Drapatyi must act immediately: Butusov on critical situation in Donbas
During the livestream, Yurii Butusov, commander of a UAV company in the 23rd Assault Regiment of the Khartiia 2nd Corps of the National Guard, discussed problems in the work of the new leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the challenges now facing the new Commander-in-Chief Mykhailo Drapatyi, and the situation on the front line.
As a rule, I avoid making broad generalisations about sectors of the front where I am not personally involved in combat operations. But the situation on the front is now critical. Today, I intend to focus primarily on the situation in Donbas and the Zaporizhzhia region. We will also discuss what is happening in the Kharkiv region. But my friends and a large number of military commanders at various levels are reacting very emotionally to what is now happening in Donbas. This is particularly true of the situation in Kostiantynivka and near Sloviansk, Druzhkivka, and Dobropillia. This is a genuine crisis on the front.
I want to explain its significance and what is happening now. If we look at what is happening on the front, primarily in Donbas, this is the greatest challenge we have faced during the war. The situation is completely unstable and completely out of control, and it requires swift decisions. This is the view of combat commanders who command respect within the military and with whom I speak almost every day. The enemy has advanced very close to Sloviansk. It is effectively on the outskirts of Sloviansk. The Sloviansk-Kramatorsk urban agglomeration is the key to Donbas. It is the main gateway. It is a natural defensive line separating Donbas from Slobozhanshchyna and enabling an effective defence to be organised. At present, it is the main and most advantageous natural defensive line available to us. It is an urban agglomeration well suited for defence, where we can genuinely halt the Russian offensive.
Fighting is now taking place near the village of Mykolaivka. Mykolaivka, as everyone knows, is a suburb of Sloviansk. East of Mykolaivka are two forests near Rai-Oleksandrivka. One well-known woodland is the Chobitok tract. This forest constitutes commanding ground. The forest effectively commands the high ground overlooking the eastern outskirts of Sloviansk. If the enemy deploys UAV positions in this forest, it will be able to block our logistics, meaning that active manoeuvre operations using Sloviansk as a base will become impossible. The enemy is already carrying out massive strikes. Control of Chobitok forest will allow the enemy to take control of Mykolaivka and virtually block our logistics in the city. I think everyone understands that if the enemy, which already has an advantage in aviation and artillery, also gains a tactical advantage by deploying UAV positions, it will be able to leverage its numerical superiority in this sector. Therefore, the fighting for these forests on the approaches to Sloviansk is of crucial operational as well as tactical importance.
So where do we stand, and what is the major problem? The major problem is that there are currently no swift, systemic decisions in this sector that could genuinely stabilise the defence. I am not raising this now because I have nothing else to do. In fact, we have an enormous amount of work in the Kharkiv region. Intense combat operations take place every day. I am saying this because the fate of Donbas is one of Ukraine’s strategic priorities. The fate of Donbas – the defence of its last defensive line, the strategically vital Sloviansk-Kramatorsk urban agglomeration is central to the strategy of this war. If the enemy succeeds in capturing Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, and if it succeeds in capturing the commanding heights overlooking them, we will lose this key area. We will lose Donbas completely. Completely.
What would the loss of Donbas mean for Ukraine? The loss of the Luhansk region and the loss of almost the entire Donetsk region. It would mean that the enemy would want to and would commit every force available to capture Zaporizhzhia. Why? To declare that the objectives of the "special military operation" had been achieved. All the territories that Putin decided to incorporate into Russia would have been captured. For Russia, this would provide a basis for forcing Ukraine to capitulate and for showing the European Union – those countries where parties with strong pro-Russian sympathies are in power – that Ukraine must be brought to the negotiating table. Putin has reached the borders; now Ukraine must negotiate to avoid being destroyed. Let us force Ukraine to accept these terms.
Putin has effectively fulfilled the demands set out in the objectives of his "special military operation" regarding the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. He is fighting for the commanding heights overlooking Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. If we lose the battle in these sectors, the subsequent defence of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk will be an act of heroism, perhaps a prolonged one, but the tactical advantages will shift to the enemy. We cannot allow that to happen. These tactical episodes, the struggle for these minor terrain features, could have major operational and strategic consequences and become a means of exerting pressure on the political position of our entire country. Therefore, I believe that swift decisions are now needed to stabilise the situation in the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk sector.
I must also state my position on this matter. This is my personal opinion. At present, I see only one swift decision that could improve command and organisation. A force grouping should be established to defend the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk urban agglomeration. I would also include Druzhkivka and what remains under our control in Kostiantynivka within this grouping’s sector and place the grouping under the command of Third Army Corps commander Andrii Biletskyi. Biletskyi has demonstrated what he can do: he holds a 130-kilometre sector. He managed to stabilise the front in that sector when it was collapsing. He halted the enemy’s advance towards Lyman. He significantly improved our positions on the Lyman and Oskil fronts. Over three years, the corps has not lost a single position; on the contrary, it has improved its positions and advanced. Apart from the Third Assault Brigade, all the other brigades in the corps are regular infantry. They are ordinary formations, by no means elite. The corps commander made them combat-effective. The corps defending Sloviansk and Kramatorsk is currently directly adjacent to the flank of the Third Army Corps. I propose simply expanding its area of responsibility, entrusting Andrii Biletskyi with organising the defence of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, and subordinating the neighbouring corps’ brigades and troops to him. This would give the Third Corps the ability to manoeuvre its forces and redeploy some combat-effective units, including assault and UAV units, to defend Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. They could stabilise the situation there just as these forces stabilised the Third Corps’ sector, which stretches from Borova to Lyman, a broad section of the front.
