How will politics affect battlefield?
Yurii Butusov, a platoon commander with the 13th Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine’s "Khartiia," is analyzing live the "peace plan" proposed by the United States to Ukraine to end the war with Russia. How will politics affect the battlefield?
This broadcast is devoted to important developments now unfolding around Ukraine, both in domestic politics and in the war. I am going live with you today because the circumstances raise a huge number of questions for everyone, for all Ukrainians at the front, abroad, and in the rear.
So, the situation is tied to the peace plan, the so-called Trump peace plan, which was backed today by Putin, the Russian dictator who is waging this deadly war against us. Putin liked this plan. We have heard the White House’s statements about what is going on, and now we need to figure out what has actually happened, whether this is an ultimatum, and what to do next.
I will now briefly go over what is listed in this peace plan and answer your questions.
First, let’s define the terms and what exactly is happening. There are 28 points that have been published. On the surface, there are a lot of good words in them: a comprehensive non-aggression agreement between Ukraine, Europe, and Russia. A non-aggression agreement with an aggressor who has already violated several agreements, interesting. A commitment by Russia not to invade neighboring countries, and by NATO not to expand further. So it is a rather curious line, an attempt to ask the aggressor to stop killing and seizing territory. NATO is not to expand further. NATO exists for security and defense and has not seized anything from anyone.
Dialogue between Russia and NATO, mediated by the United States, to resolve security issues and create conditions for de-escalation. That is normal. Providing Ukraine with reliable security guarantees. Point five. Security guarantees sound very good, but not a single word is said here about what those guarantees are. There is no detail. This point overlaps with another one. The first point, which I did not mention, is confirmation of Ukraine’s sovereignty. These are obvious things for us.
Point six: limiting the size of Ukraine’s Armed Forces to 600,000 troops. This is completely unclear and one-sided. It speaks only about restrictions on Ukraine. Why there are no limits on other countries and how this could be monitored, is simply left out. This is also a fairly declarative phrase, but what matters is that once again it is Ukraine that is expected to impose limits.
Point seven: Ukraine enshrines in its Constitution a renunciation of NATO membership, while NATO enshrines that Ukraine will not be accepted in the future. So we are supposed to change the Constitution. For what purpose? Why should we give up a security guarantee when no other guarantees have been provided to us? It is unclear.
Next. The stationing of European fighter jets in Poland. This does not concern us. NATO does not deploy troops on the territory of Ukraine. This is not the case at present. A guarantee, but that is beside the point, whether there are any guarantees or not.
The United States receives compensation for this guarantee. What guarantee? What does it consist of if there are no NATO troops on Ukrainian territory? It is unclear.
If Russia invades Ukraine again, all sanctions are reinstated, and any new territorial recognitions and agreement privileges are revoked. Russia has done this before; it will do it again, ramp up, and, in principle, go back to enduring those sanctions. That is the condition. If Ukraine, "without cause", I liked that wording, launches a missile strike on Moscow or St. Petersburg, the guarantee becomes void. Meaning that Ukraine would supposedly, out of nowhere, decide to hit Moscow or St. Petersburg with missiles. Without cause. Just because. You know, the way Ukraine supposedly always does it, randomly striking Russia, Moscow, St. Petersburg for no reason. Of course, that is nothing more than a joke.
Next, Ukraine is granted the right to EU membership and short-term preferential access to the European market while this issue is being considered. Very interesting. The United States guarantees that Ukraine will receive certain preferences on the EU market, but what exactly those preferences are is not spelled out at all. Then there is a global package for Ukraine’s reconstruction: creating a development fund for technology investment; U.S.–Ukraine cooperation on recovery; development of gas infrastructure; rebuilding affected territories; construction of housing and residential areas, again without any budgets or concrete details; expanding the extraction of mineral resources; and a special World Bank financing package to speed up these efforts, a package that does not exist at the moment.
Next, Russia’s reintegration into the global economy through lifting sanctions, essentially removing the main political, economic, and financial lever of pressure that restricts the Russian Federation from strengthening itself and from financing its army and this war. Without those limits, Putin’s resources would be several times greater. Right now, he is deprived of that, and the plan proposes simply giving it back to him. For what, at this stage, is still unclear.
An invitation for Russia to return to the G8. Fine, perhaps that is purely declarative, but it comes together with lifting sanctions.
A long-term U.S.–Russia agreement across various areas. All right, that is their business.
