"Show me company commander who doesn’t have ’pit’ for ’avatars’," - Company Commander Semen Salatenko
Semen Salatenko, commander of the 21st SMB’s motorized infantry battalion, believes that the Ukrainian army needs systemic reform, not yet another reshuffling of leadership. The military officer speaks of the need for military justice, effective accountability mechanisms, and the retention of experienced fighters, and warns that a potential "freeze" on the war without resolving key issues will become a trap for Ukraine.
– Hello everyone, you’re watching the Butusov Plus channel. My name is Iryna Romaliiska. Today we’re joined here in Kyiv by Semen Salatenko, commander of a motorised infantry battalion. Semen, thank you once again for agreeing to speak to us.
– I’m on leave.
– Let me remind our viewers that today is the 18th, and we’re meeting in Kyiv. In fact, let’s start with that. A new Minister of Defence is expected to be appointed any moment now – perhaps today, or perhaps tomorrow. People with placards have gathered once again outside the Verkhovna Rada. What are your expectations? What sort of appointment do you anticipate?
– There’s a wider problem. Let’s call it ‘Bolshevisation’. Every cook dreams of running the country. Can they run the country? It’s Lenin’s principle. Just as we had so many ‘experts’ at first in football, then in the fight against Covid. Now everyone’s an expert in military affairs. We have the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the President of Ukraine. Whether we like him or not, he is our commander. He has the right to appoint someone. He appoints them. The task facing this person is simple: to sort out what all their predecessors failed to manage, including the one people are marching against with placards. And they must do so quickly, because we are at war; we have no time to spare – time is measured in weeks. To build a new system within the Armed Forces. Unfortunately, the previous leadership – and we must admit this – failed to build such a system. And, unfortunately, the previous leadership – as I wrote on my Facebook page…
– Are you referring to Fedorov now?
– Yes. did not understand the essence of the Armed Forces. I’m not saying that Fedorov is a bad minister, a bad manager or a bad IT specialist. But to successfully manage any system and carry out reforms, one must understand its essence. Unfortunately, the previous leadership did not understand the essence of the Armed Forces. And so, from a civilian’s point of view, they proposed the right things, but from the point of view of, for example, me as a military officer, they proposed quite controversial measures.
– What sort of things?
– What is valuable in the Armed Forces? People. What sort of people? If we look at it from the perspective of IT specialists. There’s an IT specialist. If he leaves, we train a new one. In wartime, it’s practically impossible to train a new top-class specialist. For example, I started fighting in 2014. I served in a volunteer battalion for a year and a half. Then a short break, a civil service post, then the Armed Forces: soldier, junior sergeant, squad leader, assault platoon commander, company commander, battalion commander. I’ve been a battalion commander for almost four years now, and spent three years as a company commander, platoon commander and squad leader. All this time, I’ve been involved in combat operations. High-intensity, low-intensity, and full-scale operations. I trained in the US and was wounded. What needs to be done to find someone like me to take my place? With the same experience. I’m not saying I’m the best. There are far better than me, because I’m not a career soldier either. But in order to train someone, you need to find a person who will fight for eight years, gain combat experience and be able to replace me if, for example, I’m killed. Or if I retire, or my contract ends. Unfortunately, the main point of these contracts that were in place is that the main perk is not having to serve in the army. And that’s wrong. The army’s most important task is to retain its specialists. Because recruiting new assault troops – Colombians, Ukrainians, Nigerians – isn’t a problem. Training them isn’t a problem either. But who will lead them? Sergeants.
– So, in your view, this reform he’s proposed regarding the new contracts isn’t acceptable?
– In my view, it might be all right. They haven’t presented it in its entirety. Either present it in full, or don’t present it at all. The value of the army lies in experienced people who know how to fight. That’s what enabled us to hold our ground in 2022. There was a large cohort of people who knew how to fight. Yes, the issue of terms of service and discharge from the Armed Forces needs to be addressed. But that’s one thing.
