SOF strike UAV company commander Dzhokhar: It is like fishing from distance of 40 km. You sit and wait for big fish to swim by
A military journalist who had covered events in Donbas on television since 2014 mobilized during the full-scale invasion, despite having a solid mobilization exemption because he worked at the Office of the President of Ukraine. He now specializes, together with his unit, in cutting off the enemy army’s supply routes using FPV "sleeper" drones. He is also ready to share the experience of his Special Operations Forces unit, which has achieved an almost 100% success rate.
A year ago, we met Dzhokhar in one of the cities near the front line. When I asked him what had happened to journalism, he snapped back: "What journalism? Women can do that. Men should defend the country." He has now been serving for four years, working in an important niche: destroying enemy logistics with FPV "sleeper" drones. He compares his work to fishing, something he has not been able to do for several years. He positions the drones and waits for a "big fat fish" to swim up:
"The closest enemy fiber-optic crew position I observed was one and a half kilometers from the line of fire," Dzhokhar says. "An assault group came in and cleared the position. And an FPV operator working with fiber-optic drones immediately sat down next to the assault trooper. He instantly began striking our roads and the vehicles using them. What stable operations can we talk about if they target our logistics the moment they advance even a little? Their FPVs are used precisely to cut off our roads. They move and drive up as close as possible, bring in supplies, and that means they have to be hit on the approach. That is why we also remotely mine roads. It is an effective method. I analyze exactly where PTM anti-tank mines can be scattered, and we deliver them by drones. At night, we mine a sector. In the morning, our fixed-wing UAV takes off, and it is very satisfying to hear the pilots' report after nighttime mining: there is a wrecked vehicle on one mine, another vehicle burned down on another. They all worked. It is the same kind of fishing. Just like working against logistics. You sit and wait for a bite. It works like a float."
I hope you can also sense that Dzhokhar treats everything he likes with tenderness. And I hope you will understand why we are not publishing our interlocutor’s face or name. There are serious reasons for that.
"I HAD A MOBILIZATION EXEMPTION, BUT I STILL MANAGED TO ENLIST"
- Before the full-scale invasion, I was a military journalist and had visited a great many units. The army was becoming professional before our eyes, almost elite. And I had no thoughts of going to war. There was no active, dynamic fighting either. I even had a break in my work as a military journalist. I saw no point in going east to cover events because nothing was happening.
- What period was that?
- I had a pause in trips to the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) zone around 2017, when the endless Minsk agreements began, the war was being blurred, and there was nothing to cover. All the stories were going around for the third time, with the same well-known media commanders. But I kept in touch with those who were defending Ukraine. From time to time, I spoke with Da Vinci, Vasia Tarasiuk, and Andriukha Verkhohliad. We were constantly in contact with Fedorovych, Valerii Hudz, the commander of the 24th Brigade, who was killed in Popasna in March 2022.
- And your father also fought…
- "I basically sent him into the army myself," Dzhokhar laughs.
- So even during that period of the war, there was someone from your family in the army.
- That is not quite the right way to put it. Circumstances worked out in such a way that my father joined the Armed Forces. Apart from him, I still had a circle of military people I was friends with and enjoyed staying in touch with
- What happened during the full-scale invasion that made you decide to join the army?
- By that time, I was already in the civil service. And I happened to be at the Munich Security Conference before the full-scale invasion in February, literally ten days before the invasion. Flights were already being canceled then. It felt strange to us. We had routine work, and further visits were being planned. But we saw this odd behavior from the organizers of the Munich Security Conference. They all seemed to sympathize with us somehow. And that surprised me, because personally I did not feel that something was about to happen any moment. I did not even believe that a land operation of that scale was possible in modern history.
On 24 February, I woke up to missile strikes. I immediately went online, and it became clear that the Russians had moved in. In late March, I returned to the office to work, but I already had a plan: I started training and reached out to a friend from the 3rd SOF Regiment to ask how I could get in. Although I had a mobilization exemption and, by law, could not be mobilized, I thought I would be able to get around that. So I spent the whole summer training, because my friend from the 3rd told me they had very serious physical demands. Why did I choose the 3rd specifically? I wanted to run with the cool guys from the posters. When I was filming TV reports, I saw how SOF teams operated. They would enter the grey zone, all tacticool. They do not sit in dugouts feeding wood into a potbelly stove; they do special work.
