Foreign volunteers in Armed Forces of Ukraine: experience of deployment and current challenges in recruitment
Yurii Butusov, commander of the unmanned systems platoon of the "Khartiia" Brigade, answered questions about the course of the war in May 2026.
Our livestream is dedicated to the situation on the front line. I’d like to thank everyone who supports the ‘Butusov Plus’ channel for giving us this opportunity; it enables us to do our work, whilst also supporting my unit—a company of unmanned strike systems tasked with neutralising enemy UAV operators’ launch positions.
In short, we are currently witnessing an incredible situation: Russia, which promised to capture Ukraine in three days, is now offering Ukraine a two-day ceasefire so that Ukrainian drones do not bomb Russia for two days and do not prevent Putin from holding a parade. A parade at which Russia has no plans to display any military equipment at all this year. In other words, four years of war have passed, and in the fifth year, Russia is already asking: where is the equipment? Because the main equipment of the Russian army, which is currently most widely used on the front line, does not look particularly impressive for a parade. I mean, all these UAZs, jihad mobiles, which Putin uses to send cannon fodder into battle – they are now the backbone of the front line, along with Chinese golf buggies and electric bikes. Undoubtedly, Russia no longer has enough equipment to display at parades. Well, and we understand that Putin is afraid that at least one Ukrainian drone might fly into Red Square, and his embarrassment would be broadcast live. They decided, instead of a parade, simply to take a risk, as always, with that cannon fodder that is supposed to march. There’s plenty of it, so it’s no great loss, and in this way Russia is trying to avoid at least a political PR fiasco. We’re making a lot of ironic comments about this on social media. In Russia, Putin’s security is treated just like in any dictatorship.
From 5 to 9 May, work in Russia is severely restricted. In some regions, telephone and internet connections are regularly blocked. Thus, the ‘denazification’ Putin spoke of actually works only against the Russian Federation itself, where the ability of all these Z-bloggers and Telegram patriots to keep hyping up the war against Ukraine is already significantly curtailed. The war has reached their own homes, and now it turns out that it’s not so much fun, and sometimes impossible. Now they’re not only having Telegram cut off, but also, in principle, access to the hostile American internet itself. That’s the funny story.
Question
The Office of the President has raised the issue of recruiting foreigners. Have they been in touch with you, or have they simply just now voiced what you’ve been saying on air for months?
Yes, this is an important issue. On 5 May, the Head of the Office of the President, Kyrylo Budanov, made a statement that Ukraine needs a single coordination centre for recruiting foreigners into military service. The issue is more than relevant. Firstly, I will now talk about it in more detail, because I myself am quite actively involved in this process. And in my company, there are already more than 20 Latin American, Colombian and Argentine fighters, and a Spaniard has recently joined us. He’s a really great, highly motivated young man who served in the Spanish army as a paratrooper and decided to gain knowledge and experience of modern drone warfare, so he came to us.
Foreigners are the most pressing issue in the ‘Khartiia’ Corps. The entire command is dealing with this issue, and the 23rd Assault Regiment ‘Rukh’ has been specially created within the Second Corps of the ‘Khartiia’, where all the positions of assault infantrymen are held by foreign volunteers. Mostly from Latin America, in fact. Ukrainians, meanwhile, hold positions as UAV operators and in command, communications and fire support roles – in other words, Ukrainians are in these roles. I would like to say that in several assault operations, foreign volunteers – Colombians, Brazilians, Argentinians – are performing brilliantly and effectively, inflicting significant losses on the enemy and carrying out an incredible amount of combat work, completely replacing Ukrainians in all assault operations. Ukrainians are not taking part in the assault operations. And the operations are being conducted quite successfully under the command of the commander of this newly formed assault regiment, Captain Hamlet Avagen.
We are also supporting the actions of the 23rd Assault Regiment with our own unit, and I personally see how effectively the Colombian infantry operates on the ground. I think that right now the Colombians have some of the most effective combat units in Latin America, and here in Ukraine. The Colombians, and to a lesser extent the Brazilians. So, for me personally, this is a very personal story.