Secondly, what about those people who do not want to leave? It should be: if you want to leave, you leave; if you want to serve, here you go. Or, if you’ve served from 2014 to 2022, here’s your health insurance, housing loans, education for your children, and cash bonuses. In other words, this contract has put people who joined yesterday on an equal footing with those who joined from 2022 onwards. But for those who’ve been there since 2014, this is unfair. And we’ve got plenty of good examples to draw on. Take the US Army, for instance; we could easily adopt US Army contracts and adapt them to our own experience. In other words, the longer a person serves – not just in terms of calendar years, but how much training they’ve completed. How does it work there? Well, it’s based on how much training they’ve completed, their knowledge of foreign languages, where they’ve served, which combat operations they’ve taken part in, whether they’ve participated or not, and to what extent. All of this can be calculated.
Otherwise, we’ll simply have to wait until everyone has signed new contracts, hold off on the offensive for two years, and then, in two years’ time, when everyone has been discharged, we’ll launch the offensive again. Even now, with the same pay. A soldier is holed up in a foxhole. To be frank – and I tell my own soldiers this – for them, death is a ‘drop’. For a soldier standing a little further back, it’s an FPV. For me, death is a KAB. For the brigade command post, death is an Iskander. Everyone is at almost the same risk. It’s just that the means of destruction are different. An older, 56-year-old soldier with limited fitness – a mobilised tractor driver standing on a road 15 kilometres from the front line, shooting down FPV drones – may sometimes be in greater danger than an assault soldier. This is because an assault soldier’s task is to go in, clear the area, and come out; or, for a reinforcement group, to go in, find cover, and take cover. And whilst a well-trained, reasonably intelligent soldier will immediately dig in, take cover, and be protected from above by unmanned aerial vehicles, the person holding the logistics corridor has no such protection. They engage the drone one-on-one. And in our system, it is assessed as follows: if you’re not on
the front line, then you’re on the second line. And you don’t get 170, you get 30,000. Or, for example, a fuel tanker driver – it’s not as if the Russians are hunting down our fuel tankers like we do – or a driver who evacuates the wounded or transports soldiers.
And every time he goes out, it’s just as much of an assault. It’s just that he hasn’t fired at anyone, but he still has to drive 20 km to reach the front line, and another 20 km back. And not everyone makes it back. We criticise ‘Skelia’ and its commanders for their brutality, but the army is held together by discipline. What is difficult for a civilian to understand is an axiom for a military.
For example, whilst in the United States, I took part in the Leader Forge training programme. All officers of the United States Army took part, all with combat experience. Most were Rangers or members of elite units in the US Army. Nearly 200 people. Almost every year, someone dies during these trials. And we even had a moment when one of our soldiers nearly died. We thought he was dead. Well, fortunately, he was pulled out of the swamp, taken to an ambulance and saved. Every day, young, fit officers with combat experience have to perform ‘do or die’ exercises. And some even die, but thanks to this we have combat-ready soldiers.
– Well, of course, that’s not what we’re talking about, Semen.
– What is it about, then?
– It’s about the fact that there are cases where soldiers bully other soldiers. Cases of bullying must be investigated, and people must be punished if it is indeed bullying.
– Right. Let’s take an example. A group is being assembled for a strike and search operation. It’s an important, delicate and dangerous mission. Six soldiers are selected. They’re briefed on the task. They’re briefed on the route. Positions. What are they supposed to do? A briefing takes place. The six soldiers hear all this, familiarise themselves with the details, are given the relevant maps and so on. Communication equipment. They board the vehicles to travel to the drop-off point and then on to carry out the mission. During this, one of the soldiers feigns a heart attack.
– How are we going to sort this out?
– It’s simple. There’s a medical evacuation team nearby.
– Are you referring to a specific incident?
– A specific case. The soldier is taken to the stabilisation point, where they perform an electrocardiogram on him; he’s fine. He’s a malingerer. Realising he’s faking it, the soldier tries to escape to the AWOL.
What do you do as a commander? If the man escapes to the AWOL, there’s nothing you can do. The law forbids you from taking any action against him. But then the other five, or seven, or ten soldiers will be at risk. We don’t know what was going on. We can’t read his mind. Why did he suddenly agree to everything, and then want to escape? He got scared. Could he, excuse me, be an enemy agent? Could the details of this route end up in the enemy’s hands tomorrow? He knows everything. What should the commander do? The commander must isolate this soldier. Correct? For the duration of the mission.
– Hand him over to the Military Law Enfocement Service.