- So the romance of the special forces worked on you?
- Well, yes. All that ‘came in quietly, left quietly’ stuff works
At that time, Right Sector joined the SOF. I began making inquiries through Da Vinci, considering joining his unit. At that point, Right Sector became a unit of the Ground Forces, specifically the 67th Brigade. I traveled to the Yavoriv training ground to enlist with them despite my military deferment and all other obstacles. This was in October. I was unable to complete the enlistment process immediately. I even went for an interview with the regional military commissar. I spent a week at the training ground unofficially. I had to either mobilize or return to work. Da Vinci and I had already decided that I would join his battalion in an officer position, as I had completed the military department program during university. However, at the last minute, everything changed, and I became an officer in the 67th Brigade. Perhaps it was for the better. I finally managed to mobilize. I spent a few months in the 67th Brigade and met some remarkable people there. The 1st Battalion was led by Da Vinci; the second consisted of fellow countrymen from Boryspil and Georgian volunteers; the 3rd Battalion commander was a strong leader and ideological nationalist, Gonta; and the 4th was led by Kulibin. All were volunteers since 2014. I knew most of them. I found myself in a familiar environment. I assisted the brigade with media relations, but it was not the role I aspired to, given the ongoing active combat operations. I began looking into transfer options. I spoke with Taras Stepura and learned that an unmanned systems unit was being formed within the 24th Brigade, led by Khasan — Oleh Huit. We met on March 9, 2023, in Druzhkivka. I was supposed to lead a reconnaissance assets platoon, but Khasan suggested: "You will be an FPV operator." At that time, neither he nor I knew what the term "FPV" meant. This was the beginning of our communication. It was new to us. I agreed to the transfer. A month later, I was already serving as a platoon commander in the "Raroh" FPV company of the 24th Brigade.
- When did you first see an FPV drone?
- At that time, the platoon consisted of five people whom Khasan had reassigned from the infantry. One of them had an FPV drone. Prior to that, I had only seen "Mavics." I had no idea what it even was... but that guy knew how to fly. Khasan and I still joke that if we had our current skills and knowledge back then, we would likely have worked wonders. But at the time, it was all trial and error—one step forward, two steps back. It is only now that I understand the mechanics of how it all works. But back then...
- At what point did you realize this was a significant asset?
- For a couple of months, we struggled to achieve successful flights. We secured sponsors. We purchased 20 drones. When everyone else was operating at a range of two to three kilometers, and you reached ten! That was a breakthrough. You realize the immense potential. At first glance, FPV provides impressive footage, but it requires substantial financial resources, competent engineering, and a professional laboratory. Nothing will fly unless sufficient funds are invested. Unfortunately, most commanders fail to grasp this.
- Do you remember your first effective operation?
- We were stationed near Horlivka. Our first targets there were dugouts and shelters. Nothing extraordinary, but at the time, it was significant. We were flying directly inside; back then, it was a "wow" moment for us. We were neutralizing observation posts (OPs) on the slag heaps. The distance from our launch point in New York to the Horlivka slag heaps was eight to nine kilometers. For the summer of 2023, that was a major breakthrough.
"I FALL ASLEEP WATCHING FEEDS FROM FIXED-WING UAVS, AND WHEN I WAKE UP, THEY ARE THE FIRST THING I CHECK"
- "We really started hitting the enemy hard in the autumn of 2023," Dzhokhar continues. "We were striking equipment and artillery systems. But based on our current experience, it is fair to say that it was relatively primitive.
Better-funded units fly 10-inch drones, while poorer ones use 7-inch drones. That determines the flight range and how many batteries and how much payload the drone can carry. For example, we now mostly use 10-inch drones in "sleeper" mode. We have our own signature style, our own tactics. In the unit where I serve now, we have developed one tactic that is 100% effective.
