ukraine on the days when the Nord Stream incident occurred, that he was on active duty, that he holds military status, and there are many other corroborations. Yet the court remains "deaf" to such arguments.
Their second piece of "evidence" is the claim that DNA was allegedly found on a bottle. How can the Italian court even take that into account if Kuznetsov’s DNA has never been officially collected for comparison with what was supposedly found there? Where could they have obtained it? Perhaps only in Ukraine, when we all enlisted for service, DNA samples were taken, so that’s the only possible direction for speculation. But I am not even sure that’s the case. In other words, his identification, the allegation that he crossed the border under a different passport, that he left fingerprints or DNA, or that photographs were compared, none of it withstands any evidentiary scrutiny. The difficulty with this process lies in the fact that a European Arrest Warrant does not assess the substance of the evidence collected, the reasoning behind the charges, or even the legal qualification of the offences. It only examines how the suspect was apprehended, whether his fundamental rights were violated during detention, whether his rights will be respected if extradited to another country, whether the detention facilities meet European human-rights standards, and whether a political element is involved. That’s all! Neither the suspect’s status nor his alleged involvement is reviewed. The substance of the accusations is not analysed. We are emphasising that the very classification applied by the German prosecutor’s office contains a political element, since it includes three articles, one of which concerns undermining the constitutional order of Germany, that’s inherently political. And it’s worth noting how the Polish court viewed this. It pointed out everything correctly and, I must say, very professionally. The judge who issued the ruling in Poland is a well-known scholar who once published an accessible Polish translation of Germany’s Criminal Code, meaning he has a thorough command of German criminal law. In his decision, he stated that even under its own legislation, Germany had no legal grounds to open this criminal case. In contrast, the Italian Court of Appeal, as we can see, approached the matter formally and with clear bias.
I believe that justice and the rule of law were not observed in this case. When a court decision is issued within the European Union, it is binding and must be taken into account in any subsequent rulings by courts of EU member states. Incidentally, Ukraine has ratified this convention, and since last summer, all decisions of Ukrainian courts are also binding, including for consideration by European courts in EU countries. However, this principle was not applied here. Indeed, in 2022, amendments were introduced to this convention concerning extradition matters, and since then, its application has become discretionary, left to the court’s judgment. However, legal practice shows that in political cases, such as this one involving the persecution of Serhii, this principle must still be taken into account. The political nature of the case is explicitly stated in the qualification of the arrest warrant issued by Germany. Therefore, we are, of course, dissatisfied with this decision and, as I said, will appeal to the Court of Cassation. We have a few days left to prepare the cassation complaint, and we will continue to pursue the appeal.
We also intend to petition the Minister of Justice of Italy, who, under Italian law, has the authority to suspend an extradition. We will use every possible legal mechanism to ensure that Serhii is not transferred to Germany, where the court will undoubtedly be biased.
- How is the Ukrainian state acting in this situation? Is it protecting its citizen?
- In the Polish case, we saw a completely different attitude, even the consul visited Zhuravlov in prison, inquired about his conditions, and asked how he could help. We felt real support there, although for some reason it remained non-public. In Italy, however, things are different. At the time of Serhii’s arrest, they did get in touch and even appointed a defence counsel they said they trusted, although, as it turned out, his services were extremely expensive. So we decided to work with another one, the one we are cooperating with now. A well-known attorney with experience precisely in such cases, Niccolò Canestrini. But that was where state involvement ended. The embassy has shown no further initiative, except for attending court hearings as observers. No real action. Yet there are legal options available. For example, the embassy is entitled to request that Serhii be released into its surety, so he is not held in detention but instead stays either at the embassy or in accommodation leased by Ukraine. We have not succeeded in this yet, though we expected it to happen. The Foreign Ministry, as we can see, is passive and has taken no official steps. I believe the reason lies solely in the president’s public statement, "It wasn’t us." After that, everyone simply washed their hands of it. The logic seems to be: if it wasn’t us, then any official assistance to our citizens might be seen as an implicit admission of involvement. At least, the German prosecutor’s office treats that version as the main one. Perhaps that explains the nervous caution. Yet, as I wrote in my article for Dzerkalo Tyzhnia entitled "Legitimate Target: The Military Nature of the Nord Stream Attack", even if Ukraine had carried it out, there would be no reason to fear it.