– But we don’t have one. We don’t. And the Military Law Enfocement Service won’t be able to do anything here, because the soldier isn’t technically breaking any rules. He isn’t drunk; he isn’t an alcoholic. We have neither a guardhouse nor disciplinary battalions anywhere. What do we have? What does the commander do? The commander locks such a soldier up. And that, excuse me, is a criminal offence. It is the unlawful detention of a person and deprivation of liberty.
– I understand your position. That’s not just your position; it’s the reality, isn’t it? But when people are killed, when they’re beaten, and people die.
– We need to distinguish between cases. Firstly, there must be a system of military justice: a military police force capable of conducting a professional investigation; a military prosecutor’s office; a military court; and disciplinary battalions, and so on.
– Because civilians cannot: a) gain access to the scene of the investigation, b) do not know...
– By the way, I can give you an example. I was a company commander at the time. A young officer joined the company, the unit. This was many years ago. During an argument with a soldier – let’s say, a veteran. Those soldiers, under the influence of certain substances – alcohol, drugs – killed this officer. They killed him. And then they thought, ‘Well, the company commander sent this platoon commander to us. Let’s kill the company commander too.’ To do this, they staged an attack on their own observation post and called the company commander, claiming that the occupiers were breaking in. The company commander arrived at the company post, and whilst he was there, they tried to kill him. If, say, whilst detaining these soldiers, the company commander were, for example, unable to disarm them himself, or with the help of his men – that is, without firing a shot – and were forced to engage them in combat because they’d already killed one officer, the company commander would be imprisoned. Well, the company commander arrives, they point an automatic rifle at him and say, ‘We’re going to kill you right now.’ The company commander raises his own automatic rifle first and shoots at the soldier.
– Well, of course, I see your point.
– Look, there should be a military police force to investigate all the facts. What happened, how it happened – everything. The problem is that those scoundrels weren’t jailed. The Mariupol court heard the case, but look at the state of Mariupol now.
– But we’re talking about something else here, in ‘Skelia’. And again, I don’t want to—under no circumstances—I am not talking about the whole of ‘Skelia’ or the whole army, but here the evidence…
– When criticising one system, even a deeply corrupt one, we must propose an alternative. You can’t beat a soldier – I agree – you can’t torture a soldier.
– Let’s put it this way: you mustn’t torture, you mustn’t kill.
– That’s a given. But instead, to ensure such incidents don’t happen, and to prevent these incidents from being exploited, there needs to be a military police force capable of determining what actually happened. Was it deliberate infliction of bodily harm? Or, for example, could a sergeant have injured himself? Sometimes you get these unhinged characters turning up, and you have to defend yourself against them. It’s not you hitting them, it’s them hitting you. Or was it, for example, an attempt to desert, or to seize a weapon? All of this needs to be investigated. And only then should conclusions be drawn.
– I see. And you’re saying there should be a military police force. But what sort of military police do we have at the moment?
– In effect, there isn’t one. There are no investigative activities. We effectively have no detention facilities. They mainly just hold members of the AWOL there.
– So the body exists, but it lacks sufficient powers and, in your view, is not functioning properly.
– It’s virtually impossible to imprison someone for desertion here. Well, apart from the fact that we’re constantly granting them all sorts of amnesties. I’ve had service personnel turn up who had eight attempts at desertion on their record. What’s more, most of these attempts – if not all of them – occurred when the person wasn’t even in combat, let alone having reached the front line. They ran away from training centres. There was a mechanic; they brought in an old bloke, gave him a spanner and told him, ‘Tighten the nuts – you’re a mechanic, you’re not going on any assaults.’ And yet they still run away. What responsibility do these people have? None. Refusal to carry out an order. What responsibility? None. For example, three soldiers are manning a position; two decide to run away. They run away, and to ensure the third one cannot contact the commander and report that he’s been left alone—and so that they can escape—they even take his radio, stealing it from him. The two of them run away, whilst that soldier dies. What is the liability of these two when they’re caught?
– Well, we have from five to ten cases of AWOL. Or are you suggesting once again
that in practice this doesn’t work?
