Yurii Butusov: on front line, foreign nationals, ’Svoboda’ and problems facing Armed Forces of Ukraine
In a live broadcast, Yurii Butusov, commander of the UAV company of the 23rd Assault Regiment within the National Guard’s 2nd Corps "Khartiia," analyzes the new challenges of modern warfare, the course of combat operations on the front lines, and personnel decisions made by General Mykhailo Drapatyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
We’ve had a few rather intense combat missions. Let’s now discuss the current situation on the front line. What is happening is causing great concern. There are a great many questions concerning the situation on the front line, and our efforts to tackle corruption, which is one of the biggest problems. Suffice it to say that even the former Minister of Defence, Mykhailo Fedorov, stated that corruption is one of the factors preventing Ukraine from winning.
We have learnt new facts about a whole network of civil servants who, during the war, are lining their own pockets with money to buy Franck Muller watches, jewellery and simply countless flats. It is simply beyond belief that people are capable of such things and that these people are also citizens of our country. They, too, say: ‘Glory to Ukraine!’ They place their hand on their heart and swear to do everything for the sake of Ukraine. Well, it feels as though we really are living in different worlds, even though we seem to be walking on the same earth.
Answers to questions
What is your view on Trump’s latest statement that we are creating a global diesel crisis? And he asked Zelenskyy not to target Russian oil.
Everything Trump says is driven solely by domestic politics. In America right now, preparations are once again underway for the autumn elections – yet another election campaign. And as part of this campaign, Trump staged a show called ‘I’m inviting everyone to peace again’. Kushner and Witkoff travelled from Moscow to Kyiv, thereby simply demonstrating that Trump hasn’t forgotten about Ukraine and that he has some sort of peace initiatives. Well, in reality, it was just a pre-election stunt. That’s obvious. Trump is not taking any concrete steps that would force Putin to make peace. What do ‘steps’ mean? They mean blocking Russian maritime trade. Here, on the contrary, Trump made an exception for Russian oil exports, meaning he didn’t put any pressure on Putin at all. And secondly – supplying Ukraine with weapons or funding the war. Here, too, Trump has not allocated any additional funding. So how does he intend to influence Putin, apart from negotiations and these televised statements?
This statement by Trump is an attempt to place the blame for the continuation of the war squarely on Ukraine itself.
He claims that Ukraine is causing a global diesel crisis. This is coming from the very person responsible for the ongoing blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and the constant Iranian attacks on tankers. Yet America itself is also blocking Iranian tankers and detaining them at sea. These statements are completely incomparable.
Well, we realise that Trump has long since, in his rhetoric, evidently crossed the line between diplomacy and telling such sad jokes that, in reality, amuse no one. It’s all a game, a political game ahead of the elections. And I wouldn’t take US policy towards Ukraine seriously at the moment, as it consists mainly of statements and lacks any concrete action.
Will resolving the issue of the ‘Svoboda’ battalion’s redeployment become a new challenge? Has the ‘Svoboda’ battalion been formally incorporated into the 23rd Regiment?
Yes, there is a decision by the command of the Second Corps of the National Guard stating that the ‘Svoboda’ battalion is to be incorporated into the 23rd Assault Regiment of the R.U.G. as a drone systems battalion. I can confirm that this decision has been taken at this stage. And a large number of "Svoboda" servicemen have already been transferred to the ranks of this battalion. Nevertheless, the entire battalion is not being transferred. What can I say? In other words, some of the fighters are already there. Some were held back to carry out a mission as part of the National Guard’s 1st Corps, "Azov", in the Pokrovsk direction.
How can this be explained? Well, to be honest, I don’t know; there is absolutely no sound logic behind these actions. I think these are simply emotional moves of a purely political nature. And one gets the impression that the command of the First ‘Azov’ Corps is not paying attention to this issue. Perhaps Denys Prokopenko is not fully aware of the situation regarding the ‘Svoboda’ battalion. Perhaps he is either not being briefed, or he does not have the time to look into it, and he simply does not know that the battalion under his command has been performing its duties – its combat duties – with great dignity and to a high standard, holding the line. This battalion has not received any reinforcements from the First Corps for a long time and, to be honest, has long been in need of redeployment, as stipulated by the order. And to hold back this battalion, which has fought so honourably and bravely and where there are almost no combat-ready infantrymen left – what is the point of this?