We position our drones in the enemy rear and work strictly against their logistics. I will not disclose the number of our crews, but there are fewer than ten. Even so, in February, we destroyed 105 vehicles. In the points ranking for the number of vehicles destroyed, we placed eighth among 360 units. In March, we destroyed more than a hundred as well. And that was with our small number of crews. The Unmanned Systems Forces have an order of magnitude more of them. Even so, in terms of strikes on vehicles, we were outperformed only by Magyar’s Birds and Phoenix among USF units. All the others are below us. We work strictly with FPV drones, without bomber drones or fixed-wing kamikaze UAVs. But the key thing is not the numbers, it is killing as many ba#stards as possible. Our tactics fully align with SOF doctrine: carrying out sabotage operations deep in the enemy rear. We cut off logistics. What exactly do our tactics involve? We plant "sleeper" drones in places where the enemy definitely does not expect us. Sometimes that can be a bus stop; we can land on a house, but in a way that gives us a view of the road. It depends on the crew’s experience. After flying over a village, the pilot understands where to land and where it is better not to. Hitting logistics targets in search mode is not very effective. A detector in the vehicle tells the enemy that an FPV is flying nearby, and then they have time to hide. But in ambush mode, you can land under any little bush, observe and wait for as long as needed, and attack at any moment. This tactic is exactly what allows us to be among the top units, specifically in destroying logistics. "
"This video was taken from one of our "sleeper" drones sitting at a bus stop...
"...and this one is from the camera of a Russian occupier."
When I was serving in Raroh, I was offered a transfer to the 3rd Regiment. I agreed because I wanted to be useful to the SOF. Thanks to the strong army school I had gone through with Hasan, I already had a certain level of skills. And I wanted to prove myself in a small tactical group where we could carry out pinpoint missions. In Raroh, I went out to positions every other time, while in the 3rd, I had my own crew, with whom we worked almost nonstop for a year near Vovchansk and Horlivka. We went out to knock out a tank. We hunted air defense systems.
- Successfully?
- Yes. With an ordinary $500 drone, we hit a high-value air defense asset: a Pantsir-S1 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun and missile system worth $15 million. There is video! We destroyed artillery pieces near Shebekino. And we worked in Sumy Oblast for a long time as well: we burned substations and carried out sabotage operations. I spent a year in the 3rd Regiment, and then our entire group was transferred to one of the SOF units, where I now serve as a company commander. There are not many of us, but we are one solid core. And in our work, as in any other, teamwork is extremely important. In February, we destroyed 105 pieces of enemy equipment! We are inviting any FPV crews who want to come and learn our tactics for cutting off logistics.
Everyone talks about Rubicon, the Russian unmanned systems unit. But there is nothing complicated about what it does. You cut off two or three logistics arteries, preferably around the clock, and that significantly weakens the enemy’s offensive potential.
What matters above all is a systematic approach to the work. I suspect that for them, striking our routes is a priority area. The logic here is simple: in order to carry out active assault operations and make them effective, the first thing you need to do is cut the logistics routes used to supply everything our troops need at the front, make logistics impossible in terms of fuel and lubricants and weapons, and prevent rotations. It is not difficult to do. I do not like comparisons, but I will explain from our own experience how it is done. The first thing I open in Delta when I enter our area of operations is the enemy’s logistics routes. Second, I analyze where the enemy’s most dynamic vehicle movement is taking place. I look and see some field road with constant traffic along it. How did our first strike happen in the new sector, when we had just moved into position in mid-December? A fixed-wing UAV from an adjacent unit went up. I was watching the feed and saw two vehicles driving 15 kilometers from the line of contact. It was 10 in the morning. To me, that was wild. In one of our areas of operations, we did not see a single vehicle during the day because we did not allow the enemy to move freely. We hit them immediately. They drove only at night. So I realized: if two vehicles are driving calmly here at 10 in the morning, then this road has to be brought under fire control and they have to be smashed there. And that is exactly what happened. Then I identified two more logistics routes. We began working them heavily as well. As a result, enemy assault activity also decreased. So there is nothing complicated about Rubicon’s tactics
If you want to succeed in what you do, you have to be deeply immersed in the process. You cannot do anything properly by force. Who are you going to make watch feeds for hours? But I do it because it is important for me to know the terrain where we operate. We work along three designated logistics roads where fixed-wing UAVs are constantly flying. I already know every bush there. When a vehicle appears in a certain grid square, it takes me a matter of seconds to give target designation to my pilots. To my mind, it is wild when, in Vezha, the general feed from various types of reconnaissance assets, someone from an adjacent unit asks the operator: ‘Could you tell me which settlement you are flying over and where you are observing enemy military transport?’ How can that be? How are you supposed to provide target designation quickly then? By the time the operator answers you, by the time you pass the location of the enemy to your FPV operator, by the time he launches the drone... It means the unit next to us does not have situational awareness. So when the question comes up as to why we do not have our own Rubicon, I say: spend a month sitting on the feeds, study the terrain of a specific sector so you know everything down to the street name, house number, even the doghouse... Only then can the work be effective. I fall asleep with feeds from fixed-wing UAVs on, and I wake up with them.