I would like to say that if you look at the statements made by our leaders and their actions, it is paradoxical that everyone is talking about bringing in foreigners. Statements on the need to involve foreigners have been made by all, without exception, of Ukraine’s top leaders. Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi, and also the Head of the President’s Office, Kyrylo Budanov. This process has been fully supported from the very beginning by Minister of Internal Affairs Ihor Klymenko, Commander of the National Guard Oleksandr Pivnenko, and Deputy Head of the President’s Office General Palisa. Everyone supported the creation of an assault regiment within the National Guard made up of foreign volunteers and signed the necessary documents.
However, I must now report that, despite such strong support, there is a certain lack of coordination at the middle management level. I am, of course, currently verifying this information. After all, the process of bringing foreigners into Ukraine is being blocked by a large number of various bureaucratic procedures, thereby effectively sabotaging the decisions adopted by the leadership of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s Headquarters.
In 2026, around 500 volunteers were brought into Ukraine, who are now part of the 23rd Assault Regiment ‘Khartiia’, and around 400 Latin American volunteers, who entered the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade via Zaporizhzhia and are serving there. That is all. The queue of such volunteers is only for us – only for the 23rd Assault Regiment ‘Khartiia’.
That’s over 1,200 people who say: "Ukrainians, give us tickets, help us with the paperwork, and we’ll fly out tomorrow to fight for you." We don’t need to round these people up on the streets, nor do we need to send Ukrainian taxpayers to do so. They fight under the same conditions as Ukrainian soldiers. They receive the same pay. Nevertheless, the process is moving very slowly.
I would like to say that there is some positive news today: thanks to the support and decisions of Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, with the assistance of the Ukrainian Armed Forces command, and thanks to the fact that from the very beginning the Ministry of Internal Affairs, led by Ihor Klymenko, provided budget funds to our account at the TCR, which brings in foreigners, the first 10 million hryvnias have been transferred. This is a major achievement and a huge undertaking. I am grateful to everyone who took part in this. I want to say that the pace of implementing decisions is very slow, given the critical situation we face with the people on the front line. I very much hope that this 10 million will be followed by a larger sum, so that we can at least bring in those who are currently in the queue and asking for help to get to the front to fight in an assault regiment.
Such people do exist. It turns out that for a salary of 3,000 dollars, in a world with a population of over 8 billion, you can find tens of thousands of people who, with proper organisation, management and leadership, are ready to take part in the war and defend Ukraine. No particularly exclusive conditions are required for this. Tickets, transfers, hotels, transport and delivery services – nothing is needed. Everything else is already provided for in Ukraine. We have plenty of vacancies for assault troops.
I hope that this will be considered at the next meeting of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s Headquarters, assessed, and measures taken to speed up what is, to put it mildly, the slow pace of our work. And this will be beneficial for everyone. To be honest, it is very strange that we have to convince everyone of this. It is simply unbelievable. Everyone is in favour. The regiment has been formed, there is support, all orders have been issued. They are not being carried out at the pace envisaged. This needs to be done.
So the first step, in the fifth month of 2026, has been taken, and it is encouraging. We hope there will be further steps and a faster pace. We hope that, after all, all the decision-makers will look at this situation from every angle and realise that we simply cannot afford to slow down any further. The summer battle has begun, and this battle requires motivated volunteers whom we know how to work with.
Why do you think sanctions were imposed on Bohdan? Why three years for Mindich and ten for Bohdan?
