Russia uses foreign equipment for UAVs at Alabuga – DIU
The War&Sanctions portal has published data on machine tools, robots, and other equipment from manufacturers in China, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and Iran.
This was reported by Censor.NET, citing the Telegram channel of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense.
In particular, the portal has published data on 20 pieces of foreign technological equipment used in the Russian production of various modifications of the "Geran" UAV within the "Alabuga" Special Economic Zone: lathes, milling and drilling machines, machining centers, industrial robots, automatic component placement machines, soldering equipment, and other machinery from Chinese, German, Japanese, Swiss, and Iranian manufacturers.
Specifically:
- VMC 1000Q vertical milling machining center manufactured by SMTCL (Shenyang Machine Tool Co., PRC);
- JUKI (Japan) RS-1R automatic component inserter;
- A mechatronic production line from Festo (Germany) featuring a Melfa industrial robot from Mitsubishi (Japan).
"The processing of metals and other materials, the assembly of SMD components onto printed circuit boards, and the training of personnel on specialized production lines—these are different processes, different equipment from different manufacturers, but they share a common goal: the mass production of tools for terrorizing the civilian population," the intelligence report noted.
The Defense Intelligence called on manufacturers to step up oversight
The agency is calling on global manufacturers of high-tech equipment that could be used in the production of weapons and military equipment for the Russian Federation to:
- strengthen oversight of end users and the actual location where the products are used, in particular by conducting on-site inspections by authorized representatives at the declared address where the equipment is installed;
- extend the enhanced control procedures to spare parts, components, technical fluids, consumables, software, updates, and maintenance services necessary for the operation of the equipment;
- conduct regular audits of distributors, dealers, and other intermediaries, particularly those that ship to high-risk jurisdictions, and identify signs of re-export or a change in the end user;
- investigate instances where the manufacturer's products have been identified within the Russian military-industrial complex, trace their supply chains, and take measures to halt further deliveries through the relevant intermediaries.
Technology should serve progress, not be a tool for creating means of terror.