The distribution of frozen assets. One hundred billion dollars in Russian assets would be invested in Ukraine’s reconstruction, and the United States would receive 50% of the profits. One hundred billion in losses from Russia’s invasion, and the losses are already far greater than that, many times over. Who will rebuild, how will it be done, and why only 100? Then Europe is supposed to add another 100 billion dollars, Trump promises. Europe has not heard anything about this so far. Russia’s assets in Europe would also be unfrozen. In other words, Russia starts doing business with Europe again. Other Russian funds would be invested in a U.S.–Ukraine fund for joint projects. So, not all Russian assets estimated by various assessments at up to 500 billion dollars would be confiscated, only a portion. And only part of that money would go to Ukraine, nowhere near all of it. Even from what is confiscated, not everything goes to Ukraine. The creation of a U.S.–Russian security working group to monitor the implementation of the agreement. So security oversight would be handled by America and Russia. What stopped them from "monitoring security" earlier? How would this working group be better than the OSCE mission? It is not clear at all. Ukraine already had security guarantors — Germany and France, also powerful states. There were observer missions from across Europe. For some reason, Russia rejected them and did not fulfil its commitments. Now Americans will be going there, Trump is sure. Russia would then enshrine in law a policy of non-aggression towards Europe and Ukraine. This is simply laughable. Russia, putting this into law, that’s a joke. Next, the continuation of nuclear arms control treaties. Ukraine is non-nuclear. The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is to be restarted under IAEA supervision. Electricity would be split 50–50 between Ukraine and Russia. That is quite a story… the enemy seized the plant and now "allows" us to receive something from it.
Educational and social programmes aimed at fostering mutual understanding, tolerance of different cultures, and eliminating racism and prejudice. Ukraine is to introduce EU standards on religious tolerance and the protection of linguistic minorities. Both countries would repeal discriminatory measures in the media and education.
Russia repeals them, meaning it stops killing Ukrainians and completely shuts down its state television that for years has been saying Ukraine should be destroyed and Ukrainians should be killed. Interesting how they plan to control that from Washington.
A total ban on Nazi ideology. So what is that, locking up "United Russia" and Putin’s administration along with it? How else can Nazi ideology be banned in Russia?
The territories of Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk are recognised de facto as Russian, including by the United States. Given that this is proposed for signing and for launching negotiations, it is obvious that Ukraine would also be expected to recognise Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk as Russian at the outset.
Kherson and Zaporizhzhia would be frozen along the line of contact, which would mean de facto recognition along that line of contact. In other words, some line of contact that will run exactly where Putin still wants to crawl to. Russia would renounce other agreed-upon territories it controls outside the five regions. It has renounced the occupation of Ukraine before, more than once. And in public declarations, by the way, many times.
Ukrainian forces would withdraw from the part of the Donetsk region they currently control. That is, without a fight, they would hand over defensive lines, positions, high ground, all of it simply as a gift. The withdrawal area would be considered a neutral demilitarised buffer zone, internationally recognised as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian forces would not enter this demilitarised zone. I want to remind you that for the previous eight years, Russia claimed it had no forces in Ukraine at all and none on the Donbas either, on the territory of the so-called "DNR" and "LNR." Russia also said its forces were not there, but in fact, they were. And again, for the second time, the plan repeats that Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia are occupied and must be internationally recognised, including by Ukraine, as territories belonging to the Russian Federation.
Both countries commit not to change territorial arrangements by force. Russia has promised that several times already and still changed them anyway. So what happens in case of a violation? In case of a violation, any security guarantees would not apply. But what does apply instead? Presumably, sanctions would be re-imposed, the same sanctions that are already in place and are now being proposed for removal.
Next, freedom of navigation on the Dnipro and the transport of grain through the Black Sea. A humanitarian committee, prisoner exchanges, an all-for-all exchange of bodies, the return of civilian hostages, including children. A family reunification programme and assistance measures for victims of the war. Again, Russia has taken hostages and is now including the exchange of Ukrainian hostages for Russian war criminals.
Next, elections in Ukraine in 100 days. I like that one. A peace agreement drafted by the United States and Russia, and what really worries them is when Ukraine will hold elections. They are very concerned. Elections in 100 days. A full amnesty for all participants in the war and a waiver of any future legal claims. So that there are no claims at all, Russian criminals can calmly travel around Europe and the world, and no one kills them, kidnaps them, or slaps them with arrests. The agreement will be legally binding, and so that Ukraine cannot bring any claims against Russia in courts. The agreement will be legally binding, and its implementation will be monitored and guaranteed by a Peace Council chaired by President Donald Trump. Violations will trigger sanctions. Let me remind you: a Peace Council. It is not provided for anywhere; its rights and powers are not defined. And President Trump will not be President Trump three years from now. How exactly he intends to guarantee Ukraine’s security is completely unclear, and it looks very strange, as they say.