Volodymyr Zhuravlov. Photo: Screenshot from video / YouTube / TVP Info
- The Polish judge who ruled in Zhuravlov’s case also said publicly: if Ukrainians did this, it may have been an act of justice. But that is not even the point at this stage. The state is obliged to protect its citizen, and that is not happening here.
- Let me also explain, in this context, where Serhii is now, so you understand why he truly needs help. Look, the state needed him when he volunteered despite having three children, didn’t it? He served in the Special Operations Forces, carried out combat orders, was assigned to combat missions, he fought. He left the service for family reasons. He is now in a serious condition. The question is: why are we only needed by the state when it needs us to fight? And when a person is wounded, discharged, or simply needs help, why are they forgotten? That is unfair and wrong. Who will fight for a state like that if, when you’re in trouble, no one even offers a hand? This is a short-sighted policy, and I think it needs to be changed immediately.
Serhii is now being held in a prison alongside ISIS terrorists and Somali militants. All those actual terrorists are kept in better conditions than he is. For example, others are allowed outdoor walks, while he is confined to a small caged yard, and always in shackles, which he wears constantly. Others are granted 18 hours of phone calls per month; he is allowed only two. He has specific dietary needs, yet it is nearly impossible to send him food or supplies. He has already lost half his weight. Psychological pressure is constant. Representatives of the German prosecutor’s office tell him: "We’ll give you 15 years, just plead guilty." And that raises a question: why do the Italians even need Ukrainians to admit guilt? The Germans’ motive is clear, they believe that Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 gave them an economic advantage within the European Union. Together with Russia, they effectively dictated the rules of the European energy market. That’s more than 550 million consumers! The damages claimed by Russia are estimated at around €140–170 billion. So, where do you think Russia and Germany will take this next? Naturally, to the International Court of Justice! And what will they try to do there? They’ll attempt to prove that Ukraine or those they label as such is responsible. For now, their goal is precisely to establish that Ukraine was behind it. From there, the story could evolve into a broader discussion about Russia’s €300 billion in frozen assets.
That’s why I keep stressing that there’s a political dimension here. This case politically divides Germany from within, there is no unified position. Some say, "We’re now paying €50 more for utilities," while others reply, "If it weren’t for those Nord Stream pipelines, there wouldn’t even be a war." Because once construction was completed, the need for Ukraine’s gas transmission system disappeared and that was precisely when the war began.
Imagine if those pipelines were still operational today, how much money Russia would be receiving from the European Union to prepare for its invasions, both of Ukraine and of Europe itself. Through those pipelines, they were essentially "feeding" the aggressor, who now launches Shaheds, for now without warheads, in the direction of Poland. The geopolitical consequences of this project were clear from the start. The Poles had warned consistently that it would bring no economic benefit to the EU, that it would create bondage, dependence on Russian energy, a sort of energy needle. But Merkel didn’t want to hear it, nor did the entire pro-Russian lobby in Germany. The government has since changed. You’ll recall when Scholz, at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, offered Ukraine 5,000 helmets and even that was up for debate. Now we’re talking about Taurus missiles. Germany is changing politically, yet at the same time pro-Russian parties are gaining traction, asking: "How can you keep helping Ukraine when Ukrainians blew up our Nord Stream pipelines?" And now the EU is struggling to remain competitive in industry, chemicals, and energy.
As for the Italians, on the one hand, their prime minister has agreed to provide another tranche of military aid, yet on the other, they are trying to hand over to the Germans someone who is, for now, merely a witness, but who once in Germany will effectively become an accused. And then the conversation will shift to: "Confess to whatever we tell you." From there, it could serve as the basis, as I’ve said, for Russia, either alone or together with Germany, to take the matter to the International Court of Justice.
- What will happen next with Zhuravlov?
- He’ll be fine. He’s in good shape, has been living with his family in Poland for a long time, and runs a business. I believe that will remain the case.
