Fire in Myrnohrad is result of preconditions that could have been changed – serviceman on Russian troop buildup
Lack of resources and leadership inertia allowed the enemy to build up forces, as a result, Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk suffered.
The Ukrainian Witness project spoke with the commander of a unit currently operating in Myrnohrad, Censor.NET reports.
Threats to Myrnohrad
"We could have continued holding back the Russians advancing toward Myrnohrad. We saw the enemy entering the area and reported that they were deploying ‘curtains’, electronic warfare systems that jam and prevent our drones from transmitting video. But we lacked the means to strike them, and the senior command provided no assistance," he said.
The fate of the city now engulfed in flames, with Pokrovsk at the epicenter, could have been different. This fire is the result of long-standing factors. Units defending the area had observed the situation unfolding and knew how to disrupt it. According to the commander, this did not happen due to a lack of critical resources, the inertia of senior command, and conditions that keep UAV pilots, key players in today’s stage of the war, operating safely but far from the frontlines where they are needed most. He also proposes a solution to this problem.
Missteps
"We could have stopped the Russians. We wouldn’t have let them deploy; we would have methodically neutralized them. We would have identified UAV crews and destroyed them. They wouldn’t have been able to amass forces. But everything was slapdash, nobody paid attention to our attempts to act. Of course, the enemy accumulated and pulled the rope to their side. Now they won’t let us recover, and we’re left doing damage control. We’re flying in DIU on helicopters, sending every elite unit and putting out the fire. I understand it’s easy to criticise and often right, but there is a lack of proposals, concrete solutions and discussion at higher levels.
In my view, the main danger is this. Fighters in combat units who could destroy the enemy and prevent "Rubicon" [a formation in the Russian army that mass-produces and effectively employs UAVs and currently represents one of the biggest challenges for Ukrainian defenders] from getting fully operational, when facing difficulties, begin to go AWOL. They are then transferred to Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), which in principle should be tasked with taking out "Rubicon", but end up performing other missions at safer distances. People know they will move to USF and therefore won’t sign up for the hard tasks. So those tasks must be carried out by the elite. That means either tightening requirements for USF and their personnel so they actually perform the functions expected of them, or increasing accountability for AWOL behaviour among the relevant units in frontline brigades," the commander adds.
"Take Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk. Unmanned Systems Forces pilots should have flown reconnaissance, identified enemy crews and tracked them so they couldn’t operate. Unmanned Systems Forces units have the personnel and equipment to do this systematically. Instead, they pulled back to Dobropillia and now their reconnaissance and strike assets don’t reach the agglomeration and do not provide enough support to the combat brigades. The combat brigades could have held the line, but there was nothing with which to do it. Partners did not make timely decisions, and Ukraine lacked its own strike assets.
This is exactly what happened to our brigade. We had long-range reconnaissance and long-range strike capabilities; we were holding the Russians back and preventing them from massing. But there were not enough assets. We bought suitable drones, searched where to get them to reach and strike the enemy, because we didn’t have the funding, logistics and volunteer support that the Unmanned Systems Forces did. Because of this we lost the initiative. At the time there were no assets for HIMARS or aviation. The attitude was: ‘Yes, the enemy is massing and deploying a "curtain", let them for now, there’s a more promising sector.’ We knew where the enemy was and what they were using, but we had no way to influence it," he adds.
Enemy massed forces
Ultimately, according to the serviceman, due to laxity and a lack of resources the enemy was able to amass forces and materiel for a forthcoming priority strike. In particular, it jammed the brigade’s strike-control with electronic warfare, and deployed reconnaissance assets that our UAV crews detected and tried to destroy.
"So now our interaction with the Unmanned Systems Forces goes like this. We detect an enemy UAV, pass it on for destruction and wait for something to act on it. It does act, but only damages equipment. As a result the enemy continues to deploy and operate. It’s the pilots who must be destroyed, not just the platforms.
To prevent this, in my view there should be structures integrated into combat units specifically tasked with eliminating enemy pilots, and tougher measures on AWOL behaviour among them so fighters cannot easily transfer to other formations and take safer postings with no consequences while infantry and pilots suffer, as is happening now in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. They too would have deserted to AWOL, transferred, worked from who-knows-where and not cared. But they are motivated, they understand they must work, fight and not cede ground. In addition, responsibility for the Unmanned Systems Forces must be tightened and their mission refocused on countering such assets. And from this episode we should extract every lesson and make sure it never happens again," he concludes.
