Ukrainian army is bogged down in Soviet decision-making system - WSJ
In the first year of the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation, the Armed Forces repeatedly outmaneuvered the clumsy Russian army, relying on improvisation and the determination of soldiers on the ground. However, three years later, the Ukrainian military has returned to a more rigid and vertical system of warfare, whose roots date back to Soviet times.
According to Censor.NET, this was reported by The Wall Street Journal.
It is noted that this causes frustration due to unnecessary losses and negatively affects the morale of civilians and mobilization. Without reforms, Soviet-style habits could undermine the ability to defend against Russia.
Officers and soldiers complain about the centralized command culture, which often punishes initiative and leads to unnecessary losses. Generals order frontal assaults with little chance of success and refuse soldiers who ask for tactical retreats to save lives.
"Losses accumulate in operations of minor strategic importance," the authors note.
"Our army is holding up mainly thanks to the initiative of people up to the level of battalion commander," said Major Oleksii Pasternak, who believes that the top brass needs urgent change.
Over the past few days, small groups of Russian troops have broken through Ukrainian defenses at a critical point in the eastern Donetsk region, taking advantage of Ukraine's lack of infantry.
Journalists note that the Russian army suffers from much greater problems, as its command treats people as disposable material. Russia has advanced over the past two years at a great cost. However, Ukraine cannot compensate for its losses as easily as Russia.
Traditions of the Soviet Army
Many Ukrainian soldiers repeat the bitter refrain: "The great Soviet army defeats the small Soviet army."
Journalists recall the situation with the commander of the 47th separate mechanized brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Alexander Shirshin.
He complained about "stupid" orders and losses. Also, according to him, the battalion was repeatedly ordered to carry out assaults that were unrealistic given the unit's limited resources.
He said that the final straw was the order for his soldiers to return to Kursk. That offensive was predictable for the Russians, and after several waves of Russian counterattacks, Ukrainian soldiers were forced to retreat.
Many people died, Shirsin said, including fresh, well-trained recruits who are hard to find.
"We must change our methods and move from quantity to quality," Shirsin said. "We cannot defeat Russia with our resources. They are greater — we must be better."
Journalists also mentioned the dismissal of Major General Drapato, commander of the Ground Forces, who is considered one of the most talented Ukrainian generals of the younger, post-Soviet generation.
Along the front line, many soldiers, according to the article, told stories similar to Shyrshyn's. One of the most common was when senior command repeatedly refused to authorize a timely tactical retreat, leaving people at risk of encirclement and destruction.
The publication also told the story of Lieutenant Colonel Serhii Kostyshyn, who wanted to withdraw his battalion of the Presidential Brigade of Ukraine from a hard-to-reach position in the southern part of Donetsk Oblast. He intercepted the Russians' plans to surround the battalion, but headquarters ordered him to stay put. Even when Russian troops were flanking the unit. Therefore, Kostyshyn made a decision and spent three days conducting a combat retreat. Most of the battalion managed to escape the trap, but the platoon that remained to cover the retreat was almost completely destroyed.
For several months, the military police and the SSU counterintelligence investigated the case for abandoning their positions. However, the interrogations eventually ceased.
"If you are stupid and obedient, they won't touch you," said Kostyshyn. "It's a Soviet tradition."
Kostyshyn was subsequently promoted to deputy brigade commander. "Someone at a high level must have seen the logic in my actions," he added.
Syrskyi
The publication describes the role of Syrsky, who led the Ground Forces during the battles for Bakhmut and commanded this grueling struggle. For this, the personnel gave him the nickname "the butcher."
"Bakhmut marked the beginning of a worrying trend for the Ukrainian army: choosing battles it could not afford given its limited human resources, even though Ukrainians were killing more Russians," writes the WSJ.
Syrsky later became commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but remains extremely unpopular among Ukrainian military personnel, many of whom consider him to be the embodiment of the Soviet syndrome. Journalists write that he personally interferes in the work of local units, delays retreats, or gives orders to storm positions, leading to morally exhausting losses for the sake of forest belts or other objects of dubious strategic value.
However, many officers believe that the problem runs deeper than Syrsky, as there are still many officers serving in the headquarters who were trained in the Soviet army long before the war.
Due to the rapid expansion of the army, many of them were recalled from retirement, and, according to veterans of the 2022 battles, they do not understand the dynamics of modern high-tech warfare with the active use of drones.
Some officers note that the situation is gradually improving as military personnel with frontline experience are being promoted to leadership positions. "The changes are not huge, but they are happening," said Lieutenant Colonel Yegor Derevianko, commander of the 93rd Mechanized Brigade, another battle-hardened unit on the eastern front.
NATO standards
Years before the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation, NATO member states organized training for Ukrainian officers to assist with the modernization of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
However, military officials state that NATO's command mission doctrine is absent throughout the army, with the possible exception of a few brigades.
The fear of being dismissed often leads brigade commanders to not report the loss of positions, according to officers and soldiers.