Why is the order not being carried out? I hope it is simply a lack of information on the part of the command of the First Corps of the National Guard that is preventing these obvious measures from being taken. And this must be done, at the very least, out of respect for the fighters of the ‘Svoboda’ battalion, who have faithfully carried out all orders. Well, now that the battalion has already suffered significant losses and is running out of men, why keep this unit on the front line? What’s the point? A significant number have already been redeployed. Why is this being done? Is this some sort of game? Is someone just playing around?
I hope that Denys Prokopenko, Hero of Ukraine, Brigadier General and a man of great respect, will look into the situation within his corps and simply take note of this matter, which looks very sad indeed. Personally, I get the impression that some commanders simply do not pay attention to the soldiers under their command. I wonder who it is in the First Corps who isn’t paying attention to the soldiers of the ‘Svoboda’ battalion and isn’t allowing them to reorganise properly, rest and begin carrying out their duties in their new capacity – as the unmanned systems battalion of the 23rd Assault Regiment.
Tomorrow is Tank Crewman’s Day. I’d be interested to hear your thoughts: wouldn’t it make more sense to switch them to drones?
Drones should be part of every branch of the armed forces. Of course, all equipment must be compatible with drones, but in reality, tanks and armoured vehicles have by no means lost their significance on the battlefield. What has lost its significance is the tactical approach to their use that was previously associated with tanks. It was precisely for this tactical approach that armoured vehicles were developed and deployed. What does this mean? Tanks were the primary means of breaking through enemy lines. In other words, their task was to advance to direct firing range, suppress all visible firing positions with fire, and facilitate the dismounting and deployment in combat formations of infantry fighting vehicles and other armoured vehicles transporting troops.
We can now see that the situation in the war has changed radically. The role of tanks has not diminished; they have not lost their significance. And now, in order to be able to rapidly deploy assault groups to their positions, armoured vehicles are needed. This is absolutely unavoidable. And now we need tanks and other armoured vehicles on the battlefield, both for troop deployment and for evacuation, as well as for delivering ammunition. But these must be vehicles of a different class, capable of ensuring survivability in conditions of massive use of high-precision weapons and, first and foremost, drones.
In other words, there is no longer any need to deploy massive 125 mm or 120 mm guns to the battlefield. What is required now is precision, manoeuvrability and speed. And all these tasks of engaging infantry and attacking cover can be carried out by other types of combat vehicles – that is, tanks, but with smaller-calibre guns, greater manoeuvrability and higher speed, which provide better protection against the main threats – namely drones – and which will be easier to repair and less vulnerable to landmine explosions.
Perhaps this should be specialised assault armoured vehicles, both wheeled and tracked, which will carry out various specialised tasks. The first is the delivery of assault groups, and the second is fire support to cover assault groups against the main threat, from drones and enemy infantry.
Thus, tanks and armoured vehicles remain essential on the battlefield, but these must be different types of armoured vehicles, of a different class, which will clearly meet the tactical requirements currently present on the battlefield, be designed to fulfil these tasks, and possess the necessary survivability. So, in reality, armoured vehicles have not disappeared anywhere; we simply need to move on to a new stage in their evolution.
What is happening near Lyman?
As far as we can tell from the reports, the front line has shifted quite significantly.
According to Osinter and Deep State, the situation in the Lyman sector has been changing for a long time – many, many months. All this information was kept secret. And, as far as I am aware, certain aspects of this operation are still not being disclosed. Why is this important? Because we must understand that, as it happens, in this war, commanders on both sides form their own view of the situation on the battlefield. And the waves of information that one side generates via Telegram, Facebook and YouTube allow the other side to get their bearings on the situation.
