Reboot of President’s Office
An event of major significance for Ukraine’s leadership and for what is happening to Ukraine in the world and in this war.
The Supreme Commander-in-Chief has decided to dismiss the head of the President’s Office, Andriy Yermak. Since we all understand how tectonic a shift this can cause in the system of power, and how enormous the influence of the head of the President’s Office is on politics and on what is happening in the country, the question of what comes next is, of course, of maximum interest to everyone. So, friends, I am addressing all of you: please feel free to ask your questions, subscribe to this channel, become sponsors of the channel. We need your support, as I am also raising funds for the work of the unit I have the honour to command – a strike UAV platoon.
So, what is happening now? First, about this "Mindichgate" corruption scandal, which became the reason and the underlying cause of all these political changes. I want to say that people familiar with the criminal case file and with the materials that appear in Mindich’s dossier have told me that I am among the ten journalists on whom Timur Mindich compiled files. So, you know, this is a rather unexpected nomination when you end up not on the shortlist for some award or competition, but become the subject of a dossier compiled on you by a key figure in one of the biggest corruption scandals in Ukraine’s history. Therefore, of course, I will be following what information Mindich collected. I want to stress that at that time I was working as a journalist, and the confidential data Timur Mindich collected about me and my life is a violation of the law, and such activity is illegal. So naturally, I will be keeping an eye on how my rights – my rights as a citizen – were violated by this corrupt group.
As for Andriy Yermak. I can tell you that after he became head of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Office, I had two meetings with Yermak. Both meetings were held at his invitation at the President’s Office. The first meeting took place on 4 October 2019. Yermak invited me so that I could set out my view on the prospects for achieving peace with the Russian Federation. And specifically, he asked whether we could implement the Steinmeier formula – that is, accept it, pull back our troops, stop the shooting, and, in a certain way, reintegrate the occupied territories in Donbas into Ukraine, while leaving the issue of Crimea aside. I immediately told Yermak then that I considered any Russian peace initiatives completely unrealistic. And I told him that Russia was preparing for war, not for peace. And I told him that if the Russian peace initiatives that were put forward had actually been genuine, if Russia had really wanted peace, it would at least have restored the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination, which it pulled out of in 2017. This centre, known by its acronym JCCC, had only nominal functions, purely formal, for monitoring the ceasefire. And it was Russia that withdrew from the JCCC, thereby removing from itself any responsibility for the continuation of intensive hostilities in Donbas. What did that mean? It meant that Russia would in no way seek to influence or stop the fighting, would not work to achieve a ceasefire, but would simply step aside. This is exactly what I told Andriy Yermak at the time, and I said that no peace initiatives with Russia could be achieved. Unfortunately, I should also say that there were witnesses to these conversations and, as far as I know, this was an official meeting. Such meetings at the President’s Office are recorded. So I hope that, at some point in the future, we will hear this discussion as part of the historical record.
As we know, Andriy Yermak then chose a completely different path and was publicly saying that we had made huge strides towards peace, that we were reconciling with the Russian Federation, that we were making great progress. In other words, he was saying things that did not correspond to reality, and I simply warned him about that. Why, despite having this expert opinion and the hard facts I presented, he chose to discard them – that, I believe, is another question he will also have to answer one day.
My second meeting took place on 1 February 2021. At that time, Andriy Yermak invited me to the President’s Office to discuss the possibility of appointing me to some position at the Ministry of Defence. I said I was critical of this idea. Yermak believed I should be given the post of head of the Department of Land and Property Relations so that I would deal with land issues at the Defence Ministry. Even now, it is difficult for me to understand why this was necessary. I said that the only position I, as a private individual who was not a civil servant, could hold at the Ministry of Defence was that of deputy minister, which could still be done quickly, without a competitive selection process. And the only role that interested me personally was Deputy Defence Minister for Armaments. I said that we needed to increase procurement, because at that time – that is, in 2021 – in the preceding years 2019, 2020, and 2021, the budget had not provided for the purchase of 152-mm artillery shells or Stugna anti-tank missile systems. Only missiles for the Stugna were being procured, even though these were among our main weapons systems, which were in short supply and would be the most expendable in the event of an invasion. Again, there were witnesses to this meeting. Unfortunately, as we know, nothing came of it either. And I want to say that all the procurements I spoke about did not take place before the war. I hope that one day answers will also be given to these questions. So that is what relates to my personal meetings initiated by Andriy Yermak. That was my experience.