– I am not aware of any cases where a person has been imprisoned for desertion, for absence without leave, for failing to carry out an order, or for actions that have led to serious consequences. This applies to both soldiers and commanders. The introduction of a system of military justice, disciplinary and penal battalions, the military police, the military prosecutor’s office, a military court,
and a military tribunal. This is not merely a means for a commander to punish his disobedient soldiers. It is also a means for soldiers to defend themselves against a bad commander. Show me just one battalion commander who does not have a pit for avatars. Let the commander who has no pit for avatars be the first to cast a stone at me. We lack a system of military punishments. ‘A legionary must fear the centurion’s rod more than the enemy’s sword.’ We have the enemy’s swords, we have the centurion, but we have no rod.
In condemning ‘Skelia’, we must provide the Armed Forces with an effective means of enforcement, because our army is still a volunteer force. Our soldiers are volunteers, and it is volunteers who carry out combat missions, because there is effectively no other way to compel them. A legally protected method. And the absence of this legally protected method means a commander cannot compel a soldier to carry out an order, because people may die. An evacuation team that fails to go and retrieve a wounded soldier is effectively signing that soldier’s death warrant. And what is a commander supposed to do with these people, since they bear no responsibility? They have refused.
I’ve only just had one such refuser taken away – it’s already reached the stage of criminal proceedings. I’m sorry, we’ve been struggling with this for three months.
– So there is a possibility...
– Excuse me, that’s three months of running around. He’s been through three MMCs. The investigator wouldn’t accept the documents because he complained of knee problems. But he has no problems with his knees.
– And what did he refuse to do?
– Going to a position. And it led to serious consequences right in the middle of it all.
– So there is a mechanism, but it’s incredibly complicated.
– I’m talking about an effective mechanism. Unfortunately, there’s no effective mechanism for enforcement. A soldier refused to go out; a wounded man died because they couldn’t reach him. Such a negligent soldier. It was only thanks to a stroke of luck that none of the three medical commissions found any abnormalities in this soldier. He’s like some sort of cosmonaut. So that they could pin at least something on him, because the investigator simply doesn’t want to deal with it; the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) doesn't care. He has absolutely no motivation to do this; he isn’t in charge of the unit, he isn’t responsible for combat missions. He isn’t responsible for the mental and psychological state of the other soldiers. So the other soldiers see, ‘Blimey, they didn’t take him away and he died.’ What on earth is going on?
– Second question. The second investigation. I don’t want to go into the details. I just want to discuss one part of it. Ania Kaliuzhna mentioned another regiment. That there are ‘barrier detachments’ there. Have you encountered anything like that on the front line? How do you assess this in general? As someone with your incredible experience.
– I’ve come across the 225th. There was an incident where three soldiers… I’d just taken command of the battalion. Four soldiers from the 225th were surrounded at their position.
– Were you standing right next to them?
– They were carrying out assault missions. The missions weren’t particularly successful. Four soldiers found themselves surrounded. They were holding their positions. We had to clear a corridor to get them out of there. I know nothing about blocking detachments. I’m talking about the incident I’m familiar with. Goodness, it was the hardest month of my life. My company commander – I think he was the deputy battalion commander – along with a whole bunch of the 225th, were simply holed up at the command post until I cleared a corridor for them and my fighters got those people out.
I don’t know what Anna Kaliuzhna has dug up. Because what I saw, and what Anna Kaliuzhna and one battalion commander—whose name I won’t mention—wrote, looks more like hysteria. Over the course of that month, both Shyriaev himself and many others said: ‘These are our people; we’re not abandoning them.’ Well, if there were a system of blocking detachments… From the perspective of people who are out there shooting everyone and everything. But just ordinary people, well, they’re just sitting in their positions and waiting. Food is being dropped to them from drones – no, get our people out. We won’t abandon our people. We won’t leave our people behind. These are our people.
– So you haven’t come across this sort of practice with blocking detachments?
– No, I haven’t. But…
– It’s always the ‘but’ that’s the most interesting...
– I just had a personal experience where a whole company withdrew from their position and ran in the opposite direction to the enemy.
– How many people were there?
– Enough. I was forced to run out to meet them myself, rounding them up wherever they were. Dragging them back to their position by the ear. That wasn’t in this brigade.
– You can’t just shoot them. We’re talking about different things back then, you know.