I don’t follow political events in detail. I believe, in general, that the issue of sanctions against Ukrainian citizens should be directly linked to criminal cases. I believe that imposing sanctions without criminal cases is a situation that simply fizzles out, comes to an end, and then we don’t understand the results. We have a large number of people against whom sanctions are imposed and then lifted. That is why I think the story is cyclical, and the people who use sanctions end up becoming victims of those very sanctions themselves a few years later. And I think that by opening this Pandora’s box, we will see many more interesting situations. To be frank, I would like to see less of this sort of political hype in these stories, and I hope that the exposure of Mindich’s recordings, the exposure of the facts that we have two Israeli citizens, as we heard there, Mindich and Tsukerman, influencing the decisions of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence and then fleeing from Ukraine to Israel. To be honest, this is complete nonsense, and I hope to see a resolution to this matter by the law enforcement and anti-corruption agencies as soon as possible. Because this is absolutely not a political issue; it is completely unacceptable during a war. Such actions are simply a blow to the army, when people, using powers of an unclear nature, make money and lobby for their personal interests using state funds that the state allocates and taxpayers pay for victory in the war, for the defenders of Ukraine.
Will all military personnel – both combat units and support units – really have their pay increased from June?
I have no reason to doubt this, because I have seen the statements from both the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Minister of Defence; they are quite clear. We’ll see what the outcome is, and which categories of military personnel will receive this pay rise. So far, what we’ve heard sounds promising.
Is it even possible for Ukraine to implement any kind of ceasefire? You know yourselves what a mess it was in terms of coordination between many units.
Why shouldn’t Ukraine agree to a ceasefire? If Russian troops cease fire and withdraw from our positions, moving away, then no one will fire on them; it’s enough for them to withdraw quickly and far away, and that’s it. I don’t see any problems on Ukraine’s side.
Is there a threat of a breakthrough to the Dnipro, or should we evacuate?
There is no threat of a Russian breakthrough to the Dnipro. The enemy is suffering heavy losses, and a fierce battle is currently underway on the borders of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, with every effort being made to prevent the enemy from reaching the Dnipro. Therefore, there is no cause for panic. I think everyone understands that letting the enemy into central Ukraine would mean our defeat. Both the Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia regions currently have sufficient numbers of our troops concentrated there to stop the enemy.
For five months we’ve been killing more than the Russians are mobilising – is it realistic to maintain this pace going forward?
To be honest, I’m sceptical about the estimates of enemy losses. Not all videos of strikes actually show the enemy being eliminated. If the enemy continues to advance, it means we’re not killing as many as they’re mobilising, but rather a little fewer. Otherwise, the enemy would simply have stopped advancing. I think that to stop the enemy, it is not enough to fight using drones alone. We see this on the front line. Drones alone cannot stop the enemy or ensure the destruction of all enemy infantry. The problem is that drones are not enough. Drones are a tool of high-tech warfare, of high-precision weaponry.
But we need a command structure on the battlefield. And, as I have said many times, responsibility and honesty must come first in war. Command decisions are adequate at the level of corps and brigades. There must be proper organisation. All these problems have not gone away. And it is the infantry that stops the enemy. And drones are the main means of fire support and striking the enemy. But in modern warfare, we need a combination of effective infantry operations and drones. So, if the infantry and drones work effectively together, if we reduce our losses – which, unfortunately, are also very significant. Smaller than the enemy’s, but very significant. If we reduce our losses, if we stop the enemy and build a solid line of defence, we will be able to impose our own pace of battle on the Russian army and dictate the rate of enemy casualties.
I believe it is entirely feasible to sustain the rate of losses in order to stop the enemy. I do not think we will be able to do this over the summer, because organisational and managerial decisions need to be made, and there is much to be done. We heard a statement today from the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi, that the second stage of corps reform will be completed in 2026. In other words, the corps will be fully formed, will occupy their designated areas, and the organisation of the troops will finally be streamlined. This has not yet happened, but we hope it will happen by the end of the year at the latest. And then, I am certain, we will be able to stop the enemy, provided the corps reform is carried out, provided the corps begin to receive regular reinforcements, and are able to plan their combat operations accordingly. Provided we increase the number of foreign troops, and the funds earmarked for drones actually reach the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. We will stabilise the front line and the Russian army will be defeated. At present, this is not even a technological or resource-related issue, but purely a managerial and organisational problem.
Can you already assess the results of the return of those soldiers who were in AWOL? Are they motivated, do they serve conscientiously, and do they carry out combat missions?