And now, friends, what can I say about what is happening today? What matters to us now is not political intrigue, but who will be appointed to such a key position at a time of active hostilities. We know that Andriy Yermak did a great many things and, in particular, controlled all foreign policy. He did this because he said that a diplomatic settlement of the war was possible. I have always said, including at my meetings with Yermak, that there is no diplomatic solution to relations with Russia over Donbas – that the only way to resolve the occupation of Ukrainian territory is by a military-diplomatic method. There are dozens of my articles and speeches on this. It is now obvious that there is no diplomatic path at all, and that the military path must take precedence. That is why it is important for us to talk about the future. And what is the future? The future means appointing a person who, on the one hand, enjoys the trust of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and, on the other hand, is directly connected to the war and able to influence the course of the war. Because when it comes to the war, politicians very often like to hide behind others, to shrug off responsibility, to say that the military are responsible for the war – but that is simply not true. War depends first and foremost on money. Without money, it is impossible to buy ammunition, equipment or supplies, to pay people’s salaries, to buy drones, to buy anything. So in reality, it is politicians who influence funding. It is politicians who control the resources. And we have to understand that without these resources, an effective military defence of Ukraine is impossible. That is why, in my view, what all of us and the authorities need now, in order to restore and strengthen trust and to ensure not just rhetoric but a real concentration of the state’s efforts, so that the state truly becomes the backbone, is to have a person in this post who is directly involved in the war. So who will that person be?
What will happen to Kupiansk?
Friends, Kupiansk in Kharkiv Oblast, which Vladimir Putin, the Russian dictator, has been talking about so much lately, claiming that Kupiansk has been completely captured and that the Russians are in full control there. The situation there is far from settled for the enemy. And I think we will be hearing many more news reports from Kupiansk in the near future. As far as we know, very hard, serious, painstaking work is underway. The enemy really is attacking and operating there with large forces, but the outcome of this battle is far from decided. And according to the information we have, Putin is brazenly lying when he says he has allegedly taken full control of Kupiansk. Well, liars must be exposed.
Will Andriy Yermak be called up for military service now that he has lost his exemption from mobilization?
I cannot say. No one knows what his next position will be.
What is your view on a government of national unity? In the past, you were negative about this idea – how do you see it now?
It is not that I was opposed to the idea of a government of national unity. I simply do not engage with ideas that are detached from reality and cannot be implemented. I do not analyse scenarios that cannot happen. We see that throughout all the years Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been president, the strategy has been to rely on a single-party majority. And I see no reason why this should suddenly change now. I believe what we need first of all is qualitative change. We might indeed need ministers from other factions, but what I would really like to see is the restoration of parliamentary oversight. In other words, before creating some sort of coalition government, you first need to form a parliamentary coalition. A coalition that is built not on everyone just voting somehow, but, for example, on the opposition getting control over certain parliamentary committees. That would make it possible to provide more competent analysis, offer informed recommendations on how the authorities should develop, and correct the actions of those in power where they make mistakes or are perhaps too slow to act. So when such interaction emerges at the parliamentary level, then we can talk about there being a chance of forming a coalition government. For now, this is little more than well-meaning wishes. You can say, let all the ministers take this on board and start behaving honestly. Let them hire competent people and listen to competent advice. We can say a lot of fine things here, but, friends, we have to be realists in this life. A terrible war is under way, and we have neither the time nor any reason for detached debates.
Who is going to pay Joker’s salary now?
Yes, that is a serious question. Who is going to bankroll all these hired Telegram channels now? I don’t know. We’ll see. I simply don’t read them and never have. For me, this simply shows how often politicians create a warm bath for themselves and tend to think that means just keeping the water warm for themselves. And this whole multitude of hired Telegram channels, which on command start pushing the same information, the same propaganda, is exactly that. You know, it seems to me that at a certain point, some politicians think they are sitting in a warm bath, but what they are pouring in is no longer water, it is some other substance. And by that point, they have got so used to the smell that they no longer notice what exactly they are sitting in. Telegram channels are from that very same opera. What really concerns me about these Telegram channels is whether NABU will be able to trace their sources of funding – and what money, in what amounts, was going into financing these channels. That is the question that genuinely worries me. Stolen money from corruption schemes has to be redirected to funding Ukraine’s defence forces.
Will a law on short-barrelled firearms be passed?
In fact, Ukraine is in urgent need of a law on weapons and their circulation. Without a doubt, everyone in Ukraine who is part of the defence forces, serves in reserve formations or law enforcement agencies, or performs their civic duties at critical infrastructure facilities, in short, everyone involved in one form or another in the defence of the country – must have the right to own and carry all types of weapons, from handguns to semi-automatic weapons. And I stress: not just the right to purchase such weapons, but also to carry them for self-defence. This will undoubtedly significantly strengthen our defence capability and greatly improve people’s readiness for any critical situation in life.
