Yurii Butusov: Currently, global warfare experience is not working for us due to very low education level of leaders
Yurii Butusov on the Russian Federation’s strategy of permanent offensive, organizational problems within the Defense Forces, obstacles to army reforms, and more.
The "Khid Tuzova" project. The country must hear the voice of the military. Joining us is Yurii Butusov, commander of an unmanned systems platoon of the "Khartiia" Brigade, journalist, and editor-in-chief of Censor.NET. Yurii, I am pleased to welcome you on air.
Greetings.
You are in the Kharkiv sector. What is the situation regarding the enemy's attempts to assault our positions within your unit's area of responsibility?
Within the "Khartiia" Brigade's area of operation, we hold the tactical initiative. All enemy attempts to attack are repelled, leaving the adversary with no chance. Therefore, the situation in our sector is stable. Furthermore, as far as I am aware, the situation is generally stable across the entire defense zone of the "Khartiia" Second Corps.
What have you observed? Is the enemy changing tactics in any way compared to the winter season?
For us, the winter season has not really ended yet. In other words, it is effectively continuing, so to speak, in terms of the tactics being used on the battlefield. Winter is important for combat operations because it is the season when the leaves are completely gone, and the effectiveness of thermal imaging sensors on drones increases. So now, while the vegetation has not yet come in, everything has already started turning green, but it will take another week or two before the foliage covers the tree lines and the ground warms up. Then the conditions for combat work will change.
Yurii, could you assess whether there is a threat of the enemy preparing for a large-scale offensive?
The enemy has not stopped their offensive. Russia’s war strategy has remained unchanged since October 2023. The enemy is maintaining what I would call a permanent offensive. They conduct this permanent offensive through the actions of small infantry groups and individual soldiers. This tactic is intended to be applied across the widest possible frontline, as the strategy of this permanent offensive is to exert pressure everywhere simultaneously to undermine our ability to conduct rotations, maneuver forces, and so on. Therefore, this offensive has continued just as before. As for the enemy being stopped in the winter, it was simply because infantry in winter conditions, at low temperatures and without concealment in modern warfare with high drone density, is simply doomed to elimination.
What can you say about the state of the enemy army, based on any markers you observe for assessment?
I believe that the combat effectiveness of the Russian army is significantly declining, and the conditions for stopping the enemy are currently the best since the start of the war. The enemy is exhausted by their permanent offensive and demoralized by the increased density of our UAV units' operations, as well as improvements in their quality, both in terms of command and overall organization at the front. In principle, the adversary's active offensive operations continue only because, unfortunately, we have a significant number of frontline sectors facing certain problems in troop deployment, command organization, and coordination, primarily between infantry and drones, as well as with other support and supply units.
And in areas where these problems remain unresolved, the enemy can still creep forward. Looking at the overall situation, the Defense Forces of Ukraine are currently in a state where they can both stop the enemy and defeat them in essentially any sector of the front, provided there are competent corps- and brigade-level commanders capable of organizing command and control and employing flexible tactics.
And are these aforementioned problems related to the quality of unit command?
First and foremost, the problems are organizational. From these stem issues with command, deployment, and training.
This refers to the quality of training for the command staff as well.
Yurii, tell us more about Khartiia. How much has your perception of the brigade changed since you became a serviceman? And what do you see now?
I am often asked what has changed for me since I became a serviceman. Since I already spent most of my time with the troops, it is impossible to surprise me with anything after all these years; on many issues and situations, I have experience dating back to 2014 that most other servicemen simply do not have. I was perhaps only surprised by the fact that certain administrative and bureaucratic matters, decisions I expected to be much slower and more inconvenient, are resolved here quite quickly and without issues. In fact, regarding this small aspect of administration and dealing with army bureaucracy, I am always a pessimist, and in this case, it was a pessimism that proved unfounded.
I see, that’s good. In your opinion, could Khartiia serve as a certain prototype or even a model for other units?