Once all sides agree to this memorandum, the ceasefire will take effect immediately after both sides pull back to the agreed-upon points to begin implementing the deal. And here, friends, we get to the key issue — point 28. So we, Ukraine, are supposed to sign on to this memorandum, all of it, everything, right at the door. Meaning we do not mention Russia’s crimes, human rights abuses, breaches of laws and international law, Putin’s total disregard for all of it, mass atrocities, the genocide of the Ukrainian people. All of that must be set aside; it is not important, it is not discussed, and it carries no weight for either Trump or Putin. Ukraine must agree to this, discard it all, and recognise that yes, we are giving up the Donbas, that we do not control a large part of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, and that we are ready to recognise all of this as Russian. And after we recognise and accept all of that, we must immediately pull back from the front line, pull back even further from the front, from the lines we currently hold, from our defensive positions, to agreed points. And only then, after we withdraw and pull troops back under all these terms, will negotiations begin and implementation start.
Those are the 28 points. Friends, there is a lot here that is, of course, the same declarative stuff that the Russian Federation and the criminal Putin have already voiced at the outset, and that U.S. negotiators have already floated as Ukrainian "concessions." We have heard it many times, in May, in June this year, and now again. And the main demand here is essentially for Ukraine to admit it is unable to continue fighting. All these words boil down to one thing: Ukraine capitulates, capitulates on certain terms, and Donald Trump is the guarantor of compliance with those terms of capitulation. And for some period, while Trump remains president, Putin agrees to keep to these terms that are entirely beneficial to him. This is exactly what Putin has been trying to achieve by force of arms. They have been trying to drive our troops out of the Donbas and seize the Zaporizhzhia region, and they have not managed to do it for almost four years, of this intense phase of the war, and eleven years of war overall. They cannot do it. Now, Ukraine is expected to declare that we are not continuing the fight, that we are pulling back, and Putin moves forward again. Then we recognise and legitimise all of this, and Putin is left with plenty of opportunities to push on again, under different conditions. So what is really behind this?
Answers to questions.
If developments on the front continue the way they are now, how long will it take Russia to seize the Donbas, which Ukraine is supposed to hand over to it under Trump’s plan?
If things keep going as they are now, Ukraine could lose the Donbas in a year or two. But if Ukraine starts organising coherent, coordinated action along the entire front line, if, finally, in the fourth year of the war, we see systemic changes in how the war is managed, then Russia will not take the Donbas. Right now, there is every opportunity to stabilise the front line, stop the enemy and, in doing so, inflict a strategic defeat on it. On large stretches of the front, the enemy has been unable to move even a step for a long time. And where they do advance, they are killed and the situation is restored. So the Russian army is not invincible. The situation on the front in Ukraine shows that we are capable of stopping Putin by military force. That is why, when we say "if everything continues like this," the point is that it should not continue the way it is now. Changes are absolutely necessary. I talked about these changes for many years when I was a journalist. Now, in my small position in the army, I am also trying to implement them. I believe we have combat-capable formations, combat-capable brigades, combat-capable corps. I serve in the Khartiia Brigade and the Khartiia Corps myself, and they carry out their combat missions quite effectively. And I can see that the enemy can be stopped. The forces to do so are there. So let’s think about how to fix this tragic situation we have now, and how to win, rather than admitting that we can do nothing.
If we truly could do nothing, Putin would have seized everything he wanted long ago. He cannot achieve this by military means. Overall, friends, what I want to say is that these conditions from Putin are no longer about "denazifying" Ukraine, no longer about changing Ukraine’s government, no longer about "demilitarising" Ukraine. There is no longer talk of disarming Ukraine or cutting our weapons. Everything Putin proclaimed on February 24, 2022, and repeated many times after that, is no longer here. In other words, Russia has changed its rhetoric. Why do you think Russia, Putin, is saying today that he is ready to accept this "peace path," even though it does not, in fact, envisage a forcible change of power, does not envisage him taking control of this country, does not envisage Putin being able to disarm the Ukrainian army or, more broadly, seize the country and dictate to Ukrainian society and the people what language they should speak? None of that is in here. So what is it thanks to, friends? Thanks to Ukraine’s armed resistance, effective resistance. Putin is going into these talks not because he can take Ukraine, but because he understands that he might not be able to. That he might not win on the battlefield. That he could lose. That is why Putin is agreeing to this peace plan, this so-called peace plan. But of course, he is stuffing it with his own demands.