– If there’s a case of murder, it must be investigated and the people punished. That’s murder. If a commander ran into a landing, gave someone a tug by the ear and said: ‘Right, run to your positions, follow me.’
That’s something completely different. Although both scenarios could be portrayed as a blocking detachment. Sometimes it’s not the battalion commander doing it; sometimes it’s a group of senior sergeants who run about, kicking some people or slapping others to drive them back. During such desertions from positions, friendly fire very often occurs, when not-so-bright soldiers scatter and end up in the positions of their comrades, who see a figure with a weapon approaching and shoot at him.
– Well, in this particular case, there was also a specific audio recording in which Shyriaev speaks.
– Shyriaev says that any movement in the space between positions is enemy movement. Therefore, anyone moving in that space is to be eliminated. This isn’t a barrier detachment. What does a barrier detachment have to do with it? And how does enemy infiltration take place? They move in the space between positions.
– Quote from the audio recording: Commander, attention: regarding ‘our own’ – I remind you, there are no ‘our own’. There is specifically a request via radio permission to move; everything else is the enemy. Anyone fleeing from their position is a deserter – are also the enemy. Fire on ‘our own’ and on those fleeing is not authorised.
– Look, I’ll say it again, I witnessed the events; these are just words – words can be taken out of context.
– Right, Shyrshyn, says the commander standing nearby...
– Excuse me, this is hysteria. There are more questions for Shyrshyn himself.
– I’ll just say to our viewers here that Shyrshyn is the commander who was standing next to Shiriaev, and he says that his own men were also shot.
– I apologise, they weren’t shot there, but shelled by artillery. Look, I’m woken up by my duty officers shouting. Excuse me, why are your duty officers shouting, Commander? You should be resting, as your deputy is on duty at the command post. Or there’s the system of battle captains, who must either make the decision themselves or wake you up. Shouting – what sort of service is that? Secondly, we can see a group of infantry moving along a route. Excuse me, but any unidentified group of infantry in our rear is an enemy group. Because what should a proper battalion commander do? He should request a round-up of all positions. Either all positions are in contact with him, or he has no contact with them. In that case, the question is for the battalion commander and his staff. To the battalion chief of staff. To his communications officer. Why is he not in contact with the positions? Position ‘Rose’ is not on the line. At Position ‘Rose’, three of our soldiers are on the move, three. The receiver is picked up – ‘Hello, Brigade Commander.’ The first thing the commander must do is report the situation. That means not getting into an argument with the sergeant. Who’s there on 225, Brigade Commander? I have the following situation: three soldiers are out of contact at such-and-such a position. Most likely they’ve deserted. We can see three heat signatures in the rear, moving off in that direction. It is now up to the brigade commander to contact 225, the regimental commander and the battalion commander to say: ‘Hold on, these are our men’, or ‘We have no confirmation that these are our men’.
I could give you plenty of examples. The enemy always moves more confidently in our rear than we do. So if they weren’t moving quite right over there, it doesn’t add up. One such enemy group, which was mistaken for our own, calmly entered a village where groups of brigade pilots were hiding in cellars, and began calmly clearing out one cellar after another. Just like that. Well, they might have been our own, but it turned out they weren’t. The only thing that saved the day was that a group heading towards the infantry positions came across them; they clashed, a battle ensued, and that group was wiped out. Otherwise, the entire brigade would have been left completely without its unmanned systems battalion, because, you see, they were moving – well, presumably our own men. No, everyone must understand these situations. Servicemen are manning their positions. There is constant communication with these positions. Consequently, these positions must be monitored. If people are leaving these positions, the commander must know this and understand it. The company command post must be located behind this position. The company commander, or the company sergeant major, or one of the sergeants must go out to meet this group, stop them, turn them round and bring them back to the position. Perhaps even take up a position there with them. If the company commander cannot do this, the deputy battalion commander must do so. If the deputy battalion commander cannot do this, I myself did so three times last summer, "by the ear"—everyone follow me.
– Understood. I’d like to address Oleksandr Shyrshyn and Oleh Shyriaev once more: I’m expecting both of you for an interview on Butusov Plus. I contacted Oleksandr and Oleh separately, in person; both declined, but we’d be happy to hear your side of the story and discuss it with you.