I believe Khartiia is a model that can and should be scaled. However, since Ukraine lacks analytical work regarding the analysis of combat experience and conclusions, there is no strategic plan for further actions, deployment, or force generation, as so much is still built on initiative, I believe Ukraine needs to try to systematize and scale various models from different successful combat units, several corps, brigades, and regiments. This would allow for different methodologies to be selected and tested in combat conditions for various tasks and command structures. I believe there is much to learn from Khartiia, but we also have other units with their own combat experience and models for scaling that I find interesting as well. Therefore, I think Khartiia should have been a base for scaling. I hope the Khartiia Corps will finally be fully assembled with its brigades this year, which hasn't happened yet because we underestimate the role of army corps and the proper organization of command and control, unfortunately. This is our problem at the strategic level, and the enemy surpasses us in the organization of forces at the strategic level, and has done so before, as bitter as that is to admit. So this is one of the challenges, and I hope the Khartiia experience will be scaled.
And in this context, where do you see the advantages of Ukraine’s defence forces over the enemy?
First and foremost, it is motivation and intelligence. That is, Ukraine is waging a war, and behind the Ukrainian army stands Ukrainian society. But behind the Russian army, an army hired for 200,000 roubles, which charges into battle solely under duress and fights under duress, fearing execution, fearing torture and repression in Russia, behind it, behind the Russian army, stands only the Kremlin. And that is all. Therefore, of course, the motivation of conscious, committed people who are trying to apply their intellect to the fullest to secure victory on our side is incomparably greater than in Russia. This is our key advantage, and one of the factors behind this advantage is that in Ukraine, various successful models are being scaled up, including the organisation of troops, battalions, regiments, brigades, and corps. In other words, this is one of the reasons why we are more flexible. We are flexible because we are fighting for the survival of the Ukrainian nation and an independent state, and because Ukraine’s most intellectually gifted people are in the Defence Forces or actively support the Defence Forces. This is our advantage.
The topic of our assault regiments, which are expected to fulfill missions at any cost, is a complex one. Was there any reaction to your critical remarks, which were quite harsh and pointed, and your public statement? Did you face any backlash from the military command regarding this?
Let’s put it this way: officially, there was no reaction.
And unofficially?
There was a reaction, but since it was unofficial and I am a serviceman and an official, I do not consider it necessary to disclose unofficial matters concerning me personally at this time. I said what I said; regarding the substance of my remarks, I believe it is obvious to everyone that there is nothing to refute.
In your view, is there an alternative to old-style assault regiments at the current stage of the war?
I have said it before, and I will say it again: Ukraine needs assault regiments. Ukraine needs air assault brigades, corps, the Marine Corps, and assault brigades within the Ground Forces. We have assault brigades there as well. In principle, assault units exist within any combat-ready unit; they are either organic, ad hoc, or the entire unit is designated as an assault unit. Problems and criticism arise not because a unit is assault-oriented or performs assault missions. These missions must be carried out. Personally, as a volunteer, I have participated in four assault operations. I have an understanding of what that entails, directly from my own experience. Therefore, assaulting is necessary. The question is always how. How are people organized, how are they trained, how are they equipped, how are tasks assigned, what are the operational objectives, are they realistic, and is the tactic viable and successful for the given situation at a specific time and place? If everything is planned, if there is high-quality planning, then casualties in assault operations are, as a rule, significantly lower than during the defense of certain positions. However, when there are problems in planning and tasking, and absolutely unrealistic goals are set that cannot be achieved, that is when criticism arises. People criticize assault regiments simply because almost everyone dares to criticize a regiment. But most are afraid to criticize those who assign the tasks to those regiments. That is all.
Is it realistic to minimize the risks you outlined today? It requires having an appropriate number of personnel, including trained commanders, to set adequate tasks and have the capability to execute them.
An adequate commander is always a highly subjective concept. Objectively stating which commander is adequate and which is not is only possible after they execute a specific combat mission, followed by an objective analysis of the expended resources, personnel lost, casualties inflicted on the enemy, and territory gained, held, or lost. When an after-action review (AAR), a professional post-action analysis, and one of the basic standard operating procedures in NATO countries, is applied, only then, by analyzing the actions of specific commanders, especially over time, can you say that this person is productive, effective, and competent. Currently, it is impossible to establish this objectively in our country. One of the main problems of the Defense Forces of Ukraine is that we are moving toward NATO in words only. We have many political slogans about joining NATO. In reality, none of the key standard operating procedures for troop command and control used in NATO countries, nor NATO combat manuals, are applied in Ukraine. Ranks were renamed, and old Soviet official titles in headquarters were re-labeled in the Western style as S1, S2, S3. All of this exists, but there are no real structural changes that correspond to the principles and operational procedures of NATO forces. This is why the results are what they are, and why it is difficult to evaluate.