So why does Trump need this? In fact, this so-called peace plan exposes America’s weakness, its inability to protect its allies and support them in a hard moment. So why does Trump want it? Why is this being pushed through so fast? In reality, Trump is facing a strategic challenge in the United States right now. He ran his campaign by criticising the Democrats’ policy, President Biden’s policy, and he harshly criticised America’s support for Ukraine. Now, Trump has to make a strategic decision. Throughout the first year of his presidency, aid programmes for Ukraine and Ukraine’s funding have been carried out under the plan laid down by President Biden. The military support, equipment, financing, all of that has been coming from the United States under Biden’s plan. But planning for the next U.S. fiscal year is already starting now. And in this fiscal year, Trump wants to show that he can budget differently, that he does not have to allocate money for the war, for supporting the war in Ukraine. Of course, the logic is clear. But can this really serve as such a demonstration? But can this really be a strong policy?
What does Trump show this way? That under certain conditions, America cannot sustain a prolonged struggle. It cannot sustain long-term support for its allies. And if some other dictatorial, totalitarian, authoritarian regime decides to wage war and seize a country somewhere in the world — in Europe, for example, Taiwan, or in Africa or Asia — America may always hesitate. So powerful regimes with strong authoritarian, dictatorial rule, capable of pursuing their strategy for decades, can outlast America and impose their will. Would that serve international security and U.S. interests at all? Of course not. It is a short-term approach, and this approach by Trump is facing serious criticism inside the United States itself. I understand that Trump now wants, by the end of the year, to make another strong push and pressure Ukraine’s leadership into concessions. But for us, this is not the right approach, not the maneuver Ukraine can agree to. Because this is not a long-term strategy; it is a situational political combination. And such political combinations can be influenced from different sides. Trump already tried to force Ukraine’s hand in May, and it did not work. Now there is a new approach — threats. But if we simply agree to talk within this framework and sit down at the negotiating table, that is unacceptable. It is a serious security threat, and it gives Putin the option to say at any moment: the only thing that matters in these 28 points is that sanctions are lifted on him, and then reimposed later. He is already operating under sanctions. The Russian army cannot get as many resources and as much funding as it would without sanctions. But even the resources Russians have are still several times, many times, greater than what Ukraine has. Everything is relative.
Russia can keep waging this war financially. It has markets for its energy and natural resources, in China, India, and other countries. They can survive. So we should not have illusions that sanctions will stop the war overnight. Sanctions, as we know, do not end wars. And what will Trump use next to threaten or force Putin to comply with peace agreements? With what? There are no tools. Nothing is spelled out here except Trump’s own goodwill. So this is a diplomatic maneuver. Putin has once again managed to push through many points that suit him. I should note that this is a step back compared to Russia’s demands in February 2022: Ukraine’s sovereignty is recognised, the Ukrainian government is recognised, the Ukrainian army is recognised, the Ukrainian nation is recognised. But Russia wants to leave a loophole to get back in, to exert influence and, through this occupation, keep influencing Ukraine from within. To revive its political parties again and restore the influence of its media once more. Agreeing to capitulation terms and surrendering the current front line… The current front line means the enemy would still have to fight for years for the Donbas, to wage war for years. But if we give everything up at once now, that barrier — a real barrier of our land, simply disappears. And we do have the ability not to give up this land. The Sloviansk–Kramatorsk agglomeration is a unique natural defensive line, maximally advantageous for defense. During World War II, three years of fierce fighting were waged for it because it is such a strong defensive position. Whoever controls it controls the gateway to Slobozhanshchyna and to central Ukraine. So losing it, handing it over ourselves, is like disarming ourselves. It means giving up positions that are advantageous for our troops, handing them to the enemy, and giving up land we have every ability to hold, with the necessary, of course, correct organisational and command decisions.
What do you think our authorities will do, given that the decision rests with the political leadership?
I think our authorities will always act in line with how public opinion in Ukraine shifts. In cases like this, the government does not pursue its own strategy but listens to public opinion. And here, you and I are one of the sources that, in fact, shapes it.
What happens if we are left without intelligence from the United States?
