China supplies Russia and Iran with components for Shahed drones in circumvention of sanctions – WSJ
Chinese companies are transferring engines, microchips, and other components necessary for the production of Shahed-type kamikaze drones to Iran and Russia in large volumes, effectively bypassing American sanctions restrictions.
This is reported by The Wall Street Journal, Censor.NET informs with reference to UP.
Sanctions circumvention
According to Chinese customs data, Chinese companies are shipping hundreds of containers with components to factories in Iran and Russia. In particular, Xiamen Victory Technology sells Limbach L550 engines—a key component of the Shahed-136 kamikaze drone, which Russia uses to attack Ukrainian cities.
On the company's website, an image of a Shahed-type drone is placed next to the advertising slogan: "Innovative solutions for aviation engines."
For some time, Chinese exporters intentionally provided false data about certain shipments to circumvent US and European sanctions, but according to senior US Treasury officials and weapons analysts, in many cases, they no longer even bother to do so.
China serves as a transit hub
According to former US Treasury officials, China has long served as a transit hub for American and European components, which can later be transferred to drone production facilities in Iran and Russia. At the same time, they note that a growing portion of such parts is now manufactured directly in China—often at small production facilities that ignore Western sanctions restrictions.
A US Treasury investigation showed that almost all components of US and EU origin first arrive through official distributors to retail suppliers in mainland China or Hong Kong, and from there are shipped to Iran or Russia.
Payment for such supplies usually passes through a network of shell companies that are easily registered in Hong Kong and used to conceal the final recipient of the goods.
In 2024, the US Treasury introduced sanctions against a group of shell companies in Hong Kong linked to Hamed Dehghan—an Iranian trader whose structure provided supplies for drone and missile production programs. Subsequently, as noted, his activities continued through a newly created network of similar firms.
Former OFAC official Mead Maleki stated that the Chinese side effectively ignored these flows, even despite their repeated exposure in official reports and during sanctions decisions.
The British organization Conflict Armament Research, which studies the illicit trafficking of weapons, recorded a noticeable increase in the use of Chinese components in Shahed-type drones.
Chinese customs data also indicate that local companies are increasingly participating in the supply of drone parts despite US and EU sanctions.
Reaction of the American side
At the same time, current and former American officials admit that the US cannot completely stop such schemes, so the main task remains maximizing the cost and complexity of these supplies for Iran and Russia.