This is a very important issue. Most of the servicemen in my company are people who joined the ranks after the AWOL. I am in regular contact with the military law enforcement units. I am very grateful to them for their support. The Kharkiv Military Law Enforcement Service does a great deal to ensure that every motivated serviceman detained by the police or the TCR after AWOL, and against whom a criminal case has been opened (i.e. in the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations), can quickly and without hindrance join combat units. AWOL are the people who want to join us, whom we invite; approximately 70 per cent are high-quality, motivated citizens, excellent servicemen who learn quickly and who truly make a significant contribution to our successful operations, to the destruction of the enemy, to our drone strikes, to engineering reconnaissance and logistical support. An entire company relies on AWOL soldiers. The status of a AWOL is held by everyone, by the majority of servicemen, in their official capacity. So, the AWOL resource must be utilised. With the right approach, these people are combat-ready and effective. I very much hope that, as the Minister of Defence said, there will now be, from 1 June, a reform of mobilisation, including the regulation of the AWOL issue, and that there will also be a mechanism for the rapid deployment of AWOL servicemen into the ranks.
I want to say that I have some particularly painful cases. I have two AWOL servicemen who have been serving under me for nine months. And they still haven’t been officially enlisted due to problems with our investigative and judicial authorities. And all this time they haven’t been idle; they work every day on exactly the same footing as regular military personnel, who receive a salary and all social benefits, and live alongside us. So, what are we doing? We, and I personally, support these people. We collect money for them from our own salaries and from the donations that, thank you, you send to my fund and to the channel. We collect donations, we collect money for them every month for their work. Not as much as they could receive as regular staff, but we support them. And we provide for them just as we do for those on the payroll. We’re gradually bringing them in. Some people bring in quickly. We had one serviceman who was registered after two months of AWOL. It was simply a coincidence of circumstances, thanks to the Derhachi District Court of Kharkiv Oblast. And some people—two people, that is, I have over 60 former AWOL personnel, and two people who were on AWOL and have not been registered for nine months. So this is a serious problem.
You have to understand that AWOL varies. There is AWOL where a person simply ends up under the poor command of incompetent officers. Objectively speaking, that is a legitimate reason for AWOL. There are people who simply do not get proper rest. They are not given leave, they cannot recover, they lose their physical health, and they become demotivated. This is also a legitimate reason; a person needs to rest. But, of course, there are all sorts of people among the deserters, and we need to work with them. Just like in our society. There are those who are ill, there are people suffering from alcoholism, there are drug addicts; unfortunately, this is also a very dangerous category. There are people who genuinely do not want to serve, who want to shirk their duties and do not want to fulfil their obligations.
As far as I know, the Ministry of Defence is currently planning to implement a short-term phase for the return from AWOL. We’ll see how this is actually implemented. The question here also concerns the mechanism. We were just talking about Army Plus. Formally, we have an electronic transfer mechanism. But there’s a small detail stating that it’s only with the commander’s consent. This fine electronic ‘Army Plus’ has turned into a complete sham. Because as a commander, a commander naturally isn’t keen on anyone being transferred without his knowledge.
So there needs to be a different approach.
I have written and spoken about this many times: I believe that a person who has spent two years in combat roles in the army has the unconditional right to be transferred once a year to wherever they wish. They have already proven themselves in war. And they have the right to apply their high level of professionalism within a team that provides them with the best possible conditions for effective work, where they are respected, where they are given, perhaps, a more responsible, senior position and the opportunity to develop and fulfil their potential in war. I consider this normal, and it will resolve the issue of AWOL as a forced step simply to secure a transfer by any means.
Is there a threat of a breakthrough of the border in the north, the occupation of cities such as Shostka and Hlukhiv? Is a breakthrough via Bachivsk possible?
There is a lot of activity there at the moment. The enemy is trying to press forward wherever our organisation is weak, where there are problems with technical reconnaissance and striking the enemy with precision weapons; they are trying to creep in everywhere. Incidentally, regarding the question of increased activity, this is happening because, unfortunately, the enemy is currently mobilising slightly more than we are actually eliminating. That is why this is happening.