– Well, the most important thing is this: after his group was wiped out – and he was certain it was his group – following the report from his senior commander. Commander, what should a battalion commander do? Take a pen, a piece of paper, and write a report, stating the following: whilst the group in question was withdrawing, representatives of such-and-such a unit opened fire on them, despite the fact that we had identified these fighters as our own. I request that measures be taken, a criminal case be opened, the matter be referred to the State Bureau of Investigation, and so on. If he is a witness to a crime.
– I’ll say it again: I’d be more than happy to speak to Oleksandr, but Oleksandr, if you’re watching, please do feel free to get in touch; I’ll write again.
– I’ve read his post. It’s very emotional.
– Let’s move on. There was another high-profile case that caused quite a stir. The story involving Unit 155, where the investigation accuses the battalion commander of sending his men to the village where his wife lived to abduct and kill two civilians. I believe one of them was a veteran, because they were riding noisily through the village on a motorbike.
– The army is a cross-section of society. All sorts of people end up in the army. A heroic battalion commander doesn’t necessarily mean he’s a good person in real life. And vice versa. Firstly, there hasn’t been a trial yet. The court may determine whether he is guilty or not. After all, he is a brigade commander, for better or worse. There have been crimes of various kinds in the army before. But during wartime, to ensure this does not become a tool of enemy propaganda, the matter must be handled more delicately. This does not mean that these people should be acquitted. These people must serve their sentences.
– And what does ‘more delicately’ mean?
– Less fuss in the press.
– Are the journalists to blame?
– The one who ordered the killing of two civilians is to blame. Because this is the murder of civilians. That’s who’s to blame. And his guilt must be established by a court. Let me repeat. ‘Skelia’ regiment consists, I believe, of 15 battalions. There are 15, 18 or 20 thousand people there. Out of 15, 18 or 20 thousand people, there’s always going to be a percentage of criminals, people with deviant behaviour. Point your finger at any brigade or regiment. We’ve forgotten a lot.
– I see. But I spoke to the authors of all three investigations. To Katya Lykhohliad, to Ania, and to Diana Butsko. And all three of them told me that, before going public with this, they tried to take a different route. To alert the General Staff to what was happening, and so on. But nothing happened.
– The military justice system – we’ve spoken about this before. The Military Prosecutor’s Office – if only these journalists’ complaint had been lodged with the Military Prosecutor’s Office. The Military Prosecutor’s Office would have quietly summoned this brigade commander. If the facts had been confirmed, they would have conducted an investigation, arrested him and imprisoned him. A military tribunal would have convicted him.
– Of course. It just really gets to me when journalists are blamed in such cases. We went through this at the start of our war, in 2014 or 2015, when there was the ‘Tornado’ company. And there was a debate within the journalistic community about whether it was worth talking about the horrors committed by the ‘Tornado’ company? And some people – I won’t name names right now– decided that no, we shouldn’t, because it would undermine trust in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and, well, in the volunteers and so on. And it ended up with yet another body; his murder hasn’t been proven, because they either didn’t find him there or couldn’t identify him – I can’t remember which.
– I’m not a lawyer or a prosecutor.
– I got worked up because you’re saying it’s all down to the fuss in the press.
– During wartime, the primary objective is the truth. We are fighting an existential battle. If we lose, an entire nation will cease to exist. The enemy is extremely insidious, cunning, intelligent and very dangerous. After all, it is the second-strongest army in the world. These are, if you’ll pardon the expression, the successors to the KGB and the Bolsheviks, who were highly skilled in psychological operations. We lost the two attempts to fight them in the last century – which cost us millions of lives – precisely because of information and psychological operations. The Ukrainian People’s Republic lost because the Bolsheviks managed to convince the people that there was no need to fight for their own country, that it was better to be draft dodgers or to switch sides to the Reds. Semen Kharitonovych Bezus, after whom I was named, thought the same. He was released sometime in the 1950s. He took part in what we call the liberation struggle or the civil war, because he believed that the Red regime wasn’t all that bad. Well, over the course of 30 years, they set him straight. And I might never have been born. It was simply a stroke of luck that he managed to survive 30 years in the camps.
