Melitopol was basis of 2023 counteroffensive, but Syrskyi wanted to retake Bakhmut - NYT
In 2023, the Defense Forces were supposed to concentrate the main counteroffensive forces in the direction of Melitopol in Zaporizhzhia region, as proposed by former Armed Forces chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi. However, the then commander of the Land Forces , Oleksandr Syrskyi, insisted on returning Bakhmut to Donetsk region, which changed the strategy.
This is stated in the New York Times investigation, Censor.NET reports.
It is noted that Zaluzhnyi and the British supported the option that the counteroffensive should be aimed at Melitopol, as this maneuver would block the land supply routes of Russian troops in Crimea.
In the end, they agreed to a two-stage attack to confuse Russian commanders, who, according to U.S. intelligence, believed that the Ukrainians had enough forces and equipment for only one offensive.
The publication writes that at Staff, Zaluzhnyi decided that General Oleksandr Tarnavsky would receive 12 brigades and most of the ammunition for the main attack on Melitopol. At that time, Lieutenant General Yurii Sodol, the commander of the marines, was to maneuver to Mariupol, and Syrskyi would lead a supporting strike in the east around Bakhmut.
For this, he needed more personnel and ammunition. In the end, Zelenskyy ordered that the ammunition be divided equally between Syrskyi and Tarnavsky, and that 5 of the 12 brigades that were being prepared for the Melitopol offensive be given to the Army commander.
None of this was communicated to the American partners, and they learned about it only from intelligence reports, which noticed that Ukrainian troops were moving in directions that did not correspond to the agreed plan. In the end, Zaluzhnyi admitted to the American generals that the plan had been changed, deciding to attack in three directions at once.
"For the Ukrainians, this victory raised the question: Isn't the battle for Mariupol more promising than the attack on Melitopol? But the attack stopped because of the lack of people. The problem was evident on the battle map in General Agutu's office: Syrskyi's offensive on Bakhmut was exhausting the Ukrainian army," the article says.
Agutu urged Syrskyi to send brigades and ammunition to the South to attack Melitopol. But Syrskyi did not relent, according to U.S. and Ukrainian officials.
He also did not change his position when Evgeniy Prigozhin, whose Wagner helped the Russians capture Bakhmut, rebelled against Putin and sent forces to Moscow.
U.S. intelligence assessed that the uprising could undermine Russian morale and cohesion; intercepts showed that Russian commanders wondered why the Ukrainians were not pushing harder on the weakly defended Melitopol, a U.S. intelligence official said.
But Syrskyi believed that the uprising confirmed his strategy of sowing division by destroying the Russian occupiers in Bakhmut.
"I was right, Agut. You were wrong," the American official recalls Syrskyi saying, adding: "We will reach Luhansk."
In a desperate attempt to salvage the counteroffensive, the White House authorized the secret transportation of a small number of cluster munitions with a range of about 100 miles.
"The last recommendation of the Americans was to instruct General Syrskyi to lead the battle for Tokmak. This was rejected. They then suggested to General Sodol that he send his marines to Robotyn to break through the Russian line. But instead, General Zaluzhnyi ordered the marines to go to Kherson to open a new front in what the Americans considered a doomed operation - an attempt to cross the Dnipro and advance into Crimea.
The Marines crossed the river in early November, but ran out of men and ammunition. The counteroffensive was supposed to be a crushing blow. Instead, it ended in disgrace," the NYT adds.
