Polygraph for system: whether cleansing mechanism has worked for law enforcement
One of the stated objectives of the law on the activities of the NABU (National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine) and the SAPO (Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office), passed amid scandal last summer, was to cleanse the system of "Russian influence." And not only within the anti-corruption bodies, but also within other law enforcement agencies and the Office of the Prosecutor General (OPG). The law allotted six months for this.
That deadline was nearly up when the media published an investigation by the anti-corruption outlet Mezhа into the Prosecutor General’s father, who allegedly obtained a Russian passport and travels to the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as into relatives of his deputies who hold Russian citizenship and run businesses in the occupied territories. Naturally, such information was bound to cause a public stir. That is why we decided to look into whether the measures set out in the law have produced any results, and what consequences this has had for those who failed the vetting.
VETTING THE PROSECUTOR
When, in the summer of last year, people took to the streets in different cities across the country for the first time since the start of the full-scale war to prevent the destruction of the independence of the NABU and the SAPO, the authorities were actively pushing the message that legislative changes were needed to prevent "Russian influence" in the anti-corruption institutions. And the bill that triggered the cardboard-sign protests was preceded by a special operation carried out by the SSU (Security Service of Ukraine) and the Office of the Prosecutor General. Censor.NET reported on mass searches of NABU staff, the detention of detectives accused of ties to Russia, and the reaction of the heads of the NABU and the SAPO to what was happening. Because in those same days, the SSU also came to the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office for an inspection to determine whether state secrecy legislation was being complied with. The SAPO said that SSU officers had obtained access to all proceedings and special operations being handled by the NABU and the SAPO. The Security Service denied this, insisting that the inspection at the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office did not provide for access to information on covert investigative activities, as well as special operations.
For his part, in one of his addresses, the president stressed that "the anti-corruption infrastructure will keep working. Only without Russian influence, everything must be cleansed of that." And he clearly did not abandon that intention when he submitted the bill aimed at restoring the independence and powers of the NABU and the SAPO. That move came in response to protests and international pressure after the earlier curtailment of the anti-corruption bodies’ powers, including the ban on the Prosecutor General's interference in investigations and changes to case jurisdiction. In the end, the NABU and the SAPO retained their independence, while cleansing out hostile influence became part of the law.
In particular, the final and transitional provisions of Law No. 4560-IX stipulate that, within six months of its entry into force, the Security Service of Ukraine is to vet employees of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, the Bureau of Economic Security of Ukraine, the Office of the Prosecutor General, the State Bureau of Investigation, and the National Police of Ukraine who hold security clearance, to determine whether they have committed acts in the interests of the Russian Federation, which the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine has recognized as an aggressor state.
In addition, the law provides for employees of these bodies to undergo periodic (at least once every two years) psychophysiological examinations using a polygraph.
So after reports emerged in the media about the possible ties of the Prosecutor General’s relatives and those of his deputies to the Russian Federation, we sent a request addressed to Ruslan Kravchenko asking him to comment on the facts set out in the media reports and to state whether they had been subjected to vetting, including polygraph testing, for actions taken in the interests of a state recognized by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as an aggressor state, and what the results of such checks were. We also asked whether the Prosecutor General, his First Deputy Vdovychenko, and Deputies Lohachov and Krym, who are mentioned in the Mezhа investigation, had disclosed in the "Additional information" section of their annual prosecutors’ integrity declarations for 2025 and previous years the facts reported in the media concerning their relatives’ ties with the Russian Federation. We asked about additional information for a reason, because none of the items listed there as mandatory refer to ties with Russia or any other state.
Naturally, we also asked whether those facts had been checked if the prosecutors had disclosed them, and whether an internal investigation was planned into their submission of false (including incomplete) statements in the prosecutor’s integrity declaration.
In response to these questions, the Office of the Prosecutor General said that the Psychological and Polygraph Assessment Department for Prosecution Service Personnel of the General Inspectorate had taken steps to prepare for and conduct polygraph examinations of employees of the Office of the Prosecutor General who hold security clearance. It added that the conduct of such measures is being coordinated with the Security Service of Ukraine. The Office also specified that information on the results of polygraph examinations constitutes official information, and that reports on the results of such examinations have been marked "For Official Use Only."
It further noted that prosecutors do, in fact, undergo a confidential integrity screening procedure each year by filing a prosecutor’s integrity declaration. At the same time, it clarified that the list of information a prosecutor is required to disclose in such a declaration does not include statements regarding close relatives’ citizenship of another state, their place of residence, or their employment, including in the case of relatives living in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.
"Given that the media publications in circulation contain no objective information about unlawful acts committed directly by the prosecutor himself, information concerning close relatives in and of itself, including relatives living in the temporarily occupied territories, cannot be the subject of a confidential integrity screening, as it contains no factual data indicating any inconsistency between the statements made in the prosecutor’s integrity declaration and the facts. Accordingly, at present, there are no grounds for opening an internal investigation on the basis of the facts set out in the media regarding close relatives of the leadership of the Office of the Prosecutor General," the OPG explained.
As for the claims that were published, the response provided to the editorial team included a comment from Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko: "I am not a supporter of publicly discussing family circumstances. But when private stories are being turned into a tool of political manipulation, I believe it is right to speak plainly.
My parents divorced in 2020. Since then, my mother and sister have been living in Kyiv. I last spoke to my father in 2022.