The main problem in this war is not that we are critically short of personnel, weapons, or resources. It is the organisation and management of personnel and resources. That is the key problem. The Third Corps command is capable of addressing it. I believe that at this stage of the war, in its fifth year, forces should be consolidated and reinforced around this command to avert extremely grave, catastrophic political consequences. I am compelled to speak about this because, in my view, it is currently the greatest challenge and the main problem facing the new military-political leadership of Ukraine’s Defence Forces.
I strongly urge Mykhailo Drapatyi, if he is willing to take note of my words, to consider this course of action, which is in fact one of the options he has already considered. What is needed in this case is will, determination, and an order. Sloviansk and Kramatorsk cannot be defended effectively through ad hoc micromanagement and amid chaos. Chaos has allowed the enemy to reach the outskirts of Sloviansk. Enough playing games; this is an entirely different matter.
The loss of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk would be Drapatyi’s personal responsibility. The blame could not be shifted onto any of his predecessors. Does Mykhailo Vasylovych, with his distinguished record, want to go down in history as the Commander-in-Chief under whom the enemy captured Sloviansk and Kramatorsk? I do not think that is a risk worth taking. A long military career, the respect of the people, the respect of society. But events like these can severely damage any reputation and legacy. Command must be improved specifically at the operational level. And this must be done immediately.
I mentioned a force grouping for a reason: it should take control not only of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk sector but also of the situation in Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka. The situation in Kostiantynivka is, without exaggeration, critical. There has been considerable criticism of the 425th Skelia Assault Regiment, which was created by Drapatyi’s predecessor, Oleksandr Syrskyi. The Skelia Battalion was expanded to regimental strength and provided with personnel and resources. Drapatyi has now replaced the regiment’s commander, relieving the previous commander and appointing a new one. The situation in Kostiantynivka is so critical that the city is now being held by Skelia assault battalions. Not all of them, of course, but they are holding it. Some Skelia units are not conducting assault operations but defending Kostiantynivka. The situation there is so difficult that only units with very strict organisation and discipline can conduct organised and effective combat operations. Skelia has therefore been deployed to defend the last remaining lines in Kostiantynivka. The situation is extremely difficult and requires swift, effective, and competent decisions because the enemy has advanced deep around the flanks and is effectively threatening to outflank our units in Kostiantynivka. The enemy has reached the outskirts of Druzhkivka. We need competent, responsible, and systematic command throughout this entire sector because these units are among the best and most combat-effective in our army.
Therefore, to save Donbas, I am warning now that unless these decisions are made, the consequences could be extremely grave in the near future. I hope the country’s leadership will assess the situation objectively, examine how far the enemy has advanced, which heights it has reached, and what consequences this threatens to bring. Swift decisions will then be made in response to the situation. In my view, this is now the main challenge facing Mykhailo Drapatyi. He has had a distinguished career in the Defence Forces, but what is now expected of him are unpopular decisions – not popularity on Facebook, press conferences, applause, or ratings. He must now hold specific defensive lines. The defence of these lines depends on him personally. Their loss would be his personal responsibility – a profound responsibility before the entire Ukrainian people and before history. That is precisely why I am speaking about it. Otherwise, of course, I would not have drawn so much attention to this issue, but the situation is so threatening that it must be addressed.
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
What is the situation in Kupiansk?
Heavy fighting is taking place near Kupiansk, and the enemy is trying to break into the city. Nevertheless, the Khartiia Corps under the command of Colonel Obolienskyi is now operating there. As for our situation, we are not retreating. Let me put it this way: wherever Khartiia has deployed, the enemy has been unable to advance.
As for further action, there have been no critical breakthroughs there that we cannot contain, so the situation remains under our control. I hope that, just as command in Donbas needs to be strengthened, command in the Kharkiv region will also be strengthened in due course. I believe that command structures with the resources to stabilise the front and fight the enemy effectively should be expanded. Their areas of responsibility should also be expanded, including in the Kharkiv region.
Yurii, how do you assess the subordination of Skelia to the Azov Corps?
I believe this is a sound decision that has yet to be fully implemented. At present, part of the Skelia Regiment is operationally subordinated to the First Azov Corps of the National Guard. Overall, if the entire regiment is subordinated to the corps and employed appropriately, I would view this extremely positively. I would remind you that ever since assault regiments began to be formed in early 2025, I have said dozens of times in my broadcasts and in writing that there is one main reason why these regiments suffer such heavy losses, including personnel listed as missing in action, and why troops are simply afraid of these assaults. It is because, if these regiments were subordinated to army corps, they would operate within their respective sectors, have proper coordination and clear accountability, and their losses would be reduced severalfold compared with the current practice of shuttling them around and scattering them across the entire front without preparation, coordination, or planning. This is the main reason why assault regiments suffer such heavy losses. Losses in war can be reduced primarily through high-quality planning, organisation, and command. These are the main factors. The outcome of a battle depends first and foremost on the commander and the work of the staff. If a battle is incompetently planned, no matter how heroic the troops may be, they will struggle to salvage it on their own. In today’s drone warfare, infantry will simply be unable to advance. This entire practice of shuttling assault regiments from one sector to another to plug gaps everywhere must end. It is an absurd and inept approach. Every assault regiment should operate within a corps sector.