A good company commander who commanded competently can become a rather mediocre or even bad battalion commander, and an absolutely incompetent brigade commander. This could be because they may not have had enough time to learn in this position, draw conclusions, or because they acquired the wrong professional experience. Service in the army and war does not solely provide a positive experience. Everyone says that war provides combat experience. The real problem is that war provides not only positive combat experience, but negative combat experience as well. And this is also a problem. Therefore, if you want to stay ahead, if you want to improve the quality of command, you must introduce objective criteria for evaluating commanders. What worked, a commander and their methods that were effective a year ago, can become completely obsolete, incompetent, and harmful after a year of modern warfare. This means that action analysis must be continuous during an intensive war. Then you can maintain a database of competent commanders based on objective factors. At present, as far as I know, the team of the new Defense Minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, is trying to build exactly this "mathematics of war", analyzing the actions of unit commanders, brigade commanders, and corps commanders, to establish an evidence base for conclusions. This is opposed to relying on subjective opinions: that a certain person in military uniform has served a long time, is likable, was wounded, or participated in a specific battle in a specific role, and therefore can be trusted 100%. Life teaches us that people learn differently from one position to the next, acquire knowledge differently, and perform differently. This must be taken into account; it is a living process. People can make mistakes; they need to be corrected and worked with. This is the complexity of any personnel management, and especially so in the army during such a terrible, large-scale war.
What do you know, if anything, of course, about how fierce the resistance is to the attempt to form a new system? You just mentioned the new leadership of the Ministry of Defense and Mykhailo Fedorov. How significant a factor is this for driving appropriate changes?
I think that the approach itself, although we do not yet see such global changes, as they are only being announced so far, the approach itself, the concept presented by Fedorov in the Verkhovna Rada regarding the need for a "mathematics of war," accounting for all key indicators, and conducting an after-action review, is the right direction. This truly, in my opinion, has been, is, and will remain the key, unresolved problem of the Defense Forces throughout all 12 years of the war. Generals talk about it a lot but do nothing. Political leaders talk about it a lot, but do nothing.
I believe Fedorov is an ambitious enough person to try, and change something. We will see; I am waiting for the decisions.
By the way, this kind of conditional digitalization, where everything must be counted, and Fedorov also spoke about auditing our losses and implementing relevant protocols, which can be called NATO standards; these are action protocols during preparation, during combat, and what you called the after-action review, after combat, are they applied in Khartiia?
Yes, analysis is conducted, and many problems are discussed quite openly. Certainly, I cannot say that absolutely everything is perfect here, that everything is just super good. Serious problems exist everywhere, in every military unit, because times change and the adversary changes, and you must constantly be ready to solve new tasks. But such basic things as the after-action review are conducted, I see this. I personally participate in it, and it works the same way in my unit.
In your opinion, then, what might be hindering the introduction and execution of the respective protocols in the majority of units within the Defense Forces of Ukraine?
Well, first, there is simply a complete absence of any clearly defined goals indicating that the army needs to be reformed. No one here thinks about it, and it is of no interest to anyone among the decision-makers. No one wants to solve problems, that is first. Second, there is the cowardice of the leaders. They understand that they cannot competently organize and command troops on certain scales. They are simply afraid that any criticism or any mistakes will be used by politicians against them. And instead of learning from mistakes, this Soviet mentality, unfortunately, prevails in our Defense Forces. It is the Soviet approach—that any problems, any criticism, any shortcomings must be hushed up. Unfortunately, this mindset is ingrained in very many leaders on whom people's lives depend. It prevails, and they do not want to learn anything, do not want to change anything, and continue to wage war by guesswork, just as they were taught.
Do you have ideas on how to change this?
It is not my idea, in principle. People have been thinking about this for the last 2,000 years of military history, and the recipes are known to every country.
Yurii, you say yourself that the war is changing too quickly, and moreover, those decisions that were successful some time ago might even be harmful now.