That would be a serious and painful loss for us, but we have not been left without that intelligence yet. And I want to note that it is not only the United States that provides intelligence, other NATO countries do as well, along with other participants in the Echelon intelligence-sharing programme, which works very effectively and supplies us with information on Russia. So let’s not lose heart ahead of time. In reality, nothing has been decided here. This is purely a diplomatic track. Trump wants to show: I have done the maximum, and now I want you to do what I have worked out. This is the compromise, you won’t get a better one, and you have to go along with it. But we understand that once compromises start being made, they can go much further. And in fact, we also understand that Putin does not speak the language of compromise. That is why, by the way, I think we all clearly realise that this political situation cannot be resolved within the timeframe the White House has now set — to make a decision on this peace plan by November 27. I am convinced we must present our own remarks and arguments on this plan and act accordingly.
How do we do that, how do we introduce systemic changes at the front? The same people are in charge, the same results. Changes from below will not be systemic.
That is a very valid point. Still, I believe and hope that our leadership, both military and political, will start drawing conclusions: we will not find support, we will not find a strategy for what to do abroad unless we act here. These actions are expected from us; effectiveness is expected from us. If we stop the Russian army along the entire front line, that will be the effectiveness that completely changes the political situation. If we stopped the enemy even for a month right now, these terms would look absurd. No one would be proposing them. So let’s understand this: the political conversation has to continue, this track has to exist, but right now I want to hear clear plans from Ukraine’s leadership at every level on how we stop the enemy at the front, what is being done for that, and how the combat capability and trust in the Defense Forces are being strengthened. That is what matters. To stop this, pardon the word, shitstorm, we do not need declarations; we need actions, deeds. Right now, there are no words that can convince Trump of anything. If thousands of killed Ukrainians do not convince him, if children being killed by missiles in their beds by Russian inhuman monsters do not convince Trump that Ukraine must be defended, then believe me, no words, no matter how nicely some speechwriters might put them, will work. We need deeds, we need actions, a strategy of action. The unity of the army, the people, and society must be expressed in practical steps, not words: in a systemic fight against corruption, in punishing criminals who stole, in the immediate full confiscation of assets and property from everyone who has stained themselves with theft during the war and with sending money to Moscow, to our enemies. All these people must, of course, be detained, punished, and investigated. The money must be transferred to the Armed Forces, and a key thing must be introduced in the army. I have been saying this for many years — for eleven years but I will say it again. Our war is the best academy in the world. Nothing and no one teaches modern military art, modern strategy and tactics the way the Ukrainian front does. We need after-action analysis, an after-action review. We must scale up our successful experience and stop repeating the mistakes we keep running into and stepping on the same rakes again and again. That has to stop. This does not require any absolutely unique steps. It requires a strategic decision.
Look, there are commanders and there are military units, formations, and corps that are holding the line steadily, delivering results, and eliminating the enemy. We need to scale up this experience, to scale it up and give authority to those commanders who have proven they can deliver, give them more resources, more powers, and plan operations in line with what they propose. And then it will turn out that we can stop the enemy not on isolated small stretches, not for 10, 20, 30, not even 100 kilometers but along the whole thousand. The active part of the front is just 1,200 kilometers. It is a large front. The enemy is conducting active offensive operations on roughly about half of those sections. We have to scale up successful experience, draw conclusions, and plan not just positions, not just troop deployments, where the infantry stands and who stands where. We have to plan a high-tech war. The main challenge of our time is planning high-tech operations — weapons, the use of high-tech assets, and the development of high-tech units. This has to be done along the entire front, with clear sectors of responsibility assigned to specific units for specific stretches. Not just hunting for "E-points" along the front, but being responsible for a sector and for the complete elimination of the enemy in that sector.
Under today’s conditions, what is the most advantageous way for Ukraine to end the war?
Under today’s conditions, there is only one way for Ukraine to ensure we are not destroyed and do not face a new war in a few years. That is to stop the enemy by military force. Do we have the resources for this? Yes, we do. Do we have the people for this? Yes, we do. We must do it on the main sectors where the enemy is advancing. Fighting is underway in Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk; Dobropillia is under threat, as is Mezhova; the enemy is on the outskirts of Kostiantynivka and on the outskirts of Siversk; the enemy is currently fighting in Stepnohirsk and trying to push toward Zaporizhzhia. We have many hot spots. Heavy battles are going on for Kupiansk. This requires significant attention. But can we drive the enemy out? We can.
Gerasimov reported to Putin yesterday that Kupiansk is fully under Russian control.