- So you are not scrolling Reels before bed, but...
- ...I automatically open feeds from adjacent units or our own. We also have our combat group with the crews in one of the messaging apps. When I am not on duty at the command-and-observation post, I wake up at eight in the morning, but I know our crews are supposed to start working from four. You pick up your phone, and there are twenty messages in the group, and you know for sure those are videos of strikes on the enemy. It is a gastronomic orgasm. You scroll through those videos and realize your day has started well.
Why do we target logistics? Because we have organized maximum FPV drone effectiveness at long range. We fly 40-plus kilometers consistently. That means we can pull our crews back a little from the first line. They work from safer locations, which allows us to preserve personnel and still deliver a strong result. We do not need to be two or three kilometers from the enemy. Quite often, other units send their strike UAV crews almost to the line of contact. They cannot lift their heads, let alone launch a drone or send out an FPV, because there is a constant threat of shelling or attack. For me, the priority is the lives and health of the personnel
- Do you work with FPVs only via radio link?
- Yes. Fiber optics is too expensive for the tempo of our work. Besides, fiber-optic FPVs limit flight range. If we fly 25-plus kilometers from the front line and then 40 kilometers toward the enemy, why would I reduce that distance?
- Do you think specialized crews are needed?
- That is a difficult question. Logic suggests that this is how it should be. There should be units working strictly against logistics, strictly against infantry, strictly against artillery. We will not have that. Because we have a front line, and none of the battalion or brigade commanders will allocate a crew to work only against logistics. Who, then, will cover the front line?
I listened to an interview with Kyrylo Veres. He says: ‘Yes, we are ready to switch and work deeper in the rear. But to do that, we need to leave the front line for a month or a month and a half and hand over its coverage to someone else.’ Because the moment they switch to other targets, the infantry will start getting hammered. And the e-points incentive system also plays a role, because under it, killing an enemy infantryman earns far more points than hitting equipment, whether a car or a motorcycle. Twelve points for a killed f#cker. And for a destroyed vehicle, I think it is five or six points.
- Do you think the e-points system is a good one?
- Overall, it is the right system. It has more pros than cons. I had a discussion with Hasan. He is now in the USF, Magyar’s deputy. I asked him why they give so few points for a vehicle. It is carrying infantry to the front line. And if the driver of that Bukhanka van carrying infantry hears over the radio that the previous five Bukhankas have already been smashed, he will refuse to go. Or you destroy several vehicles in a convoy, and the rest turn around and flee back to the rear. That also produces results. But even if they gave 120 points for one b#stard, cutting off logistics would still be our priority. After all, all our crews are highly professional in this tactic specifically, and they use the technical capabilities of FPV drones to the fullest. All our results are, above all, their achievement.
The negative thing I have identified in this system is the hunting of infantry... With that kind of work, there will never be progress. If you are flying, so to speak, through the bushes near the front line, your technological development will be slow. Even if you want a crew to fly 50-plus kilometers, but you focus it on infantry, it will not move forward. Sometimes one of our pilots makes up to 20 sorties a day. And the full flight range is just under 40 kilometers. That requires the right skills not only from the operator, but from the entire crew.
- So, as I understand it, we will win if we prevent the enemy from supplying its troops and keep wearing them down?