I don’t think any rapid breakthroughs are possible there, as they’d have to advance through the forests, and it’s also difficult for the enemy to advance through the forests. But they’re pressing because we’re weak there. If we strengthen the organisation of troop command there and provide reinforcements, I’m confident the enemy can be stopped there. So let’s see how the situation develops.
Why have you stopped criticising the actions of the commanders?
Because I am no longer a journalist; I am now an official myself, a military officer, with my own area of responsibility. If I criticise someone, it is no longer simply my opinion as a person, as an independent commentator, but my words carry the responsibility of a military officer. In other words, the information I provide is already official or may become official; it may form the basis for internal investigations. And whereas previously the response to official investigations was a journalist’s publication, now, if I have information, I must submit it through official channels—either to law enforcement agencies or to military command. And this requires very thorough, detailed documentation and a detailed examination of the subject.
I can now criticise actions in the areas where I am stationed, in the operations in which I am participating, and in those areas, my assessments must be backed by my responsibility and my understanding of the situation. I am currently in the sector, operating as part of the 2nd ‘Khartiia’ Corps, and in the areas where we are working, the enemy is not advancing a single step. Zero advances. The Second ‘Khartiia’ Corps has completely halted any enemy advance in its sector in the Kharkiv region. And the enemy is not advancing in our sector, and we have now been reinforced there. So, in our sector, the enemy is not advancing. That is why I have critical insights, of course, in any case, and specific analyses of combat operations; well, I convey them through official channels, and I am being heard. The results are visible on the Deepstate map.
Please comment on the situation and the new appointments in the 10th Corps.
I think you’re referring to the scandal that occurred in the 14th Brigade. I see a problem there, as I do throughout the army; I’ve spoken about this. The fact that our soldiers are deployed to positions for 200–300 days is a major problem. And the fact that they are stationed there without supplies is also a major problem, and this happens in many military units. Fortunately, not in ‘Khartiia’. We have troops, corps and brigades where commanders do not allow this to happen, where they withdraw personnel on time or provide them with supplies.
Why is this done? The Ministry of Defence has now introduced drone Mission Control. Every drone mission, every flight of every drone is recorded, logged in Delta, and monitored to track why it took off, where it went, what its task was, why it crashed, was shot down, suffered a technical failure, or returned successfully from the mission. All of this is recorded in Delta.
The same Mission Control is needed for people, for infantrymen carrying out tasks. Because they are similarly tracked within their brigade: where everyone is located with approximate coordinates, what position they are in, how much support these people receive, how many drones reach them, how many communication sessions they have, whether they can speak to their loved ones, how long they have been at their position, and when their rotation is scheduled. All this can easily be entered into Delta. And in fact, most of this data is already in Delta. It just needs to be monitored. And some indicators need to be added. Monitoring across the entire front line needs to be automated, just as e-points and drone Mission Control are calculated. Similarly, monitoring the lives of people on the front line needs to be automated.
This infantry Mission Control will rectify this situation, which, in reality, why does it arise? Because there is no planned supply of personnel to military units. There is no planning of responsibility for the defence lines. Constant personnel shuffling. Instead of bringing order to the brigades and battalions, brigade and battalion commanders are constantly being replaced in many units. And in some, on the contrary, no one is replaced at all, no matter what happens, no matter what trouble arises.
I know of one such brigade in the Kupiansk sector. No matter what happens, they don’t change anyone. They’re probably waiting for a scandal on YouTube. Unfortunately, this is the chaos we have; sometimes it’s present, sometimes it’s rectified. In the 14th Brigade, the relatives of these soldiers who were at their posts—their wives, their mothers, their friends—were starving. It was they who saved them and rectified the situation in the brigade, and saved these people’s lives. That is why I believe that, in our circumstances, this kind of public outcry from relatives and loved ones is an effective means of influence.
We need to increase our long-range firepower many times over, rather than holding every metre of ground and launching all sorts of counter-attacks. People are what matter, not territory.