Yes, and today, Putin came out with that cryptic line, that Kupiansk will be "like Kupiansk" because Kupiansk has been taken. I have to say, these are pretty funny stories that really show there are actual clowns sitting in the Kremlin, the same ones who promised Kyiv in three days. And let me remind you: two weeks ago, Putin, together with Gerasimov, promised to bring foreign journalists to Kupiansk and Pokrovsk. He still hasn’t brought anyone. Where are those journalists? I’d really like to see at least one. Okay, not necessarily foreign, show us some Russian journalist. In Kupiansk, for example. Today, Putin said that what happened in Kupiansk will now be repeated in other sectors as well, that Kupiansk has been completely captured, that’s what he claimed. Well, where is it? Is there even one Russian who has filmed himself walking around Kupiansk? I’m curious. Where is the journalist, the one Putin promised would be in Kupiansk? Where is he? We don’t see any of this. We don’t see it because, in reality, Putin is just selling hot air, farts in the wind that he is feeding into Trump’s ear. It’s all total nonsense. None of it has any connection to reality. It’s psychological pressure, pressure on global public opinion, pressure on America, meant to showcase his supposed successes, which in fact do not exist. There is no evidence that Russians are in Kupiansk, not a single video from Kupiansk showing them walking there, I emphasise, exists. No Russian commander, blogger, or Z-blogger has shown up there. So what does that tell us? Again, if Russia could achieve its goals by force right now, it wouldn’t be talking to Trump. There would be no "peace plans." What is Putin’s real objective? He wants to break the unified NATO front against Russia and thereby weaken international support — NATO countries’ support for Ukraine. That is fundamentally important for him: for us to receive less weaponry, less money, and for the stance against Russian influence to be less united. Putin needs all of that badly. And he cannot achieve it. And second, Russia is not capable at this point of getting everything it demands by military means. The war is going very hard for the Russians. According to the official reports of our General Staff, Russian losses have long since passed one million. I think perhaps not all of that million are killed, but total losses — killed, wounded, and otherwise taken out of action — significantly exceed a million. Objective arithmetic and statistics show this. If you add everything up, I’ll write about this, by the way, and we’ll do a broadcast on Russian losses, if you total all the Russian reports, they have mobilised, in various forms, and sent to war close to 2.5 million people over this period. And where are they now? They keep reporting that they have 700,000 at the front, and that’s still what they report. And indeed, that’s about how many there are, according to our intelligence as well.
The war is hard for Russia. Putin is not sure he can fulfil and achieve his goals by military means. That is why he uses every opportunity to rattle Trump and deprive Ukraine, at least partially, at least for a year, at least for some time, of American money, American weapons, and American support. That is the main thing. For the sake of this, he is ready for any lie, to say whatever he wants. I think that in due time, we will see who actually controls Kupiansk and the other parts of the front that Russia claims to have captured. Why don’t Russian Z-bloggers go to Pokrovsk? Because they could be killed there, in Pokrovsk. A significant part of the city is still holding out, fighting is ongoing there. Ukrainian soldiers, the 425th "Skelia" Regiment, our other units, the 155th Brigade, the 68th Brigade and other formations are putting up worthy resistance and hitting the enemy there.
"We have people, we have resources." Those are exactly the words Butusov used about Avdiivka. And yet Pokrovsk is already slipping into the past.
Unfortunately, friends, that comment is true. We have seen the same situation before and not only once... I can remind you of my broadcasts; you can watch them here. I spoke in detail about the problems in how we organise combat operations. Bakhmut, Soledar, Avdiivka, Vuhledar. Sadly, all of this is repeating itself now. Systemic changes have not happened yet. There are some at certain levels, there have been some shifts, but not along the entire front, only in parts of it. We can see that where, for example, army corps have been formed with a sufficient number of competent personnel, where there is organised, systematic work in the troops, where capable commanders work methodically, and where there are weapons and people, we stop the enemy. We inflict heavy losses on him. He cannot accomplish his objectives. So these changes have to be scaled up. We have the capacity to do that. I am forced to repeat this. Yes, unfortunately, there is great inertia in strategic decision-making at the top level. Yes, you are right, the point is well taken. But the situation is what it is, and we have to change the course of history. We have to shape it ourselves. That depends on us, including on democratic public opinion in Ukraine.
How can the leadership be pushed to organise an effective system of resistance against the ruscists? Because it looks like the situation suits the leadership completely.
Well, how? In Ukraine, I don’t know any other way except for the public to demand change. The authorities only hear the position that is popular. So if we support those military units and commanders who deliver results, who have no breakthroughs on their sectors, who kill the enemy and stop it, I think that will be a model the political leadership will understand, and they will start scaling up this positive experience.