We are actually considering filing a lawsuit on his behalf against the German prosecutor’s office to revoke the European arrest warrant issued by the Federal Court. That warrant covers not only him but five other individuals, also Ukrainian citizens.
- And what about them?
- If any of them were to enter the territory of the European Union today, they would be detained. The only exception would be if they managed to get to Poland, where they could undergo the same procedure as Zhuravlov. But my advice to those we know and stay in contact with is simple, don’t leave Ukraine.
- So, Kuznietsov’s situation is the most difficult one?
- It’s bad from every angle, unfortunately. For our state as well, because he’ll be the one they pin everything on.
- Why doesn’t the German side consider the possibility of a Russian trace? That’s political too, isn’t it?
- Of course! Because as soon as you raise the question of a Russian trace, it becomes obvious that it was Russia that had the motive to do it. Nord Stream 2 was completed but not operational, it hadn’t been certified, even though contracts had already been signed and deliveries were supposed to start any day. The financial penalties were enormous. To avoid them, Russia could easily have blown it up themselves and then pointed the finger at others.
And it’s no secret what the Russian Federation is doing overall. Beyond waging an unprovoked war of aggression, it is committing genocide against the Ukrainian people, murdering Ukrainians. How should the civilized world, a civilized court, law enforcement, and political systems respond to that? How can a German investigator or prosecutor even bring themselves to sign such warrants amid this war? If it must be done, at least wait until it’s over!
I want to raise another important issue. God willing, we will win, because if we preserve our state, that alone will be our great victory. But imagine peace has come. After that, the Western law enforcement and judicial systems, which are based on values, traditions, and international humanitarian law that keeps evolving from war to war, will be flooded with lawsuits filed by Russia. And not just by Russia, but jointly with those countries that sympathize with it today and claim that not enough Ukrainians are being killed, like Hungary, for instance. Our citizens, our soldiers, our heroes, will then be subjected to humiliating legal proceedings simply for having fought and defended their country, as well as European values and civilization itself. This is a question that needs to be addressed now, not ignored by "burying one’s head in the sand" and saying, "They’re our citizens, but do whatever you want with them," as we are seeing from the state’s actions in Kuznietsov’s case.
Another point, when we become a member of the European Union, war crimes and the consequences of this war will have no statute of limitations. Such lawsuits could be filed against Ukrainians 20 or even 40 years from now. So what will we do then? That’s why, in my view, our Foreign Ministry is being overly cautious politically and that’s unacceptable. They have their own diplomatic front, and on that front, they must fight to the last breath for national interests and for every citizen of Ukraine. But once again, we must anticipate that when the war ends, we’ll need to turn the EU’s legal system toward this problem — to ensure that such exotic criminal prosecutions no longer arise.
- I was reminded of another case, that of our serviceman Vitalii Markiv, who was also tried in Italy, but in that instance representatives of the Ukrainian authorities stood up for him, and today he is a free man.
- That was an unprecedented decision at the time: he was immediately sentenced to 24 years for allegedly being stationed at a position from which a shot was fired that killed an Italian photojournalist — a man who, incidentally, was on the enemy’s side. The presiding judge was a civilian, someone who had absolutely no understanding of what war is. He had only seen it in movies. One of his questions was, "Where do you record the number of cartridges you’ve fired?" In other words, he applied the standards of peacetime criminal law to a battlefield context. It was a good thing that Ukrainian officials intervened in time to defend the National Guardsman. I want the Foreign Ministry to do the same now, to fulfill its duty to protect every citizen of Ukraine and to uphold the national interests of our state. Do those interests include letting a Ukrainian be handed over to Germany, turning Ukraine into a scapegoat, and saddling us with €170 billion in damages? Of course not. So who sits in the Foreign Ministry if they fail to understand this? Who are these people who call themselves patriots and enjoy exemption from mobilization? This is their diplomatic war, one that, along with the information war, is of enormous importance. It must be fought, and they must defend those citizens of our country who, to put it mildly, have found themselves in serious trouble.
Olha Moskaliuk, Censor.NET