- How can an enemy assault if they cannot get water or chargers for radios delivered for 24 hours, if they are disoriented because they have no communication with their commanders? It is very important to isolate infantry from the benefits of civilization. Then their potential will drop. And yes, there should be units working strictly against logistics in every sector of the front. We are ready to share our experience. In Delta, it is clearly visible who allocates crews to logistics. There are not that many of them across the entire army. For others, these are situational strikes.
"WE BURN OUT EVERY VEHICLE. WE DO NOT SPARE AN EXTRA DRONE OR TWO TO FINISH IT OFF"
- How quickly can a person be taught to fly?
- Anyone can become a pilot. But if their first sorties do not go well, if the person is afraid, has jitters before approaching a target, or lacks stress resilience, we offer them another position. They will still be useful: they can solder, write off drones, fuel vehicles. There is work for everyone. Everyone will come in handy.
Photo: An SOF team at work
I have an example of one crew made up of three commanders from different platoons. One is a relay operator, and the other two are FPV pilots. They regularly go out specifically as a crew and show strong results. The key thing is people’s motivation. And the core of our company, despite this being the fifth year of the war, is still fighting with drive. For example, the commander of my company’s reconnaissance platoon ended up in the army by chance. He is an IT specialist himself. After receiving a draft notice, he did not show up at the Territorial Center of Recruitment and Social Support (TCR and SS) for six months, so he was picked up somewhere. Now he is an FPV operator and kills the enemy effectively, on par with experienced pilots. Six months ago, he came up to me and honestly admitted: staff work is not for me, I want to fly. I always support that kind of initiative. Now he is one of the best
- E-points make it possible to buy drones. But many people say that everything that comes into the army is modified on site. Is that true? Why does that happen?
- The enemy is constantly improving its electronic warfare systems and other capabilities. Today one frequency works, tomorrow it is already another one. One receiver for controlling a drone on a ‘working’ frequency costs about UAH 1,000 on average. To rework 100 drones, just think about it, you need UAH 100,000. And our average monthly expenditure is 500 drones. But within the Armed Forces, that is not a lot of money. Every brigade has subventions and everything else. Funding can be found if there is a will. But taking a drone out of the box and flying it no longer works, and has not worked for a long time.
It is the same with points. We accumulated them over two months of strikes and bought scarce thermal-imaging FPV drones, interceptor drones, and five airframes for reconnaissance fixed-wing UAVs. There is an opportunity to procure what is needed independently. Those who work get the corresponding results. The work has to be organized properly. An FPV unit needs to have its own lab. Money has to be invested in it as well, because countermeasures are constant. But it is not difficult. To modify an FPV drone, you need cash and hands that know how to hold a soldering iron. Ideally, those hands should be one left and one right. Because with two left hands or two right hands, it will already be hard to get anything done.
In four years, experience and progress have done their job. In 2023, we got drones wherever we could, met with manufacturers and companies that could procure something. That period cannot be compared with the current one. I call that period a ‘menagerie.’ You were given five drones from one manufacturer and five from another. Not only the pilot, but even the engineer who had to resolder them did not understand what was where. It was the beginning of evolution. Now the situation has changed. With points, you can get drones from one manufacturer. With help from sponsors, you can choose drones that you know for sure will work reliably. Now we have a certain stockpile of drones. But my advice to those working with unmanned systems is this: systematize your drone supply work. You do not need a "menagerie". It will not lead to anything good. It is better to take not 100 drones, but 50, from one company that, according to feedback, flies reliably. Then there will be a result. Do not spread yourself thin across many companies and chase quantity.
- How efficiently do you use drones?
- Our statistics are quite good: two FPVs per target. You can burn a vehicle out with the first one. If it does not catch fire, we always finish it off. Because it is logistics. What is a vehicle carrying toward the line of contact? Definitely something vital. If it did not ignite after the first drone, we will send two or three more there to make sure the cargo burns. We burn out every vehicle.
Everyone is driving convertibles now, with no roof. A Niva convertible. A Ural convertible. All the Bukhankas are cut down. So there is no need to aim for the fuel tank or the engine. You fly straight into the cargo bed. You watch the video afterward, and there are canisters in there that then go up like torches.
- Did you also hit ammunition?