Therefore, whilst our troops were conducting the operation in conditions of absolute secrecy for a long time, there were no questions until then. And the enemy, too, was trying to conceal the real situation from its high command.
That is why, in fact, I am not going to go into details right now about who has advanced where and how. I would like to say that units of the Third Army Corps are holding the defences at Lyman. And I would like to say that over the past year, the enemy has made absolutely no headway in the Third Army Corps’ sector and has been unable to break through our defences. Similarly, the situation in Lyman has stabilised.
The enemy continues its attacks and assaults. Nevertheless, these end in heavy losses for them. I hope that this year’s results are one of the factors that led to Andrii Biletskyi being appointed commander of the new ‘Centre’ military group, which is now tasked with stabilising the situation not only in Lyman but also in the key Sloviansk–Kramatorsk sector.
It’s a brilliant idea to place the ‘Skelia’ regiment under the command of the First Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine.
A good idea. But I would like to point out that, having received the entire ‘Skelia’ regiment comprising nine fully-staffed infantry battalions, it would be good if the National Guard Corps, the First Corps, had shown the same respect for the fighters of the ‘Svoboda’ battalion and transferred it, as stipulated by regulations and orders, to the 23rd Assault Regiment of the Second Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine. That would have shown respect for the soldiers, the fighters and the tasks set by the command.
Is Ukraine prepared for an increase of 500,000 ‘orcs’ this autumn? What needs to be done?
In reality, we cannot make any significant changes right now, because we are not taking proactive measures. Ukraine always reacts to what Russia is doing. Therefore, as soon as decisions are made, we will react. React to what? Well, how can Ukraine react to an increase in the enemy’s troop numbers? In fact, there is one key decision we can make – to lower the conscription age and repeal this strange, utterly populist decision that young people aged 18 to 22 should be allowed to travel abroad, when in reality we need to properly train these young people as UAV operators, electronic warfare system operators, managers, and specialists in radio and radar systems, as well as communications systems. In other words, our best mobilisation resource – our young people – must be directed towards waging a high-tech struggle against the enemy, so that we can fully man our new combat systems, provide education, impart technical knowledge to our young people, and equip them with the very best high-tech weaponry. And it is precisely specialists and trained personnel that we lack – people whom we can still recruit, train and prepare from among the youth, thereby staying one step ahead of the enemy’s mobilisation.
It is precisely the young people; I believe that the conscription age must be lowered right now, well, to at least 21. And this resource – this number of young people – should be channelled into strengthening UAV units, electronic warfare units, air defence units and signals troops.
This will significantly strengthen Ukraine, enhance the effectiveness of our combat operations and ease the burden on those who have been at war for five years running. This is a very urgent and necessary decision, regardless of whether Russia carries out mobilisation or not.
If, by the time Russia decides to increase its mobilisation plan and seeks to mobilise 300, 500 or 600,000 people, we have already equipped our young people with high-tech weaponry, we will be ready and will finally be able to take pre-emptive action, rather than waiting for Russia to once again dictate the initiative to us at a strategic level.
How are things in Kupiansk?
There are very heavy battles taking place in and around Kupiansk – head-on clashes. In fact, Kupiansk and its surroundings, Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi, and the areas north of Kupiansk have turned into a vast grey kill zone. And within this kill zone, there are constant manoeuvrable infantry engagements, UAV strikes and drone surveillance. Our regiment and my company of strike UAVs are both taking part in these battles. Nevertheless, the enemy is failing to make any headway on our side of the Oskil. The enemy is attempting to infiltrate Kupiansk. It should be noted that the situation there is quite serious. According to the intelligence data we have, there may be up to 100 enemy servicemen in Kupiansk.
We are engaged in constant combat with them. The enemy is being eliminated daily – on the approaches and within the city itself. Nevertheless, the enemy continues to make relentless attempts to re-enter Kupiansk and establish a foothold in certain buildings on the outskirts and in the city centre. Individual enemy infantrymen are also infiltrating the area, suffering heavy losses. Nevertheless, they are also reaching the city centre. It should be noted that Kupiansk is not currently a city with many shelters; it is simply a pile of rubble. For several years now, Russia has been carrying out massive strikes using aircraft, artillery and, now, drones. And, unfortunately, most of the residential buildings there have simply been destroyed.
