West may force Putin to reconsider his plans against Ukraine, - Bloomberg
The West is ready to increase economic and political pressure on Russia, and time may be of the essence for the Kremlin if the US and Europe act in concert.
According to Censor.NET, this is what Bloomberg columnist Marc Champion writes about.
He notes that Russian dictator Vladimir Putin is right that time is running out for Ukraine, but it could also be decisive for the Kremlin itself, provided that Washington and European capitals act in concert and decisively.
The analyst emphasises that two events were the first signs of such an approach. First, Trump outlined the conditions under which he is ready to tighten sanctions against Moscow. Second, the European Commission effectively supported a plan to use the Russian central bank's frozen assets, worth about $330 billion, as a financial instrument against Russia.
On Sunday, Trump posted a message on the social network Truth Social with demands for NATO members. He called on allies to first completely stop importing Russian oil and then join in imposing tariffs on China and India to reduce their purchases of energy from Russia and help end the war in Ukraine.
The new position appears to be tougher than previous White House statements, but raises doubts about Trump's real willingness to act. As Champion notes, the post sounded more like a complaint to European partners than a direct threat to Moscow — Putin is not mentioned in it.
Experts believe that the very fact that Trump has formulated clear conditions is seen as progress. If NATO allies can meet them, it will create real leverage to force the Kremlin into negotiations. The European Union has already significantly reduced its dependence on Russian energy since the start of the full-scale war in 2022, although exceptions have been made for Hungary and Slovakia.
According to Champion, Trump is right in his assessment of oil sanctions: they remain a weak point in Western policy and the main source of revenue for the Russian budget. In peacetime, the oil industry provided 30% to 50% of the Russian Federation's state revenues, and depriving the Kremlin of these funds would make it much more difficult to finance the war without putting additional pressure on the population.
The Russian economy has so far relatively withstood the effect of sanctions, but, as Champion notes, now is a particularly effective moment to strengthen Western measures. The reorientation of the Russian economy towards military needs has created imbalances that make it more vulnerable to external pressure. Banks are overloaded with bad debt, much of it undisclosed, to keep the weapons production going.
Former American banker and Russian energy expert Craig Kennedy estimates that between 42% and 54% of Russia's defence spending is not reflected in the public budget, and corporate debt has grown by 71%, or $446 billion, in the first three years of full-scale war.
The amount of credit for the Russian defence industry, combined with a labour shortage due to mobilisation and men leaving the country, has increased inflation in Russia. The central bank was forced to raise its key interest rate as high as 21%, which is slowing economic growth even with an expanded budget deficit.
At the same time, according to Champion, Ukraine's campaign using drones and long-range missiles against Russian oil storage facilities and refineries has had a significant, albeit uneven, impact on its oil production. Combined with US and EU sanctions and the financial plan to support Ukraine's defence, this could significantly alter the Kremlin's calculations regarding the continuation of the war.
Champion notes that all this remains hypothetical for now. Trump has not yet carried out his threats of tougher measures against Russia, and raising tariffs on imports from China and India is "easier said than done." The EU has also not yet reached agreement on the confiscation of Russian assets protected by sovereign immunity, especially those held in Belgium.
Despite this, the European Commission's announcement of a mechanism for using frozen funds "is encouraging". The chosen scheme, proposed by Champion back in July, allows circumventing the difficulties of direct confiscation and converting the money into loans that Russia will repay only after paying reparations, which, according to the author, a special UN commission will inevitably recognise as due in the coming years.
Champion expresses concern that all these steps do not constitute a "coherent, committed strategy to stop Putin in Eastern Ukraine," but rather appear to be situational and temporary. In his view, to force the Kremlin to abandon further war, Putin must be confident that the West's commitments to support Kyiv " for as long as it takes" are ironclad.
"Trump doesn’t do ironclad," the author notes, pointing out that Europe also suffers from a lack of resources and political constraints. Centrist leaders who are aware of the scale of the Russian threat are gradually giving way to far-right populists. The latter, according to Champion, are "fantasizing" and often perceive Putin as a potential ally in their own cultural war against liberalism. Among them, he names Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Robert Fico in Slovakia, the leaders of the "National Assembly" in France, the UK's "Reform Party" and "Alternative fur Deutschland" in Germany.
"Putin’s right that the clock is ticking on Ukraine. It can tick for him, too, but only if Trump and Europe finally resolve to make that happen," Champion concludes.