As for the candidates. Who are the potential candidates for the position of head of the President’s Office? Right now, as far as I know, two names are being mentioned: Pavlo Palisa, the current Deputy Head of the President’s Office responsible for military issues, and Mykhailo Fedorov, the Minister for Digital Transformation, known as the founder of the United24 fund, who in effect launched the president’s programme to scale up drone production in Ukraine. In my view, both of these figures have good prospects, and either choice would, in its own way, be a step forward from a military point of view. Both Fedorov and Palisa have experience speaking openly about tough issues related to the war; each has his own scope, his own vision, his own angle, and either appointment would, in my opinion, be an interesting decision. I do not know which one it will be, because we still need to understand what criteria the Supreme Commander-in-Chief will set. But there are two candidates, and I believe that appointing either Palisa or Fedorov would be a step forward. These are people who genuinely understand what war is, who really devote a great deal of attention to it, and who possess a measure of critical thinking, which is actually a rarity in government, and something I believe we are badly lacking today. Over these years, diplomats have said every possible word there is to say. There are no new formulas, no new words that can be invented to stop this war. And it was never really possible before either. It was impossible in 2019, and it was impossible in 2014. So what I want to say is that what we need now are people whose primary task will not be to manage diplomatic negotiations. That is the job of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ukraine’s ambassadors. You do not need the head of the President’s Office for that. In my view, the head of the Office should be helping the Supreme Commander-in-Chief address Ukraine’s key problem directly – Ukraine’s defence. To stop the enemy advancing further and seizing more Ukrainian territory. To build reliable lines of defence and a system for supplying resources to the active army. To implement organisational and managerial changes that will make it possible to stabilise the front, stop and rout the Russian offensive, and inflict losses on the enemy that it cannot replace – losses that are unacceptable. That requires the coordinated effort of the entire state. You cannot simply say, "Look, there is the military, let them deal with it." That is not how it works in any country. All of world history shows that war, the concentration of a society’s and a state’s efforts, is ensured by whom? By the country’s leadership, not by some general acting alone. Who appoints the generals, who allocates resources and money for the war, who plans mobilisation? It is the country’s leaders, not the generals. That is why the choice the Supreme Commander-in-Chief makes now will largely determine how "Mindichgate" and this series of criminal cases, these grave allegations of corruption, especially on a large scale in wartime, of transferring the "two million" to Moscow, of current Ukrainian officials sending money to Moscow to finance the Russian aggressors, will be perceived. If we are to find at least some way out of this situation, which has badly discredited Ukraine, it is essential now to appoint a head of the President’s Office who will be trusted. That trust is critically important. What we need now are people who are effective, who listen, who can implement change, and who understand what war really is.
What about Zaluzhnyi?
Friends, let's be realistic. Valery Zaluzhnyi is currently in London. He is Ukraine's ambassador. And I don't think that, given the circumstances of his dismissal from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, there is any prospect of him being appointed to this position. That would be extremely strange. I would like to remind you that Zaluzhnyi was officially removed from his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the request of his superior because he allegedly paid too much attention to image issues. Well, I think that Zaluzhnyi's appointment to the most public position in Ukraine is simply impossible.
Recently, American analysts suggested that Ukraine could lose Donbas in the next 12 months. Do you agree with this opinion? Or is this an exaggerated view?
Unfortunately, friends, I have to say that if we do not change course, if we do not reinforce the front, if we do not change our approach to conducting combat operations, then the complete loss of Donbas within the next 12 months is a realistic scenario. And I would go further: if we do not keep implementing the necessary changes, we will be talking not only about Donbas, but also about Zaporizhzhia and Zaporizhzhia Oblast. So the situation is not just difficult, it is critical, and it requires systemic change. Not endless negotiations – because sometimes, judging by the news, you get the impression that apart from who met whom, who said something to whom and who voiced concerns, there are no other problems at all. The main problems in this country are not diplomats’ conversations. Let the Foreign Minister worry about that. The core problem for the country is that the enemy is pushing forward from Huliaipole and wants to break through, seize the Huliaipole–Stepnohirsk line and advance on Zaporizhzhia – one of Ukraine’s largest industrial, economic and cultural centres, a major city whose significance simply cannot be overstated. The enemy is trying to seize the whole of Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The enemy is pushing towards Dobropillia and Kostiantynivka in order to advance on Lyman and capture a key agglomeration, a key natural defensive line – Sloviansk–Kramatorsk. These are Ukraine’s main problems. The enemy wants to capture Kupiansk and is throwing enormous forces into the fight. Those are Ukraine’s problems – the priority issues that should be leading every news bulletin. Every broadcast should start with them. Every state leader should be talking about them every day. And not just talking – not just "We heard such and such a report." They should be issuing orders that reach the troops at every level. And those orders must be part of a coordinated set of decisions.
