Russia is preparing for real war, term - several years, - BBC
NATO claims that Russia is waging a hybrid war and building up its military capabilities. There are no obvious signs of an imminent invasion, but experts say Russia has several years to prepare.
According to Censor.NET, this is reported in a BBC article.
Western experts note that the Russian economy is increasingly focused on military needs, which contributes to the growth of its defence capabilities.
At the same time, there are no obvious signs of preparations for an invasion, such as a mass troop deployment. Therefore, most analysts believe that Russia may need several years to prepare for a possible full-scale conflict in Western Europe.
Why the West fears a Russian attack on NATO
The war in Ukraine, the Russian leadership's hostility towards NATO and Russia's active militarisation give reason to expect a potential attack in the future, although there are currently no clear signs of an invasion.
Russia's relations with the West deteriorated sharply in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea and supported a hybrid war in Donbas.
The first major exercises by Russia and Belarus, such as "Zapad" in 2017 and 2021, were perceived by neighbours as a possible invasion scenario, but this did not happen. It was only in February 2022 that the "Allied Resolve" exercises became a prelude to the actual invasion of Ukraine.
After the start of the full-scale war, Finland and Sweden joined NATO. Although this did not significantly increase the alliance's strength, NATO infrastructure appeared near the Russian borders: airfields, ports, military bases.
The Russian leadership viewed NATO's expansion as a serious threat, and Ukraine's hypothetical accession to the alliance was cited as one of the reasons for the full-scale invasion.
Why the Baltic states are a likely theatre of war
Russia borders NATO in three regions:
- The Far East – maritime border with the United States, probability of war is very low due to nuclear risks;
- The Black Sea – weak Russian fleet and lack of historical claims to NATO make conflict unlikely;
- The Baltic region – land borders with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland via the Kaliningrad region, as well as with Finland and Norway.
The Russian armed forces traditionally prefer land operations. The Baltic countries are difficult to defend because land supplies pass through the 60-kilometre Suwałki corridor (Poland-Lithuania). Blocking it would significantly complicate supplies by sea or air.
Other sections of the border with Russia and Belarus are also considered potentially dangerous. In the event of an invasion, NATO plans to hold the defence of the Baltic states until the main forces arrive from deeper within the continent.
Is a hybrid war already underway in Europe, and how is NATO prepared?
Hybrid warfare refers to hostile actions in peacetime that are not overtly military in nature: sabotage, cyberattacks, airspace violations, etc.
NATO considers the series of damage to submarine cables in the Baltic Sea in 2023–early 2025 to be such cases. Although no direct accusations have been made against Russia, on 4 September NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte effectively linked these incidents to Russia's actions. In response, the alliance launched Operation "Baltic Sentry" to protect critical infrastructure; no new incidents of damage have been recorded since the start of the operation.
Recently, there has also been an increase in the number of violations of NATO countries' airspace: drone incursions into Poland, Russian MiG-31 flights over Estonia, and numerous incidents involving drones near airports in Denmark and Norway. Many of these incidents are attributed to Russia. If these were military aircraft, such actions could be considered hybrid warfare — however, formally, the aircraft and drones often did not cross a "clear line" that would allow them to be considered open aggression, so the protocol on the use of weapons was not activated.
The problem is the grey area of intent: it is difficult to prove intent because, technically, a drone or aircraft could have entered foreign airspace accidentally. History knows examples of mistakes (for example, the 2005 case with a Russian fighter jet), but the current context — the war in Ukraine and systematic incidents — makes the modern situation different in terms of scale and risks.
NATO assumes that Russian pilots and sailors know the region well and skilfully use the 'grey zone" — therefore, the alliance considers this part of the Russian Federation's hybrid strategy.
In response, NATO also launched Operation "Eastern Sentry" to protect the airspace and territories of its allies. But the alliance is often criticised for the complexity of responding effectively to hybrid threats: for example, fighter jets were scrambled and expensive missiles were used to shoot down a few drones, which is economically unprofitable. When MiG-31s flew over Estonia, they were escorted by F-35s, but formally there were no grounds for using weapons — politicians openly discussed the possibility of shooting down the planes.
How NATO would fight Russia in the event of a conflict
In the war in Ukraine, Russia is effective in positional warfare because it was unable to achieve a quick victory in 2022. Its advantages are a large number of attack drones and well-rehearsed assault tactics using small infantry groups.
NATO exercises have shown that Western troops:
- Use drones less actively (using them for reconnaissance and target designation rather than direct strikes).
- Rely on aviation, naval forces, and high-precision weapons.
- Hold back the enemy's frontline units, quickly transfer reinforcements, and draw the main forces to the combat zone.
To this end, multinational combat groups have been deployed on the eastern flank in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria.
- The total strength of NATO forces is 3.2–3.8 million personnel, of whom 1.3 million are American military personnel. European NATO countries have approximately 1.47 million military personnel.
- The Russian army has 2.2 million personnel, of whom 1.5 million are military personnel; more than 700,000 are currently fighting in Ukraine, which makes it difficult to replenish forces.
Mobilisation resource:
- Russia's population is ~146 million; mobilisation resources are estimated at 20–30 million, but only a portion of them have military training.
- European NATO countries have a population of 550–600 million, so their mobilisation potential is greater — according to preliminary estimates, 3.8–4 million combat-ready soldiers can be mobilised.
Reserves and preparation:
- Finland: army of 24,000, reserve of 870,000, compulsory service for men, infrastructure for rapid mobilisation.
- Poland: reserve of over 1 million, of which 350,000 are trained; territorial defence forces and compulsory military registration are being developed.
- Baltic countries: actively restoring conscription, developing reserves and territorial defence forces; Latvia plans to have a combat-ready reserve of 50,000 by 2027.
NATO has a significant advantage in mobilization potential and reserve training, while Russia is constrained by the war in Ukraine and its smaller population.
Nuclear weapons
In Europe, France and the United Kingdom possess nuclear weapons, and some countries store American tactical munitions. Russia possesses strategic and tactical warheads, some of which are deployed in Belarus.
Tactical nuclear weapons have a lower threshold for use, but existing nuclear deterrence limits the escalation of conflict. American weapons are controlled by the US, and Belarusian forces cannot use Russian weapons without Moscow's consent.
Europe and the USA
Europe is increasingly relying on its own strength, although Article 5 of the NATO Treaty remains in force and the United States continues to be a key ally. However, European leaders are sceptical about the level of US support in future conflicts.
EU defence spending in 2025 will be €381 billion (~2.1% of GDP), with €130 billion invested in the defence industry. Europe is increasing its production of artillery, ammunition, air defence systems and weapons, and new factories are being built (Rheinmetall, MBDA, Swebal, Lucznik). Particular attention is being paid to adapting to modern threats: drones, anti-personnel mines and new weapons.
Current situation
A large-scale conflict between NATO and Russia is not expected in the near future. Russia cannot start a war with NATO due to its losses in Ukraine and limited resources. Preparations for a potential invasion would take years and would be visible due to the concentration of troops near the borders.