Undoubtedly, and I am saying that this problem regarding the speed of personnel advancement in conflicts where everything changes—yes, this is one of the key problems in the defense organization of any country, in any war. And about this, of course, hundreds of thousands of prominent political and military figures worldwide have written a huge number of books, a vast amount of research, monographs, and recipes. The same problems existed and still exist in the US army, the UK army, the Israeli army, the German army, the Russian army, and the Soviet army. These are all known facts, and the recipes on how to build an army and promote these high-quality commanders all exist. There is only one question. Do the political leaders have the desire to change the army, the desire to conduct military reforms and utilize the experience that humanity has accumulated in warfare over 2,000 years? So far, unfortunately, global experience is not working for us due to the very low education level of the leaders. This is a problem of education, the low level of education among those people who are supposed to make the relevant decisions. For example, we are in the fifth year of the full-scale invasion, 12 years of war. The intelligence level of our generals who command... our troops still does not fight as part of army corps. You know, any person who has a military education, who at least reads books on the organization of military affairs, understands how absurd it is to deploy a million-strong army that lacks a stable force organization structure at the operational and strategic levels. We only have tactical units. At the moment, many army corps have been created in the country, but only one, the Third Army Corps, is deployed in full strength in its sector. Only one corps out of 18 altogether.
You know, why did this happen? Please excuse me for this question, perhaps it is amateurish.
Could it be because the Third Army Corps has a certain autonomy in leadership, and commanders have the authority to solve combat tasks as they consider rational? Or am I mistaken?
We are not talking about personalities right now. I want to tell you that someday, the world's military and political historians will analyze our war and say: Ukrainians at the strategic level were significantly inferior to the Russians and completely ignored all NATO manuals on force organization, ignored all military experience, and demonstrated a very low level, unfortunately, of competence at the strategic level of command. Unfortunately, any military historian will note this. And this is exactly how these people who are currently making decisions, lightly, thoughtlessly, will be remembered.
Can the implementation of a real corps system be practically enacted by the corresponding orders, so that there is no misunderstanding or sabotage, I don't know what to call it. Because, essentially, this reform has been discussed in Ukraine for a long time.
Of course, everything in the army must be determined by orders. There are no other options.
What is needed to change and adopt an appropriately effective system of troop command?
Political will, simply the desire to do it, and that is all.
Regarding politicians, do you follow what is happening at all? Particularly concerning the discussions about changes to the mobilization system. I am interested to know what you think on this topic.
I do not have the opportunity to follow all the discourse currently in the information space, as my time is quite limited. Regarding mobilization, I deal with it myself in principle, so, of course, issues of mobilization interest me.
What are your thoughts on the changes that need to be made?
Сomprehensive changes are needed, and they cannot be explained even in 30 minutes, and I think not even in an hour. What is needed is systemic action, not just on mobilization along the lines of: let us figure out how to send people from the street into the infantry so they do not fight back against the Territorial Recruitment Centers. That is what I now see as the subject of discussion, and it is presented in the media exclusively in those terms. In reality, we have a problem made up of several components: how to reduce the outflow of people from the army, how to reduce the number of non-combat losses, how to reduce combat losses, how to create incentives for people to return to duty after being wounded, and how to retain experienced personnel who, in the fifth year of the war, even the most resilient among them, are simply losing their health, trying to transfer to the rear or seeking discharge on legal grounds because service does not allow them to preserve their health, their families, or their lives. This is the problem that must be addressed first. Second, what audit do we have at all? What sources do we have for replenishing the troops? How much infantry do we need on the first line? How many replacements are needed for that infantry? Where can we get these people from? There are different sources. We need to look at how to reduce the burden so that we do not need such a large number of people as we do now. We cannot fight the way Russia does. For that, we need accounting: what exactly a given number of people are doing, how many infantry soldiers we have, in what situations we can reduce the presence of people on the battlefield, and how we can do that. This should include increasing the number of drones, both aerial and ground systems. It should include command-and-control systems and sensors. There are very, very many factors. And somewhere among them, one important factor is the recruitment of volunteers, the recruitment of foreigners, the recruitment of prisoners, and the return of AWOL personnel. And one of these issues, one out of 20 issues that should generally concern mobilization, is how to bring in by summons those who have not yet been covered, and how to account for everyone. In other words, there must be a comprehensive solution. The conditions for combat employment, force organization and training must be improved. These are comprehensive matters. The quality of working with personnel must be improved. There must be responsibility for a person from the moment someone approaches him and says: you must report to the Territorial Recruitment Center, you must receive your assignment, you have been mobilized. There must be responsibility from the first minute of contact with the army, responsibility for a person’s time in the army, and responsibility even after that person leaves the army. If there are comprehensive solutions and a large number of all these components are taken into account, there will be a result. If it simply comes down to PR, to how we can have fewer bad videos online of someone fighting with the Territorial Recruitment Center, if it is reduced exclusively to that information dimension, there will be no result.