- That happens regularly. There is a spectacular video where our crew hit a Ural at night. In the morning, we flew back and it was still standing there, the crew had run away. Just to be sure, we decided to finish it off. We came in with the next drone, and next to that vehicle there was a scatter of Grad rockets. If we had not finished it off, they would have reloaded them, and those Grads would have flown in our direction. Near Rylsk, too, we burned a Ural carrying ammo. We put on a beautiful fireworks show! There were also cases where you hit a Bukhanka, come back and it is still burning. You land a "sleeper" drone nearby, hit something else. Then you come back again, and there is nothing left of the Bukhanka but four wheels. So it was carrying some kind of ammunition as well. The fire reached it, and everything detonated. We have had many vivid moments like that. That is why we decided that we absolutely have to finish targets off and not spare drones.
An FPV located and struck a Ural carrying ammunition for a Grad multiple launch rocket system...
In this video, you can clearly see the rockets burning and cooking off. The SOF crew did not allow them to be launched at our section of the front line or at a civilian city.
- Deeper in the rear, you can also strike enemy personnel. And count them for e-points.
- Absolutely. We have had that happen more than once. We fly deep into their territory, and a vehicle is heading toward the line of contact with, say, 12 or 16 people inside. Then we go straight into that group. You come in with the next drone, and there is a blaze. Either they were carrying ammunition or fuel. Everyone tries to track down enemy pilots. That is difficult. But they move around in something. In our practice, we have hit vehicles and found boxes inside — clearly drones.
I get a certain satisfaction when a vehicle is driving along, the driver suspects something could happen, it is war, after all — but he has no idea that our sleeper drone is sitting there. The vehicle passes, our sleeper drone lifts off, unhurried, and — into the cab. The person thought everything would be fine. It will not. That is the element of surprise. You outsmart your opponent. There is an art to that as well. In the Sumy direction, I was almost killed by an FPV drone. That is why I constantly want to ‘return the favor’ to the enemy. To do it effectively, you have to keep modernizing and improving. And reach them where they do not expect it.
- Tell me about the time an FPV came at you…
- That happened near Pavlivka during the Kursk operation. We had left a radio at the position and went back for it. It was three kilometers from the line of contact. In the village, we had to take a turn to the left. We slowed down and heard a sharp whistling sound above our heads. That FPV drone exploded about a meter away from us. It was good that it was carrying a shaped-charge warhead — minimal fragmentation. But if that ‘zucchini’ had gone into the vehicle, it would have been bad. So I have a personal score to settle with them.
- Are there any targets you would like to learn how to hit? Perhaps you dream of shooting down a Russian helicopter, like the crew from the 59th Brigade?
- We had one such incident. In the Kursk region, our pilot unexpectedly saw a Ka-52 flying toward him. He turned the drone towards that "Alligator" and detonated the munition remotely, realizing it would be blown away by the rotor wash. We do not know the outcome. The helicopter apparently did not crash. We have no information on whether the fuselage was damaged. I hope that when that helicopter pilot saw his aircraft in our FPV video on public channels, he changed his route, or perhaps they stopped flying there altogether. In that situation, our professional pilot made the only correct decision — to detonate the shaped-charge munition right in front of the helicopter's cockpit. It was about 5 meters away. By the way, Censor.NET published our video and briefly reported on that incident.
We are not standing still. We are refining the technology to fly as deep into enemy territory as possible. With favorable winds and good batteries, we will continue cutting off their logistics.
- How far into our territory does the enemy fly?
- With competent operation and the correct configuration of all technical specifications, you are limited only by battery capacity. You can fly until the battery is depleted. Currently, the enemy has significantly intensified the deployment of FPVs from mothership drones. This allows them to reach distances of 45-50 kilometers from the front line. Essentially, to prevent this, we must fight for the kill zone. The wider we make the kill zone using our FPVs, the less territory the enemy will be able to strike.
- Do you miss journalism?
- Not particularly. I see how everything has changed. The television industry where I worked was already degrading back then. Now everyone is becoming a blogger. I do not have time for blogging. The media lacks balance. Everyone is chasing headlines, which means there is a lot of manipulation. Therefore, journalism as such is almost gone. Except perhaps for Censor.NET, — Dzhokhar smiles.
Violetta Kirtoka, Censor.NET