Of course, no one is going to surrender Kupiansk. And we have certain tactical advantages both around the city and within it, which we are capitalising on.
What can the people of Zaporizhzhia expect?
I very much hope that some of the most combat-ready and best-equipped Ukrainian units are concentrated around Zaporizhzhia. These include the Airborne Assault Forces Command and the Airborne Assault Corps. Reinforcements are being sent there as a matter of priority. The best volunteers and the best conscripts – the very best Ukraine can muster for the battlefield – are being selected for these units. Reinforcements in the form of weapons, military equipment and supplies are being sent there as a matter of priority. And I hope that these efforts will be sufficient to hold the enemy at bay.
However, the situation is very difficult. The enemy is trying with all its might to break through to Zaporizhzhia. Significant Russian air forces and large numbers of unmanned aerial vehicle units are concentrated there. The fighting is extremely fierce, and there can be no talk of the situation stabilising there. There is also a large grey zone there, into which more and more assault groups are constantly entering, both from our side and from the enemy’s. And the fighting is taking place under such intense UAV strikes. Winter will be very difficult. Therefore, Zaporizhzhia is, de facto, a frontline city, but significant efforts are being made to keep this city in Ukrainian hands.
How are things in Dobropillia and the surrounding area?
The situation is very difficult. The enemy is on the outskirts of Dobropillia. The enemy is trying to break through into the city, infiltrate it, and will continue to do so as long as the weather permits. Units of the National Guard’s First Corps are also stationed in this sector and are inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. The enemy is simply advancing there, and is constantly being targeted with precision strikes. A fierce battle is raging. There is no sign of any stabilisation there as yet either.
How do you assess the 425th ‘Skelia’ Regiment’s subordination to ‘Azov’?
Overall, I view this positively. I have said many times on my broadcasts that the main problem behind the heavy losses in assault regiments is that they are thrown into battle without proper planning; they simply rush about the entire front line like a fire brigade. And they have no time for planning, for preparing their operations, for advance deployment, or for establishing coordination and cohesion with other units that are directly holding the front line. This constantly leads to assault regiments being thrown, and having been thrown, into battle, constantly into head-on engagements.
I have criticised this many times and spoken about this problem. How can we avoid or reduce the losses of assault regiments? First and foremost, each assault regiment must be assigned to its own sector. And to ensure proper coordination and cohesion, the assault regiment must be assigned and optimally integrated into the army corps responsible for that sector. Then that regiment can clear out infiltrators and carry out counter-attacks and assault operations within a specifically defined sector. It knows all the brigade commanders, can coordinate with UAV units and receive intelligence support. It has a good grasp of the situation, is well-versed in the terrain and can swiftly carry out the necessary assault operations, thereby minimising its own losses and maximising those of the enemy.
I therefore believe that the current arrangement, whereby all assault regiments are assigned to specific corps sectors, is a fully justified decision. And I welcome this decision by Commander-in-Chief Mykhailo Drapatyi, who, as far as I can see, is placing all regiments under the operational command of a single specific corps. I would like to point out that none of the army’s assault regiments have been assigned to our corps, the Second Corps of the National Guard ‘Khartiia’, which comprises nine brigades. And thank God that the command of the Second Corps, recognising certain risks, independently established the 23rd Assault Regiment, which includes the 23rd Assault Regiment ‘R.U.G.’, in which I have the honour of serving, and which is currently being manned.
All our infantrymen, all our assault troops, are foreigners – foreign volunteers, mainly from Latin America. As for the Ukrainians, they are operating drones, although we also have foreigners in support roles within our UAV units.
And the decision to create an assault regiment within the corps is, to a large extent, saving the day in our sector, because – and I emphasise this once again – for some reason, not even an assault battalion could be found to reinforce us, the entire corps.