The entire concept of these rapid-reaction commands is an utterly inept approach. It deeply frustrates me that Ukraine is taking completely illogical, unjustified, and militarily unsound steps. We are proliferating administrative command structures instead of simply subordinating each assault regiment to a different army corps, avoiding unnecessary activity, bloated support staffs, and unnecessary general officer posts.
What should people in Zaporizhzhia expect?
The enemy will continue its offensive. The situation is extremely difficult for the people of Zaporizhzhia. Zaporizhzhia is a front-line city that has suffered greatly. Ukraine is doing a great deal to ensure that the Defence Forces can protect the city. But the enemy will continue to attack, strike, and devastate it. Regrettably, this is because, for Russia, capturing the territories that Putin has declared to be constitutionally part of Russia forms the basis of its negotiating position. They understand that if they reach by force the borders they have defined as Russia’s constitutional territory, they will gain serious arguments and leverage to force Ukraine into peace negotiations on terms that are as disadvantageous to us as possible. They will then tell the international community: "We have now captured part of Ukraine, so agree to peace; otherwise, we will advance further and declare Kyiv, for example, part of our constitutional territory." This threat of coercion is serious and must not be underestimated. The European front among our Western partners is fragile. We all know and see this.
What are our realistic chances in this war?
We have a very real chance of halting the Russian offensive. The Russian army is not currently demonstrating anything insurmountable. Even this summer, as it inches forward, it is struggling to advance.
What went wrong in the Zaporizhzhia sector, and why did the enemy advance to within 20 kilometres of Zaporizhzhia?
Because systemic problems in troop command went unresolved, and instead of methodical, systematic work, the enemy continued pushing our forces back. As a result, we lost Huliaipole. Through heroic actions, we are now merely trying to push the enemy slightly farther away from the city. And by heroic actions, I mean the counteroffensive that has been so widely lauded in recent days.
Let me put it this way: the enemy has advanced to within 20–25 kilometres of the city, yet our news coverage is filled with optimism. Yesterday, I heard the Commander-in-Chief say that we had liberated almost 800, 745 square kilometres there. I even called all the commanders in that sector. I said: "At that rate, we should probably have retaken Velyka Novosilka by now." But no, the enemy, unfortunately, controls Huliaipole. It continues its attacks. We did manage to recapture some of the land seized by the enemy, but we have not regained most of the territory it captured during its offensive from Velyka Novosilka towards Huliaipole. Unfortunately, we have not regained it. There are therefore no grounds for optimism. What is needed there is realism. There are sufficient forces in the Zaporizhzhia sector to defend the city. The local authorities are helping the military in every way they can, and our soldiers are fighting there. Many of the very best formations of Ukraine’s Defence Forces are currently deployed there, including the Air Assault Forces, the Ground Forces, and assault regiments, which are doing everything possible to prevent the enemy from reaching the city. And there are prospects for success.
That is why I am saying that Zaporizhzhia is one of the challenges facing Drapatyi, but it is Donbas where the situation is critical and requires immediate decisions.
Drapatyi inherited Kostiantynivka, already outflanked, from Syrskyi.
Yes, but he is now the Commander-in-Chief, and it is Mykhailo Vasylovych who holds that position. We expect decisions from him. He is the one who must act. It is his responsibility. He has already been in office for almost a month, by the way. That is why we are appealing to him and counting on flexible and swift decisions. If we delay, the consequences will be extremely grave.
Is Ukraine prepared for the orc force to increase to 500,000 troops?
Russia itself is not prepared to mobilise 500,000 people. I think it needs mobilisation, but it simply does not have enough weapons to equip that many people. Mobilisation would also hit its economy extremely hard. Russia is doing everything possible to avoid it. We shall see. Let us deal with problems as they arise. At present, the enemy is advancing. The problem for us is that it is advancing even without conducting mobilisation. For now, let us address the problem of halting the offensive being conducted by Russia’s contract army, and then we will deal with mobilisation as well.
Do you consider it appropriate and rational to give up the remainder of the Donetsk region to stop the war?
I would call that a rather naive approach to politics. Politics does not work that way. This is not a marketplace where you can say: "Let me sell you part of my land, give part of it to you, and you promise not to rob me again." That is not how you negotiate with a criminal, is it? Here is the negotiation: a criminal has put a gun to your head and is negotiating with you to make you hand over everything and bring him even more from your home. But can you reach an agreement with him? An agreement becomes possible only when the enemy understands that stealing from you by force would cost him far more than going home.
Thank you. With faith in victory. Glory to Ukraine!