It is impossible without holding territory; the war is being fought over territory.
What is the truth? Sometimes, indeed, we need to retreat; we do not have to fight to the death at every position. But such a necessity arises very rarely, and we must consider how to minimise our losses. The war is being fought for territory, and we must not think about how to retreat, but about organising a defence that will reduce the losses of our infantry and increase survivability at positions in the kill zone. And drastically increase the enemy’s losses. And the impact must not be limited to long-range strikes.
Drones must strike the enemy across the entire depth of their battle lines, right down to strategic depth. That is why we need to increase our drone capabilities. There is no such thing as a panacea – long-range drones. Those factories, burning so beautifully, will not stop the front. This is one factor in the pressure, increasing the rate of the enemy’s economic losses, weakening its resource base. But we must also take out assault troops on the front line; we must strike command posts in their immediate rear, in the operational zone, logistics hubs, and transport routes. Everything must be targeted. It is this systematic impact across the entire depth of the enemy’s formations that will lead to strategic victory in the war.
What are the chances of joining your unit after the AWOL?
If you send me a message after the broadcast, I’ll speak to you on the phone and we’ll find out what you’re capable of and what your motivation is. If you’re able to serve with us, and if you have an open criminal record, we’ll be happy to invite you and can accept you as early as tomorrow. I’ll be delighted if a motivated serviceman joins us. We need people. Just as everyone needs people in war. And we know how to work with people.
What lies ahead?
A very difficult summer battle awaits us now. A battle across the entire front. The enemy is undoubtedly trying to create some breakthrough areas. Their strategic plan is absolutely clear. The enemy needs to completely capture the Donbas. To do this, they want to roll up our front in the Kharkiv region from the north, advance on Lyman, advance on Sloviansk-Kramatorsk and head straight for Siversk from Lyman, and then break through the front at Pokrovsk, Dobropillia, Myrnohrad and Kostiantynivka. In other words, this is their strategic objective across the entire front: Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Sumy regions.
But we must understand that whilst the enemy creates strike sectors, its strategy is one of a permanent offensive and pressure across the entire front. Therefore, with a certain intensity, the enemy is constantly attempting to attack everywhere. And it concentrates its reserves in those sectors where our defences are weak, where there are organisational problems, a shortage of personnel, and a shortage of ammunition. And that is where they sense a weakness. In other words, this pressure across the entire front allows the enemy to identify sectors where its infantry advance – so-called infiltration – is most effective. Where the enemy is being destroyed, it does not venture in. It realises that breaking through there would be too costly. The enemy is looking for weak spots. And the task for this summer campaign, to win it, to prevent the enemy from building on their success, to prevent them from seeping through our battle lines under the cover of greenery and warm earth, to evade our drones – this requires systematic, constant changes and flexibility.
I hope that such decisions can be made. Because we can see, after all, that the advantage of Ukrainian democratic society over the Russian one does, after all, influence the war. Russia is not that flexible. In Russia, everything repeats itself and the authorities do not allow changes to be implemented quickly. Russia scales up very well, it organises very well and has an advantage over us at the strategic level of organisational management. But Russia lacks flexibility; it does not know how to adapt. Because it is a totalitarian state and the relationships that exist there are more important than any combat effectiveness. And if, as was stated this year, we do not have any infighting within the government, and we implement at least the basic measures that the entire front line is talking about—everyone who is fighting—if there are significant changes to ensure that we recruit as many foreigners as possible, rather than looking for people on the streets. If our technical units are expanded and provided with resources, money and personnel, we will certainly be able to defeat the enemy. This is now obvious to everyone. Even Putin himself acknowledges this and is asking Ukraine for a ceasefire. That is why we can achieve a result. And I want to say that today, more than ever, I am confident of our victory.
Thank you all for your support, and thank you to all the sponsors of the ‘ButusovPlus’ channel. We are able to carry out our work thanks to you, and we are able to support my company thanks to you as well. Thank you for the airtime, and glory to Ukraine!