So, what I’m trying to say is that having an assault regiment within the corps as a regular unit significantly improves command and control, the organisation of coordination, and makes our operations more effective. And in several sectors already, thanks to our actions, we’ve managed to clear out infiltrators and prevent very dangerous enemy breakthroughs.
We are currently operating near Kupiansk. We are operating quite effectively. In some sectors, this was recently announced officially. I am not revealing any classified information here.
The enemy broke through our defences north of Kupiansk. However, through counter-attacks by the ‘R.U.G.’ regiment, these few sectors were recaptured; successful counter-attacks were carried out and the situation was stabilised across the sector covered by our two brigades. This has significantly improved the situation around Kupiansk.
Please explain what the problem is in Zaporizhzhia, and why the enemy has advanced 20 km.
The enemy had been advancing there for a long time. And, in fact, there were serious problems with the organisation of the defences. These problems still exist to some extent today. Nevertheless, the defences in Zaporizhzhia are now finally being given the attention they require. And now, with the enemy having advanced 20 km, Zaporizhzhia has finally become the section of the front to which the necessary key reserves have been allocated. I hope that the troops concentrated there – the Airborne Assault Forces Command, the main forces of our Airborne Assault Forces – have the necessary capabilities and all the resources required to halt the enemy and defeat them in the battle for the city.
Who is now in command of the ‘Skelia’ regiment?
I don’t know; I’m here on my section of the front and simply haven’t had the chance to keep track. At the moment, I think it’s one of the commanders who were with ‘Skelia’,
What’s the situation in Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi?
There is fighting going on for Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi.
The enemy continues to build up forces and is trying to infiltrate this sector. And in fact, Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi, just like the city of Kupiansk itself, is a vast grey zone where fighting is taking place between individual positions and separate infantry groups.
What is the situation regarding the recruitment of foreign fighters? Why is the command opposed to it?
Foreigners, my friends, it’s simply unique. I want to tell you that it’s already September now – just imagine, nine months of the year have passed, and we’re on our second Minister of Defence. What do you think has changed in those nine months regarding the deployment of foreigners? We’ve heard so many words, promises and assurances that there would be foreigners. ‘We’ll bring them in.’ Presumably, everyone thinks that over these nine months in Ukraine – where there’s such an acute manpower problem, where there’s supposedly a shortage of troops on the front line, a shortage of infantrymen and assault troops – someone in the government has been tackling this issue, that a great deal has been done, and that there have been achievements.
Nothing has changed since January – that is, January of this year – when, in January 2026, I appeared on many programmes and said: ‘Well, let’s bring them in, let’s get on with it; we need to do this, that, the other and so on.’ None of this has been done. It seems that, in our country, the only people at all concerned about bringing in foreigners are the command of the ‘Khartiia’ Corps and the commander of the 23rd ‘R.U.G.’ Regiment, Hamlet Avagyan. But it doesn’t bother those people in Ukraine who give interviews and make statements, saying that something needs to be done about mobilisation, that something needs to be done about the ‘busification’ issue, that we need to recruit infantry somehow, that we need assault troops – ‘let’s do something, let’s come up with plans and proposals’. Zero. Zero.
Zero results. The recruitment of foreigners is driven purely by enthusiasm. And were it not for such selfless efforts and the work involving the business community and entrepreneurs – the work being done by Hamlet Avagyan, the regiment commander, and Ihor Obolenskyi, the commander of the ‘Khartiia’ Corps, personally – we would simply have a complete failure on our hands. There would be no people; no one would come. And all these successes have been achieved by foreign volunteers who are leading the assaults – not Ukrainians, but exclusively foreign volunteers serving in the ‘R.U.G.’ regiment. They are leading the assaults near Vovchansk, they are leading the assaults near Kupiansk, and they have led assaults in Kupiansk itself. All this has been achieved. They are being brought in – and have been brought in – mainly thanks to funding from Ukrainian patrons and businesspeople, with the assistance of the Zaporizhzhia Military Civil Administration and solely thanks to the initiative of two National Guard commanders. That’s all. And there are many meetings taking place. There are many promises, and as soon as something starts to be done systematically, I will certainly let you know.