"The head of the Office" – in quotation marks – is not supposed to be deciding anything. He must not and cannot have any powers to do so. Read the Constitution.
I agree with you. I do. There is no such structure in the Constitution. But let’s look at reality. It is not provided for, yet in practice it exists. Ukrainian voters have effectively given the current authorities this kind of mandate, and they are now acting as they see fit. So let us analyse reality, not just what outrages us or what should or should not be the case. You can see perfectly well that this is not some minor position and that it does not depend on the Constitution – this is the post where everything is decided.
What about Tatarov?
Friends, what can I say. Right now the main story is who will become head of the President’s Office, and how that person will later put their own apparatus in order will be a question for that new chief.
How do you assess Syrskyi’s performance? Why isn’t he putting pressure on the president? It feels as if he has disappeared from view and has little influence on the president.
Friends, to be honest, what is there to say? General Syrskyi really is not putting pressure on the president. In fact, generals have never put pressure on presidents. It is the president who, by decree, can appoint and dismiss them at any moment. So in the relationship between the president as Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, pressure from the bottom up is impossible. What is possible are joint actions. Those joint actions have to work, because it is from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief that certain strategic tasks are handed down, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces often has to carry them out. So the point is that people are not appointed to this position in order to be able to put pressure on the person who appointed them. You understand – the logic is different. That kind of pressure is impossible. That is why, back when Zaluzhnyi was being dismissed, I said: friends, what is the point? What will change in the relationship between the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces? This is not a matter of names. The system responds according to the tasks it is given. It does not depend on who holds the post.
Why have the heads of the Security Service (SBU), the State Bureau of Investigation and the Prosecutor General’s Office not been replaced?
I don’t think that will happen. Changes in power are currently taking place exclusively in the political sphere.
Whom would you like to see in this post?
The head of the President’s Office is the person who, over the past seven years, has been shaping the president’s policy line. It is for the president to decide who that should be. The situation at the front is difficult, and we need people who can concentrate efforts.
Do you believe Yermak could really leave power?
I don’t. Thanks to Yermak, many officials at all levels have come to power. So whether he will simply be dismissed is hard to say. It will depend on what NABU and SAPO do next.
Have there been any solutions against KABs and FABs over the past three years?
Yes, friends, we do have solutions – and not only against KABs and FABs. There are solutions for many military issues. But the topic of this stream is strategy. Our problem is not a lack of technical solutions – we have plenty of those. Our problem is not a lack of tactical solutions – we have many talented commanders. Our problem is strategy: ensuring that we concentrate our efforts, analyse our actions quickly, both the mistakes and the successes, scale up the successful practices across the whole front faster than the enemy does, and correct our shortcomings faster than the enemy can exploit them. That is what strategy in war means. I have talked about this dozens of times – after-action review, analysis after each engagement. And I hope that since both Palisa and Fedorov understand very well what after-action analysis is, we will see a head of the President’s Office who speaks the same language as those defending Ukraine, understands the same problems and is focused on finding solutions.
In my view, that is the kind of "wartime" head of the President’s Office we need now – so that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief can have a real grasp of the situation, and so that all of us can start addressing the urgent, critically acute problems at the front. Our situation is critically, acutely serious. If we do not take joint action quickly, friends, we may lose Zaporizhzhia; we may lose the whole of Donbas; if we do not move fast, we may lose Kharkiv Oblast. That depends on us. We have the capability to stop and defeat the Russian army. We have commanders who are capable of organising the army and carrying out rapid reforms. We have people, and we have resources. Yes, we do not have more resources than Russia, but we have enough for what? Not to march on Moscow. We have enough resources to eliminate 40,000 occupiers every month. Eliminating 40,000 occupiers a month makes any further advance impossible. The Russian offensive has to be stopped. That is our key strategic objective. We must build defensive lines where the enemy will simply die – and die in numbers that exceed Russia’s mobilisation capacity. Right now, that means eliminating 40,000 occupiers every month. Is that a realistic objective? It is. Do we have the capability to achieve it? We do. It is enough to say that last month we set a record: 25,000 enemy troops were hit by drones of all types. And that is only what was captured on video. In other words, halting the Russian offensive requires eliminating 40,000 enemy soldiers every month using all available means – in other words, at least another 10,000 on top of what we are doing now. Is this a realistic objective? It is. That is why we need rapid changes – and that is what we are waiting for.
Thank you for supporting the Butusov Plus channel. Thank you for supporting my unit, the strike UAV platoon of the Khartia Brigade. Thank you for your support and for not forgetting about us. We are doing what depends on us – just as every patriot of Ukraine is doing today. Thank you for being with us on this broadcast and, with faith in our victory, I want to proudly say: glory to Ukraine!
Yurii Butusov
