Lack of equipment and weapons, distribution of experienced soldiers, calculation that Russians will flee, as they did year earlier - main reasons for failure of counteroffensive in 2023 - BBC
The British Analytical Center for Security Problems RUSI named the reasons for the failure of the counteroffensive of the Armed Forces in 2023.
As Censor.NET informs, the BBC writes about this with reference to a report by British analysts.
"The authors call the original plan well-founded: 12 Ukrainian armored and mechanized brigades were supposed to break through in a 30-km-wide area, isolate Tokmak for seven days, and then break through to the south to Melitopol. At such a pace, Russia would not have had time to raise reserves, and Ukrainian troops, that were advancing, it was only necessary to overcome the resistance of six Russian regiments in defense," the report says.
The implementation of this plan was hindered by mistakes made both by Ukraine's allies and by the Ukrainian command itself. In particular:
- The Western Allies supplied insufficient equipment and weapons; unlike Russia, they did not have time to transfer industry to military flights, so they did not have enough weapons, and those that were, were delivered late. This led to the fact that there was little time for the development of new equipment in the Ukrainian army.
- The Ukrainian command decided to throw the less prepared units into the breakthrough, while the more experienced ones were to hold the front. In addition, it dispersed its forces in several directions.
- But the most serious mistake of the Ukrainian command, according to analysts, was that it calculated that the defending Russian troops would not hold out and run, as was the case near Kharkiv in 2022. When this did not happen, the ZSU hopelessly lost momentum.
- In addition, the Russian command clearly knew exactly where the direction of the main strike would be. The authors see this as a failure of operational security on the part of both Ukraine and its allies.
"The initial concept of operations for the Ukrainian offensive was justified.
It required 12 armored and mechanized brigades to achieve a breakthrough on a 30 km front, isolate Tokmak for 7 days, and then break through south to Melitopol. The pace should have prevented Russia from engaging most of its forces, so the attacking side would only need to overcome 6 regiments on the defensive," the report concluded.
RUSI also concludes that Ukraine needs effective counter-intelligence to see Russian plans, effective EW assets, and high-precision strikes.
For Ukraine, the resumption of offensive operations "is not viable in the foreseeable future," the authors of the analytical report add.
"In view of this, Ukraine should change its priorities to inflicting as much damage as possible on the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in order to gain the necessary time," experts write.
It will be recalled that The New York Times stated that due to the slow supply of weapons, Ukraine will not be able to launch a counteroffensive until next year.