At the moment, I want to say, there is a huge gulf between words and calls such as: ‘Oh dear, how can this be? What should we do about the ‘busification’? Give us proposals, give us plans, let’s reform. Why on earth should we do this?’ and the actions actually aimed at genuinely reducing that ‘busification’ and minimising Ukrainian casualties.
So, I want to say that the authorities are not making sufficient efforts to reduce the losses suffered by Ukrainian citizens and the recruitment of Ukrainians into infantry and assault units; efforts to ensure that fewer Ukrainians fight in the infantry and more foreign volunteers join the infantry are not being carried out to the extent required. And so, I would like to say that this meeting has now been going on for nine months. The National Security and Defence Council and Ihor Klymenko are paying attention to this. The Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the National Guard command are also involved. But whilst there is plenty of attention, there are no decisions requiring action from the government, directives from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, accountability from senior leaders, or the allocation of actual funds from the budget.
Remember the high-profile interviews given by Defence Minister Fedorov and the President’s statements about bringing in foreigners. Well, unfortunately, this was not backed up by funding. No money has been allocated to bring in foreigners. There were words, there were promises, proposals and plans. And many people think: ‘Well, I suppose things are working out somehow.’ Well, no, it isn’t. And the state leadership must now pay attention to this. Well, you can’t just do everything with words. It’s more beneficial to bring in foreign volunteers who are physically fit, motivated and ready to fight, than to keep rounding up people on the streets in such large numbers. Well, you could do that less. There’s no need for that.
What about the jet-powered ‘shaheds’ – when will we counter them?
That, too, requires a certain amount of time to scale up. We’re not acting pre-emptively. When should we be acting pre-emptively? Well, with all due respect, we have a Commander of the Air Force, General Kryvonozhko, who is responsible for air defence. He turned 60 this year. This man has been in charge of air defence for many years. I respect him. He’s on active duty. That’s excellent. Well, we all understand that leading in a war, commanding at such a level, places a huge physical and psychological strain on a person. And in order to overcome new challenges, let alone take pre-emptive action, one needs both a broad perspective and, at times, to change commanders. There’s nothing wrong with that.
We’ve already replaced three chief commanders in order to alter the war strategy somewhat. And yet, not once have we replaced the commander of the air force. Why not during this time? It’s absurd. Changes – qualitative changes – always require, first and foremost, a new calibre of people to implement them. But we’ve seen no changes. And what changes can there be with the old approaches?
Has the situation regarding drone supplies changed following the publicity surrounding your interview with ‘Ukrainska Pravda’?
I’ve actually spoken about the problems with drone supplies many times, including here on air and in various interviews. And I can tell you that no, it hasn’t improved. Nor can it improve, because supplying drones requires systematic planning. This is lacking. Our planned supply covers only 10–15 per cent of the requirement for many critical types of drones needed to conduct combat operations, deter and destroy the enemy on the front line. We have major problems with supply, underfunding and the under-equipping of troops with drones. Major problems. All these infiltration breaches – you must understand that this is because, in some sections of the front line, there is simply a shortage of basic Mavics, long-range batteries for them, antennas, EcoFlow power stations, generators and other basic items that can be bought with money on the commercial market. The problem of a shortage of reconnaissance assets is very acute.
The strike on Yahodyn. What does the risk of a diplomatic train being hit mean, given the Kremlin’s intentions? It demonstrates the scale of the enemy’s high-precision strike capabilities.
It shows that the enemy possesses such a large number of drones, and such high-quality control and navigation systems, that it can now launch simultaneous strikes across a vast area of Ukraine from various directions. And this is an entirely different scale of aerial warfare, one that demands an immediate response – a response that, in fact, was needed much earlier. And one such alarming warning sign, which deserved attention – and I spoke about this on my broadcasts – was the resignation of Pavlo Yelizarov, the deputy commander of the Air Force who was in charge of the Air Force’s drone component. Yelizarov resigned in protest against the dismissal of Minister Fedorov.