By the way, using Khartiia as an example, how relevant is this same issue of AWOL for you?
AWOL exists in every military unit, in every subunit. It is impossible to avoid; people are all different, and mobilization is massive. There are very many reasons why a person goes AWOL. It is not always because of a bad commander or terrifying missions. Often, there are completely different domestic or personal reasons. And they account for a large portion, perhaps half, of all AWOL cases. Someone wants to rest, someone does not want to fight, someone is afraid, and you simply cannot convince them with words. For some, harmful habits begin to take control and overpower the person. Alcoholism, drug addiction, it could be anything. Some have illnesses. A person can have a million reasons why they say, "That's it, I don't want to." Therefore, in reality, this is a very systemic, continuous issue that changes a lot. And this must also be dealt with constantly, taking all risks into account. This does not mean that AWOL can be 100% defeated. Again, no one in any army during mass mobilization has managed to do this. AWOL cases and deserters were everywhere. Even in powerful democratic countries that won wars and even advanced against the enemy, there were still people who did not want to fight, who fled, and who committed crimes. The question is not whether this can be completely avoided, but rather how to minimize this problem. How to reduce it at every stage, for every cause of AWOL. Fewer offenses. This must be worked on and minimized compared to how it is happening now. It is entirely possible to reduce it multifold.
I cannot help but ask you about the financial issue. In your opinion, everyone knows what the base salary of a serviceman is. It is clear that there are extra payments, allowances, and combat pay, but overall, in your opinion, should the state focus, set priorities, and find resources and reserves to, first of all, begin by indexing the military salary and increasing the financial compensation for those in the Defense Forces of Ukraine?
I think so. If the state is interested in retaining people in the army for such a long time and attracting new ones, it is undoubtedly beneficial for it to increase the salaries of those people in the army who deliver results. Those who are in the shortest supply and bear the heaviest workload, primarily the infantry, should have the greatest opportunities for leave and the greatest opportunities for recovery. That means both the one who assaults and the one who holds the position. That is it. If you are in the infantry, you are number one. Next are those units located on the frontline in the kill zone. That is, UAV operators, first of all, and other combat support and combat service support units operating in the kill zone. Because there is a constant risk there. And then come the lower priorities. Money is needed everywhere. Undoubtedly, there is never as much money as you want for everyone. There must be prioritization. This is a kind of managerial work. It is difficult, important, and necessary. This must be worked on.
Prioritizing the financial issue, would it improve the situation with mobilization, in your opinion?
This is just one of the components. Mass mobilization has never been on a voluntary basis in any country in the world. Mobilization in the USA, mobilization in Great Britain during both the First and Second World Wars was mandatory, compulsory. Therefore, they initially started as volunteer-based and then transitioned to compulsory. But there are no other recipes.
And finally. Essentially, moving to the finale. Regarding your unit. You are the commander of an unmanned systems platoon. Regarding this battle in the sphere of new technologies, if one can call it that, of unmanned systems. Can we say that we are ahead of the enemy in this component?
We are ahead of the enemy in certain elements of UAV development. First of all, as I said, in motivation and intelligence. The flip side, the consequence of this advantage in intelligence and in the quality of the people fighting for Ukraine, including in such high-tech weaponry, is the advantage in developing certain technologies that create superiority on the battlefield, in employing specific types of drones, and in scaling positive combat experience. And all of this, taken as a whole, works in our favor.
Thank you. Motivation, drive, and proper organization are the key to success, but we have a lot of work to do with all these components.