Whether my father obtained a Russian passport, I do not know, do not wish to know, and cannot know, because I am not in contact with him. If he made any decisions, that was his personal choice and his personal responsibility.
Neither as a son nor as Prosecutor General am I responsible for the actions of my relatives.
Now, as for the members of my team.
Mariia Vdovychenko
The personnel file of First Deputy Prosecutor General Maria Vdovychenko contains her autobiographies submitted in 2014, 2019, 2023, and 2025. In each of these documents, she provided information about her close relatives, including those living in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine and in the territory of the Russian Federation.
In her 2023 and 2025 autobiographies, she separately stated that her brother, Oleksandr Levandovskyi, resides in the Russian Federation, while noting that his exact whereabouts are unknown to her because she has no contact with him whatsoever.
She also disclosed these facts openly during interviews conducted as part of prosecutors’ attestation, with international members of the commission participating. No reservations or complaints were raised. She passed the attestation successfully.
Before her appointment as Deputy Prosecutor General, an official request was sent to the Security Service of Ukraine regarding any possible restrictions on her appointment to the post. In its reply, the SSU stated that no grounds for barring the appointment had been established.
Maksym Krym
As for Deputy Prosecutor General Maksym Krym.
His wife was born and lived in Crimea until 2015. After the occupation of the peninsula in 2014, the Russian Federation carried out a mass forced passportization of Ukrainian citizens. She became a victim of that policy, as did hundreds of thousands of other residents of the temporarily occupied territory.
She left Crimea in 2015.
Ukraine does not recognize documents imposed by the occupying authorities. So-called "automatic" citizenship is unlawful and creates no legal consequences for our state. Obtaining such a document under duress does not mean the voluntary acquisition of the aggressor state’s citizenship and does not create a legal tie to it.
There are no facts indicating that these circumstances affected Maksym Krym’s official duties or gave rise to a conflict of interest.
Viktor Lohachov
The family of Deputy Prosecutor General Viktor Lohachov is originally from Luhansk. After the start of the Russian aggression in 2014, the family lost 90% of its assets in the temporarily occupied territory. What they managed to preserve was relocated to Sievierodonetsk and Stanytsia Luhanska. After the subsequent occupation, those assets were lost for good.
Since 2014, the family has been living in Kyiv. There are no facts indicating any visits to the temporarily occupied territories or any control over businesses there.
Raiding and re-registrations in absentia are typical practice of the occupation administrations with respect to businesses owned by Ukrainians who left the occupied territories.
Maria Vdovychenko, Maksym Krym, and Viktor Lohachov hold valid security clearances granted after SSU checks.
I understand that in wartime, society is especially sensitive to any ties with the aggressor state.
But the principle of personal responsibility has not been abolished. And even during war, the law cannot be replaced by public accusations."
This brought to mind how seriously polygraph examinations were once treated at the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office, where Kravchenko and Krym previously worked. Identifying possible ties to the Russian Federation was among the top priorities there. Whether similar checks will become mandatory at the Office of the Prosecutor General remains unclear. On the one hand, there is both an order by the Prosecutor General and a corresponding instruction governing polygraph examinations. On the other hand, it is unclear what the schedule for conducting them looks like. At the very least, we received no answer to our questions about the order in which the leadership would undergo polygraph testing.
SELF-CLEANSING AT THE SSU
To find out whether vetting had been carried out at the OPG and the other bodies listed in the law, and what it had shown, we sent a request to the Security Service of Ukraine. In that request, we also asked to be informed of the measures taken based on the results of such checks. We received a rather restrained response, which stated that the security service was carrying out comprehensive measures to promptly detect and stop activities harmful to state security. However, the response said nothing about any results of such measures, or about the checks that were supposed to be conducted within six months of the law’s entry into force. "At the same time, Ukrainian law restricts access to information in the sphere of state security. In particular, it is prohibited to publish or provide (disclose) collected information, as well as information on whether or not the state security bodies have carried out relevant measures with respect to a particular person, until a decision has been made based on their results. Pursuant to Part Two of Article 6 and Clause 2 of Part One of Article 22 of the Law of Ukraine ‘On Access to Public Information,’ detailed information regarding the issues raised is not subject to disclosure," the letter states. Although the request concerned the results of checks of state bodies, it did not mention a single surname.
The six months the law allotted for vetting law enforcement agencies and the OPG have expired. And it would be important for the public to hear whether that vetting was comprehensive, whether people working for Russia were identified in any law enforcement body or in the prosecution service, and whether they have been detained or served with notices of suspicion.
Because when the law introduced the vetting provision, it was cautiously criticized, with suggestions that all law enforcement agencies had been written into it, one after another, solely to justify pressure on the anti-corruption bodies. And now it would be important to hear the results of that vetting, also against the backdrop of statements by the heads of the NABU and the SAPO about possible new attacks on the anti-corruption system.
Meanwhile, the head of state announced a cleansing within the special service itself. "There were reports from the Security Service of Ukraine - I instructed Yevhenii Khmara and Oleksandr Poklad to work on cleansing the Service of those whose interests lie anywhere but with Ukraine. There are already results. Relevant detentions took place today, and it is very important that there be fair verdicts," he said in his address.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy did not specify who exactly had been detained. Perhaps we will hear about that in due course during court hearings, if they are not closed to the public and journalists.
Tetiana Bodnia, "Censor.NET"