And I believe that people such as Pavlo Yelizarov – the innovator who established the first and largest UAV unit, ‘Lazar’, which effectively revolutionised warfare and made an invaluable contribution of historic proportions to the war in 2023–2024 – are simply incredible. Unfortunately, he has lost his post. I believe it is a great misfortune for our country that a leader of such calibre, with such innovative and forward-thinking vision, capable of building highly complex systems and thinking several steps ahead, was, regrettably, not retained in command. And now we are facing the consequences – consequences to which we are unable to react in time.
I am convinced that the state leadership, in order to minimise the consequences of what lies ahead in the coming months – not only next winter, but also in the spring and summer – must reinstate Pavlo Yelizarov to the ranks of the Defence Forces, specifically for air defence using drones. Quite simply, we have no one else of such calibre for this position.
Is Kramatorsk facing the same fate as Bakhmut?
I wholeheartedly support Commander-in-Chief Drapatyi’s decision to deploy the ‘Centre’ grouping of troops under the command of Andrii Biletskyi as part of the Third Army Corps and alongside the 11th and 19th Army Corps, which are defending the sector – that is, the three corps defending the sector, including Kramatorsk, Sloviansk.
I believe that sound organisational and managerial decisions will enable us to halt the enemy on the approaches to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk and prevent the capture of these cities. First and foremost, the key challenge for us in this war is one of management and organisation. I can see the objective results of the Third Army Corps’ work over the last two years. I can see how they are scaling up their operations and organising their combat activities. I believe that the appointment of Emil Ishkulov to the 11th Army Corps – a colonel who has also worked alongside Biletskyi in several sectors and with whom he has a good working relationship – is a significant factor in stabilising the front. And this gives us cautious hope that we will succeed in stabilising the front.
Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, in particular, are areas that are highly advantageous for defence, and it is not too late to stabilise the front around them. There is a chance, there is hope. And in the very next few days, incidentally, the ‘Centre’ group will fully incorporate all the troops into its ranks and assume full responsibility for Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. And Andrii Biletskyi, in particular, will be in charge of this important, key section of the front line.
What is your forecast for this winter? Will it be worse than previous ones?
It will be difficult, just as it has been before, because we are fighting a major war against a formidable enemy whose forces vastly outnumber ours, and who is doing everything in their power to destroy us.
Thank you to everyone who supports the Butusov Plus channel.
Winter will be tough, but first and foremost – and not just for the rear – it will be tough for the front line. This year, the enemy has deployed a large number of units, new formations and new brigades, regiments and battalions, as well as unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) forces at all levels. The enemy has increased the number of UAV crews on the front line many-fold. This allows the enemy to plan its defences and break through the front line using UAVs. This poses a serious threat to us. Furthermore, the enemy has scaled up its drone production significantly and continues to ramp up the production of tactical-level drones. This poses serious threats. Previously, for several winters in a row, we held the upper hand on the front line thanks to a significant number of units and drones equipped with thermal imaging devices, which were capable of conducting reconnaissance and striking the enemy in winter. This always led to a relative stabilisation of the situation, roughly around December and January. Now, we too will have to work just as hard. And now, commanders at all levels – and my task, as a company commander – is to ensure the survivability of our positions and supply routes, to ensure camouflage, and to ensure high-quality protection of defensive structures at all our positions, so that we can continue our defence in winter and so that the enemy cannot breach our defences during the winter. Winter will be the most difficult, but the war—the war—is becoming more difficult with every passing year. That is why this is the challenge for which we must be prepared and must take action.
I have a very clear understanding of what I must do, what my company must do, and what our regiment will do.
So, by the way, I invite anyone who is still undecided or who wishes to join the ranks of the defence forces. I invite you to join me, in the UAV Company of the 23rd Assault Regiment. This is truly a team, a unit where you will be able to fulfil your potential, where you will have direct contact with the commander – that is, with me – where you will be able to find your rightful place in the ranks and work effectively towards victory.
Are there any downsides to having fighters from South America? Are there any issues arising from their arrival?