Then the OUN-UPA lost the second phase of the liberation struggle partly because the Bolsheviks, the Ministry of State Security and the Communist Party managed to convince the Ukrainian nation that, having failed to defeat fascism, there was no point in fighting for their own state, that they could come to terms with communism and become Soviet citizens. It was more to their advantage. Otherwise, there are bandits running about in the woods, throwing schoolteachers down wells or shooting machine operators who, for some reason, were sent from the Donbas. It’s not clear, mind you, why. If we don’t show a certain degree of wisdom and tact, we’ll lose this war too. Then the Ukrainian nation will disappear. And in this case, the truth is a good thing. This is the choice in war between bad and very bad.
– You’re simply saying that publicising such cases will stoke certain fears. But what about the silence, when word spreads by word of mouth about what’s happening at ‘Skelia’? And because of this, people are afraid and say: ‘They’re not telling us the truth either; the media are keeping quiet.’ I realise there’s no clear-cut answer here.
– So now you’re the commander. Now it’s your choice between bad and very bad. So, how do you go about being a commander?
– Yes, it’s a very complex discussion. It seems to me that there’s no obvious answer.
– The obvious ones are the journalists, the public, and the military. The military cannot operate outside the system; they cannot make any demands. They operate within the rules that have been laid down for them. And that needs to be understood. The military will never demand anything. And you cannot blame the military – whether it’s Syrskyi or others – for acting this way. They operate within the system that has been created for them. They are given tasks, and they carry them out. Create a different system, and they will exist within that different system. That is why we are talking about placards and journalists. Do not demand the minister’s surname. What difference does it make who the minister is? Demand a change to the system. And not just a change of commander-in-chief. There is no particular difference in the commander-in-chief either. Take Serhii Sobko, for example. A fine chap.
– I have a question about that. We’ll get round to Sobko.
– Even a military genius within the system won’t achieve anything if the right conditions aren’t created for him. And so, let’s put it this way: here’s the task for you, your challenge.
– So, the civilians. It seems to me that those people standing there with their placards want, first and foremost, to change the system. And perhaps you simply need to meet up and have a chat.
– I’ll say it again: we’re the military; we can’t just have a chat. We’ll end up back in 2017. We’re at war; we have to win it. Before the Toretsk campaign, I used to put my men through their paces at night in the fields under drone surveillance. A system of trenches had been dug out in the field. I drove them through this system of trenches, teaching them to navigate at night using the ‘bird’—the drone. I sat there myself; a mini-command post had been set up in the vehicle. I sat there, with the company commander at first, then the platoon commander, sitting beside me. And every night they were in charge. ‘Go left, go right’ – that’s how they learnt to operate the drone. Because in reality, it’s not that easy. ‘Go left, go right.’ But at night, when you can’t see a thing, when you can’t use a torch, when there don't have even night-vision devices, for example. That’s how they taught people to find their way around at night. Consequently, people didn’t sleep; they were put through their paces every night, tormented every night. There was discontent. Then it so happened that the battalion found itself surrounded in a certain position. We had to get the men out. In accordance with orders. We were getting the men out of the encirclement. The enemy had already captured our radio stations. They knew we were coming. They were waiting for us. This was in Toretsk, in the built-up area of the city. We had to march several kilometres through territory occupied by the enemy, leading the men at night, using radios that the enemy could hear and landmarks that the enemy knew. Because they already had our prisoners and our radios. And we got everyone out. Over the course of three days, we got everyone out without any casualties. Precisely because one commander was a ‘butcher and a scoundrel’ – cruel to his own men, who he drilled by making them run across the fields at night.
– Brigadier General Serhii Sobko, whom I’ve already mentioned, became Drapatyi’s deputy.
– Just think back to two years ago, in 2023, I think, when all the news programmes were airing General Sobko’s dirty laundry. Everyone has forgotten. For us, it takes only a moment to go from hero to anti-hero.
Brigadier General Sobko is one of the brightest minds in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. He studied in the United States three or four times. I personally saw a plaque with his name on it at Benning; he was still a captain back then. He was completing the same courses as me, only at a higher level. He was already a lieutenant when he graduated as a captain. That was in 2008 or 2009. His academic paper, ‘Armoured Forces in Hybrid Warfare’, was used as the basis for the reform of their armoured forces at that time, in 2019–2020, or perhaps 2021. They put it into practice. Naturally, it was incorporated into that charter. I actually met him whilst I was studying at the academy, even before he became my brigade commander. A prime example of a highly effective leader.