How is your service going?
Thank you, service is ongoing. We are forming a new UAV unit and carrying out missions, including on hot sectors. To build up capabilities, we need to train people, a significant number from scratch, and also look for those who went AWOL. This work is not easy, but we are fulfilling our tasks, and on some sectors quite effectively. As soon as there is permission and approval, and the tactical situation allows, I will definitely share more details about what I am doing. And once we gain even greater capabilities and train new crews for strike assets, I think we will have our own fairly interesting videos as well. And I want to say that serving in the Khartiia Brigade and the Khartiia Corps is a challenge that is a great honour for me. I am here among people; it is a great honour to serve and fight alongside. And every time we have to enter a "kill zone," I understand none of this is in vain. I am with the people with whom it matters to walk my warrior’s path. So I also urge all of you who have the opportunity to join up voluntarily. This is a time when every motivated person is needed at the front.
Yurii, could the authorities’ clumsy policy further increase AWOL cases, which we already have in huge numbers?
AWOL is a separate topic. In the near future, I’ll probably do a broadcast on AWOL and I’ll be writing that AWOL soldiers are now the last substantial professional reserve the army has. I don’t agree with the decision to reintroduce criminal liability for AWOL, because there is still no mechanism for transferring from one unit to another. Criminal liability should exist and be enforced, but there must also be a mechanism for transferring between units. Right now, a system has been created in which a person may have fought for a long time, may be an experienced soldier with an extensive combat record, yet is still not allowed to transfer from one unit to another, even though they have long since earned that right through their service. For those who have just arrived and try to transfer by immediately running off, criminal liability obviously makes sense. But for people who have been at the front for three to four years, to treat them this way through AWOL and ban transfers between units is madness. And I want to say that this figure, 21,000 AWOL cases in a month, a record, is precisely the result of banning transfers through AWOL again, reintroducing criminal liability, and shutting down movement from one unit to another. That is the outcome: 21,000. People who get worn down by service conditions, by problems and conflicts, used to transfer to another unit. Now they simply go home instead of transferring. That is why the number of AWOL cases spiked sharply in October. In my unit there are quite a few people I found through various agencies that search for AWOL soldiers, and I have already managed to officially bring several of them back into service, it was not easy. One AWOL soldier essentially lived and served with me, performing duties for four months. For four months, I couldn’t formalise a motivated person who didn’t go home, who served and carried out duties without pay, while we supported him as a team. That’s why I believe AWOL soldiers are needed, and we must take into account those motivated AWOL soldiers who leave for objective reasons. They have gone through their path, and restricting people in this way means losing them.
What do you say about the corruption scandal?
It’s a disgrace, and it’s outright treason. "Two million to Moscow", I mean, I don’t know, I’ve never seen a more shameful crime. The people who said this, the people who stole those kilos of dollars that NABU showed in the photos — I believe that to rally the nation, I expect the country’s leadership to take the toughest, harshest measures themselves and show all of us that the fight against wartime corruption is real, and that these bags whole suitcases of dollars in cash, that someone stole from state officials or people close to public service will not be swept under the rug. I hope the state leadership will show us how these people will be punished, demonstratively, regardless of their influence and connections and how this money will go to the front to buy the weapons that are needed. Things like that rally the nation and generate support for our leadership’s actions. So I very much hope for this and expect it. It would be a very serious demonstration, a very serious strengthening of our unity and our fighting spirit as a nation and within all our Defense Forces.
After Kupiansk, the Russians will advance on Izium.
Friends, you probably missed something. The enemy has not taken it. There is no evidence whatsoever that the enemy has captured Kupiansk, apart from Putin’s words. I don’t think the situation there is such that the Russians can advance on Izium. Yes, I think the enemy is trying to break through the front, first of all in the Lyman direction, to reach Lyman and push toward Izium. But the troops that are standing in the enemy’s way right now, defending the Kharkiv region, will not let them through. This will not be a quick story. The battle for Kupiansk, I think, is only just beginning. It is far from decided.
Do you remember filming Mala Rohan? I wanted to thank you for that video. I was under fire there, I barely made it out of that tree line.
Yehor, it is a great honour for me. Thank you. That really is one of the strongest videos I have ever filmed in my life, one of the most powerful emotions. It was the first victory of the Ukrainian army, that first real attack. The first rout of the Russian headquarters of the 59th Tank Regiment. The first captured regimental chief of staff, the deputy regimental commander. The regiment’s commander himself was eliminated there. I will never forget it. If you took part in those events and you have photos, videos, or even just memories, I would be very glad to see them. Please message me privately, via messenger, maybe Facebook if that’s convenient. I’d really appreciate it. We need to remember this. It was a landmark event.