Everyone has their downsides. Of course, there are problems with certain people who come from South America. Undoubtedly, everyone is different, but the 23rd Regiment has a very effective recruitment system, and the vast majority of people take their duties seriously and carry out their combat missions. I’d like to say that every day, together with my comrades and commanders, we’re simply amazed by the feats that the soldiers from South America carry out day in, day out. This is true heroism.
Then there are the assault teams that go out on missions to storm a target. These assaults last a month. We’ve had several instances where an assault team would go in, carry out their mission, and stay there for a few days. And there have been cases where assault teams have been engaged in continuous combat operations for a whole month. In other words, they move in under cover of drones, break through, stealthily bypass enemy ambushes, reach the target, and then search for the enemy there for more than a day; they hide for weeks, entrench themselves, dig themselves into the ground, build up their positions, repel enemy assaults and attacks, carry out counter-assaults themselves, take prisoners and seize weapons. Well, you could simply film one such assault group; you could film a whole series, and then, once the mission is complete, they withdraw and return. I’d like to say that in the 23rd Assault Regiment, a group of fighters received payments for the month of July for assault operations; under the new rules introduced by Fedorov, new allowances have been introduced for search-and-strike and assault operations. For a day of search-and-strike operations, 20,000 UAH is paid; for a day of assault operations, 40,000 UAH is paid on top of the combat bonus of 100,000. So, I’d like to say that here in the 23rd Regiment, in July, a group of soldiers immediately received additional payments totalling over 300,000. One of the soldiers received 389,000 UAH for the month. A soldier from Colombia, thanks to the fact that he had a large number of days on which he took part in assault or search-and-strike operations. And he returned. He is currently continuing to carry out combat missions. And there are many more like him – not just one, not two, not three, not five, but significantly more.
In other words, as for the fighters from South America, the vast majority of R.U.G. regiment recruiters are recruiting people up to the age of 35 who come forward voluntarily. And they possess a sufficient level of physical fitness and motivation. A significant proportion already have experience, have handled weapons, and understand what this entails. That is why I believe this needs to be done at a state level. I am simply shocked that Ukraine continues to ignore this – despite such a shortage of personnel on the front line – and fails to scale up the recruitment and bringing of foreign volunteers into Ukraine at a state level. One need only look at the successful experience of the R.U.G. regiment. The results achieved, and the losses suffered by the Russian occupiers as a result of the actions of foreign volunteers, should be enough to, well, do everything necessary to fund and ensure such successful operations by foreign volunteers and assault troops. Therefore, these foreign volunteers whom we are bringing in represent, above all, success and effectiveness.
Is an offensive on the Chernihiv region possible?
I do not think that any offensive against the Chernihiv region is likely in the near future. In fact, we can see on the front line that the enemy has a serious shortage of infantry. They lack the troops to launch an offensive in those sections of the front that are strategically important to them. Therefore, in the Chernihiv region, I see nothing more than the possibility of diversionary actions for the enemy at this stage. Then again, everything could change. I would like to say that Ukrainian intelligence has absolutely accurate information about all movements of Russian units. And if the enemy really does want to launch an offensive on any section of the front, as soon as they begin to redeploy troops, our intelligence will immediately receive accurate, reliable data: who, how many, and where they are moving to. Therefore, there will be warnings, and it will be absolutely impossible for the enemy to avoid them. So there will be no element of surprise. We need to stay calm, watch the situation and listen to the reports.
Thank you. We’ve been on air for an hour now. I’d like to thank you all for being with us. Once again, I’d like to thank the sponsors of the Butusov Plus channel, thanks to whom our work is possible. And once again, I appeal to all military personnel currently on AWOL, those eligible for transfer, and those considering mobilisation or how to join the ranks of the Defence Forces: I invite you all to join the UAV company of the 23rd Assault Regiment of the R.U.G.
We are waiting for you all and will ensure – I personally guarantee – high-quality conditions of service, a great team and the opportunity to work in your chosen field, in line with your motivation and abilities, for our victory. Please get in touch. I will be happy to respond to every enquiry.
Friends, thank you for having me on the programme, and glory to Ukraine.