– "I read loads of books, I know loads of languages"—that’s what you wrote on your Facebook page. You wrote about him with such enthusiasm.
– A second lieutenant. He’s doing a take-off and landing course. Three months. He becomes a company commander. This isn’t a war. What does a brigade commander do when he sees that a young officer is drowning? He turns up at the company command post. He grabs this young officer by the ear.
– You… Sobko…
– And he gives him a telling-off. Yes, yes, yes. And for a whole week, even though he was a brigade commander, he’d come to the company commander. On his own. He’d give him a telling-off. On how to fight. That’s why I say he taught me how to fight. And then I even had to pass an exam set by him.
– Did you pass? Just like in the States.
– If I hadn’t passed, I wouldn’t be a company commander or a battalion commander.
– Listen, I’d also like to say to our viewers: I’ve refreshed my memory, and I advise you – if you’ve seen it, to refresh your memory too; if you haven’t, then go and watch the interview straight away – it’s a brilliant interview that Yurii Bytusov recorded with Semen six years ago, and it tells a lot about how Semen trained in the States. I found it absolutely fascinating; I’m absolutely thrilled.
There’s a question my mum always asks me: ‘When will the war end?’
– We need to realise that this war didn’t start in 2022, or even in 2014. And it won’t end in the coming years. What’s more, we should be worried that it might turn into an ATO-style conflict. In other words, it’s set to go on for a long time.
The Russian offensive will stop, and there’ll be a ceasefire – the one everyone’s so eagerly awaiting. I don’t know why you’re so keen on it. And then there’ll just be periodic shelling of Kyiv and drone strikes. Some bloke called Semen Salatenko got it wrong. A missile strike. That's how it went with Saddam Hussein until the Americans dropped their bombs. We’ll run to our Western friends and partners. Our Western friends and partners will say...
– Call a UN meeting...
– I’ll shout, condemn, say, ‘Don’t escalate.’ And here, as if to make matters worse, we'll end up with some—for heaven's sake—2014 government. We could have started a war over Crimea. We could also have handed out weapons to people on the streets from lorries, said, ‘Everyone onto the train – off to Crimea.’ There would have been bloodshed. But perhaps it would all have stopped there. Instead, we ran to our friends and partners. Our friends and partners had their say. Then they started negotiating with the aggressor. First them, then us, or us together. And then somehow it all faded from memory. Yet it never actually stopped. Shelling continued, people were dying. And then it all erupted into an offensive. When the enemy decided it was strong enough to win. And this ‘freeze’ is actually a trap. But the problem is that there won’t be peace as before – like on 9 May – and it won’t all be over any time soon either.
That’s why we must be ready to fight, because, unfortunately, the whole Western world has entered an era of turbulence. If our allies had been resolute enough in 2022–2023 and allowed us to win, back when there was a chance to do so and Crimea was still within our reach.
This might have deterred many scoundrels and dictators around the world from thinking, ‘Oh dear, you simply cannot do that.’ But the drone war, first and foremost, coupled with the impunity of Russian evil – even the freeze – has convinced these scoundrel dictators that the primary weapon, one that even Western technology is no match for, is drones: they’re very cheap, easy to obtain, and require no special resources. All you need to do is head to the Chinese or Russian market. Everything is available there. There are whole plants churning out these kamikaze drones or FPV drones. And secondly, you’ll get away with it. Fight for five years; the main thing is not to give up. And then they’ll even sign a peace treaty with you on your terms. That’s bad. Impunity for evil breeds great calamity.
– I hope that one day this evil will be punished.
– We mustn’t just hope; we must take action.
Society must realise, just as it did in 2022, that there is no turning back for us; the only way is forward. Everything for the front, everything for victory. We must all forget all the squabbles, all the scandals, all the internal strife, and work only towards the future, because our lives and those of everyone we know depend on it. Because even if Ukraine were to fall as a state, all the other countries of Europe would be next. And believe me, this is much closer to the truth than even I can imagine.
– Semen, thank you very much. Semen Salatenko was our guest. Please give us a like; my name is Iryna Romaliiska. You’re watching the Butusov Plus channel. See you soon.