Yurii, what did you do to get on the wrong side of the "green" authorities (meaning Servant of the People-led authorities- ed.) that they put you in kirza boots?
Friends, I’ve said this many times. There is nothing they can do to me, really. I have every reason, plenty of reasons, not to fight. I’ll tell you this: I have legal grounds to be discharged from the Defence Forces as soon as tomorrow. I have enough such grounds, both health-related and family-related. But I’m not doing that. I’ll say again: everything I’ve said about the authorities over the past few years, nothing in my views has changed. The course of events now confirms my words and my assessments of the authorities’ actions back when I was a journalist. You can’t intimidate me. What I’m doing in the war, all the advice I could have given outside the Defense Forces, I started writing about things like After Action Review back in 2014, and I kept doing so regularly in 2022 as well. About problems with command, with the organizational structure, with corruption in the authorities, with their clumsiness and incompetence. Now, unfortunately, I see that the situation is so critical that it’s impossible to talk sense into know-nothings. You can’t explain anything to them. If you want change, you have to become part of that change on certain sectors, to be one of those who makes it happen with their own hands. Because words won’t change anything now. We are led by people who juggle words without understanding them. That’s exactly why I say we must scale up successful experience. I don’t believe in changes made by words. That time has already been lost. Right now, we need to scale up those who have built effective combat structures, effective brigades, effective formations, to listen to them, scale up their experience and their organizational models, and draw conclusions from their combat work. And I am taking part directly in combat operations, in this war, precisely to speed up that process — so it is clear to everyone that this kind of experience works, and that everyone must join in. And one more important thing. I am in the Defense Forces now to speak plainly and call things by their proper names. I am against Ukraine’s capitulation. If I weren’t serving, those words might seem insincere in such a hard, critical situation. But when you risk yourself, when you go into the kill zone yourself, your words carry weight. That’s why I’m here, to stand behind my words, everything I’ve said, and to make my own personal contribution to Ukraine’s defense. I am at the front. Believe me, the authorities have no levers to intimidate a person who is going to the first line right now. So if someone is scared, I invite everyone, friends, don’t be afraid. Join the Khartiia Brigade. Join my unit, specifically, we carry out quite serious, responsible, and often difficult missions.
Could you elaborate on the situation in the Huliaipole direction? The maps show a sharp deterioration of the situation every day.
Yes, the situation on that axis is difficult. The specific threat is actually to the Zaporizhzhia direction. If the enemy captures Huliaipole and Stepnohirsk, that becomes a direct threat to Zaporizhzhia. The threat there is that the enemy has concentrated large UAV forces on that direction. And it’s not infantry or tank columns that are breaking through the front, it’s sustained, dense enemy drone activity in huge numbers. To stop the enemy there, we need innovative new solutions that will strengthen our command first and foremost in the UAV domain, in planning drone operations and counter-UAV systems. That’s the key issue. To the extent that I can, I’m also trying to steer some of the commanders working on that direction toward what exactly needs to be done. I think we have every capability to stop the enemy in the Zaporizhzhia region. We are obliged to do it, and we do have the means for that. We need to show the enemy’s UAV capability what a drone war looks like from our side, an effective drone war. The terrain around Zaporizhzhia is well-suited to the effective use of drones. So we can stop the enemy. But the situation is critical, and it must be talked about, absolutely. We have to speak up about it. The situation is critical, that’s true. And the threat to Zaporizhzhia is real.
Thank you. Thank you for being with me on the stream. Thank you to everyone who, despite the fact that I don’t go on air often, continues to support the channel and our team, which keeps working even under such constrained conditions. Thank you so much, friends. Thank you for this broadcast. We are preparing a series of reports; some of them were recorded before I went into military service. The war goes on, and the fight continues. Believe me, all these conditions, this pressure… We did not go to the front; we are not fighting the enemy, in order to give up. I think that if someone doesn’t understand that now, they will understand it. And I want to say this: there is no such despair at the front, most of the people who are fighting do not have it. The army will defend Ukraine. And it depends on us, on all of society, to support our Defense Forces. That is the main thing. And it is precisely on the frontline, on what is happening on the frontline, that any political or information arrangements, and everything that will be said, will depend. Friends, the fight goes on, and glory to Ukraine!
